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
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
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Morocco

a country study

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Morocco a country study

Foreign Area Studies
The American University
Edited by
Harold D. Nelson
Research completed
February 1985



On the cover: Berber horseman and his
resplendent symbols of Morocco's



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Foreword

This volume is one of a continuing series of books prepared by Foreign Area Studies, The American University, under the Country Studies/Area Handbook Program. The last page of this book provides a listing of other published studies. Each book in the series deals with a particular foreign country, describing and analyzing its economic, national security, political, and social systems and institutions and examining the interrelationships of those systems and institutions and the ways that they are shaped by cultural factors. Each study is written by a multidisciplinary team of social scientists. The authors seek to provide a basic insight and understanding of the society under observation, striving for a dynamic rather than a static portrayal of it. The study focuses on historical antecedents and on the cultural, political and socioeconomic characteristics that contribute to cohesion and cleavage within the society. Particular attention is given to the origins and traditions of the people who make up the society, their dominant beliefs and values, their community of interests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature and extent of their involvement with the national institutions, and their attitudes toward each other and toward the social system and political order within which they live.

The contents of the book represent the views, opinions, and findings of Foreign Area Studies and should not be construed as an official Department of the Army position, policy, or decision, unless so designated by other official documentation. The authors have sought to adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. Such corrections, additions, and suggestions for factual or other changes that readers may have will be welcomed for use in future new editions.

Director, Foreign Area Studies
The American University
5010 Wisconsin Avenue, NW
Washington, D.C. 10016

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The aesthetic touches that enhance the book's appearance are the work of Mr. Mendoza, whose illustrations appear on the cover and the title pages of the chapters. The inclusion of photographs in this study was made possible by the generosity of various individuals and public and private agencies. The authors acknowledge their appreciation especially to those persons who contributed original camera work not previously published.

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Preface

This edition of *Morocco: A Country Study* replaces the fourth edition, which was researched and written in late 1977 and early 1978. One of the world's few remaining monarchies, Morocco has been the scene of periodic political restiveness since regaining its independence from French and Spanish protectorate control in 1956. When the 1978 edition was published, a sense of national unity had pervaded the country as Moroccans sought to regain and administer a large segment of the Western Sahara (formerly the Spanish Sahara) in collaboration with Mauritania. A climate of tension, however, had intensified over the matter of the territory, where for more than two years Morocco's goal had been thwarted, and a costly military action to contain opposition by Algerian-supported Saharan guerrillas was still under way. In the interval since 1978 Mauritania abandoned its claim to a share of the Western Sahara, and Morocco quickly claimed the entire territory, an assertion that has gone unrecognized by all other countries. The costly war has continued, adding a heavy burden to a national economy already in distress in other quarters.

The fifth edition, like its predecessor, seeks to provide a compact and objective exposition of the country's dominant social, economic, political, and national security institutions and, hopefully, to give the reader some appreciation of the forces involved in contemporary Moroccan history. In presenting this new study, the authors have relied primarily on official reports of governmental and international organizations, journals, newspapers, and material reflecting recent field research by scholarly authorities. Detailed information on many aspects of the society, however, were not always readily available, and gaps in the data as well as varying interpretations existed among some of the sources consulted. Where appropriate, these gaps and inconsistencies have been noted in the text. Should readers require greater detail on core area topics, the authors have noted the availability of amplifying materials in bibliographic statements at the end of each chapter. Full references to these and other sources used or considered are included in the detailed Bibliography.

The literature of Morocco is frequently confusing because of the tendency to mix English, Spanish, and French transliterations of Arabic words, phrases, personal names, and place-names. The authors of *Morocco: A Country Study* have attempted to reduce this confusion by adhering generally to the system known as

Morocco: A Country Study

BGN/PCGN, one agreed to by the United States Board on Geographic Names and the Permanent Committee on Geographical Names for British Official Use. For the most part, place-names have been spelled in accordance with the United States Board on Geographic Names' *Morocco: Official Standard Names Gazetteer*, No. 112 of June 1970 and *Spanish Sahara: Official Standard Names Gazetteer*, No. 108 of June 1969. Some modifications have been introduced, however, including the omission of diacritical markings and hyphens that often appear in Arabic terms. In addition, the names of certain people and places are so well-known by more conventional spellings that to have used the BGN/PCGN system in every instance might have caused confusion for the reader.

Arab personal names are often particularly confusing to the Western reader. A man's name includes his paternal genealogy and sometimes indicates his family name, his tribal affiliation, and his village or region of origin. For example, a man named Abd al Rahman ibn (or ben) Qasim ibn Mohammed (or Mohamed) Al (or El) Hajeb would be recognized as the son of Qasim, who was the son of Mohammed, and a native of the town of Al Hajeb, a town some 30 kilometers southeast of Meknès. The man would be addressed as Mister (or his title, if any) Abd al Rahman. In spoken Arabic, names are elided, so that in this instance the name is pronounced as if it were spelled Abdur Rahman. In many instances the Western press spells such names as Abdel (or Abdul) Rahman, implying incorrectly that the man's first name is Abdel and his last is Rahman. Many Arabic names, such as the one in this example, are designations of the attributes of God. *Abd al* means slave or servant of, and *Rahman* means merciful; thus the name literally means the slave or servant of the Merciful (God). The authors were often confronted with a lack of consistency in the English spelling of Arabic personal names because of the various systems of transliteration used in source materials. In most cases the French transliterations reflect the way contemporary Moroccans usually spell their names. Thus, the royal family name Alawi will also be seen as Alaoui, as will the title Lord (Mulay or Moulay).

When foreign and technical words and phrases have been used in this study, these terms have been defined briefly where they first appear in a chapter, or reference has been made to the Glossary, which is included at the back of the book for the reader's guidance. The dictionary used was *Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary*. All measurements are presented in the metric system. A conversion table will assist those readers who may not be familiar with metric equivalents (see table 1, Appendix A).

Country Profile



Country

Formal Name: Kingdom of Morocco.

Short Form: Morocco.

Term for Citizens: Moroccans.

Capital: Rabat.

Flag: Red field centered by five-pointed green star.

Independence Achieved: March 2, 1956.

Geography

Size: About 446,550 square kilometers, not including Western Sahara (formerly Spanish Sahara), claimed and controlled by Morocco since 1979.

Topography: Country dominated by four mountain chains and has most extensive river system in North Africa; divides into open, agriculturally rich lowlands in northwest and economically poor and thinly populated mountains and plateaus in east and south.

Climate: Mediterranean climate in northwest, little seasonal variation; extreme variation in interior; rainfall ranges from moderate in northwest to scanty in south and east; climate strongly modified by local factors, and year-to-year variations common.

Society

Population: Estimated at 23.6 million in 1984. Growth rate of 2.9 percent among world's highest despite government participation in active family planning program. Over one-half of population under age 20. Urban population increased from 29 percent in 1960 to 43 percent in 1982.

Ethnic Groups and Languages: Population mixture of Berber and Arab stocks. Arabic official language and native tongue of about 65 percent of population; roughly 35 percent speak one of several Berber dialects; French spoken extensively; bilingualism and trilingualism common.

Religion: Islam official religion; observance of Sunni Islam nearly universal; king fulfills duties as commander of the faithful (*amir al muminin*). Non-Muslim minorities include about 100,000 Christians, mainly Roman Catholics, and 11,000 to 14,000 Jews.

Education: Free public education but attendance not compulsory. Modern primary and secondary education reaches approximately 3.5 million, or about half total of school-age children. Wide disparities exist in schooling rates for males and females and in urban and rural areas. Administration of school system centralized under direction of Ministry of National Education. Five-year primary system; partial instruction in French from third

grade. Largely bilingual secondary system in two cycles of four and three years each; includes academic tracks in liberal arts and science, leading to *baccalauréat* examination required for university admission, and vocational track. Higher education provided by six universities and 24 advanced professional training institutions. Limited vocational training provided by various government ministries and private sector.

Literacy: Increased from 10 percent at independence in 1956 to estimated national rate of 35 percent in 1985, rising to 50 percent in some urban areas.

Health: Shortage of modern medical personnel, particularly in rural areas. Health conditions improving generally but infant mortality rate high; parasitic ailments and infectious childhood diseases principal causes of death.

Economy

Gross Domestic Product (GDP): In 1983 amounted to nearly DH95 billion (for value of the dirham—see Glossary); real growth rate averaged 2.8 percent annually during 1980–83.

Agriculture: In 1983 provided about 17 percent of GDP. Sector divided into modern, irrigated production of citrus fruits, vegetables, sugar beets, and sugarcane and traditional rain-fed cultivation of cereals and pulses. Nearly 60 percent of total population live in rural areas; over half of national labor force engaged in agriculture. Citrus fruits and vegetables provide bulk of agricultural exports, which represented 29 percent of total Moroccan exports in 1981.

Mining: In 1983 provided about 4 percent of GDP, but major source (52 percent) of foreign exchange earnings. Morocco and Western Sahara have two-thirds of world's phosphate reserves and are largest exporter; phosphates represented 90 percent of mining sector's export revenues; other known minerals included silver, lead, zinc, manganese, copper, barite, and cement. Mining's contribution to employment negligible.

Energy: Heavily dependent on imported energy sources, putting major drain on economy. Petroleum and uranium exploration under way; coal major domestic source of energy. Public

electric power distributed throughout most of Morocco except for factories having own generators and households using traditional energy sources.

Manufacturing: In 1983 provided about 17.5 percent of GDP. Major products included processed foodstuffs, chemicals, textiles, leather goods, and metalware; most manufacturing concentrated in Casablanca. Sector employed about 11 percent of national labor force and produced 33 percent of total exports.

Foreign Trade: Exports consist mainly of phosphates, phosphate derivatives, agricultural products, and textiles; major customers France, Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), and Spain. Imports mainly crude oil and wheat; major suppliers Saudi Arabia, France, and United States. Imports generally exceed exports, causing trade deficit, offset by remittances from tourism, and loans and investments from abroad.

Currency: Moroccan dirham.

Fiscal Year: Same as calendar year.

Transportation and Telecommunications

Roads: In mid-1980s road network of about 66,000 kilometers, mostly in plains between Atlantic coast and ranges of Atlas Mountains; connected all of country's major urban centers.

Railroads: 1,700-kilometer rail system reached most of country's major urban centers; double-track rail line between Rabat and Casablanca; balance single-track. System connects with that of Algeria and in turn with Tunisian system.

Ports: Six major ports (Casablanca, Safi, Mohammedia, Agadir, Nador, and Tangier) and 10 smaller regional ones.

Airports: Over 50 civil airports, 7 of which (Casablanca, Rabat, Tangier, Marrakech, Fes, Agadir, and Oujda) offer international service.

Telecommunications: All government-operated; system adequate and being expanded.

Government and Politics

Government: Constitutional monarchy under King Hassan II, who appoints prime minister and other members of Council of Ministers (cabinet). Unicameral parliament (Chamber of Representatives) has 204 directly elected deputies and 102 indirectly elected deputies (60 representing local government councils and 42 from professional and wage-earning groups). Parliamentary term six years, but king may dissolve parliament and call new elections. King may govern by decree after proclaiming "state of exception" (national emergency).

Administrative Divisions: Governors appointed by king administer 35 provinces and eight urban prefectures in Casablanca and Rabat; Western Sahara, claimed by Morocco, organized into four additional provinces. Officials appointed by Ministry of Interior administer 846 communes, assisted by directly elected communal councils. Assemblies at provincial and prefectural level elected by commune councillors. Provincial officials convene periodically on regional basis for development planning.

Judicial Structure: Legal system founded on French jurisprudence models and sharia (Islamic law). Supreme Court of five chambers supervises lower courts; its constitutional chamber passes on constitutionality of legislation; subordinate courts include, in ascending order, communal and district courts, tribunals of first instance, and courts of appeal.

Politics: Four centrist parties supporting throne captured 215 of 306 parliamentary seats in September 1984 election; former leading party, Istiqlal, reduced to 41 seats. Socialist Union of Popular Forces, generally in opposition role, won 36 seats; Marxist parties captured three seats. King orchestrates participation in politics, deciding which parties form government, making all major appointments, and monopolizing legislative initiatives. Opposition divided and neutralized by king's strategy of co-optation, rewards, and repression. Most issues can be debated except status of monarchy and policy on Western Sahara.

Foreign Relations: Foreign policy officially nonaligned but sympathetic to West. Morocco plays constructive role in Arab councils, notably in search of peace in Middle East. Withdrew from Organization of African Unity in 1984 to protest seating of Saharan

Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) as representative of Western Sahara. Prolonged tensions with neighboring Algeria over its sponsorship of SADR and aid to guerrillas in Western Sahara. Similar differences with Libya submerged when wide-ranging alliance signed August 1984.

National Security

Armed Forces: In 1985 Royal Armed Forces included Royal Moroccan Army of 160,000 officers and men, Royal Moroccan Navy of 6,500, Royal Air Force of 13,500, and other elements. Conscription required 18-month tours of duty; no organized reserves.

Major Tactical Units and Operations: Bulk of army deployed in Southern Zone to defend Moroccan claim to Western Sahara against Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Río de Oro (Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el Hamra y Río de Oro—Polisario). Units there included four mechanized infantry brigades, nine mechanized infantry regiments, nine artillery groups, four armored groups, four engineer battalions, and several light and specialized battalions. Units in north included Royal Guard, Light Security Brigade, one armored group, one mechanized infantry regiment, one antiaircraft group, and Parachute Brigade. Major air force units included five fighter-bomber squadrons, one counterinsurgency squadron, and one transport squadron; 106 combat aircraft in 1984. Naval vessels included one frigate, six fast-attack craft, 13 patrol craft, and four amphibious transports.

Foreign Military Assistance: France main supplier of army and air force; since 1960 United States provided aircraft, armored vehicles, radar, communications equipment, and technical assistance. In 1960 and 1967 aircraft and armored vehicles supplied by Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia; few of these operational in early 1985. Military equipment and technical assistance also received from Spain, Austria, and South Africa. Saudi Arabia and other Arab states lent financial assistance to offset costs of military action in Western Sahara.

Defense Expenditures: In 1983, according to Moroccan government sources, defense spending amounted to DH7 billion, or about 18 percent of central government expenditures and 7.4 per-

cent of GDP.

Internal Security Forces: Under authority of Ministry of Interior, Sûreté Nationale (national police) of 11,000 performed most urban police duties, and 9,000-man Auxiliary Forces served as national guard; rural police affairs main responsibility of Royal Gendarmerie, officially branch of Royal Armed Forces; two separate organizations provided intelligence services.




Figure 1. Kingdom of Morocco, 1985

Introduction

MOROCCO IS A LAND of unlimited contrasts and contradictions. It is both an ancient kingdom and an emerging nation, blending diverse cultural traditions with the unifying force of Islam. The most westerly country of an area known traditionally as the Maghrib (a region that also includes Algeria, Tunisia, and the northwestern part of Libya known as Tripolitania), Morocco occupies a place of strategic importance in northwest Africa. It is territorially closer to Europe than any other African country, separated only by the narrow Strait of Gibraltar. It commands the western entrance to the vast Mediterranean Sea and is the only Maghribi nation that also faces the Atlantic Ocean (see fig. 1).

Throughout history some confusion has existed over the Maghrib's real identity: is it part of Africa, or is it a region of the Middle East? By virtue of its location, it is obviously part of Africa, but its cultural orientation—predominantly Arab and Muslim—underscores its important links with the Middle East. For its early Arab conquerors, the region was the "island of the west" (*jazirat al maghrib*)—the land between the "sea of sand" (the Sahara) and the Mediterranean. The term *Maghrib*, an Arabic word meaning "the time or place of the sunset—the west," has subsequently been used to denote the western Islamic world (northwest Africa) as distinguished from the Mashriq, or eastern Islamic world (the Middle East, including Egypt and the eastern and southern part of Libya). Thus, Morocco is an African nation with strong cultural—mainly religious—ties to the Middle East. But it also has had to learn to cope simultaneously with a legacy of ties to the nations of Europe.

Morocco has been described as a cold country with a hot sun. Its abrupt regional variations of climate are determined by the geography, which has been a dominant factor in shaping the country's development. The area south of a line running from Agadir on the west coast to Figuig in the east belongs to the Sahara, which has been both a barrier and an avenue of communication for those willing to risk traveling over it. The mountain ranges—the Rif, Middle Atlas, High Atlas, and Anti-Atlas—form long, continuous northeast-southwest chains that separate the desert from the fertile coastal plain, which is made fruitful by ample seasonal rainfall. But the mountains also isolate the plains and valleys that they surround and cut off direct north-south communications. Only at the Taza Gap is there a pass

through the mountains. Historians have pointed out the dualities of Moroccan social and political life that have been a consequence of the country's geography. Opposition was seen to exist between Arabs and Berbers, city and countryside, and sedentary population and nomads.

The Moroccan people derive from an indigenous Berber stock and from the waves of Arab immigration that swept into the area after the seventh century A.D. Along with the influence of Islam, the most salient feature of Moroccan society was the interaction of the more than 760 distinct tribal groups into which Berbers and many Arabs are divided. Since independence, tribalism, traditionally based on geography and residence patterns as well as on blood relationship, has ceased to be the force it once was. But not so long ago, government in Morocco was essentially tribal, and the monarch dealt with his subjects through the tribal structure. Morocco's ruling dynasties have all been tribal in origin, and most were kept in power by loyal tribes of Arab retainers. Jealous of their communal rights, the tribes were said to consider themselves at war unless peace was declared. Tribal wars went on for generations—often until one of the belligerents was eliminated.

Over time, Arab influence on Morocco has been more cultural than genetic. Arabic is the mother tongue of two-thirds of the population of 23.6 million. The mother tongue of the remaining one-third is Berber, and at least 40 percent of the Berber speakers also speak Arabic. Three principal forms of Arabic are found in Morocco: the old urban dialects of the original Arab settlers and Spanish Muslims, the dialects spoken by mountain tribes Arabized shortly after the introduction of Islam, and lowland Arabic spoken by the descendants of Arabs who reached Morocco in the thirteenth century.

The Berbers, whose identification is more properly linguistic and cultural than racial, speak more than 1,000 dialects contained in three major differentiated linguistic groups. Berber, as a geographically restricted language, has steadily given ground to Arabic. Many presumably Arabized Berbers identify themselves as Arabs and must be accepted as such because ultimately the individual Moroccan, the clan, or the tribe is whatever the individual or group claims to be. In contrast to the general rule, however, most Rifian Berbers speak Arabic, but they retain a culture that is indistinguishable from that of their Berber-speaking neighbors. In modern Morocco differences between Arabs and Berbers are more recognizable in terms of urban (Arabic) and rural (Berber) politics than in terms of ethnic divisions.

The dark-skinned Harratines are people of uncertain origin, although some sources say they descended from black slaves brought into southern Morocco by Arab or Berber nomads. Morocco's once large Jewish community has a continuous history of at least 2,000 years in the country, but it has rapidly dwindled in numbers since the mid-1950s.

Proud of a history that boasts their kingdom's role as the heartland of powerful empires that once exercised vast influence over most of the North Africa and much of Spain, Moroccans have perpetuated their fidelity to a system of governing authority that in the late twentieth century existed in few other parts of the world. Because of its location and resources, Morocco tempted the intervention of European powers in the late nineteenth century. From 1912 to 1956 the country was carved up into protectorates under the control of France and Spain. Although the period of colonialism was relatively brief, its effects were profound. During those years the French zones were reunited under a central government, industrial and economic development was initiated, government administration was reorganized, and notable improvements were made in transportation and communications. But the colonial legacy also imparted severe problems that became apparent when the protectorate period ended and the French and Spanish left. These difficulties included providing education to meet growing Moroccan demands, training qualified Moroccan replacements for the relinquishing French bureaucracy, and asserting control over colonial interests in commerce, mining, and agriculture upon which the Moroccan economy had long depended.

Morocco's monarchical institution was changed only slightly by the four and one-half decades of French domination, and that alteration was to increase the popularity of the Alawite Dynasty, which had reigned in the country since the seventeenth century. The traditional hold of the dynasty on the emotions and loyalties of the Moroccan people was greatly intensified by the sovereign, Sultan Sidi Mohammed V, who along with his family was sent into exile on the island of Madagascar by the French in 1953 because of his refusal to act as their puppet. Mohammed V at once became the key issue and the focal point of the independence movement. By the time independence was regained in 1956, the institution of the monarchy had become popularly identified as the symbol of Moroccan nationalism and of deliverance from non-Muslim rule.

Until 1957 Moroccan monarchs used the title of sultan, but the tradition was altered when Mohammed V adopted the title of "king" because he felt it was more modern. When the king died

unexpectedly in 1961, Crown Prince Mulay Hassan, the designated and unchallenged successor, inherited not only the throne but also his father's symbolic associations.

Under the sovereign leadership of King Hassan II, the Alawite name has achieved distinction as the world's oldest reigning royal house. The dynasty is sharifian (from sharif, an Arabic word meaning noble; pl., *shurfa*), in that it traces its descent from the Prophet Muhammad. (Until 1956 Morocco was known as the Sharifian Empire.) Hassan is accepted as the spiritual as well as the secular leader of the Moroccan people, almost all of whom are Muslims. The king's traditional and constitutional title of commander of the faithful (*amir al muminin*) emphasizes his unique role as imam (religious leader), judge, and war leader. According to Islamic tradition, the *shurfa*—Hassan among them—have been endowed with a charisma (*baraka*) that has qualified them to rule. As a reminder of his royal attributes, Hassan is styled "the nation's guide, unifier of the kingdom, builder of tomorrow's Morocco, promoter of the people's development and prosperity, father of the constitutional democracy." The king and members of the royal house, with the exception of those named Mohammed (or its various transliterations), are accorded the courtesy title of lord (*mulay*). Out of respect for the Prophet, who was titled *mulay*, those who bear his name are designated *sidi*, which also means lord.

Over the years since he became Morocco's temporal head of state and Muslim religious leader, Hassan—in association with a small, privileged leadership group—has ruled in a manner virtually as traditional and authoritarian as that of his predecessors. He has on occasion experimented with democratic institutions and constitutional procedures, but his rule has remained an essentially personal one. After succeeding to the throne on March 3, 1961, he recognized the royal charter proclaimed by his father in 1958 outlining steps to be taken to establish a constitutional monarchy. A constitution providing for a representative government under a strong monarchy was approved by referendum in December 1962, political parties were formed, and parliamentary elections were held the following year. Civil unrest and student riots in 1965, however, brought a temporary return to de facto one-man rule when Hassan invoked a constitutional provision and declared a "state of exception," during which he personally assumed all legislative and executive powers and named a new government that was not based on political parties. Five years later the king submitted a new constitution for referendum; it provided for an even stronger

monarchy, limiting the number of directly elected legislative representatives to one-third of the total membership. A third constitution developed by the king and approved by the electorate in 1972 kept his powers intact but permitted two-thirds of the legislature to be popularly elected. The 1972 Constitution has proven more durable than its predecessors.

Hassan's unique role as the Moroccan monarch gives him political power as *de jure* head of state and *de facto* head of government. Ultimate decisions on foreign affairs are reserved to him, and policy on many matters is drawn up by the government ministers but requires the approval of the legislature. The cabinet, including the prime minister, is chosen by the king, who takes into account the relative influence of the various political parties when putting together his bureaucracy.

The governing elite describes the contemporary political system as a developing democracy, and even Hassan has stated repeatedly his commitment to democratic institutions. But in practice, the king remains a monarch who exercises great power, and only rarely has he delegated any of it to others. Civil service, military, and ministerial appointees know that they are, in the most literal sense, servants of the monarch. An adroit pragmatist, Hassan has remained adept throughout his reign at playing off actual and potential opposition groups against one another. To support his preeminence in the political arena, traditional institutions and practices coexist alongside modern parliamentary-style procedures. The low level of national literacy (about 35 percent in 1985) and widespread poverty also have limited the extent to which much of the population has been able to exercise its political rights. Hassan's critics have long deplored his paternalistic attitude toward his subjects—he frequently refers to them as his children—but the practice is part of a complex yet eminently successful effort to perpetuate the monarchical system and, in doing so, to remain in power.

In the mid-1980s the armed forces, the civil service, the modern sector of the economy, the political parties, and the general structure of the governmental apparatus were still patterned on French models. Perhaps of greater significance, the French language continued to be used predominantly by the king and his governing elite, as well as by the country's commercial interests and the education system, although the Constitution designates Arabic as the kingdom's official language.

For centuries Islam has been the Moroccan society's most prevalent unifying force, giving even those inhabitants who have rejected the monarch's political authority or who have been

divided by tribal animosities a common identification with their countrymen. For at least a millennium the history of Morocco has been the history of Islam in the region. Before the advent of political nationalism, Islam compensated for the lack of a clear-cut national identity. The modern nationalist movement in Mohammed V's time was in turn clearly influenced by Islamic tradition.

Even the political structure has been tied closely to Islam. As in other Muslim countries, no distinction is made between the religious and the secular. It would appear to devout Muslims not only heretical but also fundamentally illogical that such a separation should exist. Religious values have been reflected in social organizations, in the building of the nation's cities, and in its commercial regulations. Even civil law is grounded on religious precepts. Although it has been a unifying force, Moroccan Islam has not been uniform in its expression. Enthusiasm and extremism, the rise of heterodoxies drawn from folk cults, and a zealous orthodoxy have been recurrent themes of Moroccan religious experience.

For many years Morocco had claims—some dating from the eleventh century—to territory outside the borders established at the time it regained its sovereignty in 1956, and it had long made known its intention to restore the country's ancient boundaries. A number of these demands have been subsequently renounced or otherwise resolved, but the claim to the desert territory known as the Western Sahara (formerly the Spanish Sahara) led Hassan in 1975 to commit his armed forces against resisting Saharan guerrillas in a drawn-out war that still had not been conclusively resolved in 1985.

Hassan once characterized strategically located Morocco as "the nation of the middle road . . . its shores lapped by two oceans and forming a bridge between Europe, the Arab West, and Africa [and having] no problems that are exclusively domestic in nature." In the mid-1980s, however, the kingdom did have domestic problems, the most serious of which was the deteriorating state of its economy caused in part by a prolonged drought, declining world prices for its exports (primarily phosphates), and the 10-year war in the Western Sahara that reportedly was costing the government in excess of US\$2.5 million per day. Faced with a foreign debt estimated at about 85 percent of its gross domestic product, as well as high debt service ratios, the economy had entered a period of severe retrenchment. With little real relief in sight, government spending cuts had resulted in postponements of education, housing, and health projects that were to have served the poorest Moroccans. The

immediate prospect, at least for the rest of the decade, was for continuing austerity.

The economic distress had sparked increasing poverty and discontent as thousands of rural poor flocked in desperation to the shantytowns (bidonvilles) that surround the major cities, hoping to find jobs or welfare assistance for their families. Unemployment ranged between 22 and 30 percent and, according to the World Bank, about 38 percent of the population was living in "absolute poverty." Government critics charged that the economic problems affected only the poor and that the small, privileged leadership class was still prospering—particularly those making large profits on contracts for military supplies and construction. Even the king acknowledged, "We are heading for a society where the rich will be very rich, and the poor will be very poor."

The situation has brought disquieting responses both in the form of popular disturbances and, more ominously, in the emergence of an Islamic fundamentalist movement that has accused the king of deviating from the true precepts of the religion and has questioned his fitness to serve as Morocco's commander of the faithful. The discontent reflected by those phenomena has been interpreted as potentially threatening to the government and ultimately to Hassan and the monarchical system. Since 1956 Morocco has had to cope with a wide range of challengers that have posed threats to the security of the state—and particularly to the continued viability of its king. These threats, couched mainly in terms of challenges to Hassan and his system of government, have included at least three identifiable plots against his reign (in 1963, 1973, and 1983) and two attempted but unsuccessful military coups (in 1971 and 1972).

Nonetheless, as of 1985 the wily 56-year-old Hassan had eluded the attempts on his life and had managed to circumvent situations that seemed to threaten the political, social, and economic fabric of his kingdom. His success was attributed to a combination of political adroitness, careful development and use of the versatile Moroccan security forces, and support afforded by Western governments anxious to check the spread of Soviet influence and Arab radicalism in a strategic area of Africa.


Morocco's domestic problems, particularly those related to the economy and the drawn-out war with guerrilla forces in the Western Sahara, were cited by most analysts as the major impetus for Hassan's bold move in August 1984 to negotiate a "unification" agreement with Libya's extremist leader, Muammar al Qadhaafi. Although the durability of this unlikely alliance was far from certain, its initial popularity among Moroccans kindled hope that

it would give a boost to the lagging economy and tip the Maghribi military balance in Morocco's favor.

September 1985

Harold D. Nelson

Chapter 1. Historical Setting



*Ruins of the Hassan Tower and mosque, built in the
late twelfth century during the reign of Sultan Yacub al Mansur*

MOROCCO IS BOTH an ancient kingdom and a new nation. It is one of the world's oldest states, by virtue of its continuous 1,200-year history as a political entity, and an emerging country whose problems are closely identified with those of the developing Third World. Morocco's cultural traditions, social customs, religious values, and political structures—indeed, even the very fabric of its cities—all testify to the great variety of strands woven through the country's history. Two of its most compelling historical themes have been the struggle for legitimacy by ruling dynasties and the seemingly contradictory evidence of remarkable institutional continuity in the midst of political disunity, ethnic diversity, and tribal discord. Throughout the past 12 centuries, however, it has been Islam more than any other factor that has provided Moroccans with a common identification.

Moroccans take pride in their country's distinctiveness and in its historical role as the heartland of empires that once encompassed much of North Africa and Spain. Morocco has been the geopolitical bridge and a cultural mediator between the Arab world and both Europe and West Africa. It has an affinity with other lands of the Maghrib (northwestern Africa), although, unlike them, it escaped falling under the domination of the Ottoman Empire. In perspective, the relatively brief period of the French and Spanish protectorates may be recognized as no more than a hiatus in the history of an independent Morocco—one during which a genuine Moroccan nationalism came into being.

Since its independence was restored in 1956, Morocco has struggled to reconcile its ancient political traditions with its aspirations as a modern state, able to confront the contemporary social and economic demands made upon it. In international affairs its strategic geographic location has obliged Morocco to promote close ties with the Western democracies while taking an active part in Arab and African councils. The burden of the past continues to be reflected in the policies of the present, however. On the basis of territorial claims rooted deeply in the country's history, for instance, Morocco has made a heavy investment of its diplomatic and military resources since the mid-1970s to establish its sovereignty in the Western Sahara.

Early History

The coastal regions of present-day Morocco shared in an early Neolithic culture that was common to the whole Mediterranean littoral. Archaeological remains point to the domestication of cattle and cultivation of crops in the region during that period. Eight thousand years ago, south of the great mountain ranges in what is now the Sahara Desert, a vast savanna—abounding in game—supported Neolithic hunters and herders whose culture flourished until the region began to desiccate as a result of climatic changes after 4000 B.C.

The Berbers entered Moroccan history toward the end of the second millennium B.C. when they made initial contact with oasis dwellers on the steppe who may have been the remnants of the earlier savanna people. Linguistic evidence seems to indicate that southwestern Asia was the point from which some of the ancestors of the Berbers began their movement into North Africa. An Egyptian inscription dating from the Old Kingdom (ca. 2686–2181 B.C.) may be the earliest recorded testimony to their westward migration, which over succeeding centuries extended their range from Siwa in eastern Egypt to the Niger River basin.

The Berbers are a composite people, and the affinity among the various Berber groups appears to be solely linguistic. Berber tradition holds that they have descended from two unrelated families; and some scholars believe that the Berbers crossed North Africa in two simultaneous waves, one from the southeast that entered the region after a long sojourn in Black Africa and the other that followed a northern route. The Berbers were well known to writers of classical antiquity, the earliest known reference being that of Hecateus to the "Libyans" in the sixth century B.C. Herodotus and Polybius commented on them, and Sallust's description of their way of life in the first century B.C. was in many particulars still valid in the early twentieth century.

Phoenician traders, who had penetrated the western Mediterranean before the twelfth century B.C., set up depots for salt and ore along the coast and up the rivers of the territory that is present-day Morocco. Tangier, Tétouan, Melilla, Essaouira (also called Mogador), and Ceuta all had their origin as Punic trading posts, where merchants from Tyre, Sidon, and later Carthage developed commercial relations with the Berber tribes of the interior and paid them an annual tribute to ensure their cooperation in the exploitation of raw materials.

By the fifth century B.C. Carthage, the greatest of the overseas Punic colonies, had extended its hegemony across much

of North Africa. Settlers on the Atlantic coast bartered their merchandise for gold from the western Sudan region in quest of which the Carthaginian admiral Hanno made his fabled voyage to the mouth of the Senegal River.

Beyond the Punic enclaves the Berber tribes prevailed. In contrast to the Punicized Berber farmers to the east, the inhabitants of the far west—called *Mahoarim* by the Carthaginians and *Mauri* by the Romans—were largely unaffected by several centuries of contact with the coastal towns, except in the effect on their religion. Their relationship to the local gods was personal and enthusiastic, but the Berbers also displayed a remarkable gift for cultural assimilation, readily synthesizing Punic cults—as they would later Greco-Roman and Egyptian deities, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—with the nature worship, magic, and holy places of folk religion.

Berber Kingdoms

The basic unit of social and political organization among the Berbers was the extended family, usually identified with a particular village or traditional grazing grounds. Families in turn were bound together in the clan; an alliance of clans, often tracing their origins to a common ancestor, formed a tribe. Courts and assemblies of representatives guided by customs peculiar to the group functioned at each level of organization. Berber folk law and government, like Berber religion, were highly personalized and therefore most effective at the lowest levels of their application. Ultimately each household or tent was its own republic.

For mutual defense kindred tribes joined in confederations, which, because war was a permanent feature of tribal life, were in time institutionalized. Some chieftains who were successful in battle established rudimentary territorial states by imposing their rule on defeated tribes and allies alike; but their kingdoms were easily fragmented, and the dynasties that they sought to found rarely survived more than a generation. By the second century B.C., however, several large although loosely administered Berber kingdoms had emerged. The Berber kings, supported by the farmers of the plains who looked to the kings to protect them from the raids of pastoralists of neighboring Numidia, ruled in the shadow of Rome and Carthage, often as satellites, hiring out troops and forming alliances with one or another of the great powers contending for domination of the western Mediterranean. When Carthage was finally vanquished, they threw in their lots with factions vying for power in the Roman civil wars of the first

century B.C.

One of the most illustrious of these Berber kings was Juba II (25 B.C.–A.D. 24), the son of a Numidian king deposed by the Romans after he had supported the losing side in the civil wars. Educated in Italy and identifying with Roman culture, Juba was awarded the kingdom of Mauretania (not to be confused with present-day Mauritania) by his patron, the emperor Augustus, when Numidia became a Roman province. He presided over a Hellenistic court at Caesarea (present-day Cherchell in Algeria) with his consort Cleopatra Selene, the daughter of Antony and Cleopatra of Egypt, and won contemporary acclaim as an author writing in Greek.

Roman Mauretania

Mauretania was annexed to the Roman Empire in A.D. 40 after Ptolemy, the last king, was put to death by his nephew, the Roman emperor Caligula. The Berber kingdom was divided at the Moulouya River into two provinces, Mauretania Caesariensis to the east and Mauretania Tingitana to the west with its capital at Tingis (present-day Tangier) and commercial center at Volubilis, near the present-day city of Fès (see fig. 2). "These people can be conquered but not subjugated," a Roman officer remarked of the Berbers; and, even after the Mauretanian provinces were organized, Rome controlled the vast, ill-defined territory through alliances with the tribes rather than through military occupation. Autonomous client chieftains policed the frontier and kept the wilder mountain tribes from overrunning the towns and farms. Rome expanded its authority only to those areas that were economically useful or that could be defended without additional manpower. Hence Roman administration never applied outside the restricted area of the coastal plain and valleys.

During the third century the frontier gradually contracted in the face of Berber encroachments. The reduced Mauretania Tingitana became a province under the Roman diocese of Spain as a part of Diocletian's administrative reforms at the end of the century. Road links to the east were tenuous, and the province's contacts with Spain were always closer than with the neighboring African province.

The influence of Roman civilization, like Roman political control, was restricted to the towns and neighboring countryside, and it did not filter down beyond a small Romanized urban elite. Yet ruins like those at Volubilis attest to the civic vitality of Roman Mauretania. Cities on this order were few, but they and even the




Figure 2. Roman Mauretania, First to Fourth Centuries

smaller towns had the amenities of urban life—the forum, baths, temples, and markets—found in every corner of the Roman Empire, and their inhabitants were citizens of a cosmopolitan world state and shared a common language, legal system, and Roman identity.

The gold trade remained basic to the economy of Mauretania, but the region was particularly valued for its timber, dye, and agricultural exports. Roman aristocrats acquired vast estates, which they rented to Berber tenants. Taxes and rents were paid in grain and olive oil exported to the Italian market. The *méhari*, or riding camel, was first brought to Mauretania late in the Roman period. These beasts of burden revolutionized transportation and made possible the opening of trans-Saharan trade routes. The use of camels also gave devastating mobility to the marauding Berber tribes that had been driven beyond the

Roman frontier into the desert.

Christianity was introduced in the second century and gained converts in the towns and among slaves and Berber farmers. By the end of the fourth century the Romanized areas had been Christianized, and inroads had been made as well among the Berber tribes, who sometimes converted en masse. But schismatic and heretical movements also developed, usually as forms of political protest. Donatism, a heresy within the puritanical tradition, won adherents during the periods of persecution and flourished after Christianity was officially recognized in the fourth century. It has been described as an example of the religious enthusiasm and extremism to be seen again in the history of the Berbers. Although never as virulent in Mauretania Tingitana as in the rest of Roman North Africa, Donatism became a vehicle there as elsewhere for social revolt among the Berbers at a time of political deterioration and economic depression in the fourth and fifth centuries.

Roman Mauretania had a substantial Jewish population. Some Jews were dispersed there after the destruction of the Temple in Jerusalem in A.D. 70, but others are thought to have come earlier with Punic settlers. Judaism may also have made converts among the Berbers, accounting for later traditions that whole tribes had become Judaized.

Invited to North Africa by a rebellious Roman official, the Vandals, a Germanic tribe, crossed over from Spain in 429, seized power, and under their war leader, Gaiseric, established a kingdom with its capital at Carthage. The Roman Empire eventually recognized Vandal overlordship in North Africa, but Mauretania Tingitana, abandoned by Rome, was left largely untouched by them, except as ground for pillage. The area around present-day Ceuta was occupied by the Visigoths as part of their mandate from the Roman emperor to restore order in Spain. Otherwise, inhabitants of the settled areas were without government, except that which they could supply for themselves, and many sought the protection of the tribal chieftains. Progressive deurbanization occurred, and the Roman imprint on the former province was quickly effaced. In 533 the Byzantine general Belasarius began the reconquest of North Africa for the Roman Empire; but in Mauretania Tingitana effective Byzantine control was limited to a few heavily fortified outposts. The Berbers there, who had grown accustomed to their autonomy, resisted reassimilation into the imperial system.

Islam and the Arabs

By the time of his death in A.D. 632, the Prophet Muhammad and his followers had brought most of the tribes and towns of the Arabian Peninsula under the banner of the new monotheistic religion of Islam (literally, submission), which was conceived of as uniting the individual believer, the state, and the society under the omnipotent will of God. Islamic rulers therefore exercised both temporal and religious authority. Adherents of Islam, called Muslims (those who submit to the will of God), collectively formed the House of Islam (Dar al Islam).

Within another generation Arab armies had carried Islam westward across North Africa as far as Tripoli. Stubborn Berber resistance and the caliph's restraint for a time deterred the Arabs from advancing farther west toward present-day Morocco. The first Arab raid into the region was led by Akbar ben Nafi through the Taza Gap to the coastal plains in 683, but efforts at political control and missionary activity did not commence until 710, when an Arab army under Musa ibn Nusayr, the governor of Ifriquiya, invaded Morocco and set about converting the plains Berbers to Islam. These new converts formed the bulk of the forces taken by Tarik ibn Ziyad, the Berber governor of Tangier, to Spain in 711 to intervene in a Visigoth feud. The next year Musa led the best of his Arab troops to Spain and in three years had subdued all but the mountainous regions in the extreme north. Arabs and Berbers were settled strategically throughout Muslim-occupied Spain, which like Morocco was organized under the political and religious leadership of the Umayyad caliph of Damascus.

Arab rule in Morocco and Spain—as elsewhere in the Islamic world in the eighth century—had as its ideal the establishment of political and religious unity under a caliphate (the office of the Prophet's successor as supreme earthly leader of Islam) governed in accord with a legal system (sharia) administered by religious judges (qadis) to which all other considerations, including tribal loyalties, were subordinated. Sharia was based primarily on the Quran and the hadith (the traditions of the Prophet) and derived in part from Arab tribal and market law. The form of legal interpretation eventually adopted in Morocco (as well as in the rest of the Maghrib, Spain, and Muslim West Africa) was that propounded by the Maliki school of sharia law, which resisted expansion or revision of the revealed texts.

In practice, Arab rule was a tyranny whose severity was mitigated by its inefficiency. It was easily imposed on the towns, which grew under Arab patronage, and in farming areas.

Sedentary Berbers turned to the Arabs, just as they had centuries before to the Romans, for protection against their nomadic kin. But the Berbers differed essentially from the Arabs in their political culture, and their communal and representative institutions contrasted sharply with the personal and authoritarian government that the Arab conquerors had adopted under Byzantine influence. Even after their conversion to Islam, Berber tribes retained their customary laws in preference to sharia. The Arabs abhorred the Berbers as barbarians, and the Berbers often saw the Arabs as only an arrogant and brutal soldiery bent on collecting taxes. Contrary to the tenets of the Quran, which prescribed preferential treatment of all Muslims, Arab rulers continued to levy heavy taxes on Berber converts under their control. Berber women were prized in Arab harems, and whole areas might be evacuated to escape the slave traders.

The Arabs formed an urban elite in Morocco, but they had come as conquerors and missionaries, not as colonists. Their armies had traveled without women and, after occupying Morocco, they married among the sedentary Berbers, transmitting Arab culture to the townspeople and farmers. These Berbers quickly became Muslims, but conversion was also rapid even among the tribes of the hinterland that stoutly resisted Arab political domination. Many were opportunists, however, and tribes that accepted Islam under Arab pressure often abandoned it once the Arab troops, tax collectors, and slave traders had moved on. Some tribes had records of repeated apostasy and reconversion. Once established as Muslims, the Berbers, with their characteristic love of independence and impassioned religious temperament, shaped Islam in their own image. They embraced schismatic Muslim sects—often traditional folk religion barely disguised as Islam—as a way of breaking from Arab control with the same enthusiasm that some of their Christian forebears had accepted Donatism in opposition to Rome.

Kharidjites

In the seventh century a conflict had developed between supporters of rival claimants to the caliphate that would split Islam into two divisions—the orthodox Sunni and the Shia (literally, party)—which continued thereafter as the basic separation among Muslims. The Shias supported the claim of the direct descendants of Ali, son-in-law of Muhammad and the fourth caliph, whereas the Sunni Muslims favored that of Ali's rival, Muawiya, leader of a collateral branch of Muhammad's



Roman ruins at Volubilis
Courtesy William H. Young, Jr.

tribe, the Quraysh of Mecca, adopting the principle of election of the fittest from the ranks of the *shurfa* (literally, 'nobles, descendants of Muhammad's family; sing., sharif). In addition the Sunnis accepted literal interpretations of the Quran and hadith and adhered to the Sunna (hence, Sunni), the body of customs and practices that were derived from the words and deeds of the Prophet. For the Shias the Quran was not a closed body of revelation but was open to further elaboration by inspired imams, a power that the Sunnis denied even to the caliph. The Shias had their greatest appeal among non-Arab Muslims, who, like the Berbers, were scorned by the Arabs.

The Kharidjite movement, a distinctly Berber heresy that owed much to the folk religion of the Berber countryside, surfaced in a revolt against the Arabs in 739 that was led by Maysara, a water bearer from Tangier. Although they had affinities with the Shias, the Berber Kharidjites (seceders; literally, those who emerge from impropriety) proclaimed in opposition both to them and to the Sunnis that any suitable Muslim candidate could be elected caliph without regard to his

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race, station, or descent from the Prophet. They also deviated from the mainstream of Islamic theology by rejecting the idea of justification by faith. Taking a position directly paralleling that of the Christian Donatists, the Kharidjites maintained that a sinner could no longer be a believer because faith was not possible without purity. They also denied the possibility of forgiveness and thereby regarded all other Muslims—who had committed sin by not accepting their teaching—as heretics.

The attack on the Arab monopoly of the religious leadership of Islam was explicit in Kharidjite teaching. During a period of dynastic upheaval in the Arab world, Berbers across the Maghrib rose in revolt in the name of religion against the onerous restraints of foreign domination. A number of small Berber kingdoms were established by Kharidjite sectarians, but they were unable to sustain their fragile tribal states. Without foreigners to fight, they fell to fighting among themselves. Although the religious heresy was eventually suppressed, the Arab caliphate was unable to restore its temporal authority in Morocco.

Idrisids

The struggle for the caliphate had other important consequences for Morocco. In 750 the Umayyad caliphs of Damascus were overthrown by the Abbasids, who moved the caliphate to Baghdad. A surviving Umayyad prince fled to Morocco and thence, with Berber support, to Spain, where, as Abd al Rahman I (756–88), he founded a politically independent amirate with its capital at Cordova. His line flourished for 250 years, and during that period nothing in Europe compared with the wealth, power, and sheer brilliance of Andalusia, as Muslim Spain was known.

In 786 a rebellion by the Alids (descendants of Ali) in Arabia against the Abbasids was the instigation for a massacre of members of the dynasty by Harun al Rashid, the caliph of Baghdad. Some of the Alids escaped to the west, however. Among them was Mulay Idris ibn Abdallah, who found refuge among the Awraba—conjectured to have been a Romanized Berber tribe recently converted to Islam—who were settled around the old Roman city of Volubilis. Kharidjite egalitarianism existed among some Berbers side by side with an overweening veneration of descendants of the Prophet by others, and the Awraba, impressed with the idea of having a sharif to lead them, made Idris their chieftain. They also respected his learning and piety, and both Alids and Berbers found a community of interest

in their hatred for the Abbasids. From this base Idris brought together under his rule a confederation of western Berber tribes that became the nucleus of the first Moroccan state. He met his death in 792, poisoned by agents of Harun al Rashid, but he left behind a Berber concubine pregnant with his successor, Mulay Idris II (792–828).

Late medieval tradition credited Idris II with founding two adjacent cities—one Arab, the other Berber—in two successive years at Fès. An earlier tradition, verified by modern archaeology, placed the first city in the reign of Idris I, but the later legend served in its time to demonstrate that under an Idrisid king—half-Arab, half-Berber himself—the two peoples had been united. The two cities at Fès, only much later enclosed within a single wall, each became the refuge of Arab political exiles—one group of several thousand from Cordova in 818, the other from Al Qayrawan in Ifriquiya in 825. The ulama of the mosques and the schools of Fès, where the Al Qayrawaniyin University was founded in 859, established Arab and orthodox supremacy over official Islam in Morocco. Meanwhile, the Fassi (inhabitants of Fès) provided the model for culture and good manners. The city also had a large and influential Jewish population, and many of the great Fassi families still trace their ancestry from them and its other early citizens, as well as from the Idrisids themselves.

The Idrisids established in Morocco the ideal of sharifian rule, the tradition that descent from the Prophet was a qualification for political power. But Idris II followed Berber tradition in parceling out his kingdom among his sons, destroying the Idrisid's immediate political achievement of uniting a large part of Morocco under a single ruler. During the rest of the ninth and tenth centuries, control over the fragments of the Idrisid state was contested among the Kharidjite kingdoms, the Umayyad amirs of Cordova, the Shia Fatimids of Ifriquiya, and the local Berber tribes. The last Idrisid principality at Tangier fell to the amir of Cordova in 929.

Hilalians

Despite their immense influence, Arabs in Morocco represented only a small urban elite, whose members married Berber women or took wives from their own narrow circle of Arab families that were the products of generations of intermarriage with Berbers. In the countryside, Morocco was profoundly Berber. During the twelfth to fourteenth centuries, however,

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Arabs of a distinctly different character, tribesmen known collectively as the Hilalians, reached Morocco in large numbers, dramatically altering the face and culture of the country.

In the middle of the eleventh century the Fatimids, who had conquered Egypt and established a Shia caliphate in Cairo, invited the Bani Hilal and the Bani Salim, beduin tribes originally from the Hejaz and the Yemen that for years had infested Upper Egypt, to migrate to the Maghrib and punish their rebellious vassals in Ifriquiya. The Arab nomads spread slowly but steadily across the region. In the words of the historian Ibn Khaldun, they were like a "swarm of locusts," impoverishing the Maghrib, destroying towns, and turning farmland into steppe.

The Arab impact on Morocco was not nearly as great as were the devastating demographic and economic blows dealt by them elsewhere in the Maghrib. Over a long period of time they displaced Berber farmers from their land and converted it to pasturage. For the first time the use of Arabic spread to the countryside. The plains Berbers who sought their protection were gradually Arabized. Others, driven from their traditional lands, either joined the Hilalians as nomads or fled to the mountains.

By the fourteenth century a sharp distinction could be seen in the way of life between Berber highlanders and Arab—or Arabized—lowlanders, although in some instances Arab beduins on the southern steppe were Berberized. Ironically the first entry of these Arabs into Morocco in the twelfth century coincided with a political and religious revival among the Berber tribal confederations.

Berber Dynasties

The Berbers had no concept of nationhood. Collectively they referred to themselves simply as *imazighan*, to which has been attributed the meaning "free men." But they identified themselves entirely with their separate tribes, and Berbers from other tribes were as much foreigners to them as were the Arabs. Three great confederations had come into being, however, with which most of the tribes had ties. The Masmoudas were quiet farmers from the Atlantic coastal plain or pastoralists from the high plains of the Atlas Mountains. The Sanhajas incorporated the fiercely brave, camel-borne nomads of the steppe and desert. Their traditional enemies, the Zenatas, were tough, resourceful horsemen from the cold plateau of the northern interior.



*Holy town of Mulay Idris, the first outpost
of Islam in Morocco
Courtesy LaVerle Berry*


The same impassioned religious temperament that gave rise to heterodoxy among the Berbers could nurture ultraorthodoxy as well. Indeed, Berber orthodoxy could be as much a reaction to Arab decadence as heterodoxy was to the official Islam of the Arab mosques and schools. The eleventh and twelfth centuries witnessed the founding of great Berber dynasties, led by religious reformers and each based on a tribal confederation, that were to dominate the Maghrib and Spain for more than 200 years (see fig. 3).

Almoravids

Early in the eleventh century Sanhaja chieftains, returning from a pilgrimage to Mecca, invited Ibn Yasin, a teacher from Morocco, to preach to their isolated desert tribes in present-day Mauritania. Under his direction a strict religious brotherhood was founded at a fortified retreat (*ribat*), placed by early sources on an island probably in either the Niger River or the Senegal River. Initiates in the brotherhood were called "the people of the *ribat*" (*al murabitun*, transliterated as Almoravids). Modern



Figure 3. The Berber Empires, Eleventh to Thirteenth Centuries



scholarship has discounted the existence of a single stronghold for these "warrior monks," but by the middle of the century the Sanhajas had gathered in the Sahara under the Almoravid banner to sweep into Morocco and reform Islam by force of arms.

The Sanhajas controlled a triangular piece of the Sahara that stretched from the Sous region in the north to southern Mauritania in the west and Timbuktu in the east. They were "men of the veil"—protected from the elements and the evil eye by the cloth they wrapped around their faces—who despised unveiled Berbers as "fly eaters." Although the religious intent of the Almoravids is clear, their crusade in the name of Sunni Islam was also motivated by the Sanhaja's desire to break the power of the Zenatas, who competed with them for control of the trade routes. They moved into Morocco through the Tafilalt region and in 1062 founded the city of Marrakech, which would be the capital of the dynasty established by their leader, Ibn Tashfin (died 1103). Sweeping northward toward the Mediterranean, the Almoravids attacked the Umayyads, Fatimids, Kharidjites, and Zenatas and forcibly converted tribes along the way. By 1082 they had conquered the whole of the Maghrib as far east as present-day Algiers, and by the end of the century they had built an empire that reached from the Senegal River in West Africa to the Ebro River in Spain.

In 1085 the Almoravids responded to an appeal for aid from the amirs of the Muslim *taifas* (city-states) in Spain, which had been staked out earlier in the century on the ruins of the Cordova caliphate and were now threatened by the Christian king of Castile. The Almoravids pushed back the Christian forces but soon lost patience with their erstwhile allies, the *taifa* amirs, and annexed most of Andalusia. Meanwhile in the Maghrib they employed Christian mercenaries from Spain against their Muslim enemies.

The Almoravid sultans brought nominal political unity to all of present-day Morocco and left their successors with a territorial claim to the Western Sahara. They also imposed the conservative Sunni Maliki rite, which endured as the official form of Islam in Morocco. But the Almoravids could conceive of no structure of government beyond that of the tribal confederation. Dominion over a large empire depended on Sanhaja dominance in Morocco and on the loyalty of the confederation to the dynasty. The Zenatas were never totally subdued, and the basic division between the *bilad al makhzan* (government territory) and *bilad al siba* (dissident territory) appeared at this time.

Under the Almoravids, Morocco and Spain were reunited temporarily with other Muslim lands under the spiritual

authority of the Abbasid caliphate in Baghdad. Shocked by the lassitude that they found in Spain, the Almoravids attempted to stimulate a religious revival there based on their own evangelical brand of Islam; but their leaders, who had established themselves comfortably at Seville, soon conformed to the tolerant attitudes of the *taifas*. The accommodation that they made with the gentle Andalusian life-style and the moral laxity subsequently attributed to them lost the Almoravids the respect of the Sanhaja chieftains, thereby dissipating the military power on which their authority rested and eventually leading to the downfall of the first great Berber dynasty.

Almohads

The Masmoudas of the Anti-Atlas area expressed their discontent with Almoravid rule in a new religious reform movement whose followers, known as unitarians (*al muahhid*; literally, those who proclaim the oneness of God, transliterated Almohad), preached a doctrine of moral regeneration through reaffirmation of monotheism. Although it appeared to be a sectarian struggle, Almohad opposition to the Almoravids was the result of long-standing animosity between the mountain tribes and the desert nomads. The Masmoudas had already organized a tribal state in the Atlas *bilad al siba*, which they would use as a base for attacking the Sanhajas and conquering Morocco.

The Almohad movement was founded by Ibn Tumart (died 1130), a member of the Sunni ulama who returned from his pilgrimage to Mecca to denounce the Almoravids for their decadence. Recognized as the Mahdi—the “Sinless One” sent from God to redeem his people—by his followers in 1121, Ibn Tumart condemned the anthropomorphism found in Berber folk religion that was allowed to continue unchecked by the sultan. God, he taught, is wholly abstract, without dimensions and resembling nothing; therefore, knowledge of God can be attained through the use of reason, which is also abstract and objective.

As judge and political leader as well as spiritual director, Ibn Tumart gave the Masmouda Almohads the formal governmental structure that the Sanhaja Almoravids had lacked. It was based on a hierarchical and theocratic centralized government, but one that recognized Berber traditions of representative government and provided for a consultative assembly composed of tribal leaders. Ibn Tumart tried unsuccessfully to bridge the gap that divided the tribes. Before his death he handpicked as his successor Abd al Mumin (1130–63), a Zenata. Abd al Mumin


assumed the title *amir al muminin* (commander of the faithful), which would remain the appellation of Morocco's sultans.

By 1140 the Almohad sultan occupied most of Morocco, and in 1146 he took Marrakech, massacred its inhabitants, and put an end to the Almoravid dynasty. But Marrakech remained as the capital of the new Berber dynasty, which under Sultan Yacub al Mansur (1184-99) stretched from Tripoli to Spain and achieved its apogee under Sultan Mohammed al Nasir (1199-1214).

Even before they had completed their conquest of Morocco, the Almohads entered Spain at the invitation of the *taifas*, which had risen against the Almoravids at Seville. Once again the Berbers carried forward the border of Muslim Spain at the expense of the Christian kingdoms. The Andalusian amirs were disappointed, however, to find the Almohads even more puritanical than their predecessors originally had been. Abd al Mumin forced their submission and proclaimed the reestablishment of the caliphate of Cordova, giving the Almohad sultan supreme religious as well as political authority.

Theology gradually gave way to dynastic politics as the obvious motivating force behind the Almohad movement as blood ties replaced moral qualities as qualification for high office. By 1156 a distinction was made between leaders drawn from the sultan's family and tribal leaders drawn from the Almohads and, as its empire grew, the dynasty became more removed from the Berber support that had launched it. The dynasty's power base shifted to Spain. Hilalian Arabs, defeated in battle by the Almohads, were nonetheless allowed to settle in Morocco. Four of the Hilalian tribes, designated as *jaysh* (army), were granted land tenure and exemption from taxation in return for military service and were employed as tax collectors. The growth of the empire also outstripped the capacity of Ibn Tumart's constitution to manage it. Within 50 years after his death, he was denounced as a heretic, and his religious teachings were rejected.

The Almohads shared the crusading instincts of their Castilian opponents, but the continuing wars in Spain overtaxed their resources. They were decisively defeated in the epic battle of Las Navas de Tolosa (1212), a watershed in the history of the Christian reconquest of Spain, and Muslim strength ebbed thereafter. Seville fell in 1248, reducing Andalusia to the amirate of Granada, which had bought its safety by betraying the Almohad's Spanish capital. The Hafsids, hereditary viceroys of the Almohad sultan, wrested control of Ifriquiya from the empire, and the Almohad position in Morocco was compromised by factional strife and a renewal of tribal warfare.



The walled city of Marrakech

Some sources find it ironic that a high culture should have flourished in Morocco under the patronage of what had been at the outset puritanical and intolerant sectarians from primitive desert and mountain tribes. But the Almoravids were impressed by the patently superior civilization that they found in Spain; and the Almohads, who had risen in reaction to the moral accommodations that their predecessors had made there, were themselves soon enticed by the sweetness of Andalusian life to abandon Ibn Tumart's strictures against art and music.

Morocco and Spain, linked under the Berber dynasties and forming a natural geopolitical unit, shared a common culture—called Moorish—that was a fusion of Andalusian taste and sensitivity and Berber forcefulness. Andalusian civilization was in turn the product of an earlier synthesis of Muslim Arab with Latin

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and Greek—Christian and classical—and Jewish cultural values on Spanish soil. But Moorish culture, indeed the Moorish spirit, transcended dynastic lines, political boundaries, and even religious barriers in creating the new and unique forms of Islamic art, literature and architecture that spread from Spain to the Maghrib. These are still clearly seen in the elaborate arches and stucco sculpture of Moroccan mosques and palaces of the period, in ivorywork and metalwork, in the distinctive Maghribi style of Arabic calligraphy, and in the Andalusian music that remains the classical expression of that art form in Morocco.

Moorish culture and technology struck responsive chords in Christian Europe and the tension and interplay between the Islamic and Christian worlds in Spain was a principal source of Europe's twelfth-century renaissance. It was in large part through Moorish scholars writing in Arabic, for example, that classical Greek learning in science, medicine, and philosophy was transmitted to medieval Europe.

Muslim Spain's most important scholars of the twelfth century spent the decisive years of their careers in Morocco, occupying court positions under the Almoravids and Almohads. They combined interest in philosophy, theology, and the physical and natural sciences. The Almoravid vizier Ibn Bajja (called Avempace, 1090–1138) not only corrected errors in Ptolemy's astronomical calculations and speculated on the nature of the soul but also composed a treatise on platonic love that was one of the sources for the Romantic strain in European literature. The philosophers Ibn Tufayl (1110–85) and Ibn Rushd (called Averroes, 1126–98), who succeeded Ibn Tufayl as court physician at Marrakech, were intimate advisers of Almohad sultans. European scholars studied Aristotle through Latin translations of Averroes' commentaries of his work.

Jews made contributions to the Moorish achievement disproportionate to their numbers. A few rose to high positions in government under the Berber dynasties; others prospered in trade or as craftsmen. But as a group, Jews were also subject to legal restrictions and suffered periodic persecutions. In the thirteenth century Moroccan Jews were segregated within Fès and other cities in walled compounds (*mellahs*)—for protection, it was argued, because their wealth and position had made them the objects of envy.

The tradition of Moorish learning continued through the fifteenth century in Andalusia and the Maghrib, especially in history, biography, and poetry. Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406), a native of Tunis, formulated historical laws to explain the rise and fall of dynasties in the Islamic world in his encyclopedic *Al Muqaddima* (*Prolegomena*, or "Introduction" to universal history),

an important source for early Moroccan history. Ibn Battuta (1304–64), born in Tangier of a family of qadis, was perhaps the most widely traveled man of his age—surpassing Marco Polo. Between 1324 and

Merinids

The third Berber dynasty to rule Morocco was based on the Bani Merin, a partially Arabized Zenata tribe. Pastoralists of the high plains, they had remained the enemies of the Masmouda even after the Zenata confederation submitted to the Almohads. The Bani Merin took advantage of declining Almohad power to migrate westward through the Taza Gap and establish a tribal state that challenged the authority of the ruling dynasty in that part of Morocco. In 1212—the same year as the battle of Las Navas de Tolosa—they defeated an Almohad army sent to subdue them and initiated nearly 60 years of warfare that brought disorder to the country and was concluded only with the capture of Marrakech, the last Almohad bastion, in 1271. The new Merinid Dynasty established its capital at Rabat, the site of an Almohad fortress called Ribat al Fath (Camp of Victory).

Moroccan trade with the people of the western Sudan, which had developed even before the time of the Berber dynasties, continued to flourish under the Merinids. The trans-Saharan caravans, described by the Arab traveler Abu Hamid al Andalusī, crossed the desert “as if upon the sea, guided by the stars and rocks,” carrying cargoes of salt between the inland ports that stretched from Sijilmasa to Timbuktu. Considered the “prince of commodities” in the desalinated regions of inner Africa, the salt was by custom deposited at appointed locations along the banks of the Niger River, where it was collected by local traders and replaced with equal measures of gold. No words were exchanged in this “silent trade,” which was Morocco’s most important source of income throughout the period of the Berber dynasties.

The Merinid sultans were also considerable patrons of learning and the arts, but they presided over Morocco during a period of steady political decline. Despite the best efforts of Abu al Hassan (1331–51)—the “Black Sultan” for whom Ibn Khaldun wrote, “fatigues were pleasures”—the Merinids were unable to restore the frontiers of the Almohad’s Maghribi empire.

The Merinids did not base their power on a program of religious reform as their predecessors had done. Of necessity they compromised with the folk cults, which had survived the triumph

of puritanical orthodoxy in the twelfth century despite the steps taken by the Almoravids and Almohads to stamp them out. The aridity of official Islam had little appeal in the countryside, where the ulama were replaced as spiritual guides by wandering holy men (*al murabitun*, transliterated as marabouts—see Glossary). The marabouts were mystics and seers, miracle workers endowed with *baraka* (charisma), whose tradition antedated Islam and was as old as religion itself among the Berbers. Called men of the soil (*ryal al bilad*), the marabouts of popular Islam were incorporated into local cults of saints whose domed tombs dotted the countryside and who were venerated by Muslims and Jews alike. As the authority of the *makhzan* (literally, treasury; synonymous with the central government) waned in a particular locale, the people increasingly looked to the marabouts for political leadership as well as for spiritual guidance. Small, autonomous marabout republics became a characteristic form of government in the *bilad al siba*.

As Muslim power rapidly declined in Spain, the Christian kingdoms struck directly at Morocco. In 1399 the Castilians attacked Tétouan, and in 1415 the Portuguese seized Ceuta. Throughout the fifteenth century they waged a continuing campaign that put Portugal in control of most of Morocco's Atlantic coast and left Castile with a number of enclaves on the Mediterranean coast (see fig. 4). From their coastal strongholds the Portuguese manipulated satellite Muslim chieftains and raided in the interior. Strategic considerations and concern for making a profit from warfare were interlocked. The conquest of Morocco was viewed as a necessary preliminary move to the reconquest of Granada, which had repeatedly received Moroccan reinforcements. The Portuguese also moved to cut off the flow of gold to Morocco, tapping the trade along the Guinea coast by sea. The momentum of the Portuguese offensive was not broken until the middle of the sixteenth century.

Granada fell to Ferdinand of Aragon and Isabella of Castile in 1492. The final triumph of the 700-year Christian reconquest of Spain was accompanied by the forced conversion or expulsion of Spanish Muslims (Moriscos) and Jews. Thousands of them fled to Morocco, where many gained influence in government and commerce.

By the middle of the fifteenth century the Merinids had spent their strength in efforts to sustain their dynasty against rebellion and invasion. Since 1420 actual political power had been in the hands of grand viziers drawn from the Bani Wattas, a




Figure 4. European Enclaves in Morocco, Fifteenth to Seventeenth Centuries

related Zenata tribe. The Wattasid viziers had to cope with the threat of Ottoman invasion as well as with the European offensive and the unsettling religious fervor that it excited in Morocco. In 1465 the last of the Merinids was ritually slaughtered by a mob of religious fanatics in Fès, leaving a Wattasid as heir to what remained of the *bilad al makhzan*. The Wattasids ruled Morocco for more than a century as sultans without really controlling it. The dynasty's legitimacy was never fully recognized and was continually challenged by the *shurfa* families and the numerous marabout republics.

Failure of the Imperial Maghrib

The Berber dynasties gave the Berber people some measure of collective identity and political unity under a native regime for the first time in their history, and they created the idea of an "imperial Maghrib" under Berber aegis that survived in some form from dynasty to dynasty. The Berber dynasties also performed much the same function in revivifying Islam in the West as the Ottoman Turks did in the Middle East during the same period. Beyond that, they defeated Kharidjism and repulsed Shiism, assuring the victory in Morocco of Sunni Maliki orthodoxy as the official Islam. The Berber dynasties did so, however, without affecting the popular Islam—the folk religion—of the countryside. Finally, they introduced the brilliant civilization of Andalusia to Morocco.

But ultimately each of the Berber dynasties proved to be a political failure. Succeeding ruling castes were established that soon isolated themselves from their supporters. In each case a breach opened between the military and the political administration, and the tribes were alienated from both. The Berber sultans allowed—and indeed invited—the Hilalians to enter Morocco, overlooking the consequences of large-scale Arab penetration. The Berber dynasties depleted Morocco's resources in their attempts to defend Muslim Spain and extend their hegemony in the Maghrib. Particularly after the Hilalian intrusion, Morocco's economic base was too limited to support the military expenditures necessary to hold an empire that even the Almohads lacked the government machinery to maintain.

Maghribi scholars have contended that the purpose of the Almoravids and Almohads was to formulate an ideology that would allow for a consensus on a normative Islam and bind a pan-Maghribi Berber empire together. The fundamental issue, however, is that none of the Berber dynasties managed to create an integrated society out of a social landscape dominated by tribes jealous of their autonomy and individual identity. Ideological considerations have been seen as interfering with the business of government; but, stripped of their ideological facade, the dynasties were expressions of triumphant Berber tribalism. When the dynasties relied on forces outside their tribal base, they destroyed their credibility among their own tribes. When tribal support failed or when supporting tribes lost their warlike spirit, the dynasty fell. Tribalism, rather than foreign intervention, frustrated the amalgamation of Berber Morocco and the Maghrib.

Sharifian Dynasties

During the long period of turmoil that accompanied the steady decay of the last Berber dynasty, institutional continuity depended on the efforts of three elite Arab groups. The old Andalusian families, some of them important in trade and administration since the ninth century, were the chief repository of Islamic culture, providing Morocco's ulama and qadis. Reliable tribal *qaid*s (governors of tribal areas) were recruited from the *jaysh* tribes, which continued to be the most effective military force of the *makhzan*. A third group, the *shurfa*, were those families or tribes claiming direct descent from the Prophet, their lineage usually acknowledged by a *zahir* (royal decree) from the sultan. Older Arab families, the Idrisids among them, and even some Berber clans laid claim to the title, but at the beginning of the sixteenth century the *shurfa* were particularly identified with the Arab tribes that had settled in southern Morocco in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. They constituted a religious aristocracy, respected throughout Morocco for the *baraka* they had inherited as Muhammad's children, and were sought out to act as mediators in tribal disputes. Their prestige was greatest in the *bilad al siba*, where they exercised a stabilizing influence in the absence of any authority above the tribal level. Willing to confront the infidel even when the *makhzan* demurred from the task, the *shurfa* took the lead in a popular reaction to the European penetration of Morocco, which had gone unchecked in the early sixteenth century.

Saads

In 1511 the marabouts of the Sous proclaimed Mulay Ahmed, the shaykh (tribal leader) of the sharifian Saadi tribe, as the Mahdi to lead a holy war (jihad) against the Portuguese, whom the enfeebled *makhzan* had been impotent to oust from their fortified enclaves that dominated the coast in that region. Initially unsuccessful against the Portuguese, Ahmed and his successors turned on the Bani Wattas and led the southern Arab tribes against the imperial city of Marrakech, where they set up a rival government. The capture of Fès by the Saads in 1559 marked the downfall of the last Berber dynasty and the establishment of sharifian control over the entire *bilad al makhzan*.

Over the years during which the Saads were gradually

wresting control of the *makhzan* from the Bani Wattas, they had also pressured the Portuguese into relinquishing Agadir, Ceuta, and other strategic points. Although their family had risen to prominence as leaders of a holy war against Christians, the early Saadi sultans were pragmatic in their diplomacy. The greater threat posed to Morocco's independence by the Ottoman Turks at Algiers induced them on occasion to make common cause with Spain against their mutual Muslim enemy.

Despite their success in uniting the *makhzan*, the Saads were plagued from the start by bloody feuds within the family and by disputed successions. In 1576 Abd al Malik returned from exile in Constantinople to depose his nephew, Mohammed al Mutawakkil, who fled to exile in Portugal. Attempting to exploit the dynasty's internal divisions, the Portuguese invaded Morocco in 1578 in support of the former sultan. The ill-conceived expedition was overwhelmed and destroyed at Ksar el Kebir (Alcázarquivir) in the Battle of Three Kings, which claimed the lives not only of Sebastian of Portugal and al Mutawakkil but of Abd al Malik as well. Abd al Malik's brother Ahmed, who survived the day, was proclaimed sultan on the field of battle and took the title "al Mansur" (the Victorious).

Ahmed al Mansur (1578–1603) is regarded as the greatest of the Saadi sultans. His military prowess and wealth earned him respect in the royal courts of Europe; his capacity for cruelty engendered awe and obedience in his subjects, loyalty in his servants, and restraint in potential rivals. He tamed dissident tribes, curbed the influence of the marabouts, and halted the westward advance of the Ottoman Turks into territory claimed by Morocco.

Al Mansur, who surrounded himself with skilled bureaucrats, gave new life to the forms of government developed under the Berber dynasties. He also added elements borrowed from Ottoman practice, particularly in the introduction of pashas to govern newly acquired provinces distant from the *makhzan*. His *qaid*s, adequately backed by *jaysh* troops, became effective tax collectors among the growing number of tribes that submitted to his authority. Booty and ransom for prisoners—which had emptied the Portuguese treasury after the battle at Ksar el Kebir—allowed Moroccan military forces to live off their conquests. Piracy flourished under the sultan's patronage. So great did the wealth of al Mansur's court become that to the sultan's other titles was added al Dhahabi (the Golden One).

When the demands of the *makhzan* seemed to outstrip the tax collector's capacity to meet them, al Mansur determined to acquire the mines that were believed to be the source of

Morocco's "silent trade" in gold with the peoples of the western Sudan. In 1591 he fitted out a small army, composed of 4,000 seasoned European mercenaries under the command of a Spanish eunuch, to make the trek across the Sahara into the territory of the Songhai Empire, where at Tondibi it shattered a large force of Muslim defenders. By 1595 al Mansur's pasha, installed at the desert metropolis of Timbuktu, governed a province in the sultan's name that encompassed the bend of the Niger River (see fig. 5). Although his commanders probed as deeply into the Niger River basin in present-day Nigeria, al Mansur's hopes of finding the hidden sources of the gold were disappointed. As a result of his conquests in the region, however, Morocco was established as one of the leading slave-trading powers.

The Moroccan occupation disrupted the stability and civilization of the western Sudan. What remained of Songhai after its defeat soon disintegrated into warring tribal states. Timbuktu, for centuries a center of Islamic culture at the crossroads of the Saharan trade routes, declined quickly under the rule of the pashas; its great schools were closed, and their scholars were exiled to Morocco. Remote from the *makhzan*, the pashas of Timbuktu ruled with only nominal reference to al Mansur's weak successors over a province afflicted by frequent rebellions and mutinies. Until 1750 members of the hereditary military caste, which was the product of several generations of intermarriage in the region, elected the pashas from their own ranks. When the system finally collapsed, they fought over the scraps that remained, creating a state of anarchy in the Niger River basin that persisted until the coming of European colonial rule in the late nineteenth century.

In the 100-year history of the dynasty, eight of the 12 Saadi sultans died by assassination. After al Mansur's death—from natural causes—disputed successions again divided the country. Although the Saads retained title to the sultanate until 1659, their writ eventually extended no farther than to the area around Marrakech. Everywhere local administrators and mercenary garrisons usurped authority without challenge. Tribes withdrew their allegiance from the *makhzan*, and the marabout republics, suppressed by al Mansur, reasserted their autonomy. At Safi and Tétouan, Morisco refugees founded turbulent independent states that thrived on piracy, while at Mehdia an English buccaneer, Henry Mainwaring, proclaimed the Masmouda Pirates Republic, sheltering corsairs of all descriptions until his stronghold was captured by a Spanish flotilla in 1614.




Figure 5. The Sharifian Empire, End of Sixteenth Century

Alawis

Amid the chaos another sharifian Arab tribe, the Alawis (or Filalis), gained a commanding position in the oases of Tafilalt, to which they had migrated from Arabia in Merinid times. Respectful of the hapless sultans, they expanded their influence across Morocco at the expense of the marabout republics, attacking them in the name of religious orthodoxy. Mulay Rashid emerged from competition with several of his kin as leader of the Alawite movement, and in 1666 he was proclaimed sultan at Fès after driving out its marabout rulers (see table A).

Rashid's brother and successor, Mulay Ismail (1672-1727), spent the first 20 years of his long reign consolidating his hold on the *makhzan* and winning the recognition of dissident tribes. He renewed the holy war against Spain, reducing its holdings in Morocco to a few modest enclaves, reoccupied Tangier when it was abandoned by the English in 1684, and took the offensive against the Ottoman Turks in Algiers.

To accomplish this, Ismail built a professional army estimated to have numbered 150,000 troops. Rif Berbers and European and Turkish mercenaries supplemented units from the *jaysh* tribes, but more than half of Ismail's army was composed of slave troops (*abid*) imported from the western Sudan. From them a corps of black praetorians, the Bukhariyin, was picked to serve as the sultan's personal guard. When not involved in war, the *abid* were employed in constructing the many casbahs (fortresses) from which they maintained peace in the countryside. Ismail also acquired the services of the syndicates of pirates, mainly Moriscos and Greeks, who operated out of Moroccan ports.

Ismail sent envoys to Louis XIV of France, whose court he admired, and sought to be recognized on an equal footing with his rival, the Ottoman sultan in Constantinople. Embassies were exchanged with other European powers as well, but Morocco, traditionally viewed with suspicion in Europe, failed to win their acceptance as a partner in the community of nations. French interests in particular were invited to invest in Morocco, but Ismail's efforts to forge closer commercial links with Europe were also in vain.

Ismail made his capital at Meknès, called Al Zitaun for the olive groves that surrounded the city, in the strategic Taza Gap. There he erected palaces in emulation of Versailles, built mosques, established a line of fortifications that was the most awesome in North Africa, and dug deep dungeons for his enemies, using the labor of convicts and war prisoners. Ismail was an archetypal oriental despot; but he extended the *bilad al*

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Table A. The Alawite Dynasty

| Ruler | Years of Rule | Ruler | Years of Rule |
|-------------------------------------|---------------|----------------------------------|---------------|
| Rashid | 1666-72 | Mohammed IV | 1859-73 |
| Ismail | 1672-1727 | Hassan I | 1873-94 |
| Ahmed ¹ | 1727-28 | Abd al Aziz | 1894-1908 |
| | 1728-29 | | |
| Abd al Malik ¹ | 1727-28 | Hafid | 1908-12 |
| Abd Allah ¹ | 1729-57 | Yusif | 1912-27 |
| Mohammad III | 1757-90 | Mohammad V | 1927-53 |
| Yazid | 1790-92 | Ben Arafa ² | 1953-55 |
| Suleiman | 1792-1822 | Hassan II | 1961- |
| Abd al Rahman II | 1822-59 | | |

¹Title disputed.

²Succession not recognized in Spanish zone.

makhzan, subduing even the tribes of the High Atlas, and so pacified the countryside that "a Jew or a woman," it was said, might travel across it unmolested. "Your king Louis commands men while I command brutes," Ismail is supposed to have told the French ambassador, justifying the ruthless nature of his rule. But the edifice of state, which Ismail labored to construct during his 55-year reign, crumbled at his death.

Primogeniture never took root in Morocco, and the laws of succession remained vague. In theory it would be determined that one of the *shurfa*, usually a brother or favorite son of the sultan, had succeeded to his *baraka* and was thereby singled out to follow him on the throne. A proclamation by the ulama would confirm the selection. This was monarchy by consensus. But in practice there was no fundamental principle to guide the ulama in determining who among the royal family had been bestowed with the charisma that enabled him to rule, except the ability of a candidate to enforce his claim to it and exclude his rivals. The problem of succession in the eighteenth century was compounded by Ismail's having left behind more than 500 sons.

Civil war raged for 30 years after Ismail's death, until his grandson, Sidi Mohammed III (1757-90) succeeded in ending conflict within the dynasty and gained acceptance by the tribes in a much diminished *bilad al makhzan* (see fig. 6). Mohammed was a pious and patient sultan who enforced the authority of the *makhzan* when he could afford to but contented himself with nominal sovereignty and recognition of his religious leadership in those areas when he could not. He limited government

expenditures to the income that was derived from tariffs on European trade and from periodic tax collections. The military establishment, less reliable than before, was reduced to the minimum required to defend the cities and police that part of the lowlands remaining under the control of the *makhzan*. Mohammed was embarrassed by his inability to guarantee the security of foreign merchants, and the direct trade route from Fès and Meknès to Marrakech had to be abandoned during his reign, compelling travelers between those points to go by way of Rabat. (The route was not made secure until after 1912.)

Morocco stagnated culturally in the eighteenth century, in part because of its growing isolation but in larger measure as a result of Mohammed's effort to reform official Sunni Islam. The arts were discouraged, and intellectual inquiry in the schools was stifled by a sultan whose religious fundamentalism, influenced by the Wahhabi movement in Arabia, expressed itself in book burning.

Morocco's political and economic isolation during the same period was more a consequence of the general impoverishment of Mediterranean commerce, however, than the fault of a conscious policy of withdrawal. Although he had tried to isolate Morocco from foreign ideas, Mohammed energetically courted the attention of European powers and offered generous concessions to establish diplomatic and commercial relations with them. But Morocco had little of attraction to offer in trade in the eighteenth century. Its resources were woefully mismanaged, and foreign investors were invited to fill the void left by native entrepreneurs and producers.

In 1767 French subjects were granted extraterritorial privileges in Morocco, and France was allowed to open a consulate at Salé. With the help of French patronage even Denmark, a relatively minor European power, could secure a monopoly on trade at the ports of Agadir and Safi. By the end of the eighteenth century Morocco's economy was largely controlled by Europeans, particularly by French companies and speculators whose interests were entirely exploitive.

Morocco was among the first nations to recognize the independent United States. In 1787 the two countries signed a treaty of peace and friendship and established commercial relations. Maintained in its essential provisions to the present day, the Treaty of Marrakech is the longest unbroken agreement of its kind in American diplomatic history. It also settled outstanding difficulties resulting from the seizure of American ships and seamen by Barbary pirates, the United States agreeing to pay an annual tribute of US\$10,000 to ensure protection of




Figure 6. Morocco in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries

American interests in Morocco. In accordance with a suggestion made by George Washington, an American consulate was opened at Tangier in 1791. The Treaty of Mekkès, signed in 1836, formalized the trading concessions conferred on the United States by Morocco in 1824. It also accorded extraterritorial privileges to American citizens, granting them capitulatory rights to be tried only by courts established at United States consulates in Morocco.

Isolation and Intervention

Mohammed III was plagued by his rebellious sons. The most troublesome of them, Mulay Yazid (1790-92), left the *bilad al*

makhzan in a state of anarchy at the end of his brief but violent reign. His brother, Mulay Suleiman (1792–1822), was confronted by Berber revolts that neither he nor his successors could put down. Racked by tribal war, plots, coups, and mutinies, exploited economically, and its weak and corrupt government virtually powerless to prevent European intervention, Morocco isolated itself politically and culturally.

In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the country presented foreign observers a picture of quintessential decadence. Yet while other Maghribi states and Egypt were under Turkish, French, or British domination, Morocco kept its independence. Its unique political order survived, and the Alawite dynasty remained on the throne. Morocco's instability was functional but not institutional. In theory the sultan enjoyed absolute rights, although in practice he had only limited means of enforcing them. The dynasty's title had perhaps gone unchallenged because it had recognized its limitations and made the necessary adjustments, its sultans preferring to reign even if they could not always rule. Their government, where it applied, was tolerated because it imposed itself on so few.

The sultans made several basic internal compromises, a process already under way during the period of anarchy between the reigns of Ismail and Mohammed III. They deferred authority to their supporters and to government officials on whom alone they could depend for protection, but loyalty had to be purchased. Certain tribal areas were abandoned altogether to the *bilad al siba*. Of greatest significance, however, was the compromise made between the sultans and the marabouts, between official Islam and maraboutism.

Compromise with Maraboutism

An unusual feature of Morocco's development—one absent in the Maghribi states that succumbed to foreign domination—was the profound political, social, and intellectual impact made there by maraboutism and the role that marabouts played in holding Morocco together under the Alawite Dynasty. After the collapse of the tribally based empires, the religiously based polity of the sharfian dynasties had saved Morocco from conquest by the Turks and preserved its separate identity. In the eighteenth century, however, the Alawites had sought the cooperation of the marabouts in winning recognition of their legitimacy, if not acceptance of their authority, in the *bilad al siba*. In return for acceptance of their nominal title, the sultans conceded real

political power to the marabouts over a large part of the country.

It was accepted throughout Morocco that *baraka* conferred special authority on those to whom it was given. In the *bilad al makhzan* this authority belonged to the sultan by right, and it extended to both political and religious matters. In the *bilad al siba*, however, it conferred only religious authority, the extent of which was open to interpretation, and a nominal claim to political suzerainty, the recognition of which had to be deserved. Cooperation between the sultan and the marabouts entailed an essential compromise; the sultan moderated his claims, and the marabouts used their influence to restrain their followers from attacking the *makhzan*. Further, the marabouts agreed to recognize the sultan's *baraka* only to the extent that he restricted the definition of his superior right to authority and admitted the autonomy of the small theocracies in which the marabouts kept order without need of the *makhzan*. The Alawites also allowed that *baraka* was not indivisible in the sultan but was a multiple gift that came in a special way to many of the faithful. The marabouts recognized that the sultan ruled by divine grace, and the sultan in turn accepted that the same grace fell on hundreds of marabouts as well.

The influence of maraboutism was social and intellectual as well as political. Essentially intuitive and transcendental in their theology, the marabouts, stressing community solidarity, mutual assistance, and self-defense, offered psychological reinforcement to the masses who followed them in a way that the mosque, schools, and courts could not. As the cities of the interior became more isolated and their social and economic focus more localized after the reign of Ismail, the rural phenomenon of maraboutism penetrated them as well. The effect of this diffusion of values across the barrier of habitats—city and countryside—that were usually at odds and lacking in dialogue was to deepen the Islamization of Morocco, albeit in a sometimes heterodox form.

Political Institutions

Morocco's government in the nineteenth century was little different in form from what the country had known in the sixteenth century. The country was never a unitary political community, and the influence of the *makhzan* over the tribes varied in relation to the strength of its army and the forces that any given tribe might assemble against it. To finance the government the sultan had each year to call out troops from the *jaysh* tribes and to travel with them to some part of the *bilad al makhzan*,

extracting taxes from the tribes there. Force was often necessary, as many of the tribes denied the sultan's right to tax them and resented having to support his entourage in their territory.

Because absolute power was vested theoretically in the sultan, all legislation was embodied in his *zahirs*. Government was conducted by five ministries—interior, justice, finance, war, and foreign affairs. The grand vizier, the sultan's highest executive official, was in effect prime minister, as well as minister of interior, having responsibility for tax collection and internal security. Under the grand vizier the pashas (governors of the cities) and *qaid*s exercised their authority. These offices, often hereditary, were reserved for families powerful in a given locality. As long as revenues continued to come in and relative order prevailed, the sultan placed no restrictions on their actions.

The sharifian sultans relied on personal relationships rather than rigid procedures to impose their authority in the *bilad al makhzan*, which was organized on the basis of tribal rather than territorial divisions. Justice was dispensed in parallel courts: the religious court headed by a qadi and the *makhzan* court presided over by the *qaid* of the district. This division of jurisdiction was contrary to strict Islamic practice, by which the qadi monopolized judicial authority, but there was a long tradition for it in Morocco where the legal authority of the *makhzan* had been—and continued to be—extended by military conquest and maintained by military occupation. The Maliki legal system, which applied in both courts, had been extensively modified in practice and expanded to encompass criminal cases in the court presided over by the *qaid*. In tribal areas, however, Berber customary law prevailed, and the jurisdiction of sharia gave way to that of the folk tribunals.

Mulay Hassan I and Mulay Abd al Aziz

Sultan Mulay Hassan I (1873–94) was the only strong figure to emerge in Morocco in the nineteenth century. His government was remarkably stable, and he tried, although with little success, to reduce corruption and introduce modern reforms. Hassan I reorganized and equipped the Moroccan army and led it on continuous campaigns, subduing dissident tribes and collecting taxes, in a manner that impressed European observers.

Hassan I became ill and died while on a tax-collecting expedition. His chamberlain, Bu Ahmed, the son of a black slave, summoned one of the sultan's younger sons, Abd al Aziz (1894–1908), announced the boy's succession to the troops, and then presented the ulama, responsible for legitimizing the succession,

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with a *fait accompli*. The 14-year-old Abd al Aziz' elder brothers and their supporters were arrested and imprisoned. For six years until his death in 1900, Bu Ahmed, backed by the army, ruled Morocco with an iron hand as regent for the young sultan, whose attention he diverted from matters of state. Abd al Aziz, well-intentioned but totally unprepared for the task of leading Morocco during a critical period in its history, continued to put his confidence in manipulative advisers when he finally took over the reins of government. The country's financial position deteriorated to the point that Morocco was virtually mortgaged to foreign creditors.

Nowhere was the weakness of the *makhzan* more evident than in its inability to apprehend the Rif chieftain Raisuli. From his stronghold in the Tétouan district, Raisuli and his well-armed followers had for years defied the forces of the *makhzan*. His deeds—banditry, kidnapping, and extortion—had made him a legend in that part of the country. In 1904 Raisuli abducted a foreign resident of Tangier, Ion Perdicaris, whom American authorities believed to be a naturalized United States citizen, and held him for US\$70,000 ransom. United States president Theodore Roosevelt demanded "Perdicaris alive or Raisuli dead" and threatened to dispatch United States Marines to Morocco. The Moroccan government was powerless to act, except to pay Raisuli the ransom that he demanded for Perdicari's return and to legitimize his activities by naming the bandit *qaid* over the area that he had for so long terrorized. Outlawed again in 1907 because of his despotism, Raisuli resumed his career as a bandit and pursued it successfully for many more years.

One of several pretenders to dispute Abd al Aziz' title was a chieftain from the tribes of the Taza Gap named Bu Hamara, who claimed to be the sultan's elder brother, Mohammed. In 1902 he raised a revolt in the Taza region, charging Abd al Aziz with "collusion with the infidel," and attracted a sizable following. At one point Bu Hamara had won over most of the territory between the Algerian border and the city of Fes. Although defeated finally in 1908, Bu Hamara had nonetheless contributed to the growing anarchy in Morocco that became the major pretext for European intervention.

European Interests in Morocco

The latter part of the nineteenth century saw the acceleration of European colonial expansion throughout Africa. Morocco's weakness and instability invited European intervention to protect threatened investments and to demand economic concessions.

Morocco became an arena in which the great powers flexed their muscles and tested their strength. Britain, Germany, Spain, and France each viewed politically isolated but strategically situated Morocco as a threat in the hands of any of the others, as well as an area for profitable economic penetration.

Britain's economic interests and political influence in Morocco were the most substantial of any of the European powers in the late nineteenth century. Hassan I and later Abd al Aziz relied heavily on British advisers. British engineers constructed railroads financed through British investment. Britain's concern with Morocco, however, was essentially strategic: to protect the straits at the entrance to the Mediterranean by ensuring that the shore opposite Gibraltar stayed out of the hands of a rival power. Britain's commitment to defend Moroccan independence counterbalanced French proximity in Algeria, but it was eventually weakened as Britain sought to strengthen its ties with France against the threat from Germany. A latecomer in the race for colonies, Germany had considerable mining concessions in Morocco, and by the beginning of the twentieth century its nationals formed the largest group of foreign property holders in the country.

Spanish interests derived from the long historical connection between the two countries. The only power that directly controlled territory in Morocco, Spain held the tiny coastal enclaves (*presidios*) of Ceuta, Melilla, Peñón de Alhucemas, Peñón de Vélez de la Gomera, and the *Islas Chafarinas*. A brief war with Morocco in 1860 had also established Spain's claim to Ifni, a strip of land on the Atlantic coast. Spain annexed a large portion of the Western Sahara in 1884, but the occupation of this territory and Ifni was not completed until 1934.

Morocco came into direct conflict with France over the French seizure of Algeria in 1830. French intervention in Moroccan affairs steadily increased after that date and further complicated the country's troubled domestic politics. For decades Morocco had sought to revive its hegemony in the Tlemcen area, which was nominally part of the Ottoman Empire. When the French entered Algeria, the tribes around Tlemcen appealed to Sultan Mulay Abd al Rahman II (1822–59) for assistance. The sultan responded by sending a pasha to Tlemcen to represent Morocco, but he agreed under French pressure not to station troops there.

Relations with France were severely strained when the Algerian rebel, Abd al Qadir, claiming to be the agent of Abd al Rahman, led the Berbers in a holy war against the French. Abd al Qadir was defeated and took refuge in Morocco's *bilad al siba*, from which he continued raids into Algeria. When challenged by

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France for providing the Algerian rebels with a sanctuary, Abd al Rahman countered accurately that his authority did not extend to the area where they operated. In response, French warships bombarded Tangier and Essaouira in 1844, and French forces routed the Moroccan army at Wadi Isly, thereby compelling Abd al Rahman to cooperate with the French in hunting down Abd al Qadir on Moroccan territory. The next year the Convention of Lalla Marhnia redefined the northern part of the Moroccan-Algerian border in France's favor. Morocco remained a refuge for Algerian rebels, however, and French border incursions in pursuit of them, temporary occupations of Moroccan territory, and naval bombardments were commonplace.

French relations with Morocco were based on an immediate need to control raids by tribesmen across the Moroccan border into Algeria. Ultimately, however, they were part of a French design to extend political and economic control across North Africa. Britain and Spain, concerned that France would press formal claims to a sphere of influence in Morocco, cooperated in convening the Madrid Conference of 1880 at which the European powers, France included, and the United States confirmed Morocco's independence.

Diplomacy of Protection

After 1880 Moroccan affairs received the constant attention of the European powers. Treaties were signed between them and Morocco and among the powers that reiterated their intent to guarantee the country's independence and territorial integrity. The first years of the twentieth century witnessed a rush of diplomatic maneuvering through which the European powers and France in particular furthered their interests in North Africa. The Moroccan crises of 1905 and 1911 were links in the chain of events that led to World War I.

In 1901 France secretly agreed to allow Italy a free hand in Tripolitania (northwestern Libya) in return for a concession of the same freedom to France in Morocco. A major section of the 1904 agreements between France and Britain—the Entente Cordiale directed against Germany—dealt with Morocco. The published accord stated once more their intention to respect Morocco's territorial integrity; however, the primacy of British influence in Egypt was recognized in exchange for British acceptance of France's sphere of influence in Morocco. Later in 1904 France and Spain reached a secret understanding that incorporated the principles of the Anglo-French agreement and outlined the

territory to be placed under Spanish administration in the event a protectorate was established.

In 1905 France presented Morocco with a series of proposals for reforms to be carried out under French tutelage. Angered by France's failure to consult Germany, Kaiser Wilhelm II made a dramatic appearance in Tangier during which he publicly endorsed the international guarantees of Morocco's territorial integrity and agreements ensuring equal access to its trade for all nations. He referred pointedly to the sultan as a sovereign ruler and to Morocco as an independent country. Two months after the kaiser's visit, a more confident Abd al Aziz responded to French demands with a counterproposal that reforms should not be carried out exclusively under the aegis of France but with the aid of all nations that had been parties to the Madrid Conference. With German backing, the sultan called for another international conference to discuss the question of Moroccan sovereignty.

At the conference, convened in early 1906 at the Spanish city of Algeciras, 12 interested European nations (France, Spain, Britain, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, Italy, Portugal, Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg) and the United States, with Morocco in attendance, reaffirmed their respect for Moroccan independence. It was clearly understood, however, that the principal object of the conference was to prevent Morocco from becoming a *casus belli* between France and Germany.

The German position in Morocco was weakened as Britain, pressed to honor its commitments under the Entente Cordiale, stood behind the demands of France that it monitor the Moroccan reforms. Germany, finding itself isolated diplomatically at the conference it had initiated, recognized those portions of the 1904 Anglo-French agreement dealing with Morocco on the condition that German commercial interests would be safeguarded. The conferees assigned France and Spain responsibility for training Morocco's gendarmerie. France was granted virtual guardianship of Morocco's finances through its control of a state bank created to supervise payment of foreign debts, which had been assumed earlier by the French government. The administration of the Moroccan customs service and, later, the collection of customs were taken over by French officials. The protocols of the Algeciras Conference provided that every nation have equal access to Morocco, but they could not alter the reality that the international community had sanctioned the preeminence of French influence there. Nor could they disguise France's intentions to intervene militarily when deemed necessary to

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protect its interests.

In 1904 French forces occupied territory in the Figuig area south of Oujda, which in the absence of a clearly defined border had been nominally part of Morocco. The murder of a French citizen in Marrakech was the pretext for the occupation of Oujda in 1907. Further outbursts of violence against French citizens and property provoked the subsequent military occupation of Casablanca and Rabat, where the Moroccans offered bloody resistance.

Mulay Hafid

The inaction of Abd al Aziz at the time of the French military intervention in 1907 served as an excuse for a coup d'état staged by the ulama of Marrakech, who proclaimed as sultan his brother, Mulay Hafid, vice regent (*khalifa*) of the city, on the condition that he abrogate concessions made at Algeciras and declare a holy war against Spain. Abd al Aziz resisted but, failing to win support in the country at large, he eventually abdicated.

Once installed as sultan the next year, Hafid put aside the pledge he had made to the religious leaders, which no responsible Moroccan officials had ever considered wise or possible, and obtained the formal recognition of the powers represented at the Algeciras Conference. Hafid took steps to protect European interests against popular violence and to reassure Morocco's creditors of the stability of his regime. But, as it became more difficult to fulfill his obligations to the guaranteeing powers to keep order and to win the support of his subjects who wished to see the country rid of foreigners, the sultan retreated further into his drug addiction. Local uprisings and demonstrations increased in frequency and intensity, and the forces at the disposal of the *makhzan* seemed unable to control them. In 1911 the sultan himself was besieged by his own subjects in Fès and appealed to France for military assistance. In response, French troops dispatched to relieve the sultan occupied Fès, as well as Rabat and Meknès. Spain, uninvited, countered by seizing the area south of Tangier.

Germany, still smarting from its setback at Algeciras, reacted to the French military occupation by dispatching the gunboat *Panther* to Agadir, ostensibly to protect German interests threatened by local disorders. The French understood the German move to be a provocation, since damage to the small warship could have been considered in Berlin to be a pretext for war. After some weeks in the harbor at Agadir, the *Panther* was recalled home, and Germany withdrew its opposition to the

French occupation in exchange for a piece of French territory in the Congo basin. The establishment of a French protectorate over Morocco was agreed upon by all of the signatories to the treaty produced by the Algeiras Conference except the United States, which withheld recognition until it entered World War I in 1917.

Treaty of Fès

The French-Moroccan Treaty of Fès of March 30, 1912, provided that the French government would establish in cooperation with the sultan "a new regime comprising the administrative, judicial, educational, economic, financial, and military reforms which the French government may see fit to introduce within the Moroccan territory." While preserving the religious status and traditional prestige of the sultan, the French would organize a reformed sharifian *makhzan*. Measures of the new regime would be established by a *zahir* of the sultan upon the proposal of the French government, represented by a resident general, who was empowered to act as the sole intermediary between the sultan and foreign representatives. France would thus control Morocco's foreign relations and, specifically, its foreign borrowing. France was permitted to station troops in Morocco, to exercise police powers, and to reorganize with the sultan's approval the finances of the central government.

The treaty also specified that Spanish interests and possessions in Morocco would be recognized following bilateral negotiations between France and Spain. It also accepted the existing special international status of Tangier. A French-Spanish treaty in November 1912 established a Spanish protectorate over the northern coastal zone and the Rif, as well as over the Tarfaya area south of the Drâa River, where the sultan remained nominally the sovereign and was represented by a vice regent under the control of a Spanish high commissioner. Although organized as a separate protectorate, the northern zone was "sublet" to Spain by France in accord with the 1904 agreements recognizing the Spanish sphere of influence on Morocco's Mediterranean coast. The Atlantic coastal enclave of Ifni was regarded as sovereign Spanish territory distinct from the protectorate zones. The presidios on the Mediterranean coast were considered parts of metropolitan Spain.

The special status of the city of Tangier was recognized in the 1912 treaties. Tangier became an international zone in 1923, and the next year it was placed under international administration in which foreign relations were reserved to France. Religious

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authority over Moroccan subjects was delegated to the *mandub* (sultan's agent).

Hafid was caught between accepting foreign intervention or facing increasing chaos within his country. He signed the treaty but refused to put it into effect. Patriots condemned Hafid as a traitor to his country and to Islam. The French forced him to abdicate in favor of his younger brother, Mulay Yusif (1912-27), a puppet of the French whose nomination was nonetheless dutifully ratified in the traditional manner by the ulama of Fès.

The Protectorate

From a strictly legal point of view, the 1912 Treaty of Fès did not deprive Morocco of its status as a sovereign state, even though all external prerogatives and most of the internal jurisdiction had been transferred to France. Theoretically, the sultan remained the sole source of sovereignty in the three separate zones of Morocco. He reigned, but he did not rule. In the respective zones the real authority and the source of legislative, executive, and judicial powers (on matters other than religious) rested with the French resident general in Rabat, the Spanish high commissioner in Tétouan, and eventually the International Committee of Control in Tangier (see fig. 7).

French policy in Morocco, as it evolved, was two-pronged. First, in accordance with the Treaty of Fès, the mission of the residency was to protect the enfeebled *makhzan*, leaving indigenous law and institutions intact but reorganizing government administration. It was argued that France's security demanded a stable Morocco and that stability required the restoration of order and respect for the *makhzan*. Second, however, the residency purposefully constructed a network of alliances directly with the *qaid*s and other local leaders, whose authority—which had often been in competition with that of the sultan—the French recognized in return for their cooperation with the residency. One of the effects of this policy was to co-opt potentially rebellious *qaid*s into the service of the French-administered *makhzan*, but another was to strengthen the personal power of the *qaid*s in their areas at the expense of the sultan.

Marshal Lyautey

The French resident general from 1912 to 1925 was Marshal Louis Hubert Gonzalve Lyautey, an aristocratic officer with a

distinguished record of colonial service who attempted to implement a limited interpretation of the role of France in the Moroccan protectorate. His view was that France had undertaken to act in the name of the sultan in order to modernize the *makhzan*, at the same time respecting Moroccan sovereignty and culture. Lyautey's formula was to "govern with the *makhzan*, not against it," but he insisted that his authority as resident general must not be questioned—in Rabat or Paris. Lyautey was conscious of Morocco's past, and he tolerated no condescension toward local customs by French officials. "Do not offend a single tradition," he cautioned his subordinates, "do not change a single habit."

His first task was the pacification of the dissident tribes and the assertion of central government authority throughout the country. The old urban elite and the prosperous tribes, who valued the benefits of security, did not resist French intervention; but within weeks of promulgation of the protectorate treaty, riots broke out in Fès protesting the sultan's surrender to foreign "infidels." Marrakech was seized by a marabout, and other areas withdrew their allegiance from the sultan. In the first two years of the protectorate Lyautey succeeded in establishing a working relationship with the *makhzan*, reorganizing the Moroccan army, and pacifying central Morocco between Fès and Marrakech, the High Atlas and the Taza Gap. During this period he won over the Berber leaders of the Atlas, including the important Thami al Glawi, pasha of Marrakech.

Following the maxim "display force in order to avoid using it," Lyautey committed large numbers of French troops, supported by local auxiliaries, to the pacification of each dissident tribal area. He did not order frontal assaults with the superior forces under his command, but rather he surrounded the tribal area to be pacified, isolated the tribes, and then methodically reduced it to submission to the *makhzan*. Pacification was made easier by the mutual hostility of the tribes, which came to trust the French—particularly Lyautey—more than they could each other. The process left no long-lasting scars. Lyautey, for instance, refused to turn over captured Berber dissidents to Moroccan authorities on the grounds that the French army—not the *makhzan*—had subdued them. But neither did he support the idea of Berber tribal autonomy under French patronage, as proposed by some, although the resident general, like many French officers, was personally sympathetic to it. Dissident tribal leaders, however, were often recruited as *qaid*s once they had surrendered to the French army.

Lyautey, who exercised considerable independence from





Figure 7. The Protectorate, 1912-56

Historical Setting



Paris, disregarded instructions to withdraw after the outbreak of the European war in 1914 from the positions he had won in the interior. He pointed out that any move likely to be perceived as a French retreat would be damaging to the long-range interests of the protectorate. With reduced forces, he continued to nibble away at the *bilad al siba*, where dissidents were receiving German support, and enlarged on public works projects, using conspicuous German prisoner-of-war labor. More than 40,000 Moroccan troops served in Europe under French officers during World War I. In 1923 all Moroccan troops, except the sultan's ceremonial guard and irregulars attached to the *qaid*s, were incorporated into the French army.

French president Raymond Poincaré said of Lyautey that "he meant to make the army the quartermaster of civilization and the soldier the forerunner of the engineer, the tradesman, and the teacher." Lyautey's residency depended most heavily—and with greatest confidence—on several hundred dedicated and resourceful military officers assigned to the Bureau of Native Affairs (*Service des Affaires Indigènes*—SAI). The SAI officers exercised real and usually absolute power in tribal areas, where they were responsible for political administration, economic development, public works, and defense. A warlike people themselves, the Berbers among whom the SAI worked understood better than Lyautey's French political critics the combination of military and civil command and seemed to prefer army rule.

Lyautey was criticized for tolerating corruption—of a sort that had always been a part of Moroccan administrative practice—by the *qaid*s through whom the SAI controlled the tribal areas. The Glawi clan was particularly notorious for their extortions. "Morocco is a cow," it was remarked: "the *qaid*s milk her while France holds the horns."

Lyautey's years of benevolent authoritarianism provided Morocco with an intelligent administration, often as sensitive to the future of the Moroccan people as it was to that of the French presence in North Africa. One of the most effective proconsuls in the history of European colonialism, Lyautey was convinced of the validity of France's "civilizing mission" in raising the level of public life in Morocco—without, however, exhibiting the arrogance associated with the concept. He foresaw the creation of a French-educated elite (*évolués*) that would identify with French interests in Morocco and on whom responsibility for government under French supervision could eventually devolve. Under his successors as resident general, much was done in the

Lyautey tradition for Morocco, but contrary to his vision little was done by Moroccans. The condescension that he had deplored became the rule. "The Arab is the windmill, while the European is the wind," it was explained; "when the wind lets up, the mill stops."

Abd al Krim and the Rif Rebellion

In 1919 Lyautey resumed large-scale operations against the dissident tribes, but his methodical campaign was interrupted in 1924 by the threat to French Morocco posed by a revolt of Berber tribes in the Rif in the Spanish zone under Abd al Krim. Until 1919 Spain had done almost nothing to assert control over the *bilad al siba* in the northern zone, and even the areas around the presidios were weakly held. When in 1921 the Spanish army sent an expeditionary force of nearly 20,000 men into the eastern Rif, Abd al Krim, a qadi in Melilla, rallied the mountain tribes in resistance. In July the advancing Spanish column was cut off by the Rif Berbers at Annoual and virtually wiped out. Surviving units deserted their outposts in the interior and fled toward Melilla, leaving behind more than 9,000 dead and missing and large stores of rifles, ammunition, and artillery.

Abd al Krim, a scholar who proved to be one of the great military geniuses of his time, was also the first major Moroccan political leader to justify his cause in terms that lay outside the dynastic system. His movement was in its inception regional and tribal in character, and it limited its activities to the Spanish zone; but it has been seen as bridging the gap between traditional tribal rebellions and modern, ideologically motivated revolution. Abd al Krim promoted an Islamic revival in the Rif, which was directed as much against the principle of sharifian political and religious authority as against the Spaniards. Taking the title "Amir of the Rif," Abd al Krim in 1922 founded the Rif Republic, the first central government that much of the region had known for centuries. Abd al Krim abolished the customary law courts and replaced them with sharia, uniting hostile tribes in the Rif under his own tribe, the Ait Waryaghar, who dominated the movement.

For more than three years the Rif Republic administered most of the northern zone, collecting taxes and operating an ambitious program of education and social services while carrying on a successful war against a European army. Abd al Krim curbed banditry, in part by capturing Raisuli and ending his long career. A popular and romantic figure abroad, Abd al Krim sent diplomatic missions to Europe, holding out the promise of mining concessions to gain support for Rif independence.

The success of Abd al Krim's republican government was the source of his defeat. The French held the Spanish military in low esteem and refused to cooperate in suppressing the Rif Berbers after the disaster at Annoual for fear of losing their hard-won prestige among the tribes in the French zone. But the Rif Republic was more than a tribal rebellion and held out the example of a successful indigenous state that was seen as a threat to French dominion in North Africa. The French provoked a confrontation that Abd al Krim had tried to avoid, and in the spring of 1925 his forces crossed into the southern zone, overrunning French positions, and drove to within 30 kilometers of Fès. Abd al Krim and Lyautey both appealed for the support of the tribes, which remained loyal to the French and vindicated the resident general's policy.

France assumed primary responsibility for the war and permanently occupied a portion of the northern zone that had been pacified by French forces. It required over 400,000 French and Spanish troops, supported by armored units and aircraft, and a large-scale amphibious landing by Spanish forces at Alhucemas Bay to end the Rif rebellion. In the meantime, Marshal Henri Pétain had been dispatched to Morocco to relieve Lyautey of his military command. Abd al Krim was approached with a compromise peace plan that would have left him a *qaid* in the Rif, but he would accept nothing short of independence. In 1926 he surrendered to the French with his entourage and was sent to an honorable exile on the island of Réunion. French forces thereafter gradually subdued the Middle Atlas and Anti-Atlas, the Sous and Drâa valleys, and the Saharan steppes. By 1934 all of Morocco had been brought under central control for the first time in the country's history.

Many military reputations were made or lost during the Rif war. Francisco Franco emerged from it as Spain's most famous soldier and its youngest general officer. Moroccan troops of Spain's Army of Africa spearheaded Franco's drive on Madrid in 1936 and served the nationalist cause throughout the Spanish Civil War.

Administration of the Protectorate

Under the terms of the Treaty of Fès, the resident general acted in a dual role. He was the supreme representative of the French Republic, but he was also the sultan's minister of war and minister of foreign affairs and was responsible for all government operations. Lyautey's policy was to preserve traditional

institutions and provide guidance for Morocco in the economic and political spheres.

Even in Lyautey's time, official French circles were beginning to favor the policy of assimilation rather than tutelage, and the drive toward direct administration proved impossible to check. Lyautey's dual position as both resident general and commander in chief of the French forces in Morocco opened him to attack from opponents across the French political spectrum. The left resented his combination of civil and military authority and joined the right in opposing his resistance to European settlement in the protectorate. After Lyautey had been relieved, Morocco was reduced, for all practical purposes, to the status of a French colony. His successors progressively introduced direct French administration. Although care was taken to preserve the paraphernalia of his authority, the sultan became a mere figurehead. The *makhzan* had no real powers, and the *quids* and pashas became merely the executive assistants of the French regional administrators.

The bureaucracy became a political power when French civil servants, who were assigned to Morocco in increasing numbers after 1925, allied themselves with the French settlers (*colons*) and with their supporters in France to prevent any moves in the direction of Moroccan autonomy. The process of legislation passed fully into the hands of the resident general and his staff. *Zahirs* were drawn up and approved by the resident general and submitted in final form for the sultan's seal. The French administration then promulgated and executed the new laws. Decrees issued by the resident general in administrative matters did not need the sultan's approval and were widely used in times of strained relations between the palace and the residency. The sultan's personal government was composed of the grand vizier, who was nominally the premier and as minister of interior had de jure supervision over pashas and *quids*; the minister of Muslim justice, who supervised the sharia courts; and the minister of religious endowments.

The French-staffed residency services were divided into the directorates of sharifian affairs, interior, and public security. In addition, the residency had a number of other regulatory and supervisory agencies: political, economic, administrative, and military. For administration purposes the country was divided into civil regions under appointees of the French foreign ministry and military regions under military officers from the SAI. The most important representative of the residency in the rural areas was the SAI district officer, who was the chief contact between the

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French administration and the local Moroccan population. Cities were administered by French chiefs of municipal services. The pashas and *qaid*s were retained as tax collectors, directors of public order, and judges in civil and criminal cases. Their regulations and decisions, however, required the countersignature of an appropriate French official, and all their reports and communications to the sultan's personal government were routed through French regional offices. After World War II the sultan was forbidden to initiate informal meetings with the pashas and *qaid*s.

In reorganizing the judicial system the French asserted the right to administer justice in cases involving non-Moroccans. By 1916 all foreign states except the United States and Britain had renounced their long-standing capitulatory rights. Britain relinquished its rights in 1937, but the United States retained its special jurisdiction until the protectorate ended in 1956.

Local consultative bodies were established under the protectorate, ostensibly to give voice to popular interests and demands but in fact to act as sounding boards for French policies. The highest of these was the Council of Government, which had French and Moroccan sections, each composed of representatives of the local consultative bodies and administration officials who belonged *ex officio*. The major task of the council was to discuss proposed budgets, but members had no vote. After 1945 the French tried to develop consultative bodies on a wider basis; but as all attempts were made on the premise that the French minority should have representation equal to that of the Moroccan majority, Sultan Sidi Mohammed V (1927-61), backed by the growing nationalist movement with which he was allied, refused to cooperate.

The French gave support to pashas and *qaid*s opposed to the sultan. The Glawi family in particular, traditional enemies of the Alawis before the protectorate, allied their interests early with those of the French. In return for his assurance of peace in the area around Marrakech, the Glawi chief, who was pasha of the city and *qaid* over several tribes, was permitted to multiply his landholdings and to exercise nearly absolute control over administration, commerce, agriculture—and prostitution—in southern Morocco. The French also allowed considerable freedom to cooperative marabouts and religious brotherhoods, which had earlier opposed any contact with the "infidel" Europeans, as counterweights to the sultan's authority as imam.

Government operations developed in the Spanish zone in much the same pattern as they did in the French zone.

Nominally, executive power in the zone resided in the appointed representative of the sultan. In practice, that authority was exercised by the Spanish high commissioner in Tétouan and his administration. After 1934 Tarfaya was linked with Ifni and the Spanish Sahara under a military governor in a single administrative unit (Spanish West Africa) with its capital at Sidi Ifni.

The sovereignty of the sultan in Tangier was recognized by all the treaties regulating the special status of the city, and the international administration exercised its delegated powers. The *mandub*, a personal representative of the sultan, had powers similar to those of a pasha with respect to the Moroccan population of Tangier but was subject to the same limitations in the discharge of his duties as was his sovereign. The highest supervisory body of the administration of Tangier was the International Committee of Control, composed of the consular representatives of the signatory powers of the Algeiras Conference.

Economic and Social Developments

Private European commercial interests were active in Morocco long before the establishment of the protectorate. As pacification proceeded, the French government pushed economic development, particularly the exploitation of Morocco's mineral wealth, the creation of a modern transportation system, and the development of a modern agricultural sector geared to the French market. Under Lyautey's administration Casablanca, which had been a small fishing community in the nineteenth century, was converted into a great seaport, and work was begun on several other ports. A railroad system, begun before the protectorate, was extended initially for military purposes but also with a view to opening the interior to economic exploitation. An extensive road network was constructed as well. Agricultural timber surveys were undertaken, mineral prospecting was encouraged and regulated, industrialization was stimulated, an electrification program and irrigation projects were initiated, chambers of commerce were opened, and a start was made toward modernizing the tax system.

Lyautey had opposed, but could not stem, the influx of French settlers and purely exploitive commercial interests. Tens of thousands of *colons* entered Morocco and bought up large amounts of the rich agricultural land on the plains. Privately and officially sponsored colonization doubled in the three years after Lyautey left office, and by the late 1930s *colons* owned about 1 million hectares of the best agricultural land. By 1936 about

200,000 Europeans, including 150,000 French citizens, lived in Morocco. Interest groups that formed among these elements continually pressured the Paris government to increase its control over Morocco and promote French economic penetration.

Urban development on European models—the so-called new towns (*villes nouvelles*)—mushroomed during the 1920s and 1930s. This development was hastened by the growth of suburban slums (*bidonvilles*) around the cities where rural Moroccans had migrated in search of work. Modern sanitation, hygiene, and medical facilities were introduced for the French population and gradually reached out to the Moroccan population as well.

The French educational system was introduced intact in Morocco, initially for the children of the *colons*. As educational facilities expanded, however, the number of Moroccans attending French-administered schools steadily increased. A parallel modern school system using Arabic did not exist, and instruction in that language was largely confined to classical literature and religion in Muslim schools.

Origins of the Nationalist Movement

Moroccan nationalism stemmed from the merger of two reform movements that had appeared in the early 1920s and whose aims, originally unrelated, later became intertwined. The first was a religious reform movement, the Salafiya, which grew up among the ulama and students associated with the ancient Al Qayrawaniyin University at Fès. Its members advocated the fundamentalist ideals originally preached by Islamic reformers in the late nineteenth century. The Salafiya sought the spiritual and intellectual renewal of an orthodox Islam stripped of the mystical accretions associated with the often pro-French marabouts and religious brotherhoods. While retaining the essential spiritual and moral values of Islam, the Salafiya also sought to adapt Moroccan society to the requirements of the modern world by using the tools of Western technology. During the 1920s Salafiya schools were opened in several cities to spread knowledge of Arabic and Islamic culture, which had been ignored in the French schools.

The first modern nationalist political movement arose in 1925 among French-educated students in Rabat, who founded secret societies to promote opposition to the growing intervention of the French administration. Within a few years societies combining the aims of religious reform and the assertion of Morocco's political independence were being formed throughout the country, and by 1930 the future leaders of the nationalist movement had already

become well known through their activities in these groups. Allal al Fassi assumed leadership of the Salafiya movement, while Ahmed Balafrej, one of the founders of the Rabat group, went to Paris seeking support for Moroccan independence among left-wing political circles there. Mohammed Hassan Wazzini, who was a university student in Paris at the time, became a disciple of the pan-Islamic movement, which was giving common cause to Arab nationalists throughout North Africa and the Middle East.

The promulgation in 1930 of the so-called Berber *zahir* converted what had been an isolated elite-based movement into a popular force aggressively opposed to continued French rule. The French administration claimed that the *zahir* was intended to modernize the complex Moroccan legal system by ending the judicial powers formerly exercised over the Berber tribes by the *qajids* appointed by the *makhzan*. These powers were shifted to the traditional representative Berber community councils. The effect of this step, however, would have been to reduce the authority of the *makhzan* still further and to strengthen the autonomy of the Berber tribes. Nationalists saw in it still another attempt by the French to divide the Berber and Arab elements of the population in order more easily to impose French control by deliberately reviving the old divisions between *bilad al makhzan* and *bilad al siba* under overall French authority. The supporters of Islamic orthodoxy were incensed by what they took to be a threat to Islam in the strengthening of Berber customary law at the expense of sharia. Public demonstrations against the *zahir* spread rapidly to all Moroccan cities and led to the arrest of nationalist leaders.

The French managed to bring together all the diverse strands of Moroccan politics at the time in opposition to the Berber *zahir*. Indignant protests against the measure were made all over the Muslim world in response to the publicity given the *zahir* by the Moroccan nationalists in Paris, influencing the French government to instruct the resident general not to enforce it. Although the protest movement quickly subsided, the proof it had given of the breadth and depth of Moroccan opposition to the French protectorate encouraged the nationalists to organize on a more ambitious scale.

In December 1934 a small group of nationalists—members of the newly formed Moroccan Action Committee (Comité d'Action Marocaine—CAM)—proposed the long, detailed Plan of Reforms, which they submitted simultaneously to the sultan, the resident general, and the French foreign ministry. The plan called for a return to indirect rule as envisaged by the Treaty of

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Fès, unification of the judicial systems of Morocco, elimination of the judicial functions of *qajids* and pashas, admission of Moroccans to government positions, and establishment of representative councils.

The moderate tactics used by the CAM to obtain consideration of reform—petitions, newspaper editorials, and personal appeals to French officials—proved inadequate. The tensions created in the CAM by the failure of the Plan of Reforms caused it to split; Wazzini withdrew from the movement and took with him most of the traditionalists. The rump CAM led by Fassi was reconstituted as a nationalist political party to gain mass support for its more radical and far-reaching demands. A number of violent incidents laid to Fassi's followers caused the French administration to suppress the party in 1937. Fassi was arrested and exiled to Gabon, where he remained until 1946. Wazzini, whose splinter group was proscribed, was also sent into exile. In the Spanish zone, groups similar to the Rabat nationalist movement were formed in the late 1920s. When the French suppressed the nationalist demonstrations in 1930, Tétouan became a center for activists in both zones.

World War II

Allied forces liberated Vichy-administrated French Morocco in November 1942 after conducting amphibious landings as part of Operation Torch. The landings occurred on November 8 at Fédala (present-day Mohammedia) near Casablanca, at Port Lyautey (present-day Kenitra), and at Safi by 35,000 American troops that embarked from ports in the United States. French resistance on the ground was light except at Port Lyautey, where the invasion force came under concentrated fire from positions defending the estuary of the Sebou River. A sharp naval battle was fought off the coast, inflicting heavy losses on the French fleet. On November 10 the resident general, General Henri Nogués, ordered forces under his command to surrender to the Allies.

Having secured Morocco in only two days, American units moved quickly to link up with British and American forces that had landed at Oran and Algiers. In order not to provoke a reaction from Spain, the United States gave assurances to Madrid that no operations were being planned against Spanish Morocco.

During World War II the badly split Moroccan nationalist movement became more cohesive. The French defeat in 1940, the enunciation of the Atlantic Charter the next year, and the subsequent promise of independence held out to Syria and Lebanon

encouraged informed Moroccans to consider the real possibility of political change in the postwar era. At the outbreak of the war, Mohammed V had pledged Moroccan support to France and its allies. After the fall of France he continued to give his personal loyalty to the Allies and refused to receive German representatives in Morocco. He also declined to issue a Vichy-initiated decree aimed at the persecution of Jews and withheld support for the pro-Vichy resident general in his attempted resistance to the Allied landings in Morocco. During the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill met with the sultan separately from French authorities. Correspondence with Roosevelt after the conference strengthened the sultan's belief that the United States would support Moroccan demands for independence.

The French community in Morocco had been divided in its loyalties before the Allied landings, the residency and many *colons* supporting the Vichy regime. When Moroccan army units were demobilized in 1940, many troops continued to train secretly under SAI officers and returned to uniform after the liberation. By the end of the war some 300,000 Moroccans had seen service in the French army. Moroccan units participated in the Tunisian campaign and the invasions of Italy and southern France, providing at one point about half of all French combat troops in the Mediterranean theater.

More than 80,000 Moroccans subsequently served with French forces in Indochina and Korea, although recruiting became a problem and press-gangs were instituted in the cities. The loyalty of the Moroccan soldiers was to their French officers rather than to France, and many army veterans joined in the armed resistance to the protectorate after 1955.

Istiqlal

The nationalists were disappointed in their belief that the Allied victory in Morocco would lead to a modification of French rule and pave the way for independence. The continued suppression of their activities led the nationalists to the conviction that independence must precede political reform. Balafrej and Ahmed Mohammed Lyazidi led a group of veteran nationalists, joined by young urban intellectuals and middle-class Moroccans, in forming a new political party, the Istiqlal (Independence). At its first conference in Rabat in January 1944, the Istiqlal issued a manifesto demanding full independence, national reunification, and a democratic constitution. The sultan had received and approved the manifesto before its submission to the resident general, who answered that,

although political and social reforms would be granted, no basic change in the protectorate status was being considered. The general principles of reform that he voiced were categorically rejected by the Istiqlal. A few days later, 18 Istiqlal leaders, including Balafrej and Lyazidi, were arrested on a charge of having collaborated with the Germans, the action sparking violent demonstrations against the French administration by nationalists.

Other nationalist parties were formed during this period and immediately after the end of the war. On his return from exile, Wazzini formed the Democratic Party of Independence (Parti Démocratique de l'Indépendance—PDI), thus preserving the split in the nationalist movement created in the mid-1930s.

Struggle for Independence

The general sympathy of the sultan for the nationalists had become evident by the end of the war, although Mohammed V still hoped to see complete independence achieved gradually. The public was much more aware of nationalists than it had been in 1939, but the residency in 1945, supported by French economic interests and vigorously backed by most of the *colons*, adamantly refused to consider even those reforms the nationalists demanded short of independence.

Official intransigence contributed to increased animosity between the nationalists and the *colons* and gradually widened the split between the sultan and the resident general. In 1946 a liberal resident general, Eirik Labonné, proposed a series of reforms aimed at improving living conditions and giving Moroccans a greater voice in their government. But by then nothing short of independence would satisfy the nationalists. In deference to them the sultan withheld his signature from the *zahirs* that would have implemented the reforms. Each side accused the other of obstructing solutions to the conflict.

In this heated political atmosphere the sultan's trip to Tangier in the spring of 1947 became an event of considerable importance, because until that time the protecting powers had not allowed him to visit the city. The occasion was intended to mark a new effort at cooperation by both sides, but while he was there, a riot in Casablanca brought relations between the French and Muslim communities to the boiling point. Angered by the news that French police had fired on Moroccans, the sultan called for national reunification and independence in his scheduled address at Tangier, omitting his planned mention of French-

Moroccan friendship and the benefits of French rule. The official French reaction to the Tangier speech was to name General Alphonse Juin, the choice of the most conservative interests among the *colons*, as the new resident general.

Juin quickly decreed a governmental reorganization aimed at further weakening the *makhzan* and made statements intended to discredit the sultan. He refused to promulgate a *zahir* issued by the sultan as imam that would limit the activities of the religious brotherhoods. The sultan in turn refused to sign most of the *zahirs* presented to him by Juin, nearly all of them designed to limit the sultan's authority. This veto power, established by the 1912 Treaty of Fès, proved to be the nationalist's major weapon as the Istiqlal intensified its public condemnation of the absence of basic liberties, the denial of union rights, and the tightening of press censorship.

Mounting Tensions, 1950-53

During the next four years the French repeatedly proposed measures, which the sultan refused to sign, that would have reduced his power. In October 1950 the sultan traveled to Paris to discuss the growing Moroccan crisis directly with French government officials. His proposals for greater Moroccan autonomy were ignored by the French politicians, but on his return the Moroccan people gave him a great show of support. In reaction, Juin demanded that the sultan sign the *zahirs*, threatening to depose him if he refused.

At the same time, Thami al Glawi, pasha of Marrakech who had supported the French from the early days of the protectorate, openly attacked the sultan for the backing he had given to the nationalists. After being forbidden entrance to the palace, Glawi and Berber tribal *qajids* plotted against the sultan with the help of the French residency. In January 1951 Glawi and Juin called on the tribes to move on Fès and Rabat. It is probable that few of the tribal leaders or their followers understood the crisis or the way they were being used in it. The result, however, was that the sultan agreed under duress to sign the *zahirs*, although making it clear that he did not consider them to be valid.

The humiliation of the sultan and the arrests of the Istiqlal leaders ended one crisis, but another was soon precipitated. Moroccans, particularly among the rural population, who cared little about the Istiqlal, were furious at the insult to the sultan by the foreigners. The splintered nationalist factions joined with the Istiqlal in a national front to oppose the protectorate. The parties

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pledged to refuse to negotiate with France without a proclamation of independence, to remain loyal to Mohammed V, and to collaborate with the League of Arab States (Arab League). But they also agreed to refrain from forming any alliance with the new Moroccan Communist Party (Parti Communiste Marocain—PCM).

It was the Casablanca riots of December 1952, arising from a protest by workers to the murder of a Tunisian labor leader, that marked the real watershed in relations between the political parties and French authorities. In clashes between Moroccan rioters and police, an estimated 400 people were killed. In the aftermath of the riots the PCM and the Istiqlal were outlawed by the residency.

Exile of Mohammed V

In early 1953 Glawi, backed by the resident general, once more mobilized his supporters among the Berber tribes against the sultan. In August the events of 1951 were repeated almost exactly, but on this occasion the objective was the sultan's overthrow rather than his temporary submission. Berber horsemen loyal to Glawi massed around Rabat, and French tanks surrounded the sultan's palace; but Mohammed V refused to sign away his remaining powers. Finally the resident general ordered the arrest of the sultan, who with his family was sent into exile on Madagascar. The resident general then summoned the ulama to approve in the traditional manner the nomination of a new sultan, Mohammed Mulay Ben Arafa, an aged member of the Alawi house. Two of the ulama who refused to comply were arrested.

Mohammed V's deposition enraged not only the nationalists but also all those who recognized the sultan as the religious leader of the country. Never during his reign had the country been so solidly united behind the sultan nor had national sentiment been so aroused. French attempts to bolster Ben Arafa by enacting reforms in his name only led to a further deterioration of the situation. Immediately after his accession, he not only turned over most of his powers to a French-appointed council but also signed a *zahir* creating French-dominated municipal councils to which Mohammed V had refused to give his signature for six years.

By the end of 1952 when it was banned, the Istiqlal had developed an active membership of some 80,000 and a mass organization of several hundred thousand sympathizers, but nearly all of the party's leaders were in exile or in prison. Control of the nationalist movement passed into the hands of younger

men more willing than the maturer leaders to use violent methods to attain their goals. By mid-1955 partisans had been organized by a kinsman of Istiqlal leader Fassi into the Army of National Liberation (*Armée de Libération Nationale*—ALN), numbering several thousand, and were attacking settlers and engaging in combat against French troops. It was estimated that during the two years of the sultan's exile 6,000 acts of terrorism were committed and over 700 people killed.

On August 20, 1955, the second anniversary of Ben Arafa's accession to the throne, Berber tribesmen in the Middle Atlas descended on a village and murdered French settlers there, thus shattering any remaining notion of Berber solidarity behind Glawi. In addition, the Rif Berbers revolted in sympathy with the rebellion in Algeria against French rule. As the French negotiated with various Moroccan leaders in the hope of finding a solution, Berber attacks continued, persuading Glawi to advise the French that Mohammed V be allowed to return. Glawi's supporters followed him in declaring their loyalty to the sultan. Faced with the united Moroccan demand for his return, the rising violence, and the deteriorating situation in Algeria, the French government decided to bring Mohammed V back to Morocco.

Independence

In October 1955 a policy of Moroccan "independence with interdependence" was adopted by the French National Assembly. At the same time, the French legislature affirmed that the Treaty of Fès should remain the basis of French-Moroccan relations. Restating the principle of Moroccan sovereignty, it was agreed that Morocco should exercise fully all the powers and authority stipulated by the treaty that had been held in abeyance. It was insisted, however, that France should continue its responsibility for Moroccan defense and foreign policy and that the French presence in Morocco should be permanent and acknowledged by the full representation of French settlers in Moroccan affairs.

Mohammed V was received in Paris with full honors on October 31. He rejected the French position out of hand but continued negotiations until agreement was reached on November 6. Although the Treaty of Fès still was not formally abrogated, provision was made for a gradual restoration of Moroccan independence within the framework of a guarantee of mutual rights and permanent ties of French-Moroccan interdependence. The sultan agreed to institute reforms as a

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result of which Morocco would become a constitutional monarchy with a democratic form of government. He returned to Morocco in triumph and, after consultation with spokesmen of the several political parties and the labor movement, entrusted a nonparty politician, Embarek Bekkai, with the task of forming a cabinet. The old ministerial system of the *makhzan* was abandoned, and the Council of Ministers (cabinet) was formed on the basis of the administrative structure created by the French. The new cabinet was sworn in, and government functions were transferred to it gradually from the French residency.

In February 1956 limited home rule was restored to Morocco in a protocol implementing the November 1955 declaration. Further negotiations for full independence culminated in the French-Moroccan Agreement, signed in Paris on March 2, abrogating the 1912 Treaty of Fès and acknowledging the independence and territorial integrity of Morocco. Later that year Morocco was admitted to the United Nations (UN).

When independence was restored, the full exercise of legislative power reverted to the sultan. The French resident general was replaced by a high commissioner, who two months later was redesignated ambassador. Both governments undertook to conclude new agreements in order to define their interdependence on a free and equal basis in fields of common interest—especially in matters of defense, foreign relations, commerce, and culture—and to guarantee the rights of French citizens in Morocco and Moroccans in France.

Reunification

Spain did not participate in the French-Moroccan negotiations. During the reign of Ben Arafa, Spain had continued to recognize Mohammed V as the rightful sultan and imam in the northern zone. Once France had accepted the principle of Moroccan independence, the nationalists expected Spain to follow suit. Spain hesitated, and when rumors circulated that a separate government under a regency might be established in the northern zone, Spain lost much of the popularity it had cultivated. The nationalists charged that Spain had no right to adopt a policy toward independence different from that of France.

The abolition of the Spanish protectorate and the recognition of Moroccan independence by Spain were negotiated separately in Madrid between the sultan and Franco and made final in the Joint Declaration of April 1956. The declaration provided for "free collaboration" between Spain and Morocco, granted the sultan

immediate legislative powers in the northern zone, and provided for the retention of Spanish troops on Moroccan soil during the period of transition to independence and reunification. Meanwhile, the sultan's sovereignty in Tangier was restored, and the international status of the territory was officially ended at the Conference of Fédala in October.

The Spanish-Moroccan agreement did not include the protectorate in the Tarfaya area south of the Drâa River and the presidios, which were under exclusive Spanish sovereignty. A clash between Spanish and Moroccan troops in Ifni in late 1957 raised the question of the transfer to Moroccan sovereignty of that enclave and the protectorate zone. Spain agreed to return Tarfaya to Morocco, the transfer becoming effective in April 1958. Ifni was finally ceded to Morocco in 1969 (see fig. 8).

Political Developments, 1956–70

After his restoration in November 1955, Mohammed V announced a policy for independent Morocco predicated on the recognition of the country's continued interdependence with France in terms of its needs for economic and technical support. Moroccans, meanwhile, would be trained to assume administrative and technical positions formerly occupied by the French. The Bekkai government installed by the sultan in December 1956 consisted of nine members of the Istiqlal; six from the small, conservative PDI; and six nonparty independents loyal to the sultan, including the prime minister.

The goal of the Istiqlal was the creation of a one-party state in which the monarch would be a figurehead. The party was mainly Arab and urban in orientation and drew its leadership from a bourgeois elite. It was unquestionably the best organized of any political group, and its members had gained influential positions in important ministries, such as interior and public works. The party also forced the expulsion of local *qaid*s who had cooperated with the protectorate regime and replaced them with Istiqlal members. Its leaders resented the sultan's failure to name a predominantly Istiqlal government but continued to support the sultan's basic policies.

Mohammed V's personal popularity was high. He enjoyed the unusual position of being a royal figure who was hero of an independence struggle. Under him, the sultan's dual role as head of state and religious leader was strengthened as it had not been for many centuries. The object of popular veneration, he was able





Figure 8. Territorial Changes, 1956-79



to control the balance of power and parcel out responsibility among the country's competing institutions, factions, and parties. This permitted him to consolidate political power in the crown rather than being dependent upon any particular party, such as the Istiqlal, which in essence needed him more than he needed it.

In the months that followed independence Mohammed V moved to build a modern governmental structure under a constitutional monarchy in which the sultan would have an active political role. He proceeded cautiously in order to avoid letting loose potentially uncontrollable forces that sought to divert or accelerate the course of development he had planned. Social and economic reforms were part of his program for independent Morocco, but he had no intention of permitting the more radical younger elements in the nationalist movement to overthrow the established social order and introduce a socialist system. He was also intent on preventing the Istiqlal from consolidating its control and establishing a single-party state.

In April 1957 Mohammad V appointed his son Crown Prince Mulay Hassan (later King Hassan II) chief of staff of the new Royal Armed Forces (Forces Armées Royales—FAR), which was being formed with French assistance. At the same time, the French army remained at stations in Morocco under the terms of the March 1956 treaty. Although the bulk of the ALN was incorporated into the FAR, dissident elements continued to operate independently, particularly along the Algerian border, where they supported the Algerian National Liberation Front (Front de Libération Nationale—FLN), and in the south around Agadir. The FAR succeeded in eliminating ALN units in the Agadir region with French cooperation in 1960. Combined operations by French and Spanish forces mopped up ALN units active in Mauritania and the Spanish Sahara.

Another source of resistance was the Berber tribes in the Rif, the Middle Atlas, and Tafilalt. The rural elite had correctly seen the Istiqlal's attempts to consolidate and centralize power as a challenge to their traditional authority. This, combined with rural economic grievances, had led to a series of uprisings in the late 1950s when tribes rebelled against local government officials in a demonstration of hostility toward what they considered an Arab-dominated central government.

The uprisings were put down, but out of the unrest a new political party—the Popular Movement (Mouvement Populaire—MP)—emerged, claiming to represent the interests of the Berber rural population that were ignored by the mainly Arab and urban nationalist parties. The MP had been formed clandestinely

in 1957 by dissident Berber groups but apparently had not been directly involved in the tribal insurrections. Despite Istiqlal opposition, the MP was legally registered in 1959 with behind-the-scene backing from Mohammed V.

The proliferation of new parties, representing interests not served by the established parties, enhanced the king's political position by undercutting the dominance of the Istiqlal and offering him more options in forming governments. At the same time, reaction within the Istiqlal to Mohammed V's activist role as a king who intended to rule as well as reign split the party's leadership. Older politicians saw nothing to be gained from breaking with the king because by continuing a working relationship they at least kept their influence in the government. Younger leaders rejected their royalism as well as the conservative wing's approach to social reform through traditional Islam. In 1959 the radical wing broke away from the Istiqlal and formed a separate political party, the National Union of Popular Forces (Union Nationale des Forces Populaires—UNFP), under a second-generation nationalist leader, Mehdi Ben Barka. The main trade union, the Moroccan Labor Union (Union Marocaine du Travail—UMT), previously aligned with the Istiqlal, switched its support to the new nationalist party.

Divisions within the nationalist movement made it more difficult to form workable coalition governments. Chronic governmental instability led Mohammed V, who had taken the title of "king" in 1957, to assume direct leadership of the government in 1960, naming Hassan his deputy. In order to assure his people that he was not instituting a dictatorial regime, Mohammed V promised to promulgate a written constitution by the end of 1962. Early efforts at representative government failed, largely because the appointed consultative assembly was not given any real authority to legislate, and the parties had little experience in parliamentary politics. Local communal councils were created in the new country's first national elections in 1960, but the effective power of these new councils and of local government in general remained minimal.

In foreign relations Mohammed V pursued a policy of nonalignment in his effort to establish an independent position for Morocco. He insisted on renegotiating the 1948 treaty under which France had allowed the United States to maintain several air bases in Morocco. In 1959 he obtained an agreement with the United States to remove its Strategic Air Command units and to transfer control of the bases to Morocco. The king also turned to the Soviet Union for military equipment and advisers to

supplement assistance already received from the United States and France (see United States, ch. 4; Foreign Military Cooperation, ch. 5).

Morocco was admitted to the Arab League in 1958. Along with other member states, it officially promoted the cause of the Palestinians and refused to recognize the existence of Israel, but Morocco's overall position on issues concerning the Middle East was generally considered moderate. Because of uncertainties about the future of their status as a minority in an Arab country, however, about two-thirds of Morocco's Jewish population, estimated at more than 200,000 at the time, chose to emigrate in the years immediately after independence. Most sought a new home in Israel, although significant numbers went to the United States, France, and Canada. Measures were subsequently taken by the Moroccan government to halt the flow of emigrants to Israel (see Peoples of Morocco, ch. 2; Other Arab Countries, ch. 4).

Morocco's relations with neighboring Algeria and other African countries were complicated by irredentist Moroccan claims, some reaching back centuries for their precedent. The claim to a "Greater Morocco," including Mauritania and the Spanish Sahara as well as parts of Mali and Algeria, was part of the Istiqlal's party platform. Morocco's stand on Mauritania isolated it from most of the newly independent countries of Africa, most of which had recognized Mauritania when it became independent of France in 1960. In January 1961 Mohammed V hosted a conference in Casablanca of several of the more radical independent African states of the period, including Ghana, Guinea, and Egypt (then known as the United Arab Republic), as well as the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic in exile. At this conference he sought support for Morocco's claims to Mauritania in return for his backing of the neutralist and anticolonialist policies of the other states. The so-called Casablanca Group failed to achieve overall coordination in foreign policy, however, and in 1963 its members joined with moderate African states in forming the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

Hassan II: The Early Years

Mohammed V died suddenly in February 1961 from complications after surgery. Some initial doubts were expressed about the ability of his successor, the 31-year-old Hassan II, to hold the country together. He attempted to mobilize mass support in rural areas to offset the influence of the urban-based nationalists and acted decisively to assure his people that he

would follow the domestic policies set by his father. In foreign affairs, however, he did not show the same interest in strict nonalignment as had Mohammed V but turned increasingly toward the West.

The new king took personal control of the government as prime minister and named a new cabinet. He was able to exercise considerable political leverage through his exclusive control of patronage. Aided by an advisory council, Hassan drew up his own constitution, which he presented for approval in a referendum in December 1962. The Istiqlal, the MP, and other progovernment groups supported the constitution. The opposition UNFP led a vehement campaign urging a voter boycott of the referendum on the grounds that government intervention had predetermined the results.

The referendum was, as expected, an overwhelming vote in favor of the draft constitution. Under its provisions the king remained the central figure in the executive branch of the government, but legislative power was vested in a two-house parliament, and an independent judiciary was guaranteed.

Although the Istiqlal had campaigned for approval of the constitution, it had also used the referendum to test its popularity and its electoral machinery. The king determined to remove the Istiqlal ministers from his cabinet, apparently in an attempt to undercut the party's potential strength in the upcoming elections. Learning of the king's intention, the ministers resigned in January 1963, and the Istiqlal became an opposition party. Parliamentary elections in May secured a small plurality of seats for the royalist coalition, formally organized as the Front for the Defense of Constitutional Institutions (Front pour la Défense des Institutions Constitutionnelles—FDIC).

The historical concept of unity among the North African states of the Maghrib revived when these states individually regained independence after World War II, but there were differences as well as similarities among them. Morocco supported the Algerian revolt against the French; but soon after Algeria received independence, the two countries became embroiled in a border dispute in the region southwest of Bechar across nearly 1,000 kilometers of desert to Tindouf, where the French had never delineated the frontier. Both countries had claims and maintained military forces in this region. The dispute was complicated by the ideological gulf that divided the conservative monarchy and its revolutionary socialist neighbors.

During the summer of 1963 Morocco charged Algeria with a series of unfriendly acts, chief of which was an allegation of

support given by the latter to a conspiracy to overthrow the monarchy. According to the government, the UNFP was also deeply implicated in the plot, and among those arrested were 23 of the party's 28 parliamentary representatives. Ten of its leaders, including Ben Barka, who had fled the country and was tried in absentia, were sentenced to death. The short border war in October, during which Moroccan and Algerian forces clashed in several limited but sharply fought engagements in the disputed desert area, muted potential criticism of the government's action by the opposition.

In 1964 Hassan reorganized the government, naming Ahmed Bahnini prime minister to head a cabinet drawn from members of the FDIC group of royalist parties. This move was explained as a means of allowing for easier cooperation by the opposition Istiqlal and the UNFP. In fact, a stalemate developed in parliament between the government and the opposition, and little legislation was passed. By late 1964 the Istiqlal was openly questioning the legitimacy of the regime and calling for new elections. The FDIC was beset by internal dissension, and some reports indicated that the MP considered bolting the government coalition to join the Istiqlal and the UNFP in a censure motion against its economic policy.

Political tension mounted during the first half of 1965. In March the Ministry of National Education issued a directive requiring all students over 17 years of age to include in their education some form of technical training. Large numbers of students, apparently believing that implementation of the directive would limit access to higher education, demonstrated in Casablanca. Starting as a peaceful protest against the curriculum reform, the student movement soon attracted participation by workers among whom dissatisfaction had been growing for at least a year because of rising prices and increasing unemployment. For three days widespread rioting and looting raged through Casablanca and, to a lesser degree, in other major cities. The police, reinforced by the army, restored order, but at a high cost. According to reliable observers, about 400 people were killed.

Fourteen Moroccans, convicted earlier of gunrunning in connection with the 1963 Algerian-linked conspiracy, were executed to demonstrate the government's determination to maintain order. But in a broadcast to the nation, Hassan dismissed rumors that the Casablanca riots had been provoked from abroad. He stated that the real cause lay in the internal economic and educational difficulties and placed chief blame on the bickering of politicians and factions, which, he said, had

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
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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

paralyzed legislation designed to remedy the situation.

The king declared an amnesty for political prisoners, including certain UNFP leaders who had been condemned to death in 1963 for conspiring against the government. He consulted jointly with the leaders of all parties and unions and laid before them a program of administrative, social, and economic reforms that covered almost all the areas of dissatisfaction. His efforts at forming a new national government based on the royal reform package, however, were unavailing. A consensus could not be reached because the counterproposals made by the politicians were unacceptable either to the king or to one or more of the parties.

Emergency Period, 1965-70

Because the FDIC coalition had been badly splintered by the events of the preceding months, Prime Minister Bahnini found it impossible to hold his government together and resigned in June 1965. Hassan, making use of his constitutional prerogative, proclaimed a "state of exception," or national emergency, and assumed full legislative and executive powers. He appointed a nonparty cabinet—composed of technocrats rather than politicians—and personally assumed the duties of prime minister. He indicated that elections would be held at some unspecified future date after a new constitution had been drafted and submitted to a referendum. Promised reforms were shelved, but the trend toward political disintegration seemed to have been arrested.

Before the year ended, however, severe strains developed in relations between Morocco and France as a result of the cause célèbre that became known as the Ben Barka affair. Ben Barka, who was living in exile in Paris, disappeared mysteriously in October and was presumed to have been abducted. His disappearance roused vehement protests among the left-wing parties in Morocco and in France. French authorities pursued investigations, which were widely reported in the press but never fully explained by the police. A number of French as well as Moroccan nationals were implicated in Ben Barka's alleged abduction. French authorities issued international warrants for the arrest of General Mohammed Oufkir, the Moroccan minister of interior, and for Colonel Ahmed Dlimi, the chief of the *Sûreté Nationale* (national police). The Moroccan government maintained that the warrants were in violation of the French-Moroccan judicial convention of 1957 and hence invalid. Each

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country withdrew its ambassador, although diplomatic relations were not broken.

Oufkir and Dlimi were among the defendants arraigned in absentia at a trial that opened in Paris in September 1966. Later, Dlimi unexpectedly appeared in France and was arrested. The French court acquitted him but sentenced two French officials to terms of imprisonment and Oufkir, in absentia, to life imprisonment for complicity in Ben Barka's abduction. All the while Hassan retained Oufkir in his cabinet as minister of interior.

At the start of the June 1967 War Hassan placed three of his army's best battalions at the disposal of the Egyptian command engaged on the Sinai front, but Moroccan forces did not arrive in time to be committed to action. After the defeat of Arab forces in the six-day war with Israel, demonstrations were started in several Moroccan cities that appeared to threaten the Jewish community, and an unofficial commercial boycott was instituted against Jewish businesses. These actions were backed by the trade unions, where radical Arab nationalist ideology generally had more appeal than elsewhere in the society. The secretary general of the UMT was arrested when he criticized the government for condemning the boycott and the acts of terrorism against Jews that accompanied it. Despite government assurances of protection, most of the 80,000 Jews remaining in Morocco left the country within the next few years.

The king stepped down as prime minister in 1967. Political party and trade union activity were gradually resumed, a major step in the direction of ending the "state of exception," although still under close government scrutiny. The opposition parties boycotted municipal and rural commune elections in 1969. Hassan purposely avoided associating his own interests with any political party, and as a result successful candidates were mostly identified as royalist independents.

The Istiqlal and the UNFP continued to cooperate in a joint opposition front to the king's government. Although unresolved economic questions posed serious problems for the government, Hassan's personal position was buoyed by his successes in foreign affairs, convincing him that he should end the "state of exception." In July 1970 he announced that yet another constitution had been prepared and would be submitted to a referendum for approval the next month. The proposed constitution, which increased the king's formal powers, was subsequently accepted by 98.7 percent of participating voters. Elections for a new unicameral legislature (the Chamber of Representatives) followed in August, and the emergency period

was brought to a close.

Stress and Crisis, 1970–72

The 1970 constitution restored limited parliamentary government after the five-year emergency period during which Hassan had exercised personal rule. The boycott of the August parliamentary elections by the National Front (Al Kutla al Wataniya)—a coalition formed between the Istiqlal and the UNFP with support from the UMT to oppose the constitution in the referendum—resulted in a landslide for nonparty royalist candidates, who won 219 of the 240 seats.

Of all the sources of dissent and pressure for change, possibly the greatest was the general complaint of widespread corruption and malfeasance in government and government-related affairs. Addressing the Chamber of Representatives, Prime Minister Ahmed Laraki stated that bribery had become a “serious social disease” in Morocco and pledged a government attack on this condition. Earlier, Hassan observed with regret in a public address that integrity was becoming a “rare virtue” and that corruption existed on all sides—including “some in high places.”

By mid-1971 measures directed at the principal economic, social, and administrative problems of the country had been undertaken, and all the legal and political forms of power, supported by tradition, were held by Hassan and his supporters. The political opposition, however, remained alienated, insisting that progress was either too slow or nonexistent and maintaining their familiar demand for “democratic elections” and constitutional change as vociferously as the law and the watchful Ministry of Interior under Oufkir would allow.

Attempted Coup d'État of July 10, 1971

Approximately 400 guests were assembled on July 10, 1971, at the royal seaside palace at Skhirat, 24 kilometers southwest of Rabat, to celebrate Hassan's birthday. The guests included cabinet ministers, members of the diplomatic corps, and prominent Moroccans in official and private life. Among them were members of all political parties except the UNFP, including Fassi of the Istiqlal and the communist Abdulhadi Messouak. Early in the afternoon the garden party came under sudden attack by troops employing small arms and grenades. Hassan and Oufkir withdrew to the private apartments of the palace. Outside, firing

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continued. The troops involved were all young and could be identified as noncommissioned officer trainees from the training center at Ahermoumou, about 220 kilometers east of Rabat.

Meanwhile, another contingent of cadets under Colonel Mohammed Ababou, commandant of the Ahermoumou training center, seized the army headquarters in Rabat as well as the radio and television stations. Insurgent-controlled radio stations in both Rabat and Casablanca announced that a revolution was under way. The Rabat radio stated that the king was dead and announced that "all responsibilities are deferred to the local military authorities," ending with the words "Long live the Republic." The Casablanca broadcast stated, "The army has just conducted a revolution for the people. The royal regime is abolished." None of these broadcasts, beyond proclaiming an army-sponsored republic for "the people," contained enough substantive content to show what sort of new regime was to be established.

About two-and-one-half hours after the attack commenced, Hassan emerged from the royal apartments accompanied by a sergeant and several young soldiers. The troops present shouted "Long live Hassan the Second!" and the revolt began its precipitous collapse. As stated later by the king, he was informed by the sergeant that the troops had attacked the palace because they had been told the king was in danger. When they saw Hassan, they put down their arms. Others, in confusion, mounted trucks and drove off to Rabat as ambulances began to arrive. The king on the spot invested Oufkir with full civil and military powers and commanded him to restore order.

Moving immediately, Oufkir found that lines of communication were still open and that all regular troops and police, with the exception of the trainee attack unit from Ahermoumou and small elements in Casablanca, remained loyal. The insurgents had called upon regular units, including the air force, to join the revolt, but to no avail. The counterattack was swift and became decisive by midnight. By noon on July 11 rebel elements had been mopped up. Soon afterward Oufkir announced that all those implicated were dead—among them Ababou, who was killed in fighting—or in custody. Rabat quickly returned to normal, but military forces remained on the alert and took over the port of Casablanca as part of the security operation. Public reaction was passive on the whole because of the swiftness of events. Demonstrations occurred at several locations after the rebel broadcasts but were quickly ended by the rapidity of the counteraction.

Hassan, addressing the nation by radio on July 11, identified

General Mohammed Medbuh, killed on the afternoon of the attempted coup at the palace, as the leader of the coup, directing a group of not more than 10 officers. The next day Hassan, accompanied by King Hussein of Jordan, participated in the funeral of loyal officers and soldiers killed in the uprising. On July 13, after interrogation, four generals, five colonels, and a major accused of leading the conspiracy were executed by firing squad at the direction of a ministerial war council headed by the king.

According to official figures, 99 guests and staff personnel were killed and 133 wounded at Skhirat Palace; in Rabat and elsewhere 158 mutineers were killed, and about 900 were taken prisoner—all from the Ahermoumou training unit. Although the interrogations of the officers who were later executed were not made public, government sources stated that the attempted coup was the work of "paranoid schizophrenics" who had grossly misled the noncommissioned officer trainees. The 900 prisoners were confined under continuing investigation but not treated in the same category as the ringleaders.

Oufkir, after returning from the executions on July 13, stated to the press that the plot had been in preparation for more than a year and that the principal leader was, in fact, Ababou rather than Medbuh. He announced also that his special task was now finished, that his extraordinary powers were set aside, and that he was returning to his usual functions at the Ministry of Interior. The monarchy, he said, was the safeguard of unity, and only the king could lead the country.

The executed generals, all of brigadier rank, were, like Medbuh, regarded as conservative, austere, and honest disciplinarians. A common trait among them, according to international press commentators, was exasperation with the personality intrigues and influence traffic in all phases of public life generally included under the term *corruption*. Some were said to be impatient with any indications of liberalism or concession by the government to the political opposition, such as the king's effort to establish a dialogue with students. All the conspirators were of Berber origin, but so also were Oufkir and a majority of the military forces of all ranks.

The ultimate intentions of the conspirators, had they succeeded, as to the form of government or its foreign relations or the person of Hassan were not known. It was clear that the attempt was not a revolution of any radical ideology and that it developed from an internal source in the form of an essentially conservative, or puritanical, impulse to purify the government and national life. No evidence of actual foreign participation was

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uncovered, although the premature Libyan broadcasts of support after the attack was initiated resulted in the withdrawal of diplomatic missions by the two countries. More important, none of the recognized opposition groups was involved—neither the Istiqlal nor the UNFP, nor the labor unions, nor the student organizations. The explosion of July 10, 1971, came from an unexpected direction and, as such, was symptomatic rather than determinant of the pressures for change.

Royal Reform Program

In August 1971 Hassan accepted the resignation of Prime Minister Laraki and his cabinet. Change was required, Hassan said, not in the fundamental principles of the nation but rather in means and emphasis. Article 29 of the constitution specifically allowed the delegation of royal powers to the prime minister and ministers. Although the heaviest and final responsibility still rested upon himself, the king announced that he would implement Article 29 and hold ministers responsible for their performance. This statement was significant as indicating a limited withdrawal from the practice of direct royal rule. The new government, the king said, would have approximately 18 months to draw up and implement a reform program centered on four related areas: education, distribution of the national wealth, administration, and justice. Hassan decried the widening gap between rich and poor as intolerable, cited the need for improvement in land distribution and industrial organization, and was particularly emphatic on the "offense of corruption."

A new government was formed in which Mohamed Karim Lamrani was prime minister and minister of finance. Oufkir was designated chief of staff of the armed forces and held the portfolio of minister of defense. Hassan informed the new prime minister that the reform program had to be implemented within 18 months. He described the delegation of power provided for in the constitution as involving increased responsibility for ministers, individually and collectively, and stressed that the task of government had been shifted decisively to the cabinet. The National Front declined Hassan's invitation to participate in the government and reiterated its basic position calling for new elections and a "democratic constitution."

The choice of Lamrani as prime minister showed the emphasis to be placed in that area. The shift of Oufkir from the Ministry of Interior, which he had headed since 1964, to the Ministry of Defense was of at least equal significance. Because the

top military leadership had been decimated by the coup attempt and subsequent executions and because of the critical importance of the armed force's loyalty as the underlying source of power, Oufkir's task was to reorganize and retrain these forces.

Oufkir remained an enigmatic character. A Berber of the Middle Atlas whose family had collaborated with the French, he had been commissioned in the French army and had served in the Italian campaign and in Indochina, where his bravery was legendary. He later acted as aide-de-camp to both the French resident general and Mohammed V and had reportedly retained links with French intelligence after Morocco's independence. Named head of security (intelligence) services in 1960, he had held office throughout Hassan's reign and had been entrusted by the king with more power than any other public official.

In February 1972 the cabinet proposed a new reform constitution that allowed for a unicameral legislature, two-thirds of its members to be elected directly. The Constitution was approved by 99 percent of the 91 percent of the eligible electorate that voted. The opposition objected that the referendum had been rigged by the government.

Negotiations to form a broad coalition government failed, and Lamrani resigned, paving the way for the appointment of a nonparty government, composed of younger technocrats, in which Oufkir kept his post as minister of defense. Continuing efforts to find a political base for a new government broke down when the National Front demanded that it control all ministries except that of interior and defense. Lamrani was reappointed prime minister to prepare for parliamentary elections. A split between the UNFP and the UMT over negotiation strategy broke the National Front.

Attempted Coup d'État of August 16, 1972

After the failure of the 1971 coup attempt, Hassan repeatedly stated that he expected more challenges to his regime. On August 16, 1972, as he returned from a visit to France, the king's Boeing 727 was fired on over Tétouan by an unscheduled escort of six Moroccan air force F-5 jet fighters led by the commandant of the Kenitra air base. It was badly damaged and lost altitude, two of its three engines knocked out and the cabin depressurized. Their mission incomplete, the attackers broke off their pursuit and returned to Kenitra to refuel and rearm. Three of the F-5s made strafing runs against the Rabat airport where Hassan's 727 had managed to make a safe landing. The king, unharmed, had in the

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meantime escaped by automobile to Skhirat.

Three of the pilots involved in the attack fled by helicopter to Gibraltar, where their request for political asylum was denied by British authorities. They and the commandant of Kenitra, who had bailed out of his aircraft and was captured, identified Oufkir as the mastermind behind the attempted coup.

When Oufkir—apparently unaware that his part in the plot had been given away—reported to Skhirat late in the evening of August 16, he was met by Hassan's aide-de-camp, Colonel Dlimi, who had been implicated along with Oufkir in the Ben Barka affair, and by the king's cousin, Moulay Ahmed Alaoui, a newspaper editor. Oufkir was reported to have committed suicide when confronted with evidence of his conspiracy. His body, buried the next morning in his home village, bore four bullet wounds, according to one French press report.

A government investigation subsequently concluded that Oufkir had been a party to the 1971 coup attempt, promising Medbuh to support him if he succeeded and to execute him if he failed. The conspirators allegedly had kept Oufkir's secret at their trials in order to give him another opportunity to overthrow Hassan. It was charged that in the 1972 attempt Oufkir had intended to establish a regency council and rule in the name of Hassan's then nine-year-old son, Crown Prince Sidi Mohammed. Libyan support for the attempted coup was suspected, but Oufkir's and the other conspirator's justification appeared to have been that of a preemptive coup—like the 1971 attempt—to prevent suspected leftist junior officers from seizing power.

Reacting to Oufkir's treason, Hassan confided, "Henceforth I must never place my trust in anyone." Citing their "criminal enterprises," he blamed the political parties—which was taken to mean the National Front opposition—for fostering divisions within the armed forces and among the people at large. And he accused Berber families prominent in the army of allegedly having treasonous histories.

Royal Government, 1973–77

The atmosphere in the country remained tense, and Hassan was unsure where dependable support lay. At one point, the king tried to effect a reconciliation with the parties of the former National Front, but he was rebuffed. Already weakened by internal conflicts, the opposition was unwilling to consider participation in a broad coalition on his terms. The Istiqlal,

committed to one-party rule, insisted on constitutional revisions to limit the king's authority, while the UNFP was openly hostile to the monarchy. Hassan, therefore, placed reliance on his family and court intimates. In January 1973 he appointed his brother-in-law, Ahmed Osman, a former ambassador to Washington who was director of the cabinet, as prime minister to head a government of "political neutrals."

There was no portfolio for defense in the new government. The king himself assumed immediate control of the armed forces in an effort to heal the breach between the military establishment and the royal establishment that the attempted coups had revealed. Few high-ranking officers were above suspicion of having been in Oufkir's confidence, and none was trusted enough to fill the position.

Meanwhile, more than 200 officers and enlisted men were standing trial before a military court at Kenitra, charged with involvement in the August coup attempt. Defense lawyers contended that the coup leaders and their accomplices had been compelled to take drastic action because no legitimate avenues of dissent were available to them. Nor, they added, was there an "authentic parliament" through which grievances could be aired by elected representatives. Most of the enlisted men, whose role in the coup was limited to having serviced the aircraft employed in the operation, were acquitted by the court, but 11 officers were found guilty and were executed for their part in the conspiracy; many others received long prison sentences.

Perhaps the most politicized and radicalized element of society in the early 1970s was the academic community. Militant teachers and students were certainly the most vocal in their dissent. The latter were organized in the National Union of Moroccan Students (Union Nationale des Étudiants Marocains—UNEM), which usually was the first group in the country to express itself on a controversial issue or to take a strong political stand. Organized by Ben Barka for the Istiqlal in 1956, the UNEM was taken over in the 1960s by Marxist-Leninist leadership belonging to the so-called Frontist group. It was evident that the king came to regard it as one of the most dangerous potential threats to his regime. Demonstrations and strikes led by the UNEM that disrupted universities and schools in 1971 and 1972 were followed by large-scale expulsions of students and dismissals of teachers. In January 1973 the UNEM was suspended, and subsequently many of its leaders were arrested as a result of their involvement in further and more serious unrest.

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In March several armed bands infiltrated Morocco "by known routes" from Libya where, according to evidence produced by the Moroccan government, they had been trained and equipped. Moving unobserved to their objectives, the guerrillas detonated bombs in several cities and attacked government outposts in the Middle Atlas region, where they clashed with security forces. American installations were also targeted but escaped being damaged.

The terrorist attacks were alleged to be part of a carefully coordinated effort to create chaos in the country in order to destabilize the regime. Mohammed Basri, a onetime associate of Ben Barka in the UNFP who had twice been condemned to death for subversive activities, was identified as a leader of the armed bands. A large number of suspects, including prominent members of the UNFP, communists, and student activists, were arrested in connection with the terrorist attacks, but most of those directly involved in them had escaped from the country. In the so-called 3 March Plot, 84 death sentences were handed down after a prolonged trial in Casablanca, 62 of them in absentia. Civil liberties were suspended as the search continued for convicted fugitives and others implicated in the plot. The radical Rabat branch of the UNFP was banned for having served, according to the government, as a "cover for subversion and illegal activities."

Moroccanization

A series of *zahirs* were issued in March 1973 implementing plans for the "Moroccanization" of the economy. The move toward greater participation by Moroccan citizens had been mooted for several years and therefore was not unexpected by the foreign business community. The government was careful to explain that Moroccanization did not mean expropriation but was intended rather to increase the share of Moroccan participation in ownership, management, and employment in business and industry. The Moroccan economy would remain receptive to foreign investment.

In accordance with the *zahirs* about 2,000 foreign-owned companies operating in Morocco were obliged to allocate at least 50 percent of their registered shares to public agencies or to private Moroccan investors, who were extended loans to encourage their participation. A majority of a firm's board members—although not the general manager responsible for day-to-day operation of a business—were required to be Moroccans. Businesses affected included most of the

manufacturing and mining sectors, banks, insurance companies, and large commercial enterprises as well as many small proprietorships that were eventually sold to Moroccan buyers.

Under a *zahir* published at the same time, the state became the owner of all land held by foreigners. In 1963 the Moroccan government had initiated the gradual retrieval of land that had been granted to French settlers during the protectorate, but the 1973 *zahir* extended this to property legitimately purchased by Europeans from Moroccans. Included were more than 2,000 farms comprising nearly 300,000 hectares. No compensation was offered, although a subsequent French government grant provided indemnification for loss of livestock, machinery, and other assets apart from land.

The announcement of Moroccanization and land reform was accompanied by the publication of a new 1973-77 development plan. The largest share of planned investment, over one-third of the total, was allocated for industrial development and another sizable share for export-oriented agriculture. The plan also called for increased public spending on social services, low-cost housing, subsidies for food staples, and economic programs for less developed parts of the country. Investment funds, according to the plan, were to be made available from income derived from phosphate price increases, from loans abroad, and from foreign assistance.

Parties and Politics

Although the early 1970s was a period of serious domestic turmoil, the patriotism engendered by Morocco's participation in the Middle East conflict and by the events that were transpiring in the Western Sahara contributed to Hassan's popularity among the population at large and strengthened his hand politically. The king had dispatched Moroccan troops to the Sinai front after the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli October 1973 War. Although they arrived too late to be engaged in hostilities in that sector, the action won Morocco goodwill among other Arab states, including some that had been unfriendly in the past. Moroccan army units were deployed to the Golan Heights in July 1973, where they served beside Syrian troops until mid-1974.

Within the next year the attention of the Moroccan government had turned to the acquisition of the Western Sahara from Spain, a goal on which all major parties agreed and which had strong public support. A significant rapprochement between the government and the opposition, based on the Western Sahara

issue, was evidenced when most party leaders accepted missions from the king to explain Morocco's position in various capitals abroad. Even the Moroccan communist leader Ali Yata was pressed into service, acting as the king's emissary in Eastern Europe. The apparent unity and stability produced by the Western Sahara issue persuaded Hassan to promise new elections, although without specifying a date. News that elections would be permitted in turn prompted the formation of several new political parties in 1974.

The new party with the broadest appeal was the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires—USFP), which was based on the Rabat branch of the UNFP that had been suspended the previous year for its part in the March plot. In its platform the USFP demanded an amnesty for political prisoners and called for reform of the social and economic order through nationalization and land redistribution. Under the leadership of Abderrahim Bouabid, it soon eclipsed the more moderate UNFP as the most important mainstream left-wing opposition party. It competed for support, especially among younger political activists, with the Party of Progress and Socialism (Parti du Progrès et du Socialisme—PPS), founded by Yata as the successor to the regular communist party and subsequent front groups that had all been banned. The party was orthodox in its Marxism, but Yata admitted that Morocco was not yet ready for a revolution. Meanwhile, the Istiqlal remained unchallenged as the largest political party. When Fassi died in 1974, unsuccessful in his efforts to revive the National Front, he was replaced as party leader by Mohamed Boucetta.

After several postponements, communal (municipal) elections were held in November 1976. Approximately 13,300 local council seats, including those in that part of the Western Sahara claimed by Morocco, were contested by more than 40,000 candidates. In the voting, independent royalists won 64 percent of the seats, the Istiqlal finishing a distant second with only 16 percent. Provincial elections the following January gave independent royalists 70 percent of the seats in regional assemblies. In both elections, the Istiqlal and other opposition parties complained of irregularities in the voting, charging intimidation of voters and falsification of returns. The UNFP officially boycotted the election to protest the delay in granting a general amnesty to political prisoners, but it allowed party activists to run as individuals.

In March 1977 Hassan broadened the base of the Osman government in preparation for parliamentary elections by

appointing the party leaders of the Istiqlal, MP, and USFP to the cabinet as ministers without portfolio. In June, 82 percent of the electorate cast ballots in parliamentary elections, which the UNFP boycotted as it had the earlier contests. Independent royalists received 45 percent of the popular vote, winning a total of 81 seats by direct election. The Istiqlal took 22 percent of the vote and 45 seats, while the MP won 12 percent and the USFP 15 percent for 29 and 16 seats, respectively. Yata was the only candidate of his party to win a seat but became the first communist to be elected to parliament. USFP leader Bouabid, who lost his election bid, resigned from the cabinet to protest alleged election irregularities. These and similar allegations were denied by official sources but were generally accepted as valid by other observers. Indirect elections by regional assemblies for additional seats raised the number of independent royalists in parliament to 141, giving that group an absolute majority.

In October Hassan asked Osman to form a government of national unity that would stress "democracy and pluralism" in parliament rather than the concept of one-party, majority rule. Both the Istiqlal and the MP accepted the invitation to join the independent royalists in a coalition cabinet whose attention turned increasingly to events in the Western Sahara.

Morocco and the Western Sahara

Moroccan claims to the Western Sahara dated to the eleventh century, when tribes in the region gave their allegiance to the Almoravid sultans. For modern Moroccan nationalists, it remained part of what they referred to as "Greater Morocco" (also including Mauritania and parts of Mali and Algeria). Spain first occupied outposts in the region in 1884, but the colony was a neglected backwater of European imperialism until the discovery of large phosphate reserves in 1963 brought it attention from Spain as well as from neighboring Algeria and Mauritania. As long as the issue was one of decolonization, Morocco and the other African states presented a common front in their demands for Spanish withdrawal. Morocco supported the 1966 UN resolution calling for a referendum on the status of the Western Sahara. From the Moroccan point of view, however, the future of the region was nonnegotiable: the Western Sahara was Moroccan soil, and there was no other acceptable option for the territory except reunion with Morocco. Morocco rejected any idea of a Maghribi union that would include a separate Western Sahara

entity and after 1970 refused to consider further proposals for a referendum to determine the will of the region's inhabitants. For the most part, these people consisted of nomadic tribesmen who regularly migrated with their herds between the Western Sahara and Mauritania and for whom national borders had little meaning.

Hassan assured the OAU heads of states meeting in Rabat in 1972 that his country would not resort to force against Spain to recover the territory and would rely instead on negotiations. Relations with Spain already were complicated, however, by a dispute over fishing rights and by the outstanding issue of the Spanish-occupied enclaves. Morocco also sponsored a pro-unification liberation movement that agitated for Spanish withdrawal from the Western Sahara. In 1973 a rival Algerian-backed movement committed to self-determination leading to full independence appeared in the region, claiming to be the sole legitimate representative of the Saharan people, also called Saharawi. Organized as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Río de Oro (Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el Hamra y Río de Oro—Polisario), it commenced military operations against Spanish forces in the Western Sahara.

In August 1974 Spain formally acknowledged the 1966 UN resolution calling for a referendum on the future status of the Western Sahara. Madrid requested that a plebiscite be conducted under UN supervision within the next year. A UN commission reported in early 1975 that a majority of Saharawi desired independence. Morocco protested the proposed referendum and took its case to the International Court of Justice at The Hague for an advisory decision on the question of sovereignty in the region. The effect of the litigation was to postpone the referendum. In the meantime, the king had assigned Dlimi, then his closest military adviser, to command the military region bordering the Spanish-occupied territory and reinforce the garrison there.

The International Court made known the results of its deliberations in October 1975. The panel found that, although "ties of allegiance" had existed historically between Morocco and the tribes of the Western Sahara and Mauritania, such ties did not mean that Morocco exercised sovereignty there. It concluded that there was no legal justification for departing from the UN position that the Saharawi were entitled to self-determination. Spain, meanwhile, had reacted to Moroccan intransigence with a declaration that even in the absence of a referendum, it intended to surrender political control of the Western Sahara, while

retaining its economic interests there. This became the signal for convening a tripartite conference involving Mauritania, but Madrid announced that it was also opening independence talks with the Polisario, which had begun to receive significant military as well as political support from Algeria.

Hassan decided on a drastic course of action that would dramatize Morocco's resolve to recover the Western Sahara. By early November an estimated 350,000 Moroccan civilians had been assembled near the border to take part in the Green March, so called for the holy color of Islam under whose banner the unarmed marchers were to advance, copies of the Quran in hand, into Spanish-occupied territory to repossess it for Morocco. Spanish troops went on alert behind a "line of dissuasion," a barrier of wire and mines laid down 12 kilometers inside the border.

On November 6 a contingent of more than 40,000 marchers, led by Prime Minister Osman, crossed the border and proceeded in a mass across the desert to within sight of the Spanish defense line but moved no closer. Great prudence was shown on both sides. The UN Security Council passed a resolution that same day deploring the march and demanding an immediate withdrawal of the marchers, but over the next two days they were joined by others.

Hassan described the Green March as a witness of his people's "faith and conviction." It was an extravagant gesture combining patriotism and piety that had indeed demonstrated their solidarity with the king on the issue of the Western Sahara. (Students were specifically excluded from participating.) Having made his point that Morocco would not back down from its stand on the Western Sahara, Hassan accepted a symbolic victory, and on November 9 he called off the march.

The tripartite negotiations begun in October were brought to a speedy conclusion in the Treaty of Madrid, signed on November 21 by Morocco, Spain, and Mauritania. The agreement stipulated that Spain would share administration of the Western Sahara with the other signatories while it carried out a graceful exit scheduled for completion in February 1976. (In fact, the evacuation of Spanish personnel was completed a month ahead of schedule.) The three parties also agreed to consider the *jamaa*, the assembly of Saharan tribal leaders that sat under Spanish auspices, as a fully representative body competent to speak for the Saharan people and thus make a referendum on the region's political future unnecessary. Amid charges of manipulation from the Polisario, the *jamaa* acknowledged Moroccan sovereignty, and the chiefs formally gave their allegiance to Hassan. Under the accord Spain retained an

economic stake in the Western Sahara, but Morocco obtained a 65-percent share in the phosphate-mining enterprise at Bu Craa. Pursuant to an earlier agreement, the Western Sahara was partitioned in April, Morocco assuming control over the northern two-thirds of the territory while conceding the remaining portion in the south to Mauritania.

The Polisario derided the *jamaa* as a "masquerade by a handful of traitors" but quickly accepted the support of chiefs who defected in increasing numbers to its side. In December 1975 a provisional council met in Algiers under the Polisario's auspices to formulate a constitution for the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). Of 115 delegates, 56 had been members of the *jamaa* that only a few weeks earlier had pledged fealty to Hassan. In February 1976 the Polisario announced the formation of a SADR government. A new dimension was thereby added to the dispute because the liberation movement could now present its claims as a government-in-exile.

The Western Sahara issue created divisions within the OAU. It dominated the proceedings of the 1976 summit at Port Louis in Mauritius, where an Algerian-sponsored resolution was passed supporting self-determination for the Western Sahara but without mentioning the SADR. A few months later, however, the OAU's Liberation Committee came out in favor of formal recognition of the Polisario as the sole legitimate representative of the Saharawi. A select committee of African heads of state, the so-called Wise Men's Committee, was subsequently set up under OAU auspices to propose a formula for a settlement in the Western Sahara. Its recommendation for a renewed effort to schedule a referendum was approved at the 1979 OAU summit by a narrow margin. The OAU action reflected the continuing erosion of African support for Morocco's position (see Western Sahara, ch. 4).

Morocco eventually committed a large part of its combat forces—by some estimates, up to 80 percent of effective manpower—against the Polisario's relatively small but well-equipped, highly mobile, and resourceful military force, which used Algerian bases for quick strikes against targets deep inside Morocco and Mauritania as well as for operations in the Western Sahara. Although the Moroccans occupied all of the towns, they were unable to move outside them except in force and had to evacuate some of the more remote former Spanish outposts. The mines at Bu Craa came under attack, and the conveyor belt along which phosphates were shipped out was repeatedly cut by the Polisario. Another proof of the Polisario's mobility and its ability

to control territory was the success it achieved in escorting an estimated half of the region's nomads to camps under its control.

By 1977 the Mauritanian-assigned southern sector of the Western Sahara became the focus of extensive Polisario activity. Some 9,000 Moroccan troops were dispatched to reinforce beleaguered Mauritanian forces there and soon took over most operations from them. In July 1978 the Mauritanian government was overthrown in a bloodless military coup. Corruption was cited by coup leaders as the cause of their disaffection from the regime that had governed the country since independence in 1960, but most observers interpreted the action as a recognition that Mauritanian forces had been defeated and desired an end to the war. After negotiations with the Polisario on disengagement, Mauritania in August 1979 renounced its claims in the Western Sahara. Moroccan forces thereupon raised their country's flag in the southern sector, and the area was formally annexed by Morocco and organized as a province. It became the scene of some of the fiercest fighting of the war (see *War in the Western Sahara*, ch. 5).

Retrenchment and Renewed Unrest, 1978-81

More than any other issue since independence, the objective of securing the Western Sahara had unified the Moroccan nation. Because of the firm stand that the king had taken, it also enhanced his popularity in the country. By the late 1970s, however, the war against the Polisario guerrillas had begun to put severe strains on the economy, and Morocco found itself increasingly isolated diplomatically as a consequence of the Western Sahara involvement.

Hassan was resentful of the recognition given to the Polisario by other countries in the region and frustrated as well by what he considered the lack of support shown by Morocco's friends in Western Europe and the United States. Washington acknowledged that Morocco exercised administrative authority in the Western Sahara, but, pending a political solution through the referendum process, it declined to recognize Moroccan sovereignty there. Additional strains in relations resulted from Washington's unwillingness to supply Morocco with military equipment that could be used in the Western Sahara. Although the United States became more flexible in this regard after 1979, Washington continued to take the official position that a military solution was not possible. France remained the primary supplier of arms to Morocco but was clearly suspicious of Hassan's intentions in the region (see *Western Europe*; *United States*, ch. 4).

After the 1977 election the king continued to rule within the framework of a government composed of a handpicked cabinet of notables. The revived parliament provided a new forum for debate but represented no real change in the political power structure. A majority of its members were nonparty figures loyal to the king and described collectively as "independent royalists." In March 1978 they organized as the National Rally of Independents (*Rassemblement National des Indépendants—RNI*), described as a "structured political movement to give more effective political support to the king's program." The RNI was not supposed to be a political party, which would be too narrow to encompass its broad proroyalist constituency, but in practice that is what it became.

Osman stepped down as prime minister in March 1979, purportedly to devote his full energies to organizing the RNI, but differences with Hassan on foreign policy questions and Osman's lethargic habits were said to be the main factors leading to his removal from office. Named to replace Osman was Maati Bouabid, who inherited the three-party coalition consisting of the RNI, the *Istiqlal*, and the MP. A onetime member of the UNFP who still described himself as a "moderate socialist," Bouabid had been disavowed by the party when he joined the Osman government in 1975 as minister of justice. In 1981 a total of 59 royalist deputies left the RNI to form a new party. The split occurred as a result of disagreement within the royalist camp over subsidies to large commercial farms, but members of the new faction, which represented the rural elite, remained within the government coalition. As another partner in the government, the *Istiqlal* took an openly harder line in foreign policy than did the other parties and also pressed for rectification of the border with Algeria and recovery of the Spanish enclaves. Like the other parties, it was immovable in its commitment to holding on in the Western Sahara (see *Political Parties*, ch. 4).

A new union, the Democratic Confederation of Labor (*Confédération Démocratique du Travail—CDT*), was formed in 1978 with backing from the USFP to organize public sector employees, including civil servants, teachers, and medical personnel. More militant than the UMT, the CDT carried out successful strikes in schools and hospitals in 1979 that won pay increases and improved working conditions for its members. It soon emerged as a potentially significant base of opposition to the royalist regime.

The growing criticism of its economic policy in parliament and the restive mood in the country over low wages and the rise in

living costs persuaded the king to postpone elections scheduled for 1981. He justified his decision on the grounds that the country could not afford such a diversion of its energies during a critical phase of the war in the Western Sahara. A constitutional amendment was proposed extending the life of parliament from four to six years. Submitted to a referendum in May 1980, the measure was approved, according to the official count, by over 99 percent of those voting, but the USFP and other opposition parties charged that the results had been falsified. The USFP, which in relation to its following in the country was underrepresented in parliament, had expected to pick up a large number of seats in the now postponed election.

A Troubled Economy

The workability of Morocco's ambitious 1973-77 development plan had depended on projected growth in income from phosphate exports and the availability of foreign loans to finance industrialization schemes. Owing to high world market demands, Morocco was able to hike prices for its phosphates by nearly 300 percent in November 1973, earmarking added revenue to investment in development projects. But by the mid-1970s the demand for phosphates had begun to decline, causing prices to plummet on the world market. Morocco cut production of its basic export commodity in a vain attempt to stabilize prices. Meanwhile, the cost of essential imports, especially oil and foodstuffs, and capital equipment for development projects had risen dramatically. As conditions worsened, Morocco borrowed heavily to cover balance of payments deficits. Investments contracted as development funds and foreign exchange were diverted into food purchases. By 1977 income from exports covered only about half the cost of imports. The debt service alone that year equaled the total earnings from phosphates.

The government abandoned the development plan before the end of the five-year period, admitting that it had been a failure. A three-year austerity plan was imposed in 1978 that clamped tight controls on luxury imports and attempted to set limits on public spending. Development aims during the period were to be modest and, under the circumstances, more realistic.

The economic crisis in Morocco was brought on in part by unfavorable international conditions over which the government had no control. The rise in energy costs after 1973 contributed to a world recession and a decline in commodity prices that had a particularly depressing effect on the phosphate market. Blame for

Morocco's deeply troubled economic situation could be laid as well to the effects of a natural disaster. In the late 1970s harvests in Morocco were afflicted by the severe drought that swept across the African continent. Cereal production fell by 1980 to only one-third of normal yield; livestock was reduced by 40 percent. But the problems that beset the Moroccan economy in the late 1970s were also the result of structural dysfunctioning. Half of the country's farmland was owned by 10 percent of the landholders, who had been the chief beneficiaries of expensive development projects directed toward improving export-oriented agricultural production. The smallholders who produced food for domestic consumption on the other half of the land had been largely neglected by development projects, and their rain-fed farms were among those most hard hit by the drought. Ruined peasant farmers sold their holdings and migrated to the cities, where only about half of them were able to find work.

There were other factors contributing to the economic malaise. Development funds continued to be wasted on uneconomic but politically expedient projects in Morocco's less developed areas and in the Western Sahara. The European Economic Community had placed restrictions on the import of tomatoes and other food products that were important to the growth of Morocco's modern agricultural sector. The cost of the war in the Western Sahara had laid a heavy burden on the economy. Expenditures on the security forces were reliably estimated to consume 40 percent of the national budget in 1980 at a time when the government was imposing austerity measures in other areas, including public sector wage increases, food subsidies, and education. The three-year austerity plan ran its course at the end of 1980 without having contributed noticeably to the improvement of economic conditions.

1981: Year of Turmoil

By the beginning of 1981 popular discontent with social and economic conditions was manifesting itself in renewed unrest among students and union members, and for the first time the opposition parties leveled their criticism of government policy directly at the king as well as at his ministers. The USFP challenged Hassan for being too soft on the Western Sahara and accused him of betraying national interests when he agreed in principle in June 1981 to an OAU proposal for a cease-fire to be followed by a referendum. Hassan had, in fact, said that a referendum would only be accepted as an act of confirmation of

Saharan allegiance to the Moroccan crown. Moreover, he had rejected negotiating directly with the Polisario over either a cease-fire or the terms of a referendum.

The year had begun inauspiciously for the government. In January Marxist candidates swept the elections for student councils at the universities. Before the end of the month, students were striking across the country to protest overcrowding in classrooms, cuts in student stipends, and proposed revisions in entrance requirements that would make admissions to universities more selective. The strikes turned violent when leftist students clashed with Muslim fundamentalists. To protest police intervention, the UNEM announced a nationwide boycott in February that took 70,000 students out of their classrooms. Troops were then called in to clear the university campus at Fès, and numerous student leaders and teachers who had supported them were arrested.

The next round of unrest occurred in June when strikes were called in Casablanca and other major cities to protest the rise in food prices. The official rate of inflation in 1980 was 20 percent, but this was an unrealistic reflection of the increased cost-of-living impact on an urban population whose numbers were swollen by the influx of migrants from the drought-stricken countryside. Severe food shortages because of the drought and the high cost of imported foodstuffs had required a 300-percent increment in public subsidies to maintain existing price levels during 1980. Early in 1981, however, the government began to phase out the subsidies in order to comply with conditions set by the International Monetary Fund for a three-year US\$1 billion loan sought by Morocco. The immediate result of this action was a price increase averaging about 40 percent on staple food items without compensating wage increases.

The USFP and PPS demanded restoration of the subsidies, and the unions threatened strikes unless food prices were rolled back. Even the government parties were divided on the issue. Prime Minister Bouabid gave in to the pressure and ordered price increases reduced by half and salaries raised for public employees. Interpreting the government's retreat as a sign of its weakness, the unions pressed for further concessions.

In June the CDT and UMT called strikes that closed shops and shut down transportation and other public services in Casablanca. Rioting, arson, and looting followed, causing extensive damage to property. The army was brought in to restore order, and troops opened fire on demonstrators. According to the official count, 66 Moroccans were killed in the incident, but the USFP put the

number of dead at 10 times that figure. More than 2,000 union and opposition party leaders and activists, many of whom were not directly implicated in the violence, were arrested.

Reflecting on the turmoil in the cities, Hassan attributed it to the dislocation of the peasant farmers, who traditionally had been a pillar of the royalist regime. When he had come to the throne in 1961, they had represented more than 80 percent of Morocco's population, but by 1981 they composed less than 60 percent. "People . . . have lost their roots in the countryside," he said, "and we need to do more to keep them there." While observers looked for signs that his government would respond to the needs outlined by the king, the tensions reflected in the 1981 unrest were a warning that failure to deal effectively with mounting social and economic grievances could place the political system under dangerous and recurring strains.


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The most authoritative scholarly surveys of Moroccan history have been written in the context of the Maghrib as a whole. Abdallah Laroui's *The History of the Maghrib* is an interpretive work recommended for readers with some previous background in North African studies. Although his nationalist bias is evident, Laroui's work can be balanced against that of European and American historians whose approaches he criticizes. Jamil M. Abun-Nasr's *A History of the Maghrib* is a more objective narrative survey. Charles-André Julien's *History of North Africa*, edited and extensively revised by Roger Le Tourneau, provides the clearest survey of the earlier periods of Moroccan history. Edward William Bovill's classic *The Golden Trade of the Moors* offers a specialized treatment of Morocco's economic history.

The story of French military intervention is related in a lively fashion by Douglas Porch in *The Conquest of Morocco*. Robin L. Bidwell's excellent monograph, *Morocco under Colonial Rule*, is the best single study of French administration during the protectorate and its effect on contemporary Morocco. The intellectual conflict posed by colonialism is the subject of David Gordon's *North Africa's French Legacy, 1956-1962*. David S. Woolman's *Rebels in the Rif* is the solidly researched and entertainingly written account of Abd al Krim's rebellion in the 1920s. John Waterbury, a leading American student of Moroccan affairs, views the contemporary monarchy against the background of the sharifian regime's long

history in *The Commander of the Faithful*. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment



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*From the minaret of a mosque, a muadhhdhin calls
the Muslim faithful to prayer.*

MOROCCO IN THE MID-1980s was a nation striving to divest itself of a colonial past and assert itself as a modern state. Under French rule the country was characterized by an urban-rural dichotomy and presumed differences between Arabs and Berbers. Since independence, local ethnic affiliations have in part been diluted by the massive movement of rural peoples to the cities. The traditional centers of the cities and their sprawling bidonvilles (slums), located on their outskirts, were home to poor families from many social environments throughout Morocco. Closely knit relationships remained centered on the family, but the new residential patterns have brought immigrants from different regions into contact with one another. The territorial division of Moroccan society according to ethnic and tribal identity has thus, to a large degree, given way to one based on wealth.

The religion and language of the Arabs remained the cohesive forces of Moroccan social life. The indigenous Berber population brought to Islam their distinctive concept of saints as mediators in the people's relationship with God. Arabic, the dominant language of the nation, was used in the public domain. Although many Berbers, particularly in the urban areas, have adopted Arab language and culture, they have retained their ethnic heritage. Berber ethnicity remained vibrant, especially in the rural areas.

The society has been struggling to overcome its shortcomings in providing health care, family planning, and education to its citizens. Over the past decade, infant mortality rates have been lowered, and life expectancy has been lengthened, but the health of Morocco's children has been significantly poorer than in countries of similar per capita income. The swelling rural exodus has exacerbated urban difficulties in providing adequate environmental sanitation, housing, and schools. Some gains have been made in lowering the birth rate, but rapid population growth continued to strain the society's ability to provide for its members. Literacy rates have been increased for both sexes, but employment opportunities did not exist for many Moroccans. In addition, rural women were still locked in the yoke of virtually nonexistent literacy. The crisis of unemployment affected even university graduates if they had studied in nontechnical fields.

Geography

Located at the extreme northwestern corner of Africa, Morocco is bounded on the north by the Mediterranean Sea, on the west by the Atlantic Ocean, and on the east and southeast by Algeria. Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia constitute an area known as the Maghrib ("the time or place of the sunset—the west"). The northwestern part of Libya, known as Tripolitania, is also included in this grouping of Arab states, which have similar physical features and closely related histories and ethnic groups.

Morocco has an area of 446,550 square kilometers, excluding 178,000 square kilometers of the Western Sahara (formerly the Spanish Sahara) claimed and controlled by Morocco. In 1976, by agreement with both the Spanish and the Mauritanian governments, Morocco assumed jurisdiction over a major part of the Western Sahara as the Spanish withdrew. After Mauritania renounced its claims to the remainder of the territory in 1979, Morocco annexed this area as well, calling it Oued ed Dahab (Gold River). This province is entirely desert and is the home of a nomadic population (see Western Sahara, ch. 4; War in the Western Sahara, ch. 5). It has mineral wealth in the form of phosphate rock.

Two Spanish enclaves on the Mediterranean coast—Peñón de Alhucemas and Peñón de Vélez de la Gomera—are claimed by Morocco. Its claim to Mauritania has been abandoned. The length of Morocco's border with Algeria is 1,617 kilometers, and that with Mauritania is 1,213 kilometers.

The topography is dominated by rugged chains of mountains that divide the country into three geographic regions: the mountainous interior, including plateaus and fertile valleys; the Atlantic coastal lowlands; and the semiarid and arid area of eastern and southern Morocco where the mountains descend gradually into the Sahara (see fig. 9). On the country's northern flank the Rif runs parallel to the Mediterranean coast. The peaks seldom exceed 2,100 meters, but erosion has carved deep ravines, particularly on the seaward slopes, that make penetration of these highlands difficult. South of the Rif a series of three Atlas Mountain ranges somewhat overlap one another as they slant across the country on a generally northeast-southwest axis. The most northerly of the three, the Middle Atlas range, is separated from the Rif by only a narrow corridor. The High Plateaus of the Middle Atlas have been the scene of considerable oil exploration (see Mining, ch. 3).

Immediately to the south of the Middle Atlas and parallel to




Figure 9. Terrain and Drainage

it is the lofty High Atlas range, an interior region having elevations of 1,200 meters or higher. Some 720 kilometers in length and up to 64 kilometers in breadth, the High Atlas divides the country into two climatic zones: one that receives the westerly winds from the Atlantic and one that is influenced by the proximity of the Sahara. West of the city of Marrakech the High Atlas is a solid granite wall with peaks ranging from 3,000 meters to over 3,900 meters. Eastward beyond the Tichka Pass, elevations drop to 2,400 meters or lower, although one peak, Boulemane, exceeds 3,900 meters. The mountains are less symmetrical than those in the west, and their slopes and declivities are sharper.

Farther south and to the west lies the third of the Atlas systems, the Anti-Atlas. Backing on the High Atlas and separated from it in the west by the fertile valley of the Sous River, the Anti-Atlas has peaks lower than those of the other Atlas ranges, and in those portions west of the Drâa River it has the appearance of a high, denuded plateau. East of the Drâa, it rises as a massif of old rocks with elevations of 2,400 meters or more, and still farther to the east it drops gradually to rocky pre-Saharan uplands.

The coastal lowlands of western Morocco stretch from Tangier south to Essaouira. Small enclosed coastal plains occur south of Agadir and around the mouth of the Drâa River. The coast is flat and is bordered with sand dunes or marshes; the plain north of Essaouira is uninterrupted, although the depth varies widely.

Inland a large, open, but irregular plateau with elevations of between 540 and 900 meters covers tens of thousands of square kilometers. The soil is poor, but the area around Khouribga (known as the phosphates plateau) is the center of rich phosphate deposits that make Morocco one of the world's largest producers of this mineral.

Two major inland plains of agricultural importance lie between the plateau and the Atlas ranges. One, the Tadla Plain, is centered on the Oum er Rhia River, which has covered the plain with a rich deposit of silt. The other, the Haouz, is the basin of the Tensift River near Marrakech.

The entire area of the Atlantic plains and plateaus is relatively open and easily accessible, and transportation is well developed. Although low and regular, the coast offers few natural harbors, none of which is of significant size. Until the construction of man-made harbors at Casablanca—the principal port—and several smaller port facilities, landings were made by small boats through heavy surf.

Eastern Morocco is the lowland area between the Middle

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Atlas and the Algerian frontier, an extremely arid and sparsely populated area of monotonous tableland, valleys, and depressions that are the remnants of former lakes. Elevations reach 900 meters. In the north a narrow valley occupied by the Taza Gap extends westward between the Rif and Middle Atlas to the city of Fès.

The country has the most extensive system of rivers in North Africa. The streams generally flow northwest to the Atlantic or southeast to the Sahara; the Moulouya is an exception and flows 560 kilometers northeast from the Atlas systems to the Mediterranean. The principal rivers with outlets to the Atlantic are the Sebou, Bou Regreg, Oum er Rhia, Tensift, and Sous. The Ziz and Rheris are the main rivers flowing southward into the Sahara. The largest of the rivers is the Sebou; together with its tributaries it represents 45 percent of the country's water resources. None of the rivers is navigable, but in a country where seasonal droughts are common, their value for irrigation is enormous.

Western and northern Morocco have a Mediterranean climate of mild winters and hot, dry summers. The west coast receives moist winds from the Atlantic as well as a cold current from the Canary Islands. On the Atlantic coast the mean temperature is 16.4°C to 23°C and in the interior 10°C to 27°C. The pre-Saharan south has a semiarid climate. The Rif and Atlas ranges act as barriers between the western and eastern parts of the country. In winter the westerly winds off the Atlantic bring snow and rain that fall on the western flanks of the mountains, leaving little for the eastern steppes and plains. Cold, stormy winters are the general rule. They are characterized by raw cold and excessive rain, with heavy snow in the mountains, accompanied by a continually overcast sky and an agitated ocean.

The coldest month is January, and the hottest is August. In the summer the climate is more uniform—hot and dry—except for the humid Mediterranean coast and the mountains, where temperatures are cool, although the sun may be bright. In the spring and fall, precipitation is slight and irregular. The coast in general has a more stable climate than the interior, and particularly around Casablanca it is fresher and less humid than on the Mediterranean. The rainy seasons are from April to May and from October to November. Only in the mountains does it rain in the summer. Annual rainfall varies considerably from 25.4 millimeters at Marrakech, 800 to 1,016 millimeters on the Atlantic coast, 1,092 millimeters in the Middle Atlas, 1,000 to 2,000 millimeters in eastern Morocco, and 100 millimeters in the pre-Saharan south. Since 1979 Morocco has been plagued by a drought that has taken its toll on crops and livestock.



Hundreds of red clay casbahs (ancient fortresses) abound in the High Atlas valleys of the deep south near Ouarzazate.


Population

According to the latest official government census (1982), the country had a population of 20,419,555, including 130,000 inhabitants of the Western Sahara. This figure, however, was lower than the estimates of the United States Bureau of the Census, which were based on extrapolations from earlier data. The latter source estimated that the population of Morocco was 23,565,000 in 1984. The previous official census of 1971 had reported a total population of 15,300,000; the 1982 total represented a growth of 32.8 percent during a period of 11 years. The rate of natural increase in population of 2.9 percent annually between 1983 and 1984 was extremely high, denoting a doubling of the population every 24 years. It was, nevertheless, comparable to the growth rates of Morocco's Maghribi neighbors, Algeria (3.3 percent) and Tunisia (2.6 percent).

The high growth rate of the population was associated with improved living and health conditions, which were further reflected in a decline of the annual death rate from 21 per 1,000 population in 1960 to 15 per 1,000 in 1982. Life expectancy has risen from 50 years for males and 53 years for females in 1970 to 56 and 59 years, respectively, in 1982. The longer life span has increased the population over the age of 60 to about 7 percent of the total in 1982, compared with about 3 percent in the early 1970s. Nonetheless, Morocco had a very young population; about 53 percent was under the age of 20 in 1982 (see fig. 10).

The population has become increasingly homogeneous in terms of citizenship. Only 62,000 foreign nationals were registered in 1982, compared with over 500,000 when Morocco became independent in 1956. Nearly half of the total population was concentrated in the fertile plains of the central and northwest sections of the country and in the major economic centers along the Atlantic coast. The phenomenon of rural-urban migration was underscored by a 5-percent annual growth rate of the urban population between 1971 and 1982, when it increased from 5.4 million to 8.7 million residents (see table 2, Appendix A). By 1982 the urban areas contained about 43 percent of the total population. Corresponding rates of urbanization had been 29 percent in 1960 and 35 percent in 1971.

Migration to the cities has become even more pronounced as a result of the drought that began in 1979. The effects of the disaster included the death of over 40 percent of the nation's livestock and the failure of harvests. Many peasant farmers were



Source: Based on information from Morocco, Ministry of Planning, Directorate of Statistics, *General Population and Habitat Census for 1982*, Casablanca, February 1984, in Arabic, 8.

Figure 10. Population by Age and Sex, 1982

forced by economic circumstances to sell their arid farmlands and surviving animals to seek new livelihoods in the cities.

The urban agglomerations of greater Casablanca (population 2,263,469) and Rabat-Salé (population 893,042) accounted for 26 percent and 10 percent of the entire urban population, respectively. The rate of growth along the Casablanca-Rabat-Kenitra axis in fact slowed during the period 1972-82, owing in part to the establishment of new industrial zones in the east, north,

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and south. A total of 14 cities recorded populations in excess of 100,000 in the 1982 census (see table 3, Appendix A). The number of average-sized cities having populations of 20,000 to 100,000 tripled in number from 15 to 46 between 1960 and 1982.

Family Planning

Rapid population growth has had the effect of simultaneously increasing and making more conspicuous both social inequality and the disequilibrium between economic resources at hand and the needs of the population. It has been a root cause of the migration to the urban centers that has resulted in profound changes in life in the cities.

Family planning in Morocco dates from 1967, when a royal decree terminated the prohibition on the sale of contraceptives, and numerous family planning clinics were opened. Acceptance of limitations on family size did not come easily. Although the Quran does not speak against birth control, attitudes opposing the limiting of birth have been at least partly religious in their inspiration, especially in isolated rural communities and among the poor. The fundamentals of a national population policy were established in 1968. Family planning was to be introduced as an indispensable part of efforts to reduce overpopulation of the cities. The national birth rate was to be reduced from 50 per 1,000 population to 35 per 1,000 by 1985. Nevertheless, the development plans of 1968-72 and 1973-77 failed to meet their modest targets for numbers of women being assisted. A major obstacle was the limitation of the program to the available public dispensary system and the failure to carry out an intensive information and education campaign. In 1971 the Moroccan Family Planning Association was brought into being and commenced distributing materials on family planning through the private sector.

The restricted scope of the family planning program during the first decade of its existence was in part a result of political factors. The principal opposition to the program came from the Council of Ulama (Islamic scholars) and the independence party, the Istiqlal, a nationalistic political party associated with the urban bourgeoisie. Although the ulamas did not condemn contraception, they objected to governmental sponsorship of efforts that would limit the number of Moroccans and Muslims. The Istiqlal press denounced family planning as an affront to Islam, a Zionist plot, and a capitalist device to restrain Third World development. Growing economic strains and housing and

employment problems gradually induced the Moroccan authorities to support a more active campaign for curtailing population growth. King Hassan II spoke publicly in favor of family planning for the first time in 1978, and political opposition has since become less pronounced. The religious establishment has given less attention to the issue and, because the Istiqlal was well represented in the cabinet, the party has been less inclined to dissent from government policy.

Particularly in rural areas, parents have tended to have more children than the desired number in order to be certain of having surviving offspring. A survey in connection with the 1982 census revealed that for married women just beyond childbearing years (ages 45 to 49) the average number of children born was 7.4 in rural areas and 6.3 in urban areas. These excessive levels were expected to diminish with urbanization and increased education of girls. It was estimated that 15 percent of all Moroccan couples practiced birth control in 1983; a decade earlier only 3 percent were using contraceptive devices. An energetic family planning policy resulting in one-third of all couples practicing contraception could, according to the World Bank (see Glossary), result in a population of 35 million in the year 2002, compared with other projections that ranged as high as 43 million. Success in controlling Morocco's demographic growth would relieve somewhat the pressures on public service and welfare systems and could make it possible to realize the country's goal of educating all of its children before the end of the twentieth century.

Housing

Like other developing countries with rapidly increasing populations, Morocco in the 1980s was suffering from an acute and deepening housing shortage. The amount of private housing being built fell far short of meeting the demand in the fast-growing cities, and the rate of construction of public housing, while increasing, had made little impact on the deplorable conditions under which most low-income families lived. The first years after independence were relatively prosperous ones, and there was substantial construction of private housing but extremely few units of public housing. The 1968-72 development plan called for the construction of 151,000 units, but most of these were to be in rural localities in support of the government's policy of discouraging urban migration that was taxing the capacity of public services and leading to the growth of urban slums. The 1973-77 development plan introduced a basic change of policy, stressing state participation in urban development and

provision of infrastructure and services. The plan's principal shortcoming was that it gave priority to those able to pay rather than to the poorest groups and did not include effective programs for upgrading substandard housing and bidonvilles. The 1978-80 development plan was more modest, stressing the completion of projects already under way and rehabilitation rather than removal of slums.

In spite of these efforts, the housing crisis continued to intensify, compounded by a rural exodus amounting to 1,000 persons a day. It was estimated in 1983 that the housing backlog had reached 700,000 units nationwide. In addition, in order to meet the requirements of current urban growth, construction would need to be continued at a rate of 90,000 units annually. Although housing construction had more than doubled since the mid-1970s, the level of output had reached no more than 45,000 to 50,000 units per year a decade later.

The slums, which represented the most glaring of the housing problems, were of two varieties. First were portions of the old inner cities—the *medinas*—where once-substantial family dwellings had been subdivided and occupied by a great many families, each occupying a single room in many instances. Second and more numerous were the bidonvilles (literally, tin can towns, so named because flattened tin cans were a frequently used construction material). These communities had grown up in the suburbs of the larger cities, Casablanca in particular.

The two kinds of communities had different populations. The center-city slums were likely to be inhabited by long-time urban residents, and most bidonville residents were newly arrived migrants who were either unemployed or subsisting on marginal incomes. Some bidonville families were squatters, but others had either acquired title to the land on which their shacks were erected or rented their makeshift dwellings from former residents.

It was estimated that by 1983 about 30 percent of all urban dwellers were living in squatter areas. Existing residences had progressively deteriorated, and about 40 percent of them were old and/or lacked basic sanitary facilities. A substantial part of the housing units being constructed by the private sector consisted of illegal settlements built without construction permits on unserviced land and in areas not covered by official development plans. According to the 1982 census, about 63 percent of urban households had running water and 74 percent had electricity. This represented some improvement over 1971, when only 52 percent had running water and 68 percent had electricity. The number of households with a bathtub or shower rose from 19 to 24



*Rabat, the national capital and primary
center of government activities*



*Bab Boujloud, a monumental
gate of the medina in Fès,
Morocco's oldest imperial city*

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percent between 1971 and 1982. Although a large proportion (87 percent) of people living in rural areas owned their own lodgings, the level of conveniences was far lower. Only 2 percent were equipped with running water, and 4.5 percent had electricity.

Since the urban riots of 1981, the government has made a renewed effort to provide basic facilities to the bidonvilles around Casablanca and to replace slums with low-rent housing developments. Legislation enacted in 1981 to provide various tax exemptions to private companies building housing units for sale or rent has resulted in a substantial increase in lawful construction of middle-income and some lower-income housing. Two projects approved by the World Bank in 1978 and 1981 to provide infrastructure and shelter for slum dwellers have contributed to the redirection of government policy from demolition of slum areas to upgrading of settlements when feasible. Another project, approved by the World Bank in 1983, financed construction loans for unfinished core units and walk-up apartment buildings, with maximum selling prices of US\$5,300 to US\$13,300.

Ethnic Groups and Languages

Modern Moroccans are, for the most part, descendants of indigenous tribal peoples who have lived in the area at least since Phoenician times. Beginning in the seventh century, successive waves of Arabic-speaking conquerors replaced the local language and religion with their own; in modern times Arabic was predominant and Islam nearly universal. A similar, though less extensive, penetration by French culture began in the late nineteenth century and has continued in a much attenuated form.

Although they do not have a collective name for themselves, the indigenous people are known to others as Berbers, a term of uncertain origin designating the Caucasoid peoples of North Africa. The native people who once occupied the entire Maghrib, Berbers were the "Libyans" encountered by the Greeks in early classical days. Their language, composed of several differing dialects, is widely spoken in the mountainous regions. Arabic, which dominates the plains and the Atlantic coast, is the official language of the kingdom, and government policy has encouraged its exclusive use.

Peoples of Morocco

Under the French protectorate Arabs and Berbers were

perceived as two distinct ethnic groups. The Arabs were considered an urban population loyal to the sultan in contrast with the Berbers, who were regarded as a rural, tribal population free of the sultan's authority. The French assumption that Berbers and Arabs were culturally distinct groups was ascribed to a colonial policy of divide and rule. Protectorate officials maintained that Berbers rather than Arabs could become part of French civilization and sought to separate the Berbers from Islam. The culmination of this policy was the so-called Berber *zahir* (royal decree) of May 16, 1930, which formally removed Berber communities from the jurisdiction of Islamic law (see Origins of the Nationalist Movement, ch. 1).

Berbers and Arabs are normally distinguished from one another by their respective languages, but this marker is easily erased. Many Berbers speak Arabic, and those Arabs living near Berber communities in the highlands often learn the Berber language. Overall, however, it has been the Berbers who have become absorbed into the dominant Arab society, particularly in the towns. Ethnic identification also has been blurred by the sharing of Islam by Arabs and Berbers as well as by common ties to a town, village, or region. Moreover, Arabs and Berbers have shared similar concepts of social status—based on wealth, political influence, and religious position—which have tended to mute the differences between the groups.

For these reasons anthropologists writing in the 1970s and 1980s have come to emphasize the similarities rather than the differences between the Arabs and Berbers. They point out, in addition, that the total number of Arabs who arrived in the Maghrib during the invasions of the seventh and eleventh centuries probably never made up more than 10 percent of the population. The first invaders brought with them few of their women, and sexual liaison with the indigenous Berbers became extensive at an early date. The invasion of Morocco that followed the fall of southern Spain to the Christians at the end of the fifteenth century was not made up primarily of Arabs but rather of the descendants of Berber converts to Islam who had entered Spain in the eighth century. Berber descent accordingly has outweighed Arab ancestry, and anthropologists have been increasingly inclined to divide the Moroccan population into Berbers and "Arabized" Berbers when they make such distinctions at all.

The two other groups—Harratines and Jews—have characteristics that have kept their ethnic boundary immutable. The Harratines are a black Muslim population believed to be from

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the Sahara. A depressed economic group frequently working as manual laborers and farmworkers for Berbers and Arabs, the Harratines rarely have intermarried with Berbers or Arabs because of their low social status. Jews have been set apart from the other groups because they are outside the Islamic faith. Before the imposition of the protectorate, their status as a people protected by the sultan subjected them to restrictions on their social and economic activities. Inter-marriage was uncommon, but if it happened, it generally occurred between a Muslim man and a Jewish woman, who would then convert to Islam.

Arabs

The present-day distinction between Arab-speaking people of the plains and Berber speakers of the mountains had its earliest roots in the events of the first invasions; the cities of the plains and their hinterlands fell to the Arabs, but the mountain tribesmen were able to resist the invaders successfully. Eventually, Arabic became the language throughout the areas most attractive to migrants and conquerors—the so-called *bilad al makhzan* (land of the central government) or what the French were to refer to as *Maroc utile* (useful Morocco). Berber was, with a few exceptions, to remain the language of the mountains. The distinction became crystallized after the fall of Moorish Spain, when the Arabized Berbers who entered Morocco from the cities of Andalusia settled in Fès and other lowland cities.

In modern times, the Arabic culture and language have played a dominant role in Moroccan society. Since at least 1500, Arabic has been developed as the language of trade and religion. As such, it has come to serve as a unifying force, linking Moroccan communities with one another and with the outside world. Whenever it is spoken, Arabic is divided broadly into the classical idiom of the Quran—a form used also in the press—and the colloquial idiom. In Morocco, the colloquial language is further divided into an urban dialect spoken in Fès and other old centers; a mountain dialect, resulting from the Arabization of Berber at a very early date; and a lowland dialect, resulting from the Arabization at a later date under the influence of nomadic beduin Arabs. This latter dialect, spoken by nomadic tribesmen, illustrates the distinction in which sedentary farmers are usually Berber speakers, while nomadic tribes speak Arabic.

The spoken Arabic dialects of Morocco belong to the Maghribi group. These dialects are mutually intelligible, but they have diverged so far from eastern dialects that North Africans



Tangier presents a charming mixture of Arabic, Berber, and European cultures.

have some difficulty in conversing with a Syrian or an Iraqi. Dialectical Arabic, the local speech learned at home, is usually referred to as Moroccan Arabic and is usually not written or used for literary purposes.

Arab culture, because of its dynamism and predominance within the national society, has been regarded by some Moroccans as more prestigious than Berber culture. Although the permeable ethnic boundaries between Arabs and Berbers have permitted a good deal of intermarriage, the actual degree of such intermarriage was unknown; conclusions have varied in the anthropological studies undertaken in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. At least one study has suggested that Berber men have tended to marry Arab women as a means of "moving up" socially. Others, however, have emphasized that Moroccans tended to avoid in-

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terethnic marriage unless the families were neighbors or business associates or otherwise were familiar with each other's lives. According to this view, Berbers in the rural, traditionally Berber areas have preferred to maintain their ethnic identity.

Berbers

The Berbers are a Muslim ethnic group that can be found in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and the states of the Sahara and Sahelian West Africa. Of these countries, Morocco had by far the largest concentration of Berbers in its population—about 34 percent in the mid-1980s, according to the latest reliable estimates. Berbers do not identify themselves as a people but as members of a clan and tribe. Outsiders often identify them with a regional group, such as the Saharawi of the Western Sahara or the Ait Waryarghar of the Rif. Berbers, like their Arab compatriots, are Sunni Muslims of the Maliki school of Islam. They have kept their pre-Islamic observance of saintly cults, which the Arabs also observe (see *Popular Religion*, this ch.).

At least half of the Berber speakers also speak Arabic, and a substantial number also speak French. Bilingual Moroccans are most frequently men or schoolchildren. Arabic is learned at school, and men often travel to work in cities where they learn Arabic. Berber women have less use for another language and are said for the most part to remain monolingual. One authority has reported that less than 1 percent of the women in the Rif knew Arabic or a European language. In one Middle Atlas community in the early 1970s, however, 72 percent of the men and 58 percent of the women were reported to be bilingual. In contradiction-ridden Morocco, everything or nothing can be proved by example, but there is a consensus that Arabic is the language of status. It is used in commercial and legal transactions, but in bilingual families Berber continues to be spoken in the home.

The Berber language is found in many forms throughout the Maghrib, but it lacks the unifying vehicle of a written form. Language, dress, and ecological adaptation vary from region to region. The three principal Berber dialect groups are the Rifi of the Rif; the Tamazight of the Middle Atlas, the central High Atlas, and the Sahara; and the Tashilhit of the High Atlas and the Anti-Atlas. The numerous tribes have been grouped regionally into the Rifians of the North, the Shluh of the southeast, and the Berraber in the center of the country and the Sahara.

A significant but undetermined number of country people have settled in cities and retain a communal identity there. They



*Berber tents in the Middle Atlas area
Courtesy Will D. Swearingen*



*Berber village in the High Atlas region
between Marrakech and Quarazate
Courtesy Sally Ann Baynard*

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have also branched out into businesses, including retailing and wholesaling; a majority of the small entrepreneurs in Casablanca are Berbers. In many cases families, rather than individuals, run a business, and the male members alternate between the city and the family landholdings, usually leaving their wives and children in the country. A growing number of men, however, have brought their immediate families to town, weakening and in some cases eventually breaking their ties to family and village. Specific data are lacking, but it would seem that ultimately the children or grandchildren of these urban migrants will become Arabic speakers and be considered Arabs by non-kin.

Morocco's efforts to annex the Western Sahara have brought the government into contact with the Saharawis, the inhabitants of the Western Sahara, who are the descendants of the Maquil Arab tribe and the Sanhaja Berbers. The Maquils settled in the western part of the desert in the fourteenth century and entered into a conflict with the Sanhajas that lasted until the end of the seventeenth century. Through intermarriage the Maquil Arab culture and its dialect, Hassaniya, overrode that of the Sanhaja Berber. The Saharawis are subsistence farmers, growing the main cereal crops without benefit of irrigation. Irrigated farming of fruits and vegetables occurs in the Saguia el Hamra valley near El Aaiún. There is commercial fishing off the coastal towns of Lemsid and Dakhla. The Saharawis, backed by the Algerian government, have been engaged in fighting Morocco over the Western Sahara territory since 1975. During that period a large part of the Saharawi civilian population has lived in Algerian refugee camps (see *War in the Western Sahara*, ch. 5).

Harratines

The origins of the Harratines, a black, nontribal people, have long been debated. One generally held belief is that they are the descendants of black immigrant slaves from south of the Sahara brought by nomads to work in the oases. Another explanation is that they migrated north to escape the harsh desert conditions and paid tribute to the Arab or Berber nomads. A large proportion of the inhabitants of the southern oases are a mixture of black and Shluh Berber stock. They engage in farming or in specialized activities, such as well digging, smithing, and house building.

Harratines residing in the southern oases live in their own villages or in those inhabited by their Berber patrons, the owners of the lands that they work. Harratines name themselves after the rivers near their villages: Ait Dra, Ait Dads, and Ait Tudh. The

relationships Harratines have with Berbers and Arabs alike are based on inequality. Although Harratines are legally free and allowed to own property, almost all of them residing in rural areas are farm laborers.

The patron-client relationship of Berber and Harratine is signified by the sacrifice of a sheep or any other animal at the door of the patron's house. This sacrifice carries with it a curse because a selected patron refusing his role would be shamed in the eyes of God. Harratines thus are able to select their particular patrons and to change patrons if the need arises. The ability to select and possibly reject patrons probably mitigates against Harratines being harshly treated. Female Harratines act also as grain sorters for female patrons in the Middle Atlas.

Even though Harratines are Muslims, they endure a negative mystical connotation. Spiritual beings (jinn) are physically represented as black and are likened to the Harratines. Their low economic and political status, coupled with unflattering mystical notions, quite effectively removes Harratines from consideration as marriage partners by Berbers and Arabs. In the mystical sphere, Harratines are permitted only the roles of fool or sensual dancer at celebrations. Although the Harratines' blackness is considered evil and sinister, some rural Moroccans believe that their mothers' milk has curative power, particularly for diseases of the eye. Regardless of their locale, urban or rural, Harratines predominate in the occupations of potion dealers, healers, and sorcerers.

In urban areas Harratines rarely achieve positions of power or influence. They are primarily employed as domestic servants and carpet weavers. They also work as unskilled or semiskilled civil servants in sanitation services, parks and gardens, construction work, cement factories, dockyards, and in the iron industry. Many, if not most, urban Harratines live in shantytowns where their conditions are thought to be worse than those of the impoverished Berbers and Arabs living around them.

Jews

Jews have lived in Morocco since the days of classical antiquity and have been the only local religious minority since the Middle Ages. In the mid-1980s it was estimated that the Moroccan Jewish community numbered only about 11,000 to 14,000 persons compared with the more than 200,000 who resided in Morocco at independence in 1956. It is generally believed that Morocco at that time had the largest Jewish

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population in North Africa and probably in the Arab world. The social principle that governed the relations of the Jewish community with others of the Moroccan society was that of *dhimmi* (subject people). As a subject people, Jews paid tribute or tax to the ruler and in return received physical and economic security, religious freedom, and autonomy in matters regarding personal status (marriage, divorce, inheritance, and education). As did other Jews in North Africa, Moroccan Jews often lived apart from the Muslim population in walled quarters called *mellahs*.

From the Middle Ages to early modern times, the restrictions regarding *dhimmi* status were rigorously applied. In the economic sphere Jews were prohibited from working in trades performed by Islamic guilds. The only profitable occupations available to them were those closed to Muslims, such as jewelry smithing and moneylending, which required a high capital outlay that only a few could afford. The greatest number of Jews lived in the cities, which were under the sultan's rule, and worked as porters, day laborers, bath keepers, and butchers. There were also numerous Jewish communities in rural areas not under government control. In the countryside Jews worked as farmers and shepherds. Regardless of the milieu, they were involved in commerce—ranging from financiers in international trade to peddlers—and as rabbis, teachers, and scribes. They were excluded from holding positions in the military and from posts involving Muslim religious activities.

During the protectorate period Jews for the first time gained full legal equality in Moroccan society. More than any other ethnic group, their social and economic position improved significantly under French control, and many were trained as workers in fields designated by the French administrators. Unlike the Jews in Algeria, those in Morocco did not have French citizenship, and they were fearful of being openly supportive of the protectorate in times of nationalist sentiment. But even then—and perhaps contrary to Jewish expectations—support by the sultan prevented them from being discriminated against by anti-Jewish laws of the Vichy French authorities. The sultan proclaimed that "Moroccan Jews were just as Moroccan as the Muslims."

When the state of Israel was established in 1948, large numbers of Jews left Morocco at once to take up citizenship in the new nation, and the exodus increased after Moroccan independence. The flight was not a consequence of government policy or severe discrimination; some discrimination had existed, although Jews had received better treatment in Morocco than

elsewhere in the Arab world. Rather, the migration to Israel and to other countries had resulted from the Jews' concern over what might await them in an independent Morocco. Since the mid-1950s, according to official Israeli sources, more than 236,000 of Morocco's Jews took up residence in Israel; large numbers also emigrated to the United States, France, and Canada. In 1976 King Hassan appealed publicly for their return, promising a full restoration of citizenship rights and protection, but few heeded the call. According to the 1984 Israeli census, Jews of Moroccan origin and their descendants formed that country's largest nationality group.

In May of that year the Conference of Jewish Communities of Moroccan Origin was permitted for the first time to invite an official delegation from Israel, including civic leaders and members of Israel's Knesset (parliament). According to the secretary general of the conference, "The example of Morocco should serve as a challenge and a lesson with regard to coexistence between Muslims and Jews." Hassan endorsed the conference, indicating that it would "help the Arab cause by speeding a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict."

Language and Society

Arabic is the official language of the country. It is the mother tongue of approximately two-thirds of the population and is spoken by more than 80 percent of all Moroccans. The remaining one-third relies on one of the Berber dialects as a primary language. Three decades after Moroccan independence, French is still used in government and business, is the mode of conversation among the Moroccan elite, and is taught as a compulsory subject in the schools. Spanish is also heard in areas of the country where Spain formerly exercised a protectorate.

In addition to being the principal determinant of ethnicity, language has also been one of the central issues of controversy in Moroccan society. French colonial policy bequeathed a dual language system, the effects of which continued to reverberate through the social structure in the 1980s. French has been, and in large measure continues to be, the language of the modern sector of society; in order to obtain desirable jobs and advancement in that sector, it has been necessary to learn French. After independence, the mass of people formerly excluded by the language barrier demanded access to the modern sector. This meant both the replacement of French personnel with Moroccans and a widening of the primary route of access, the educational system.

Policymakers found themselves caught between the conflicting demands of Moroccanization and Arabization. The two terms have sometimes been used interchangeably, but they have different though related meanings. The former is a nationalistic concept that specifically has applied to the return of the economy and public administration to the Moroccan people. Because participation in the modern sector depended on competence in French, access could be opened either by expanding the teaching of French or by converting the modern sector to the use of Arabic. Arabization is a cultural as well as a nationalistic concept that has involved the gradual replacement of the French language by Arabic wherever possible—in schools, in the bureaucracy, in business, and in cultural activities. Although many officials were initially skeptical about its chances for realization except in the long term, the scope of Arabization has broadened appreciably in the years since independence, and its pace has quickened. The Bureau of Arabization in Rabat has been responsible for implementing the government's language policy and for facilitating the transition to Arabic in all sectors.

Choosing between the two languages can be difficult because the differences between French and Arabic represent disparities not only in speech but also in world views and social contexts conditioned by language. For example, social relationships between men and women that cannot be defined in Arabic are commonplace in French, and relations between the same two people have been observed to differ drastically when expressed in the two languages. The confusion of identity suffered by the bilingual individual can be considerable and has proved particularly painful to adolescents passing through an educational system that vacillates between the two languages.

The radical estrangement of the French-dominated modern sector from the mass of the people and from traditional culture that continued after independence was underscored by a survey conducted in the mid-1960s showing that only about 30 percent of the population could speak French, however badly, but that less than 10 percent could read it. Two-thirds of all literate Moroccans at that time were bilingual. Later surveys of this sort were not available in the mid-1980s, but the assumption could be made that as a result of expanded education in a system requiring compulsory training in French, the proportion of bilinguals in the literate segment of the population was greater than it had been in the 1960s. Literacy, education, and participation in the modern sector, therefore, still implied a working knowledge of French.

The balance maintained between French and Arabic in

official circles has been delicate and often paradoxical. Hassan, for instance, has regularly addressed the people and issued official pronouncements in classical Arabic, but he has customarily conducted his press conferences and consulted with his advisers in French. In 1977 it was announced that correspondence between nontechnical government departments would thereafter be in Arabic, but provision had to be made at the same time for retraining civil servants unfamiliar with the use of their native language in an official context.

Social Structure and Cultural Meanings

Morocco's social organization has gone through various periods of change during the course of its history, but the most profound of the social and cultural dislocations experienced have been those attending the intervention of France. Before the coming of the French, the roles of townspeople and those of rural tribes were distinguished from one another by an ancient cultural division in dress, custom, livelihood, and loyalty. Nonetheless, country and town were complementary parts of a single cultural tradition. After the period of the protectorate, two fundamentally alien social sectors were juxtaposed: one consisting of a small but influential, modernized, and Europeanized group; the other consisting of the less privileged urban dwellers and nearly all the rural people. A significant residue of preprotectorate tribal structure and values has remained, modified by the direct and indirect influences of the French occupation.

A continuing urban migration has transformed many tribal people into city dwellers. Its policy tended to speed erosion of tribal organization when, soon after independence, the government undertook the reorganization of the countryside into communes. These new administrative structures were drawn up on the basis of criteria alleged to be more rational than the traditional tribal ones and more in keeping with modern needs (see *Local Government*, ch. 4).

Structure of Society

Traditional society consisted of relatively small groups, many recognizing no sovereignty above their own. The central government ruled over raised armies in, and extracted taxes from only a central core of lowland tribal areas loyal to the sultanate, which later became the monarchy. Beyond this limited

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government zone—the *bilad al makhzan*—stretched the larger *bilad al siba*, where tribesmen recognized the sultan's religious but not his temporal primacy.

Moroccan society in the mid-1980s remained pluralistic, although Islam—and to some extent the monarchy—served as integrating symbols. The government seemed to be endeavoring to develop national unity by capitalizing on the king's status as commander of the faithful (*amir al muminin*), the embodiment of Islam. Both through his sharifian descent and through his position as head of state and government, the king personified leadership of the Muslim community. The increasing use of the Arabic language also appeared to be emerging as another symbol of national unity.

The high rate of urbanization in Morocco accelerated by periods of drought since 1979 has brought large numbers of rural Arabs, Berbers, and Harratines to the cities. These newly arrived migrants who have settled in the urban shantytowns have shared alike the problem of finding work. Success in finding adequate jobs had few ethnic boundaries, and high- and middle-level occupations were held by both Berbers and Arabs. Some were quite well-off as landlords, merchants, and top-echelon government officials. Others worked in the professions as doctors, lawyers, teachers, and pharmacists and in the trades as shopkeepers and artisans. Jews, unlike the Harratines, have not been consigned to the lowest economic status. Before and during the protectorate period, a goodly number worked in the professions and were highly skilled laborers. Their economic status has been relatively high in contrast with their feelings of apprehension concerning their political status upon Morocco's independence three decades earlier.

Lower-level occupations—itinerant tradespeople, pastoralists, day laborers, and small farmers—were the positions held by the great majority of the population. Morocco has had a high rate of unemployment, and about one-third of its population above the age of 15 was considered inactive, i.e., not looking for employment (see Employment, ch. 3). Thus, the number of persons in upper- and middle-level income brackets was relatively small when compared with the total population.

Tribal Society

Since the beginning of the twentieth century the tribe has been the most significant administrative and social force in rural Morocco. The Berber population has been organized almost

entirely on a tribal basis. Arab tribes were less numerous, but there were several tribes of nomadic Arabs—descendants in spirit, if not in fact, of the beduins—as well as sedentary Arab tribal groups. A web of kinship bound the rural individual to his tribal territory, to his immediate family, and to his more distant kin.

Among Arabs and Berbers alike, tribal organization is based ideologically—but not always in practice—on the principle of the segmentary lineage system, a group of kinsmen tracing their descent through the male line to a common ancestor. The founding ancestor, the presumed father of the entire tribe, fathered a specific number of sons, who in turn produced a known number of sons, the process continuing over several generations to result finally in the current membership of the tribe, grouped in a cluster of local communities that forms on a higher order of inclusiveness the sections of the tribe.

The kinsmen who mass together as descendants of a common ancestor at each level view themselves as united in opposition to all other groups formed in that tribe at the same level. That is, the grandsons of brothers form two groups in opposition to each other, but they form one group in opposition to the descendants of the brother of their common great-grandfather.

Lineage mates, when they agree to split apart from one another, form two lineages, which are headed by more recent founding ancestors. Fission within a local community or lineage occurs when individual households or groups leave to work newly purchased lands or because of dissension within the community. These households either form their own local community or join another one. These new social relationships are announced at the yearly festival of the major saint in the region. At the festival campgrounds groups are demarcated by the placement of their tents and in their competitive displays of horsemanship and shooting, called powder-plays or fantasias.

Disputes between fellow tribesmen ordinarily are settled at the appropriate level of complementary opposition. Because the constituent opposing groups are implicit in the relationships of all kinsmen except one's immediate household, disputes between kinsmen are rapidly escalated to the highest relevant level of opposition, involving the members of the affected groups, who may, depending on the circumstances, either attempt a reconciliation or resort to various means of conflict.

The structure of the tribe and the relationships within it are fluid. An opponent for some purposes might be an ally for others. People tend to exploit this fluidity, emphasizing the ties deemed the most beneficial and maneuvering among the relationships. The

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massing and opposition of the tribal segments at the various levels constitute an important form of social control in many of the tribes, enabling them to function adequately despite the absence of an organized system of authority. Among some Berber tribes in the Middle Atlas region, the pacific intermediary role played by saints prevents lineages from being torn apart by endemic feuding. Conflict between two lineages usually does not prevent them from cooperating at a higher order of segmentation.

These tribes elect chiefs for each of their segments on an annual basis. Potential chiefs can be selected from only a particular section, and its representatives on the council cannot vote for a chief. Council members are influential men from each segment. Elections take place at the shrine of hereditary holy men, a sanctuary where feuding is prohibited. A chief's authority is largely limited to his ability to use public opinion as a sanction. Order is maintained not by the chief but by the holy men.

The genealogies of these holy men trace back to a saintly ancestor as well as to the Prophet Muhammad. Only a few members of a saintly lineage perform the functions of a holy man. Attributes of a saint are pacifism, generosity, hospitality, and wealth. There is no rule of succession for saints. Ideally, succession is decided upon through the divine allocation of religious charisma (*baraka*), but in actuality the tribesmen decide who will be a saint. The tribesmen bestow offerings so that the saint is prosperous, enabling him to be generous, hospitable, and pacific.

In many ways the French intervention in Morocco meant disaster for tribal life. For example, land among the Ait (people of) Ndhir was considered the collective property of all the male members of a section. The French protectorate completely undermined the tribe's land tenure system. The French acquired Ait Ndhir lands for their nationals by converting a collective system of landholdings into private property. Under the French the Ait Ndhir became a landless tribe, which was forced to become agricultural laborers first for the Europeans and then for the Moroccan government, which took over the farms. As the French divided the country into new administrative areas, movement between the areas was restricted, and nomadic and transhumant tribes were less free to engage in their seasonal migrations. When tribal boundaries were modified for administrative purposes, the village assumed greater significance at the expense of the tribe or a segment of it.

Not fully understanding the fluid complexity of tribal government, protectorate officials attempted to integrate tribal leaders into the governmental bureaucracy in the hope of making



*Feverish excitement of Berber riders shooting from the backs of their racing horses highlights a popular spectator attraction known as fantasia.
Courtesy Richard Rosenman*

their people more manageable. An effort was made to co-opt the marabouts, the Islamic holy men who functioned as mediators in tribal disputes but whom the French mistakenly took to be tribal leaders. Many of the marabouts responded favorably to the French blandishments in the belief that their prestige would be enhanced. The consequence, however, was that as the independence movement developed with strong overtones of religious orthodoxy, they became regarded as pro-French collaborators and religious frauds.

A number of tribes traditionally had councils or assemblies of lineage elders, which generally represented little more authority than consensus. Nevertheless, the French attempt to incorporate existing institutions into a colonial bureaucracy upset the equilibrium of tribal relations and in many cases gave certain favored individuals and groups unaccustomed prestige and power. Despite these internal changes, the outlines of most tribal organization remained largely unchanged.

The most recent wave of change in tribal life resulted from a reorganization that took place in the early 1960s. Attempting to

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put rural life on a more efficient and manageable footing, the government organized the countryside into administrative units called communes, each composed of a number of hamlets and grouped around a natural center, such as a market or a crossroads. Some of the new entities coincided with tribal boundaries, but many did not. Relationships and power structures were realigned; and although the social life was not immediately seen as disturbed, the new arrangement subsequently has had erosive long-term effects on tribal life.

Urban influence has been increasing steadily in the countryside. A growing stream of migration to the cities has drained off many of the rural population's young people, but a number of city migrants have retained ties to their tribal homeland. Many men have left their families in the country, and a number who have moved permanently to the city have continued to visit their homes regularly.


Urban Society

The cities of Morocco have grown explosively during the course of the twentieth century, the process resulting in a collection of urban centers populated largely by country folk or, at best, by people very recently acclimated to city ways. Because each year it has absorbed thousands of rural dwellers and transformed them into city people, Casablanca has been called an "urbanizing machine." Coming as they have from many regions and social environments, the migrants have had little shared culture or consciousness, and the new centers such as Casablanca, Kenitra, and Agadir have become cities without tradition.

Because the urbanizing process coincided with the widespread adoption of European culture, the growth of the cities has been more than a new accretion of population. The various sections of many of the cities were built before, during, and after the protectorate period; and the several sections are peopled by groups having widely differing values and ways.

The traditional city, the *medina*, was made up of several *derbs*, or quarters. Each of these units housed a number of families who had resided in that place for several generations and who were bound by a feeling of solidarity and common identification. Families of every economic standing lived in the same quarter, and the wealthy and the notable assumed leadership.

The arrival of the French disturbed the equilibrium of urban life. Unaccustomed to the ways of traditional Morocco, they built



Casablanca, the industrial and commercial center of Morocco

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their suburban new cities along European lines. As growing numbers of Moroccans began to copy Europeans in dress and in other ways of life, European mass-produced products came increasingly into general use, and local artisans were either driven out of business or forced into reduced circumstances. Many of the affluent Moroccans moved to the new suburbs, and the old city gradually turned into neighborhoods for the poor, while residential segregation by class and income became important for the first time. In place of the old residential divisions, based principally on ethnic background, the distinctions between residential neighborhoods became those of class.

The new governmental and economic system introduced, or in the words of one observer, "parachuted," by the French into Moroccan society opened expansive new opportunities for the minority equipped with French education. Although Europeans staffed most modern institutions before independence, the demand for trained Moroccans became insatiable for a few years after 1956. Those able to assume important posts in the modern economic, governmental, and cultural structure immediately constituted a powerful new bourgeois elite. Recruited both from prominent families and from ambitious youths of modest social origin, the new middle class legitimated its recently attained social position by conspicuous consumption of expensive European-style consumer goods, such as swimming pools, lavish modern villas, fashionable clothing, and contemporary furniture.

The introduction of modern institutions drastically increased opportunities for social mobility through education and technical expertise; the relatively static traditional system had provided few possibilities for social movement. Nevertheless, by the 1970s the job market had become glutted with a far greater surplus of university graduates, particularly in the liberal arts, than it could absorb into acceptable white-collar work. Although pure science also enjoyed great prestige, technical and engineering fields, especially those having manual overtones, attracted relatively few candidates because of the traditional disdain for working with one's hands. Consequently, although French and other European technicians held important technical posts for which trained Moroccans could not be found, the schools continued to produce applicants for white-collar positions that did not exist. In the mid-1980s many young people feared that the status for which their education was to prepare them would prove illusory, along with the opportunities for social mobility to which they believed independence entitled them.

Because of these changes many of the older traditional elite

found themselves stripped of the influence and often of the income they formerly enjoyed. A class of religious dignitaries and families claiming descent from the Prophet formerly occupied the social pinnacle, along with wealthy landowning and merchant families. Although devotion to Islam has remained strong, some traditional religious teachings and institutions have lost prestige with the advance of European culture and the spread of French education.

Traditional Islamic intellectuals adapted only reluctantly and uneasily to the challenge of European science, which had great prestige, particularly among the educated young. Muslim learning had long assumed that the Quran, as God's complete and final revelation, contained all knowledge. Intellectual activity consisted primarily of the examination of the Quran by deductive means, in addition to theological and ethnological studies. The inductive experimental method of Western science, assuming the possibility of unknown and unforeseen results, was profoundly foreign to the traditional outlook.

Assured that the profane knowledge of infidels had little value compared with God's revelation, Islamic scholars nevertheless grudgingly had to recognize its undeniably impressive results. Thus, as science gained ground among the modern educated, the traditional Islamic authority, initially slow to react, lost ground. At first, however, the scientific method was little understood; when European education was introduced, Moroccan students found classical literary authors and thinkers, such as Cicero and Jean Baptiste Racine, far more congenial than empiricists, such as René Descartes and Isaac Newton. Among the sciences it was mathematics, the least experimental, that first gained wide acceptance. Nevertheless, the widespread acceptance and prestige of the scientific method was symbolized by Hassan's statement in 1971 that Morocco aspired to participate in space exploration along with other nations. Many modernist intellectuals have subsequently attempted to integrate the teachings of Islam with modern science.

Although industrial technology provided enviable opportunities for some, it did not offer them to all. As mass production replaced handicrafts, many skilled artisans, who formerly occupied respectable positions in the community, were reduced to being factory hands. Others managed to stay in business by changing their style or producing for the growing tourist trade. The government has attempted to nourish the artisan tradition and find it markets abroad, but much of the work has become decorative rather than central to economic life.

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Related changes occurred in the rural areas cultivated by the French settlers, where tribesmen became laborers for commercial farms.

Although some rural migrants have lost all roots in the traditional culture, others have exploited their tribal connections to help in adjusting to city life. In the early 1980s the serious shortage of jobs prevented most new arrivals from finding work on their own. In many cases, those who succeeded in getting an industrial position did so through a network of tribesmen or relatives already employed in industry. Often whole sections or departments of factories were staffed by men of the same tribe, village, or region, who were hired by an employed kinsman or friend.

Many new arrivals who were unable to find any settled work swelled the ranks of the underemployed, performing tasks of little economic value. Large numbers of peddlers crowded the sidewalks of cities selling snacks, trinkets, and other objects for little profit. These individuals, although scarcely supporting themselves, avoided the demeaning admission that they did not have a trade.

The Individual, the Family, and the Sexes

Social life in Morocco centers on the family. The household is composed of kin, and among the tribes, family ties ramify into tribal structure. The individual's loyalty to family overrides most other obligations. Segregation according to sex is basic to Moroccan social life, and an individual's sex is one of the most important determinants of social status. Men dominate women in most aspects of life, and although the systematic seclusion of women is not common, men and women constitute largely separate subsocieties.

In the 1980s, however, the winds of change were blowing. Segregation was practiced less rigorously, family ties were loosening, and young people were commencing to have a part, however secondary, in the selection of their partners. More girls were attending secondary schools and university classes, and more women were leaving their homes in greater numbers to find a greater variety of jobs (see *Changing Social Values and Practices*, this ch.).

Moroccans reckon kinship patrilineally, and the household is based on male blood ties. Ideally, the extended family consists of a man, his wife or wives, his single and married sons with their wives and children, his unmarried daughters, and possibly such other relatives as a widowed or divorced mother or sister. At the

death of the father, each son ideally establishes his own household to begin the cycle again.

This pattern of the patrilineal extended family household has been a source of endless fascination to students of the Moroccan social scene, who have written a great deal about its significance. In the early 1980s, however, this pattern was in an advanced stage of decline. A survey of a community in the Middle Atlas range found only a single extended family household. Even in the hamlets the small nuclear family—a man, his wife, and their unmarried children—was the rule, and the report of this survey noted that the extended family appeared to be uncommon in the Middle Atlas and in many other regions as well.

Whatever the degree to which the extended family pattern continued to prevail, marriage in Morocco remained largely a family affair rather than a personal one. The sexes seldom mixed socially, and most parents arranged marriages for their children, finding a spouse through their own social contacts or through a professional matchmaker. Arrangements were negotiated, and plans for the coming wedding were made by the mother rather than the father, one of the few areas of family responsibility in which the woman traditionally played a leading role.

Marriage is a civil contract rather than a sacrament. Although the future husband and wife must give their consent to the union, they traditionally take no part in the arrangement. A young man might suggest a preference among eligible girls, but girls do not ordinarily have a corresponding privilege. The contract establishes the terms of the union and outlines appropriate recourse if the terms are violated.

At the time of marriage the bridegroom and his family are expected to make a considerable payment of money to the bride's family. Sometimes the bride's family insists that a portion of this bride-price be deferred, to be paid on demand or at divorce. If divorce occurs, the sum required in order to placate the offended wife may be substantial. In addition, the bride comes to her marriage with a dowry from her father—the money to be spent on the bride's trousseau and on the furniture and equipment for the new household. These household goods belong to the wife and leave the marriage with her. Usually the bride's family does not permit these items to be enumerated; thus anything acquired after marriage may also be construed as belonging to her, and the divorced husband may stand to lose all or most of his acquired possessions.

The husband may take up to four wives at one time, but a wife can have only one husband. Plural marriage is not common,

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however, and is found most frequently in the lower social and economic classes. A man can divorce his wife by simply repeating "I divorce thee" three times before witnesses; a woman can initiate divorce only with difficulty. Children of the union remain with the husband after divorce.

Wives, however, manage to protect themselves from mistreatment through a number of informal means. Asked about the ways available to her for securing a divorce, one young matron replied that a wife eager to terminate her union could easily make her spouse's home life so miserable that the sought-after divorce would promptly be forthcoming. The husband may not divorce his wife completely at once. The three statements of repudiation must come at separate times, and the divorced wife must receive a conciliatory gift of money.

Segregation of the sexes is practiced universally; but in the countryside and in urban poor families women are frequently job holders, employed in all kinds of farm and household work in rural localities and in factories and elsewhere in cities. Women of the urban upper classes fulfill few economic functions, however; in varying degrees they tend to be confined to the home, and their interests tend to be limited to an exclusively feminine sphere. The houses of financially prosperous urban families contain specifically assigned women's quarters from which adult males other than relatives and servants are excluded. Unlike their rural counterparts who move freely through fields and villages, urban women walk the streets discreetly in veiled pairs, avoiding souks, cafés, and other public gathering places, as well as avoiding contacts with men.

Although urban wives are not often in total seclusion, a great many remain in their homes voluntarily, seldom if ever accompanying their husbands outside. Their life is taken up fully with managing the household, caring for their children, and visiting with other women. Occasionally, husbands do place their wives in complete seclusion, a sign of social distinction tied directly to the family income level. The human contacts of the cloistered urban woman are confined to residents of her own household and a limited number of female visitors. In the countryside some women cannot go to market, but all leave the home on occasions such as a visit to parents or to a shrine. The Berber village girl marrying into an urban household may find her activities so restricted as to cause her severe emotional distress.

Girls most frequently marry in their middle teens to men averaging about 10 years older. The proscription against a girl's marrying even earlier is not readily enforceable, and it does occur



*Marked contrasts in women's attire reflect a pattern
of changing social values in modern Morocco.
Courtesy Richard Rosenman*

among people in some of the more remote parts of the country. Even a modern secondary-school girl in Fès remarked that she felt that women should be ready to "take up their responsibilities" by the time they reach the age of 20.

The failure of a wife to produce sons can be grounds for divorce or for taking a second wife; barren women visit the shrine of a marabout to pray desperately for a male child. They are less likely to visit a mosque; although such visits are not denied them, they are discouraged by widely held beliefs that women either do not know how to pray or that their presence distracts men from worship.

Changing Social Values and Practices

Increased opportunities for mobility, both social and physical, have undermined the old family ties and the values that subordinated the individual to his or her kin group. Especially among the educated young, a growing individualism has

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appeared. Many young people prefer to set up their own household at marriage rather than live with parents, and those with a modern education have viewed polygyny with scorn. At the same time, a new social security program has lessened the dependence of the aged on their children and their relatives (see *Health*, this ch.).

Among the most marked changes have been those concerning females. Young women, especially in the cities, have begun to enjoy greater freedom than in the past, although the broad guidelines of traditional practice still govern their lives. Women have in recent decades begun to participate more in activities and interests outside the home, and the less extreme modern feminine fashions have begun to appear on city streets.

In the mid-1980s progressively greater numbers of city girls attended secondary schools and universities, and young unmarried women were less closely chaperoned than formerly. They also tended to marry later, often after working for several years. Where in earlier times education was considered irrelevant for women, in the 1980s having a literate wife had become a status symbol. Boys in Western-style clothing could occasionally be found clustered around pinball machines or experimenting with forbidden Moroccan wine or Spanish brandy; the girls could occasionally be found listening to pop records, learning to dance, or complaining about a social system that still drastically limited their opportunity to meet boys.

Nevertheless, much of the traditional way of life has remained. The king symbolizes the national ambivalence on the role and status of women. On the one hand, he has encouraged his sisters to lead the emancipation movement for the social, cultural, and legal advancement of women. On the other hand, the king's wife lives in seclusion, taking no part in public life and receiving no mention in the press. Social, political, and intellectual trends point toward a further easing of restrictions on women but within the framework of the deeply engrained Muslim tradition.

In some aspects of Moroccan life, change may have outstripped awareness that it is taking place. In the slow process whereby females were admitted to the classroom, admission to primary classes in limited numbers came first. Husbands and fathers felt that becoming literate constituted quite enough education for a woman, and in the late 1960s and early 1970s a girl in a secondary-school classroom was a rarity. As reported in the mid-1980s, however, female Moroccans constituted nearly 40 percent of the total school enrollment, and the number of girls entering the school system exceeded that of boys (see *Education*, this ch.).

Religious Life

Islam animates the nation's spiritual life. The Constitution guarantees freedom of religion but not of proselytizing among other faiths; nevertheless, it describes the nation as Muslim and the king as commander of the faithful. The Ministry of Religious Endowments and Islamic Affairs acts for the government to strengthen and support Islam.

The Islamic concept of the word *state* differs from the Western one. In traditional Islamic thinking, the state is made up of all individuals embracing Islam, and the political state and the religious state are thus one. Allah (God) is recognized by all as the sovereign authority and Muhammad as his Prophet on earth. These elements constitute the Dar al Islam (House of Islam), which has no fixed bounds. The sanction of religious authority and the king's position as the leading figure of the *shurfa* (sing., sharif), the descendants of the Prophet Muhammad, have been significant in maintaining loyalty to the central government, which, as the embodiment of Islam, is the single institution commanding the loyalty of virtually all elements of society. Islam has proved a strong unifying force. Veneration of the Quran, respect for the reputed descendants of the Prophet, and proud personal identification with the Muslim community cut across lines of social distinction to forge the dynamic sense of nationhood that developed during the period of the French protectorate.

Orthodox Islam

In A.D. 610 Muhammad, a merchant of the Arabian town of Mecca and later known as the Prophet, began to preach the first of a series of revelations granted him by God through the angel Gabriel. Muhammad denounced the polytheistic paganism of his fellow Meccans, his vigorous and continuing censure eventually earning him their bitter enmity. In 622 he and a group of his followers fled to Yathrib, which came to be known as Medina (the city). The flight, or hijra (known in the West as the Hegira), marked the beginning of the Islamic era. In Medina he continued to preach, eventually defeated his detractors in battle, and consolidated both the temporal and the spiritual leadership of all Arabia in his person before his death in 632.

After Muhammad's death his followers compiled those of his words regarded as coming directly from God as the Quran, the holy scripture of Islam; others of his sayings and teachings as well as the precedents of his personal behavior, recalled by those who

had known him during life, became the hadith. Together they form a comprehensive guide to the spiritual, ethical, and social life of the Muslim.

Islam was rapidly transformed from a small religious community into a dynamic political and military force. By the end of the seventh century Muslim conquerors had reached Morocco, and by the twelfth century the orthodox Sunni denomination had become firmly established. The Berbers had been substantially Islamized as early as the eighth century but had brought to Islam a genial sense of paganism that has frustrated every effort to eradicate it. Nevertheless, today's Berber speakers are often acutely aware that they are the presumed descendants of people who were not original Muslim communicants, an omission on the part of their ancestors that makes them particularly zealous in their display of piety.

There is no Muslim clergy. However, the ulama, who teach religious law and dogma, the *muadhdhin*, who issues calls to prayer, and a considerable list of other functionaries guide the faithful in pursuit of their religious obligations. All these functionaries are paid by the government, which also pays for maintenance of the mosques.

The *shahadah* (testimony) states the central belief of Islam: "There is no god but God (Allah), and Muhammad is his Prophet." Allah is the Arabic word for "God" rather than a particular name; Muhammad denied the existence of the myriad minor gods and spirits previously worshiped and declared the omnipotence of the unique creator, God. Islam means "submission to God," and he who submits is a Muslim. Muhammad's revelation is said to complete for all time the series of revelations received by the Jews and the Christians. God himself is believed to have remained the same throughout time, and Abraham, Moses, and Jesus are recognized as inspired vehicles of God's will; but Islam reveres as sacred only God's message, rejecting Christianity's deification of the messenger. It accepts the concepts of guardian angels, the Day of Judgment, general resurrection, heaven, hell, and the eternal life of the soul.

The duties of the Muslim form the "five pillars" of the faith. These are recitation of the *shahadah*; *salat*, daily prayer; *zakat*, almsgiving; *sawm*, fasting; and *hajj*, pilgrimage. The believer prays in a prescribed manner after purification through ritual ablutions at dawn, midday, midafternoon, sunset, and nightfall. Prescribed genuflections and prostrations accompany the prayers, which the worshiper recites while facing toward Mecca. Whenever possible, men pray in congregations at the mosques.

and on Fridays are obliged to do so. Women may worship at the mosques, where they are segregated from the men, although more frequently they pray at home.

Ramadan is the month of obligatory fasting in commemoration of Muhammad's receipt of the Quran. During this period all but the sick and certain others are enjoined from eating, drinking, smoking, or sexual intercourse during the daylight hours; and the pace of industry and commerce slows. Since the months of the lunar calendar revolve through the solar year, Ramadan falls at various seasons in different years.

Finally, all Muslims should make the *hajj*, or pilgrimage to Mecca, to participate in special rites during the twelfth month of the lunar calendar. The pilgrim, dressed in the white seamless *ihram*, abstains from sexual relations, shaving, haircutting, and nail paring. On returning, he is entitled the honorific al Hajj before his name. In addition to specific duties, Islam imposes a code of ethical conduct encouraging generosity, fairness, honesty, and respect, and it forbids adultery, gambling, usury, and the consumption of carrion, blood, pork, and alcohol.

The Prophet enjoined his followers to convert the infidel to the true faith but specifically exempted the "People of the Book"—Jews and Christians—whose religions he recognized as the historical basis of Islam. These peoples were to be permitted to continue their own communal and religious life as long as they recognized the temporal domain of Muslim authorities, paid their taxes, and did not proselytize or otherwise interfere with the practice of Islam.

Popular Religion

Throughout the centuries since its introduction into North Africa, Islam has interacted with the indigenous, predominantly Berber culture to produce a style of religious belief and practice uniquely Moroccan. Both Arabs and Berbers have been profoundly Islamized; religious terms, for example, are not translated into the Berber language. Paradoxically, however, the highly fragmented traditional social organization of the dissident tribesmen has been antithetical to the unity envisioned by orthodox Islam. The religion in a sense therefore has inhered in the individual rather than the group.

At various times in Moroccan history the Berbers' separatist aspirations and their reaction against Arab authority at the center have expressed themselves through the heretical and schismatic doctrines of particularly vivid Berber holy men. In addition, a

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residue of pre-Islamic belief and practice has remained, coloring the worship of the uneducated. Popular Islam is thus an overlay of Quranic ritual and ethical principles on a background of belief in spirits, the evil eye, rites to assure good fortune, and the veneration of local saints. The educated of the cities and towns—merchants, artisans, professionals, and scholars—have been the primary adherents and guardians of austere orthodox Islam.

Moroccans generally believe in the existence of a special group of spiritual beings called jinn, whose supernatural powers can be used either benevolently or malevolently. Many people fear them and protect themselves by magical incantations, petitions, offerings, animal sacrifices, and the use of such objects as salt, iron, steel, and gunpowder, which are said to be impregnated with *baraka*. *Baraka* is a transferable quality of personal blessedness, holiness, and spiritual force that is said to take root in certain individuals.

Belief in the evil eye is widespread; the glance or look of certain individuals causes an evil or deadly spell, and danger is particularly great when accompanied by an "evil mouth," that is, by loose talk, praise, joking, or cursing. Protection is most commonly sought in incantations, symbolic forms of the number five or of the hand, and the use of magical colors, such as black, yellow, blue, and red. Abstract forms of the number five or of the hand are frequently tattooed on the faces of women, particularly among the Berber tribes, and are a dominant motif in crafts and architectural decoration.

Sometimes an attempt is made to establish a new cult or embellish a weak one; in Casablanca, for example, the mushrooming bidonvilles and suburbs have overtaken and absorbed old rural communities and, with them, their saints. The veneration of saints is widespread among the uneducated, particularly the rural and urban poor, and also among many urban middle-class women. A long-term declining trend has been noted in the cities, however, probably caused by education, Western influence, the general secularization of life, and the greater tendency toward orthodoxy among reform-minded city dwellers.

The government has neither encouraged nor discouraged the cult of saints but is said to view them as a symptom of a vigorous folk culture. The Alawite Dynasty, as the leading sharifian family in the country, derives loyalty and a degree of legitimacy from the position of its members as religious leaders, both *ex officio* and by descent. The special spiritual features of all sharifian families are held to occur most strongly in the royal line.

The descendants of an important saint, the *awlad siyyid*

*Koutoubia Mosque,
the most important religious
site in Marrakech*



(saint's children), often form a saintly lineage, accepting the reverence of laymen because of their illustrious ancestor. They frequently act as custodians of the tomb and shrines, living from the contributions received from pilgrims and devotees. The Muslim duty of pilgrimage has been widely reinterpreted in the popular mind to include pilgrimage to shrines of the saints. Some persons of the Rif are said to believe, for example, that seven pilgrimages to the shrines of Mulay Idris ibn Abdallah and Mulay Abd al Salam equal a pilgrimage to Mecca.

In addition to guarding the shrines, the saintly lineages, particularly in the highland areas, serve as mediators between tribal groups, adjudicating disputes, assigning rights, and

granting asylum. Berber tribesmen in the past frequently came forward with claims of sainthood and sharifian descent. Although Berber culture was firmly established in Morocco long before the arrival of Islam and Arabic culture, many believe that those Berbers claiming to be *shurfa* are descended from originally Arab families that later became Berberized. Consequently, a large proportion of the population claims, with varying degrees of success, sharifian descent, despite the logical contradiction implicit in history.

Religious Brotherhoods

Groups of disciples have frequently clustered around particular saints, especially those who preached an original *tariqa*, a mystical or devotional "way." Brotherhoods of the followers of such mystical teachers appeared in North Africa at least as early as the eleventh century and during the instability of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries became mass movements. The founder, an obvious possessor of great *baraka*, ruled an order of adepts who were ordinarily organized hierarchically. The authority of the leader, or shaykh, was often absolute; it was said that "He who has no shaykh has the devil for a shaykh." The brotherhood usually centered physically on a combined lodge and shrine, called a *zawiya* (pl., *zawiya*). Although the *tariqa* was held to supplement and enrich the members' Islam, in practice it usually supplanted orthodox worship.

The cult of saints and the belief in sanctity and brotherhoods apparently antedated the arrival of Islam in Morocco, and the adaptation of these indigenous forms eased the acceptance of Islam by the Berber tribes. In fact, the brotherhoods were the most potent vehicles for the early spread of Islam in the highlands. The *zawiya* also served as hostels for travelers and sanctuaries from enemies, much as monasteries did in Europe during the Middle Ages. Because of their evident success and social utility, the orders were widely tolerated by the orthodox ulama, many of whom were said to be members in the preprotectorate times. The orders came to exercise significant political influence.

The strengthened central government that developed under the protectorate has absorbed many of the traditional social functions of the brotherhoods, however, and an ideological shift within Islam has largely robbed them of their legitimacy. Although it was reported that in 1939 nearly 20 percent of all Moroccan males belonged to one of the 23 largest brotherhoods,

by the late 1960s the orders' vitality had waned. Observers stated that those *zawiyyin* still functioning consisted of older men and were not successfully recruiting among the younger generation. In the mid-1980s, however, evidence existed that the *zawiya* as a social form was still vigorous, even among urban populations. A survey among the Istiqlal party leaders in Fès, for example, indicated that a majority viewed their local party group as a *zawiya*, albeit one combining secular and religious overtones.

Religious Reform

The *zawiyyin* and marabouts for the most part coexisted easily with the French authorities. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries there began to grow in the central Middle East a new drive for an Islam purified of unorthodox accretions. Founded by Jamal al Din al Afghani and Muhammad Abduh, this movement was known as the Salafiya, from the Arabic *al salaf al salih* (the pious ancestors). A small group of men who had lived in the Middle East, including Abdullah Ben Driss Senoussi and Bouchaib al Doukkala, brought these ideas to Morocco after World War I. By the early 1920s study and discussion groups had been organized in Fès and Rabat. A student of Doukkala, Mulay al Arabi al Alawi, in turn instructed the future nationalist leader Allal al Fassi and his circle.

The members of the Salafiya taught that the salvation of society and of Islam, at that time both suffering disorganization and indignity at the hands of the French, lay in a return to the simple orthodoxy of the Quran. They rejected the profusion of popular beliefs and practices that had grown up around Islam and denounced the marabouts as frauds and as sycophants to the French authorities. Early nationalism in Morocco arose from this movement and therefore from the beginning carried heavy religious overtones. The Islamic reformers were revolted by the deep inroads made by French culture, by the ignorance of the youth of their Arabic and Islamic heritage, and by the debasement of the Arabic language caused by the growing use of French by the educated. They began to organize private Arabic-language Quranic schools and nourished the interest in classical Arabic that has been growing in recent decades.

Because of the increasing influence of Islamic reformism, the marabouts and brotherhoods quickly lost prestige. Throughout the struggle for independence, performance of certain public duties of Islam carried strong nationalistic overtones. Although the requirements of industrial and office work in many cases

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precluded daily prayer, the strict observance of Ramadan became a badge of solidarity with Islam and the Moroccan people.

In more recent years the public aspects of Ramadan have retained their symbolic importance, although the observance of other religious duties has appeared less widespread than the fast. During the month of the fast, national wine consumption drops 30 percent. Violations of the rules of Ramadan occur mainly among the educated and Westernized and usually in secret. Observance is generally heartfelt; workers, even those doing hard labor, abstain from food and drink; smokers curb their habit; many omit swimming for fear of swallowing water; and women give up garlic, which is believed to have aphrodisiac properties. Each year hundreds of restaurant customers are arrested and fined under a provision of the 1962 Penal Code that forbids the public consumption of food or drink by Muslims during the fast period.

Because other religious duties are more private, observance is more difficult to measure. The number of pilgrims to Mecca has continued to rise annually and includes a substantial number of women; in some years women constituted over 30 percent of the pilgrims originating in Casablanca. Particularly for city dwellers employed in industries or offices, halting work for the periods of daily prayers presents difficulties, and observers have noted that many, particularly the young and the educated, omit this practice. Nevertheless, in the early 1980s popular feeling toward Islam remained prevalent.

Muslim Fundamentalism

The Islamic revival that materialized in the late 1970s following a pattern established in other Muslim countries has produced an increase in religious consciousness among certain groups. The movement has been guided by a number of new Muslim associations, some of them dedicated solely to the deepening of personal religious faith and purity in its observance. Others of a more militant nature have presented a challenge to the existing political-religious hierarchy by demanding deep-seated changes in society. The movement has precipitated an upsurge in piety among those attracted to it, including the adoption of more conservative attire and the study of Islamic topics through books, discussion groups, and tape cassettes of sermons of well-known fundamentalists in other Arab countries.

With varying degrees of zealotry sometimes bordering on fanaticism, the militants have demanded the application of sharia (Islamic law) in public life and have preached that the deep social

and economic cleavages found in Morocco are immoral and contrary to Islamic teachings. They deplore Western cultural and moral influences as materialistic and decadent. Morocco's economic involvement with the industrial powers of the West are seen as exposing the nation to alien exploitation. Some preachers have argued that the relative backwardness of some Muslim states and their political divisions, notably with respect to Israel, are afflictions brought upon them by Allah for their failure to adhere to the teachings of their religion.

The beliefs of the fundamentalists and their unwillingness to acknowledge the primacy of the official religious establishment have brought them into repeated conflict with the authorities. As of 1985 only a small minority of the population appeared to be directly affected by the movement. Its adherents were found primarily among students, teachers, and intellectuals. Nevertheless, the stress on purification of the society rather than on the moral life of the individual carried with it the potential for undermining the religious basis of the king's legitimacy. Accordingly many activists have been subjected to suppression and surveillance by the authorities (see Interest Groups, ch. 4).

Other Religions

The Jewish community had declined by the mid-1980s to about one-tenth its size three decades earlier. Its few remaining institutions functioned under government supervision. Judaism shares with Islam an uncompromising monotheism, as well as proscription of the consumption of pork. It emphasizes the Sabbath as a day of prayer and rest and the unique mission of the Jewish people as bearers of God's law as embodied in the Torah. Among the relatively few Jews who remained in Morocco in the mid-1980s, certain aspects of the traditional religion were being discarded or de-emphasized. The omission of family prayers and other ceremonies was becoming commonplace, and women were assuming more active and open roles.

The predominantly French and Spanish Christian population had been sharply reduced after independence, but in the mid-1980s perhaps 100,000 remained, a large majority of them Roman Catholics. A few foreign Protestants resided in the country, and there were a limited number of Protestant missionary institutions.

The Roman Catholic Church was established in the country in the nineteenth century. After the Algeciras Conference in 1906, it was not permitted to seek converts, but it was encouraged

to operate schools, hospitals, dispensaries, and other institutions. Relations between church and government have generally been cordial, despite some anti-Christian sentiment among conservative Muslims. The Roman Catholic archdioceses were located in Tangier and Rabat, and parishes were active in Tangier, Rabat, Casablanca, and Fès.

Education

Administration of Morocco's rapidly expanding educational system in the mid-1980s was highly centralized under the Ministry of National Education. The ministry held overall responsibility for the formulation and implementation of the government's education policy as well as for the supervision of teaching, curricula, and school facilities at all levels. The country was divided into regional school districts, each directed by a representative of the ministry in Rabat. This official ensured that the ministry's directives were enforced in schools within the district and was also responsible for maintaining teaching standards.

The educational system was divided into primary and secondary levels of instruction and higher education. The primary level consisted of a five-year cycle (ages seven to 11) and was followed at the secondary level by a first cycle, or junior program, of four years (ages 12 to 15) and a second cycle, or senior program, of three years' duration (ages 16 to 18). From four to six years of higher education were usually needed to fulfill requirements for a university degree.

During the 1970s and early 1980s Morocco made exceptional efforts to improve both the quality and the accessibility of education, expanding school facilities and increasing the number of teaching personnel to meet the needs of a burgeoning school-age population. During that period the number of primary-school students grew at an average annual rate of 6 percent, and secondary-school students increased by 10 percent. University enrollment more than tripled. As a result of the increase, by 1980 about 60 percent of those in the primary-school age bracket and about 25 percent of those of secondary-school age were reported attending school. This compared with less than half of the children in the appropriate age bracket in primary school and 5 percent in secondary school in 1960. Impressive as these gains were, school attendees still accounted for only half of the total number in the five- to 19-year age cohort, and Morocco's

schooling rate (percentage of school-age children actually attending school) was below that observed in countries with a comparable level of economic development.

Sizable disparities still existed in early 1985 between the schooling rates of males and females and those of children in urban and rural school districts. Availability of classroom space and the quality of instruction also varied greatly from district to district. Out of a total primary and secondary enrollment of 3.5 million, less than 40 percent was female. Only 37 percent of children in the appropriate age bracket attended school in rural districts, which contained almost 60 percent of the country's population. Advancement beyond the primary level was also less likely for females and rural students than it was for males and urban students. More than one-third of the total student population in the cities was attending secondary schools as compared with 14 percent in rural areas. This was partly because of the much lower proportion of females going on to the secondary level in rural school districts but also because the better students in those areas went to the cities for further education. Urban students were also five times as likely to attend a university as their rural counterparts. Nonetheless, the size of enrollment in rural school districts more than doubled between 1970 and 1985, and the gap between the schooling rates of males and females was closing, particularly in the larger cities. According to government projections, tuition-free primary education will be available equally to all by the mid-1990s.

To support expansion of the school system and universities, an average of 7 percent of gross domestic product (GDP—see Glossary) was devoted annually to education during the 1970s and early 1980s, placing Morocco third in this category among 82 developing countries surveyed by the World Bank. Outlays for education in the national budget were the largest after defense and accounted for nearly 20 percent of nonmilitary spending. Because of the priority accorded education, growth in that sector was not affected by cutbacks demanded in other areas by austerity measures imposed in 1978 and still in force in 1985. Morocco has also benefited from multilateral aid distributed through United Nations agencies and from bilateral assistance programs funded by France, the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait.

Private schools accounted for less than 1 percent of primary-school enrollment, but this figure rose to 7 percent (about 65,000 students) at the secondary-school level. Most of the private education sector was composed of modern schools operated under foreign auspices for children of the European community,

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but these schools were also favored by the Moroccan elite. Schools sponsored by the French government's cultural mission and by French universities accepted Moroccan applicants on a competitive basis. Several schools were conducted by Roman Catholic religious orders. These included both academic-oriented schools that had integrated European and Moroccan enrollments and vocational schools for training Moroccans.

Several privately run secular schools teaching a modern curriculum in Arabic were found in Rabat and Casablanca. Private religious schools offered three years of traditional Quranic training for children up to the age of 10. Special provision was made by school authorities to integrate students from these schools into the fourth grade of the public primary-school system without putting them behind other children in their age bracket. There were also a few traditional schools at the secondary level that emphasized Islamic studies and Arabic literature. Students at these schools prepared for admission to Al Qayrawaniyin University and other centers of advanced religious education (see Higher Education, this ch.). Private schooling formerly available in Hebrew schools for children of the Jewish community had virtually disappeared as the Jewish population declined through emigration.

Education in Morocco has always had a religious as well as a secular dimension. Indeed, from the viewpoint of a devout Muslim, there was no secular subject that did not have a religious dimension. Preschool education was essentially religious in character and was intended to lay down a basic religious foundation for young children. Islamic studies were an integral part of the curriculum through the primary and secondary levels. Traditional schools, operating outside the modern school system, devoted a major part of their curriculum to religious education. Religious seminaries (*madrasahs*) located across the country served as centers where the ulama were trained and where at different levels teachers, scholars, and prayer leaders studied the Quran, theology, philosophy, law, and related literature. Some graduates of these traditional schools went on to Al Qayrawaniyin University. Other universities also had faculties of Islamic studies, and one of the university-level advanced schools offered a specialized program in Islamic law and theology.

Public support was given to a small number of schools operated by private groups for children with disabilities. One of these was a special school at Khemisset, financed by the American-based Save the Children Fund, that provided care and education for handicapped children brought to it from all parts of the country.

During the period of the protectorate, the French established a modern educational system in Morocco that was intended essentially for the education of children of the large European community. It also reached a very limited number of Moroccans, most of whom went on to fill lower-level positions in the civil administration. A corresponding modern school system operating in Arabic did not exist in Morocco.

The system inherited from the French was not well adapted to the realities of a country in need of modernization and development. Those Moroccans who had received a modern French education had not been encouraged to pursue studies that would qualify them for the professions or for technical and managerial positions. Vocational training had been seriously neglected, denying the newly independent country a skilled work force and making it dependent on the continued presence of expatriates, particularly in its school system.

Frequent changes at the ministerial level hampered the formulation of a well-coordinated education policy, and little movement was made to alter the classical French-oriented curriculum found in the schools. In fact, not much thought appeared to have been devoted to the question of whether there was a single curriculum that suited Morocco's diverse population. Instead, educators addressed the emotion-charged problem of Moroccanization and Arabization of the school system.

Moroccanization of education was the process by which expatriate teaching personnel, mainly French, were replaced by Moroccans, and Arabization involved replacing French with Arabic as the language of instruction in all subjects. For more than 20 years after independence, both concepts were implemented on an erratic basis without an accepted timetable. The preparation of an adequate number of properly trained teachers proved to be an enormously difficult task, but by accelerating teacher training programs it had become possible by the mid-1970s to fill virtually all assignments at the primary level with Moroccans. Complete Moroccanization of the secondary schools was scheduled for 1990.

In theory, Arabization was a process aimed at welding national unity and creating a more clearly defined national identity. In practice, it proved to be a frustration for school administrators and teachers, who found it easier to operate in French in an academic environment. Some officials complained that Arabic was ill-adapted for teaching mathematics and modern scientific subjects, and they predicted that it would take 50 years before the technical curriculum could be converted to Arabic.

Others pointed out that Arabic was as much a foreign language as French to Berber children in rural areas, for whom no consideration was given to using their mother tongue in the classroom. Most educators, however, were unwilling to accept the pessimistic estimates of critics of Arabization. Complete Arabization, including instruction in mathematics and science, was planned for the mid-1990s.

Primary Education

In early 1985 some 2.5 million Moroccan children were enrolled in primary schools. More than 400,000 new students entered at the primary level in the 1984-85 school year, accounting for a dramatic 17-percent growth in enrollment that significantly improved the primary-schooling rate. Although still only 37 percent of the total at that level, the enrollment of girls in urban districts almost matched that of boys. Girls were also entering school at a much faster rate of increase than boys. Through the 1970s a large number of classrooms in rural schools were multigrade and, because of the strain put on facilities by enormously expanded primary-school enrollments, a majority of schools in both rural areas and cities operated on a shift basis. The situation was relieved somewhat in the early 1980s when classrooms were increasing at an annual rate of 8 percent.

Repeaters, who constituted approximately one-third of the total enrollment in primary grades, caused much of the continued overcrowding. The large number of repeaters sharply increased the per-unit cost of education. It also created difficult age disparities in many classes and contributed to a very high drop-out rate after the third grade. This situation was considered to result in some measure from the inability of students to cope with instruction in French, which was introduced at that level. Particularly in rural schools, however, both repetition of grades and school-leaving were also attributable to defects in multigrade teaching, the cost of books, the long distances many students had to walk to school, and the real or fancied need for their labor at home or in the fields. Not one in five students entering the first grade completed the primary-school cycle.

In rural localities parents still regarded schooling for their daughters as irrelevant, even at the primary level. Rural parents were known to state with a degree of pride that "we do not send our daughters to school." The attitude of rural people toward primary schools, however, was ambivalent. In some villages the school was seen as a symbol of outside interference in their affairs

*Grace and refinement
that characterize Moroccan
art are reflected in the
architecture of the
Attarine Madrasah in Fès.
Courtesy LaVerle Berry*



and the cause of unwelcomed taxation by the government. The urban background of most teachers made them resented as alien and, therefore, an undesirable influence on local children. But the school also represented the road to literacy and gave status to the village, so that where there was not a school, the people would ask for one.

Instruction in the first two years of primary school was devoted to introducing classical Arabic in written and spoken forms, elementary arithmetic, and religious education. The final three years of instruction were bilingual, as students were exposed to 10 hours of French each week in addition to 20 hours of continued grounding in classical Arabic. Social studies, history, religion, science, and arithmetic were taught in Arabic, but students became familiar with French terminology for the last subject in order to prepare them for secondary school, where mathematics would be taught entirely in French.

About a half-million children under the age of seven attended preschool religion classes based on the *mdih*, or tradition-

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al Quranic classes. Children customarily spent most of their time reciting verses from the Quran and committing them to memory. Preschool religious education was expanded under the patronage of Hassan, but the program was also enlarged to include basic instruction in reading that would prepare children for entry into primary school. Some privately run modern kindergartens were also available in larger cities.

Secondary Education

Only about 40 percent of Moroccan children completing primary school went on to secondary school. Of the 1 million students who were enrolled in secondary schools in early 1985, more than 90 percent attended modern bilingual schools where part of the curriculum was taught in French. The remainder were in modern Arabic-language schools or attended traditional Quranic schools.

Modern Moroccan secondary schools were patterned closely on the French model. The first cycle, or junior program, offered a four-year general course of study in a *collège* that paid special attention in the curriculum to Arabic and French language and literature. In bilingual schools history, geography, and religion were taught in Arabic, while instruction in mathematics and science was given in French. The first cycle terminated with a standardized comprehensive examination that determined admission to the second cycle. A little over half of the students passed the examination, and many of those who were not advanced to the senior program continued their education in vocational schools.

The second cycle was pursued at a *lycée* where, on the recommendation of a selection board, first-year students entered one of three tracks: literary, scientific, or technical. The first two programs led to a *baccalauréat* (secondary-school degree required for admission to a university); the third led to a technical diploma. Over 40,000 Moroccan students were graduated with the degree or diploma in 1984. This compared with 55 who received the *baccalauréat* in 1956. In the second year, students were assigned by the board on an individual basis to one of several two-year specialized course options within their track on the basis of academic performance, career interests, and personal qualifications. Those in the literary track could participate in a traditional program of Islamic studies and Arabic literature; a modern liberal arts program that covered history and social science, Arabic, French, and another language, usually English;

or an economic sciences program that concentrated on the social sciences, particularly economics, and mathematics. Options in the scientific track included natural and experimental sciences, mathematics, technology, and an economic sciences program similar to that offered in the literary track. The technology program stressed applied mathematics and physics and was seen as preparing students for professional education in engineering, architecture, and allied fields. Students in the technical track chose in their first year to follow either an industrial studies program in mechanics and engineering or a commercial program. A special two-year teacher training course was also available in place of the senior program in the second cycle and led to placement in an advanced education program for first-cycle secondary-school teachers.

Half of all first-cycle students successfully completed the examination for admission to the lycée, and a similar proportion of second-cycle students passed the *baccalauréat* examination. The attrition rate was high throughout the secondary-school years, and many students declined to sit for the examinations required for advancement to the next level of education. Critics of the system, particularly those advocating more rapid Arabization of education, laid blame for the high rate of failure and large number of dropouts on the use of French at the secondary level and requirements for fluency in that language. In 1979 examination standards were watered down to eliminate the oral examination in French formerly required for the *baccalauréat*. Authorities have also experimented with a new form of final examination for first-cycle students to allow them under some circumstances to be promoted on a subject-by-subject basis rather than as the result of a comprehensive examination requiring proficiency in French. A more flexible promotion policy was viewed as making it possible to retain a greater number of students in the second cycle. Ministry officials were aware of the wastage involved in preparing students for jobs that did not exist. It was recognized that scientific and technical courses needed expanding and that more teachers had to be trained to offer instruction in them. Revision of the curriculum was being considered in order to make vocational training more attractive to academically oriented secondary-school students and to emphasize technical courses in the academic tracks. An alternative curriculum that would relate Islamic studies more closely to the country's practical needs was also recommended for traditional schools.

Despite the rise in enrollment and demand, secondary education was still available, with few exceptions in the mid-

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1980s, only in larger urban centers. Most *collèges* and lycées, however, had facilities for several hundred boarders. In fact if not in intent, class discrimination existed in secondary-school admissions, which in part reflected the difficulty experienced by poorer urban families and rural families in supporting a student through seven years of secondary education. In part, it was a result of the cultural gulf separating the offspring of these families from the children of middle-class and elite families. As a consequence, students of working-class or peasant background were a rare exception in schools at this level. As in the primary schools, the number of females entering secondary schools was increasing at a much faster rate than that of males.

Higher Education

Institutions of higher education included universities and advanced professional schools. In academic year 1984-85 approximately 100,000 students were enrolled in Morocco's six universities, and an additional 30,000 Moroccans were attending universities abroad, about half of that number in France. About 30 percent of those studying at the Moroccan universities were women.

More than half of all university students were concentrated at faculties located in the Rabat area, approximately 35,000 attending Mohammed V University, Morocco's largest institution of higher education. Reorganized under its present name in 1957 on the basis of an institution established by the French during the protectorate period, the university maintained faculties of arts and letters, science, medicine, engineering, education, law, and Islamic studies at its campus in the capital and at branches in Casablanca and Fès. Instruction was given in both French and Arabic. The second highly regarded university was Al Qayrawaniyin University, a famous center of Islamic studies in Fès. Founded in the ninth century, it claimed to be one of the oldest institutions of higher learning in the world and attracted students from countries throughout the Middle East.

Although technically supervised by a department of the Ministry of National Education, the universities were considered autonomous entities, each having a separate administration and budget. Efforts were being made by the government to decentralize university facilities, which were concentrated in a few cities, by creating new university centers, in some instances through branches of existing universities.

Specialized professional education was provided for approximately 8,000 students at 24 advanced schools (*écoles*

supérieures), some of which offered degree programs equivalent to those at the university level. Among the most important were the National School of Public Administration, which trained candidates for the civil service; the Higher Civil Service Staff Institute, which offered courses for select mid- and upper-level bureaucrats; the Institute of Commerce and Administration, which produced management-level personnel for business and industry; and the Hassan II Agriculture and Veterinary Institute, which was the largest of the advanced schools. Others included advanced schools for engineering, architecture, computer science, medicine, nursing, law, journalism, Islamic studies, physical education, hotel management, and forestry, as well as the armed forces and merchant marine academies. Each advanced school was funded and operated by the appropriate ministry rather than by the Ministry of National Education.

Practically all students accepted for study at this level in Morocco and most of those studying abroad received a modest government stipend that was intended to provide for their basic needs. Students benefiting from these grants were obliged to register for so-called Citizens Service, which put them at the disposal of the government for up to two years after completion of studies. About one-third of those eventually recruited in this manner were assigned to the Ministry of National Education to work as teachers.

Based on the number of secondary-school students expected to receive *baccalauréats*, as many as 50,000 students could be applying for places in universities by the late 1980s. About 60 percent of all university students were enrolled in law and liberal arts faculties. Despite serious overcrowding in these faculties and the lack of related job opportunities, plans did not exist in the mid-1980s to limit admission or to impose quotas related to demand for graduates trained in certain disciplines. A high percentage of students changed their major fields of study, however, and a large number left before completing their degrees or after failing their final examinations. The Ministry of National Education proposed but had not succeeded in obtaining acceptance for other reforms of admissions policy by which the *baccalauréat* would automatically entitle a student to enter a university. Plans called for selective admission of those who held the degree and also for opening admission in some instances to those who held comparable vocational diplomas. Although the 8,000 students receiving degrees annually in the early 1980s represented a 20- percent increase over graduation figures of 10 years earlier, this number was a relatively small proportion of

those who had entered university with them. The unemployment rate, which was as much as 50 percent in the 15-to-24 age bracket, affected graduates as well as those having little or no formal education. It was unlikely that the economy could produce employment to match the expectations of all but a small percentage of graduates. Paradoxically, Morocco suffered from a severe shortage of qualified manpower at practically all levels of occupations requiring the sort of technical education that was disdained by many students.

The strongest stimulants to political activism by students on university campuses were Marxism and Muslim fundamentalism. Slates of Marxist candidates consistently won student council elections, and Marxist-dominated student unions, which organized secondary as well as university students, were able to enforce large-scale classroom boycotts. Protests were related to educational policy or administrative shortcomings, such as overcrowding in classrooms and inadequate stipends, rather than to broader political issues. Students also resisted any reform of admission standards, whether proposals called for greater flexibility or selectivity in considering applicants.

Teachers and Teacher Training

In the 1984-85 school year an estimated 75,000 teachers, all Moroccans, were employed in the public primary-school system. The increase in the number of primary-school teachers was gradually improving the teacher-student ratio. About 70 percent were men, but the proportion of women in the profession was growing rapidly.

Teachers in secondary schools numbered 50,000, the result of a dramatic 10-percent annual increase in personnel in the early 1980s that was made possible by accelerating the teacher training program at that level. About 90 percent of all secondary-school teachers were Moroccans. Most of the *coopérants* (expatriate teachers) were in the lycées, where they taught mathematics, science, English, and French or were involved in the teacher training program. By far the largest number of *coopérants* were French, contracted under a bilateral agreement that enabled them to be reabsorbed into the French school system without loss of seniority after service in Morocco. Although the *coopérants* were being phased out as part of Moroccanization, science and mathematics teachers were being actively recruited in the mid-1980s from Romania and Bulgaria.

University faculty of all ranks exceeded 3,000, of whom 80

percent were Moroccans and about 20 percent were women. Those at the professorial level held a position equivalent to that of a senior civil servant. Reforms were being introduced to encourage research and to bring younger scholars into university teaching.

While training programs were being accelerated to bring teachers into the system at a faster rate, standards for admission to the programs were simultaneously being tightened to improve the quality of those accepted. Most of the qualified primary-school teachers received their training in the special education program offered at the lycée level. The basic two-year curriculum was considered adequate to meet the needs of the system. Since 1979, however, regional teacher training centers have offered a one-year program in primary education for student teachers who have completed the *baccalauréat*. Teachers for the first cycle of secondary education were trained in a two-year post-secondary program that required a *baccalauréat* for admission. Teacher candidates holding the *baccalauréat* could also gain admission to a four-year course of study in an advanced normal school that prepared them to teach in the second cycle without having been to a university. In the mid-1980s most of the new personnel coming into the second cycle had followed this route. Those who failed the final examination took positions at *collèges* teaching in the first cycle. It was also possible for teachers in the first cycle to upgrade their qualifications and win promotion to a lycée faculty. Trainees coming out of these teacher training programs made a basic commitment to teach in the secondary-school system for a minimum of eight years.

University graduates aspiring to be secondary-school teachers were required to take a one-year postgraduate course in education at an advanced normal school. Many secondary-school teachers were recent university graduates who accepted teaching assignments as part of their two-year public service or as an alternative to military service. A number of these remained in the school system after having completed their obligation.

Except on university faculties and among senior personnel in the secondary-school system, the income of most qualified teachers was not commensurate with their educational background. Primary-school teachers received on the average about half the pay of a fully qualified secondary-school teacher. Most teachers at that level considered rural postings undesirable. The status of the rural teacher—typically, a bachelor or unmarried woman from an urban background—was a difficult one. Almost totally dependent on local services, the teacher was frequently resented and feared by the village people and was set

apart from them. Well-qualified teachers competed for assignment to schools in urban areas. As a consequence, a high proportion of rural teachers were not fully qualified, the figure reaching almost 80 percent in some of the more isolated areas.

Literacy, Adult Education, and Vocational Training

The overall literacy rate rose from a reported 25 percent of persons over 10 years old in 1974 to an estimated 35 percent in 1985. This compared with a literacy rate of just over 10 percent at independence in 1956. The improvement in literacy was mainly attributable to expanded primary education and increased literacy in the school-age population rather than to a decline of illiteracy in the adult population. In cities, where education was more accessible, the literacy rate was about 50 percent, but the overall rate was still considered low for a country at Morocco's level of development and indicated the extent to which large sections of the population had been excluded from the educational system. In some rural areas literacy was virtually nil among the adult population, including many who had grown to maturity since independence. Literacy programs inaugurated after independence reached an estimated 800,000 young people and adults, but after the mid-1960s they were de-emphasized in favor of attacking illiteracy principally through expansion of primary education and in connection with on-the-job vocational training.

Little formal extramural education in academic subjects was available to adults. A few private schools in larger cities prepared older students for the *baccalauréat* examination, however, or offered specialized qualifying courses in such areas as accounting and computer sciences. There was also limited outreach through educational programming on television.

In contrast with academic-oriented adult education, vocational training was accorded priority status by the government. A number of training programs were sponsored by various government ministries and agencies in the mid-1980s. Funding came directly from the budgets of the ministries operating the programs and from a 1-percent tax applied to wages. The number of full-time trainees in vocational programs and workers receiving on-the-job training doubled in the early 1980s to more than 60,000. An increasing number of school-leavers also opted to continue their education in these programs, but efforts to confer greater status on vocational training in the public-school system and to direct students from academic to vocational tracks met with resistance in the secondary schools.

Among the ministry-sponsored programs available were one-year courses offered at industrial training centers to produce semiskilled workers; a second year was added to enable a limited number to qualify as skilled workers. Specialized courses were also provided in tailoring, shoemaking, gem cutting, and such craft skills as carpetmaking and leatherworking. Commercial training was available in secretarial skills, bookkeeping, and other clerical functions. The Ministry of Public Health sponsored paramedical training for several thousand personnel to staff rural health centers as well as regional hospitals. In addition, the Ministry of Labor administered a program for training youth leaders. One of the most ambitious and innovative programs was a four-year course in tourism and hotel management sponsored by the Ministry of Tourism. There were complaints, however, that the best graduates went abroad to accept higher-paying jobs with more attractive conditions of employment than were available at home. Government vocational training programs increased in size and quality in the early 1980s, but by mid-decade they were still considered inadequate to meet both the public demand for them and the needs of the economy. Private sector enterprises also sponsored professional training schools that covered a wide range of commercial and technical subjects.

Health

Morocco has made steady progress since its independence in improving health care and in expanding the availability of modern medical resources. The foundations of the existing public health system were set in place by the French and to a lesser extent by the Spanish during the protectorate period. Because private medical care was beyond the means of all but a few, a directorate of public health was established in 1926. By 1953, on the threshold of independence, there were about 300 public health physicians as well as nearly 400 in private practice. In 1982 the successor agency, the Ministry of Public Health, reported over 1,300 physicians on its rolls, more than half of whom were located in Casablanca and Rabat. About 600 physicians were in private practice.

Although health personnel and facilities remained concentrated in urban areas during the early 1980s, mobile medical teams and a network of dispensaries and clinics provided outpatient services in rural areas. Many young physicians, however, were reluctant to take up practice in the relatively primitive countryside. The few medical doctors in rural practice

often were required to rush between clinics spaced 80 or more kilometers apart in order to complete their assigned weekly visits. The availability of hospital beds was five times higher in urban areas (one bed per 610 inhabitants) than in rural areas (one bed per 3,010 inhabitants). Official data have not reflected a severe strain on hospital capacity. Most of the dentists were in private practice and, like the medical doctors, were located primarily in the larger cities. Rural people knew little of dental health and sought help only when an extraction was needed.

Substantial success in reducing the incidence of epidemic diseases has been recorded. Plague disappeared after 1945, smallpox subsequently has been eliminated, typhus has been sharply reduced, malaria has been brought under control, and a vigorous campaign against tuberculosis has been mounted. Improvements in public health, however, have been slowed by inadequate systems of waste disposal, limited access to safe water, a rapid population increase, and the problems of bringing health care to the more remote rural settlements and to the urban poor. Morocco's high rate of infant mortality in comparison with other countries in a similar economic bracket was symptomatic of the difficulties being experienced in providing preventive care and treatment to these groups. In 1983 the number of deaths in the first year of life was 126 per 1,000 live births. This represented steady improvement over the mid-1970s, when the infant death rate was 185 per 1,000, yet it was substantially greater than that of countries with lower per capita incomes, such as the Philippines (65 deaths per 1,000 live births) and Kenya (54 deaths per 1,000). The average life expectancy for both males and females rose from less than 52 years in 1970 to over 57 years in 1982.

Infant and child ailments were among the most serious health problems; common causes of death included measles, neonatal tetanus, and whooping cough. Diseases caused by malnutrition, such as rickets, have become less prevalent as a result of campaigns to improve the caloric intake of young children. Widespread incidence of trachoma and gonorrhea was common among adults. Schistosomiasis (snail fever), which had become more common owing to the increased use of irrigation, was the object of a government control program aimed at its eradication.

The government's public health strategy has placed emphasis on improving environmental sanitation and extending low-cost medical care to needy Moroccans. Further reduction in infant mortality will be achieved through a broad program of vaccination, measures to combat gastroenteritis and diarrhea in infants, and efforts to reduce the death rate from measles and

other childhood diseases. Continued improvements in potable water supplies and liquid waste disposal are being emphasized, as well as wider availability of rural health care and the extension of programs to combat infant malnutrition.

The National Social Security Fund was established by royal decree at the end of 1959. All industrial and commercial employers have been required to register their workers for its benefits. The coverage was extended to agricultural workers in 1972 and to forestry workers in 1981, but the self-employed were excluded. Benefits included old-age and disability retirement; survivors' pensions; maternity and other medical care; family allowances; and daily allowances in cases of sickness, accident, or occupational diseases not covered by workers' compensation laws. The cost, which was funded mainly through employer contributions, amounted to roughly 20 percent of base pay. Although current data were unavailable, it was believed that coverage was lacking for a large segment of the work force.

* * *

Morocco has captured the interest of a number of anthropologists, resulting in a wealth of ethnographic studies. Two classic studies of tribal life are Ernest Gellner's *Saints of the Atlas* and Amal R. Vinogradov's *The Ait Ndhir of Morocco*, in which she describes tribal organization that differs from the segmentary lineage model. Dale F. Eickelman's *The Middle East* is a general work that provides numerous examples taken from Moroccan social and religious life. Eickelman's *Moroccan Islam* and Vincent Crapanzano's *The Hamadsha* are studies of saints and a brotherhood, respectively. *Meaning and Order in Moroccan Society*, edited by Clifford Geertz, Hildred Geertz, and Lawrence Rosen, is a collection of three lengthy essays providing analyses of jural-political relations, bazaar economy, and kinship. Data on male-female relationships are provided in Fatima Mernissi's *Beyond the Veil*, Daisy Hilse Dwyer's *Images and Self-Images*, and Dwyer's article analyzing women's participation in religious life in *Women in the Muslim World*, edited by Lois Beck and Nikki R. Keddie. Recent publications on Jewish life in Morocco are Bernard Lewis' *Jews of Islam* and Allan R. Meyers' article "Patronage and Protection" in *Jewish Societies in the Middle East*, edited by Walter P. Zenner and Shlomo Deshen. *The House of Si Abd Allah*, by Henry Munson, Jr., details the oral

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history of a Moroccan family and provides a delightful introduction to Moroccan life. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

Chapter 3. The Economy



Artisan weaving a carpet

IN EARLY 1985 MOROCCO continued to have a centralized, dualistic, underdeveloped economy that was faced with a number of problems. Its economic performance since independence has been commendable considering the difficulties with which it has had to cope. Economic decisionmaking and other broad powers have been centralized in the person of King Hassan II, who has provided an unusual consistency and continuity in the country's economic policy. This centralization has been a source of progress since independence and, other things being equal, may be expected to continue to be so, although it has posed some related political problems.

Economic activity was heavily concentrated in the cities, particularly Casablanca. Two methods of production still existed, and the contrast was sharpest in agriculture where traditional, nonmechanized rain-fed farming could be observed alongside modern irrigated farming. The disparities in income, education, and living standards were acute between urban and rural areas.

The economy was fundamentally based upon private ownership of property, private enterprise, and a capitalist form of monetary apparatus. There was, however, a large measure of government participation, and perhaps the economy could best be described as mixed—a combination of free enterprise and state participation. In fact, Hassan has called the economic development goals of his government a "happy medium between the capitalist and socialist systems."

Under the Constitution the right of private ownership of property is guaranteed, although provision is made that this right can be limited by law if the requirements of national economic and social development make it necessary. Ownership of subsoil mineral rights, however, was vested entirely in the government, which also enjoyed broad proprietary rights to the forestland and nonagricultural surface areas. Expropriation was prohibited except as expressly provided for and prescribed by law. The government monopolized some services, such as rail and air transport and communications, and participated to a lesser extent in manufacturing. In addition to its role as a direct participant in the economy, the government also exerted appreciable indirect influence through the extension of low-cost credit to agriculture, industry, and tourism; through tariff and other protection measures; through exchange and price controls; and through the use of taxes as an inducement for private investment. The

government also appeared dedicated to as rapid as possible an increase in the per capita income and a reduction in the gap between large and small incomes.

Agriculture continued to be a mainstay of the economy. About half the population was engaged in agriculture, and the development of agricultural resources remained a key factor in the country's plans for economic expansion. Except in years of inadequate rainfall, Morocco was generally self-sufficient in most foods. Rainfall was the single most important variable affecting the economy. In drought years heavy food imports were required, subsidies to farmers had to be increased, and trade and balance of payments deficits escalated.

The vast majority of cropland was devoted to cereals—wheat, barley, corn, and oats. Most cereal farmers produced in a traditional way for their own consumption. Modern agriculture consisted of farms formerly owned by foreigners and subsequently owned by the state, private Moroccans, or cooperatives. The modern farms produced crops—citrus and vegetables—mainly for export; some farms also produced cereals for domestic use.

In 1985 Morocco was one of the world's major producers of phosphate and the largest exporter. The phosphate rock reserves were enormous, and much of it was of high quality. After years of unvarying export prices for the mineral, much higher prices were established in 1973 and 1974, providing the government with windfall receipts; but consumer resistance in succeeding years forced the government to reconsider its pricing patterns. Phosphate export revenues were smaller in 1975 and have been lower since then. Nevertheless, mining remained the largest foreign exchange earning sector.

Manufacturing consisted mainly of small enterprises producing consumer goods plus several large firms producing for export and domestic consumption. More people were employed in handicrafts and small-scale workshops than in large-scale manufacturing. The agro-industries had grown considerably in the past decade and showed an important export earning potential.

Domestic trade was characterized by the existence of a modern sector juxtaposed to, but segregated from, the traditional sector. The modern sector existed primarily, but not exclusively, in the major urban centers, while the traditional sector was prevalent in smaller towns, rural areas, and the older areas of the cities. Domestic trade's basic features were the small retail shops, which carried a wide variety of merchandise, and weekly markets where large numbers of farm producers, craftsmen, and other

purveyors congregated to sell their produce or merchandise. Tourism and foreign trade were greatly helped by a well-developed transportation system that included one of the best road networks in Africa. Because of the importance of tourism to the economy, the government provided a number of fiscal and credit benefits to private investors in tourist-related industries. Tourism, along with worker remittances, was the second major source of foreign exchange.

Morocco faced many macroeconomic problems in the early 1980s. Its gross domestic product was growing at a slow rate at the same time the population was increasing dramatically. Per capita income in 1981-82 was equivalent to about US\$700. The average real growth in gross domestic product during the early 1980s has been 2.8 percent. The unemployment rate was about 25 percent. Many in the agricultural sector were really underemployed and added very little to the agricultural output. There was also a problem of quality within the labor force. A lack of skilled manpower affected most industries, and in certain areas the government had to rely on foreign technicians, particularly French citizens. Looking to the future, the government was spending heavily on training and education.

The major economic problems Morocco faced in early 1985 were the domestic budget and external trade deficits. The problems came about as a result of a number of external factors. A drought that severely affected agricultural harvests in 1979 had not really dissipated. Morocco relied heavily on foreign sources for energy, and rising oil prices had taken their toll. There had been a sluggish demand for phosphates since 1975, and a rise in the value of the United States dollar (which in 1983 was twice as costly as it was in 1979) had made an impact on the economy. Meanwhile, public expenditures continued, and the cost of the war in the Western Sahara, which was around US\$1 million a day in 1978, had probably more than doubled. As Morocco reached its limit in amounts of foreign loans, it embarked on a general austerity program to close the resource gap, and only selective investment was made in export-oriented industries. The debt burden for 1985 was estimated at US\$2 billion. Contrary to previous assessment, new loans were needed, and at least US\$115 million had been raised by early 1985.

The outlook for the next few years was for slow economic growth because of the cuts in government investment. An improvement in phosphate prices and in climatic conditions could help considerably.

National Income and Resources

In comparison with other developing countries, Morocco in the mid-1980s was reasonably well endowed with natural resources, allowing for the development of a rather diversified economy (see fig. 11). It had the world's largest phosphate rock deposits and other minerals such as iron ore, copper, manganese, lead and zinc, and an immense agriculture and fishing potential. In addition, Morocco had exceptional tourist attractions. It relied heavily on energy imports but also had good hydroelectric and hydrocarbon production levels. The population was large enough to sustain a consumer base for small industries, and the labor force was abundant.

During the period of the French protectorate, the Moroccan economy was really a dualistic one in which a small modern sector was managed by the French but the rest of the economy remained traditional, and growth was very slow. In the first decade after independence, when many French had left the country, Morocco followed a conservative approach to economic growth. Because savings were low and external borrowing was not considered, little capital was available for investment. Consequently, the capacity for growth was limited. Gross domestic product (GDP—see Glossary) grew at an average of 4 percent annually in the 1960s, and agriculture was the most important sector in terms of both output and employment. Manufacturing activity was minimal, and 90 percent of all exports were unprocessed products, of which phosphates represented about 25 percent.

In the late 1960s public investment was still concentrated in agriculture and irrigation, but it was really the construction, mining, and textiles sectors that were booming. Overall performance in the early 1970s was good, and GDP in real terms was growing at a rate just below 6 percent.

It was in the early 1970s—when the 1973–77 development plan was introduced—that economic policy became more ambitious; the government spent large amounts on public works and the chemicals industry. The government encouraged private investment by keeping interest rates low. The expansion in investments led to an increase in imports, many of which were consumer goods rather than capital inputs or raw materials. In 1973 world oil prices rose and would have made a much greater impact on the Moroccan balance of payments had it not been for the equally important rise in phosphate prices on the world market in late 1973. Phosphate export earnings quadrupled, and

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


Figure 11. Economic Activity, 1985

despite the greater outlay for oil, Morocco's external current account showed a surplus. Growth of GDP remained around 6 percent annually until the mid-1970s.

In late 1975 phosphate earnings started falling as world demand decreased. The result for Morocco was a high import bill and an increasing budgetary deficit. The government was spending expansively on different investment projects and on defense, and the domestic savings level remained low. Irrigated agricultural production was good, but rain-fed farming performed poorly, leading to less income for Moroccans in rural areas. Available data indicate that the employment rate grew at around 3.4 percent per annum during 1971-77 (as opposed to 1.9 percent between 1960 and 1971) and that the unemployment rate was tolerable.

The world demand for phosphates remained low, and in 1979 oil prices increased again, initiating a trade problem for Morocco. That year agricultural production suffered from a severe drought, and cereal imports became a necessity that aggravated the trade deficit. The central government's budget was also in deficit because of increasing defense spending, and savings remained low. Since 1977-78 Morocco has been trying to resolve its deficits. In the early 1980s it chose—under guidance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (see Glossary)—to switch from an import substitution policy adopted in the 1970s to an export promotion policy. Rather than continuing to develop industries to produce import substitutes, emphasis was placed on producing items that the rest of the world would buy and on releasing restrictions of foreign imports.

The major economic sectors in the early 1980s were agriculture, manufacturing, and trade (see table 4, Appendix A). A comparison of GDP in 1978 and 1983 showed relatively little structural change. There were small decreases in the shares of the agricultural and construction sectors, but the share of the mining and energy sectors increased slightly. The share of the manufacturing sector remained almost constant. Private consumption in 1981 continued to use up the largest share of GDP—68 percent compared with 64 percent in 1977. Government consumption remained stable at 20 percent, and the only major structural change was the decline in investment from 32 percent to 21.7 percent. Exports' share of GDP increased slightly from 17.7 percent in 1977 to 21.3 percent in 1981.

Income Distribution and Wealth

Current statistical data on income distribution in Morocco

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
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were unavailable in early 1985, but various other observations provided examples of how national income was shared by different social groups. Regional imbalances were substantial; per capita GDP in Casablanca, for example, was 60 percent higher than the national average, while in the southeast—the poorest region—per capita income was only one-half that of the national average. In 1980 some 38 percent of the Moroccan population lived below the poverty level; in the rural areas it was 45 percent. Living standards, as evaluated by the availability and quality of health services, drinking water, electricity, education, and certain other amenities, revealed large disparities between the modern residential areas of the large cities and the poor, rain-fed rural areas.

The latest available figures on distribution of expenditures by income classes in both rural and urban areas (1972), when compared with those from 1960, showed a trend that has probably continued. The wealthiest 10 percent of the population earned 37 percent of total income in 1972 versus 25 percent in 1960; the poorest 10 percent earned only 1.1 percent of the total in 1972 versus 3.3 percent in 1960. It was also realistic to assume that factors such as the drought, the high population growth rate among the poor, inflation, and public austerity measures that included freezing wage increases would have particularly affected the poorest people.

The minimum wage levels in agriculture and other sectors were raised by 10 percent in 1982; they had remained unchanged since 1977. In the meantime, as the government had raised food prices and was talking of austerity measures, its ministers had voted themselves a 100-percent increase in pay and allowances in 1981.

The tax system in Morocco was a progressive one and, except for a few subjects, tended to help the poorest by granting them many tax exemptions. Taxes on agricultural sales have been eliminated. The taxation of personal income was changed in 1983 after years of deliberation. In an attempt to reach a better income distribution and increase government revenues, the highest income tax rate was increased from 44 to 60 percent. A few features that still discriminated against the poorer businesses included a higher sales-tax rate on goods than on services, a sector that was mainly owned by the wealthiest businesses. Further, the property tax on real estate or the tax on rental income had not been raised to increase government revenues without impacting on the poorest communities. The system of subsidies indiscriminately helped the entire population; as a result the poorest 40 percent received only about 18 to 20 percent of the

total expenditures.

A traditional element in the Moroccan way of life that hindered more equal distribution of wealth—and one that was becoming more openly discussed—was corruption in the governmental structure. It was officially condemned, and Hassan had made a commitment to eradicate it. Nevertheless, it continued to exist on many levels. Payments often had to be made to senior officials or persons with influence in order to close important business deals with government agencies and entities or to obtain permits and licenses. Some civil servants earned extralegal fees for providing documents on an expeditious basis. Many families had access to persons in government who could issue permits, licenses, and credit or protect them from the enforcement of regulations. Occasionally, the government took severe action against persons accused of such practices, even at high levels.

Much of the economic activity and dominance in certain sectors was linked to particular groups within the society. Some of these groups were traditional ones. The role in the economy of the old, privileged Moroccan families and classes was not altered during the protectorate period and had carried forward into independence. In many situations of economic change after independence, the traditional elite often received an undue share of the benefits. For example, in anticipation of land reform, many foreign landowners sold their farms to wealthy Moroccans, precluding the distribution of most of those lands to landless peasants. Some Moroccan-owned land was later redistributed. The Moroccanization decree of 1973 provided a handy tool for the wealthy families to continue to maintain their share of the growth in the economy without too much effort. Certain family names often appeared as the Moroccan partners of foreign firms.

When the French left, many middle-class Moroccan bankers and merchants moved into the economic power structure and helped create a new establishment. An overly large percentage of middle-class families planned for their sons to enter the civil service, and in many schools class distinctions determined which students would take which courses. As members of the urban middle class accumulated disposable income, they made wise investments in real estate or purchased farms and became absentee landowners. Many large rural landowners who resided on their farms were middle-class Berbers. They were usually not wealthy, but they did command local prestige and influence.

Much of domestic trade and imports were controlled by urban middle-class families descended from Arabs who had

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emigrated from Spain after their expulsion in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Many of them settled in Fès, where the center of business power remained until it was transferred to Casablanca in the early part of the twentieth century. The Fès economic elite generally dominated the textile industry and trade, although they also moved into other economic fields. Because they were better educated and more highly skilled, they moved more rapidly into positions of power within the government and therefore protected their business interests. Along with the Fès families in economic power were the Soussi, or persons from the Sous River valley in the Anti-Atlas region of the south. The Soussi tended to dominate in the business of food retailing and wholesaling.

Employment

The 1982 census reported a total active population of 6 million, defined as currently employed or seeking work. The active population had grown at a rate of 3.6 percent annually since 1971; its share of the total population had grown from 26.2 percent in 1971 to about 29.6 percent in 1982. Higher life expectancies and the fact that more women and young people were joining the labor force, in addition to overall natural growth, were responsible for the increase in the active population. The urban areas showed an increase in the ratio of active to total population from 26.2 percent in 1971 to 30.4 percent in 1982; in the rural areas the ratio increased from 26.2 to 29 percent during that period. Because more women wanted to work, their share in the active population increased from 15 percent in 1971 to 20 percent in 1980.

A total of around 14 million people were reported as "inactive"; included were 4.3 million homemakers and 3.5 million students. Some 6.3 million were simply labeled "others" in the census, which further described them as retired, elderly, or handicapped, or as landlords or landowners whose primary economic activity was collecting rent. Children attending school probably constituted a large segment of the "others" category.

Many Moroccans were unemployed; different sources gave ratios varying from 22 to 30 percent. About 11 percent of the so-called active population lacked jobs; the urban ratio of 12.5 percent compared with a 9.5-percent ratio in the rural areas. Many of those employed in the rural areas were considered unproductive. The number of unemployed has increased significantly in the past decade; one of the reasons for this has

been the heavy investment in capital-intensive methods of production in the early 1970s. Unemployment was highest among youth, the unskilled, the uneducated, and those seeking work for the first time.

Data on employment in the early 1980s showed a disparate distribution by sector (see table 5, Appendix A). Agriculture remained the largest employer, as it had been in the 1970s. The exact number of people employed in that sector, however, has been difficult to estimate because many rural workers leave the farms temporarily for work in the cities during periods of drought. Although there had been few structural changes since the 1970s, it was estimated in 1985 that employment in industry, construction, and commerce would probably increase while that in the other sectors would remain somewhat constant.

The Moroccan labor market has been relatively free of distortions and imperfections, and different wage levels have truly reflected the cost of different labor skills. There were some labor unions, particularly in the cities and in certain sectors, namely transport, mining, petroleum, the administrative and hotel sectors, and among postal workers. The total number of union members, however, did not exceed 250,000. In 1982 the minimum industrial wage was raised to DH1.96 per hour, and agricultural minimum wage was raised to DH10.15 per day (for value of the dirham—see Glossary). Since then, however, most industrial workers have earned well above the minimum wage while many self-employed Moroccans in the agricultural sector have earned less.

One means by which the Moroccan government has dealt with its high rate of unemployment has been to export labor to other countries. In 1984 there were approximately 1 million Moroccans living in Western Europe and the Arab East. The countries with the greatest number of Moroccan residents and workers were France, Belgium, and the Netherlands. In the early 1980s, however, the family reunion policy in Morocco and the recession in Western Europe had increased the number of Moroccans resident abroad and reduced the number that was gainfully employed.

Moroccan residents in European countries have received the same wages and social benefits as their European Economic Community (EEC) counterparts since November 1978, when cooperation agreements with the EEC were put into effect. The West European countries stopped importing migrant laborers around 1974. The French government offered bonuses to migrant workers to leave the country but found that even when it offered

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bonuses to both employed and unemployed laborers resident in France for at least one year, the response was minimal. Failure to respond to the French offers of bonuses—an approach also adopted by other European countries enabling the Moroccans to leave with a percentage of their benefits in cash—demonstrated that few, if any, opportunities awaited them at home.

Upon entrance into the EEC, Spain and Portugal will gain employment and immigration privileges. This factor will further pressure Morocco to find other sources for its labor surplus.

Since the European curtailment of labor migration, the Moroccan government has encouraged its nationals to work in the Arab East. During the 1980s the government signed bilateral treaties with Qatar, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Jordan, and Libya to provide employment opportunities for Moroccan workers. The government in Rabat was able to increase the number of workers in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. In the last months of 1983 Libya recruited some 14,000 Moroccan workers. Economic relations between the two countries had begun improving even before a "unification" agreement was announced by Hassan and Muammar al Qadhaafi in 1984 (see Libya, ch. 4). Among the economic benefits Morocco expected to derive from the agreement was an increased demand for its workers. The total number of Moroccan workers in the Arab East in 1984 was less than 10,000, while there were approximately 350,000 in Europe. The difficulties facing migration to the Arab East have been geographic distance, the high cost of migration, and the difference in working and living conditions between Morocco and the Persian Gulf states.

Role of the Government

In the early 1980s the economic system of Morocco was not one of laissez-faire; rather, government policies were a major determinant in the growth and control of the economy and the distribution of wealth. A large degree of government investment has been traditional in Morocco. It has been not only the main source of economic growth but also a main cause of inflation and large trade deficits resulting from increased imports of capital goods. In the past decade, however, current government expenditures have far outstripped capital expenditures because of the rising cost of defense, education, and the food subsidies that all Moroccans, rich and poor, benefited from. The budget allocated to current expenditures in 1984 was almost DH19

billion, and the total investment budget was DH10 billion; about one-half of the latter amount was to be financed from abroad. A state agency known as the Office for Industrial Development (Office pour le Développement Industriel—ODI) was created in 1973 to undertake preinvestment studies and to participate in new enterprises with private—foreign or domestic—capital.

The government has enjoyed a monopoly of all subsoil natural resources, and by 1977 it had come to exert an increasing degree of direction over surface natural resources as well. It had done this by investing in irrigation and by retaining control over a growing quantity of land that was owned by Europeans during the protectorate period. Since independence this land had been repossessed by the government but had not yet been redistributed to others. The government owned the railroad, highway, power, and telecommunications networks; the large-scale, multipurpose irrigation installations; the phosphate-, sugar-, and tobacco-processing complexes; and most of the airline and navigational services. Moreover, it held participating interests in most other major enterprises associated with mining and with the modern portion of the industrial sector. Direct government participation was manifest in major projects in agriculture, mining, manufacturing, and trade.

The government also intervened in the determination of prices for consumption goods, and it influenced costs of production inputs (raw materials and labor) through its control on foreign exchange and through its monetary policy, which determined the interest rate. The labor market was relatively free of any intervention, but the government determined minimum wages and benefits. In late 1981 it ordered a 10-percent raise in the minimum wage of laborers employed in agriculture and manufacturing. Price controls have been exercised since 1957 and applied to a wide range of consumer goods, services, and transportation. The procedure was used by the government to control profits of monopolies and prevent abuses; to combat inflation and speculative hoarding; to encourage the use of inputs, such as fertilizers in agriculture; and most importantly to ensure that the poorest Moroccans could afford basic food products.

A 1984 study by the World Bank showed that the market prices were significantly different from the real costs and that the price system was therefore considerably distorted. In 1981 the subsidies to farmers were maintained while bread and flour prices were allowed to rise by about 60 percent, causing, in part at least, the riots in Casablanca. Rumors of further cuts in food subsidies in 1983 provoked more riots in January 1984, and the king

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intervened on behalf of the poor against his government's decision that subsidy cuts be canceled. In 1984 petroleum prices rose by an average of 10 percent, as did transportation and housing costs.


Foreign Investment Regulation

Foreign investment, more particularly French capital, was very important to Morocco and remained unregulated until the early 1970s. In 1973, in an effort to reduce foreign control over the economy and promote Moroccan entrepreneurship and employment, the government issued a series of Moroccanization decrees, which set an upper limit of 50-percent ownership in the corporations of certain industries. Excluded from the decrees were tourism-related activities, firms operating under contract to the government, firms exporting their entire production, and certain specialized skills and crafts. The Moroccanization decrees really favored elite groups, who had the ready capital to purchase shares from foreigners, and helped them enlarge their economic power base.

Since then the urgent need for foreign exchange and investment funds prompted the government to issue a new investment code, which became law in February 1983. The major changes in the new code primarily affected foreign investment. Exclusive foreign ownership was allowed in any Moroccan company, except for government enterprises. The condition of nationality no longer applied to eligibility for many tax breaks, and the new law further ensured easier repatriation of capital. Investments were particularly encouraged in job-creating projects where the capital per employee did not exceed DH70,000; in the export industries; and in the growing regions of Tangier, Tétouan, Nador, Ouarzazate, Tarfaya, and Essaouira. For the most part, such projects benefited from easy-term loans, reimbursement of any import tax or duty, a few years of tax-free profits, and other incentives.

Development Planning

Government social and economic development plans began before independence. In the late 1950s the United Nations (UN) and its specialized agencies had stressed the importance of planning for economic growth in less developed countries, and Morocco's first authentic development plan was that of 1960-64. Since then, Morocco has had other development plans covering



*Petrochemical complex at Safi
Courtesy Government of Morocco*

the periods 1965-67, 1968-72, 1973-77, 1978-80, and 1981-85. The plans were prepared on the submission from and consultations with government ministries and agencies under the direction of a secretary of state for planning and development. The Supreme Council for National Development and Planning, which included all institutions dealing with the social and economic life of the country, made the final recommendations to the king on matters having to do with social and economic development. Final decisions on development policy rested with Hassan, and the development plans were given extra force by being issued in the form of law.

The overall goals of the plans served as reference points for ministries and agencies responsible for sectoral policies and planning. The fulfillment of many goals was dependent upon private initiative, and it was never known to what extent the private sector would react to official investment incentives.

The development plans that preceded the one for 1973-77 all gave priority to economic growth over social equality. The 1973-77 plan, however, demonstrated a strong official intention to improve the economic situation of the poorest Moroccans. It called for increased government spending on social services and low-cost housing, price controls on food staples, and special programs for less developed regions. During 1968-77, Morocco performed very well in terms of economic growth, and often the actual income growth rate per year was higher than planned. The population was growing at a moderate rate, and income per capita was satisfactory. The 1973-77 plan started ambitiously but was revised in 1975 to reflect more optimistic goals after phosphate prices increased and higher government revenues were anticipated. The revisions called for more emphasis on developing and processing domestic minerals and for more investments in agricultural and regional development. The fall in phosphate export earnings in 1975-77 hurt those revisions, and recourse to foreign loans was called upon to pay for the investments. Nevertheless, the plan attained the 7-percent annual growth in GDP it had aimed for.

The initial 1978-82 development plan was also revised—this time before it was adopted—because it required too much public spending in a period when the world demand for phosphate remained low, harvests were poor, energy prices were up, and hostilities flared in the Western Sahara. The 1978-80 plan that replaced it required a moderate growth rate and emphasized consolidation rather than expansion. The plan aimed at closing the budget, which it reduced considerably in 1978-79 through cutting down the government's capital expenditures. Credit was also tightened to reduce private investment, and interest rates on time deposits and bonds were raised to close the savings investment gap. The plan did not compromise, however, on social programs or expenditures on education, training, and health. Defense expenses were not diminished either.

Despite the 1978-80 austerity measures, the drought in 1979 and certain external factors prevented significant improvement in the fiscal and external trade imbalances by the end of the plan period. As a result, the 1981-85 development plan, which the government termed "a plan of economic recovery," also called for

austerity in investment expenditures. But the plan did not compromise on agricultural development or national defense, which was given priority again as it had in the preceding plan. The importance of rural development, of reaching a better income distribution, and of making basic needs affordable to the majority of the population was stressed.

The plan called for a total investment of DH111 billion, of which DH76 billion would be privately financed and DH35 billion would be provided by the government. The plan allocated DH69 billion to commercial sectors and DH42 billion to infrastructure, health and social welfare, education and training, housing, and other noncommercial sectors. The amount allocated to defense was not publicized. Agriculture received 22.5 percent of total public investment as compared with 17.4 percent in the 1978-80 plan. Education and training received 19.5 percent of the total public investment, regional development got 16.5 percent, and infrastructure was given 13 percent. The largest shares of private investment—30 percent—went to industry and public works, and 26 percent was given to housing.

Long-term measures were adopted to close the resource and foreign exchange gaps, promoting tourism and the export industry in particular, rather than restricting imports and emphasizing diversification of foreign trade. The plan aimed at an annual GDP growth rate of about 6.5 percent, an increase of 2 percent in savings from 1981 to 1985, eliminating the balance of payments deficit, and increasing job vacancies by 19 percent during that period. In February 1985 the actual situation, again largely because of the weather and external factors, indicated that the plan was a particularly overambitious one (see Balance of Payments, this ch.).

Public Sector Finances

In the early 1980s the public sector consisted of the central government (the monarchy and the cabinet), the various local government units (provinces, prefectures, districts, and municipal and rural communes), and the wholly or partially owned enterprises and agencies. Some of the enterprises and agencies had their own budgets apart from the the general state budget; others had their budgets annexed to that of the central government. It was difficult to draw up the financial situation of the entire public sector and assess the full impact of fiscal operations on the economy because consolidated amounts of all public agencies

and local government were not available or were incomplete.

The general budget comprised an operating budget, resembling fairly closely the generally accepted definition of a current budget, and an investment budget, consisting mainly of expenditures for the public debt. The latter consisted of interest and repayment of principal on amortizable debt. The policy of the government was to pay operating expenses out of ordinary revenues and to finance investment expenditures generally by borrowing, although until the mid-1970s there usually had been a small surplus from current revenue to help pay for some of the investments.

The ministries were grouped within the budget by categories: administrative, economic, and social service. Those not clearly identifiable as economic or social service were grouped within the administrative section. The economic ministries generally received the largest share of the budget, particularly the investment budget.

The central government presented its annual estimates of budgetary receipts and outlays in a finance regulation that included the general budget of the state, a group of separate agency budgets annexed to the general budget, and a series of special treasury accounts. The fiscal year for the central government was the calendar year; but for some government entities the fiscal year ended on June 30, August 31, or September 30.

The so-called annexed budgets related to a number of government agencies—the Government Printing office, the Casablanca Port Authority, and the other port authorities, the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, and Radio-Diffusion Télévision Marocaine. They were presented separately from the state's general budget for historical reasons and because they resembled commercial institutions in having some independent sources of income. They were linked to the general budget through the transfer of their current surpluses, if any, to the general budget resources and through the funding of their deficits and investment outlays from general budget transfers.

The treasury special accounts were set up over the years in connection with special-purpose outlays and receipts. They included accounts covering membership in international organizations, foreign grant and loan funds, bilateral trade arrangements, foreign exchange transfers, and residual items connected with discontinued operating budget items. They were financed in part with foreign loans and grants, earmarked current revenues, monies from the general budget, and treasury bonds.

Both the annexed budgets and the treasury's special accounts could together be considered an extension of the general budget.

In addition to the posts, telecommunications, and port authorities, the major state enterprises included the public financial institutions; the transportation, power, water, phosphate, fertilizer, tobacco, and sugar monopolies; and the slaughterhouses. To the extent that these enterprises were self-financing, they were not a burden on the government and in fact contributed to government revenues in the form of dividends and taxes. To the extent that they were not self-financing, they figured in the government's expenditures, especially in the form of new investment for rehabilitation and renewal of plant and equipment.

Domestic Budget and Debt

The means of financing the central government's budgetary expenditures were for practical purposes divided into current revenues and exceptional receipts. Current revenues, for the most part, consisted of direct taxes, indirect taxes, customs duties, stamp and registry fees, and the profits of state monopolies. Exceptional receipts were for the most part foreign and domestic borrowing and generally were to meet investment expenditures.

Morocco's tax burden as a percentage of GDP (around 19 percent in 1979) was one of the highest among developing countries. Since the early 1970s indirect taxes which included turnover taxes on goods and services (*ad valorem*) and consumption taxes, formed the largest contribution to treasury revenue. The next most important source of revenue was the direct tax, which included taxes on business profits and individual income taxes. Customs duties in Morocco were among the highest in Africa and constituted a significant revenue for the treasury. A tax on property income, miscellaneous registration fees and stamp duties, and profits of state monopolies brought in the balance of the central government's current revenues. Since 1983 customs duties have decreased slightly as a result of the lower import tariffs that were part of the policies adopted to increase the competitiveness of domestic production. Total government revenues were DH33 billion in both 1982 and 1983 and DH31.2 billion in 1984.

The budget for current expenditures has generally been larger than that allocated for capital expenditures. The difference between the two has been increasing because of the rising cost of defense, education, health, and price subsidies. As a consequence of the January riots, the budget was revised in April

1984 to increase food subsidies to DH3 billion, their highest level on record. In addition, DH1 billion was allocated in 1984 for a special program of job-creating small-scale projects. The total current expenditures for 1982, 1983, and 1984 were estimated at DH18.1 billion, DH20.1 billion, and DH19 billion, respectively (see table 6, Appendix A).

The capital expenditures included investment in the different sectors of the economy. Because of the rising cost of current expenditures and, at best, a constant yearly amount of revenue, the capital expenditure budget has been decreasing in an effort to minimize the public debt. The result of lower investment has been a lower GDP growth rate. Total capital expenditures in 1981, 1982, 1983, and 1984 were DH10 billion, DH16.8 billion, DH18.7 billion, and DH10.2 billion, respectively. Equipment, public works, agriculture, and finance—in that order—received the largest shares of the investment budget. Sectors that benefited from larger shares in the early 1980s were education, mining, and energy.

An increasing burden has been the yearly debt-service cost. From DH2.8 billion in 1981, it had risen to DH4.5 billion in 1982, DH5.7 billion in 1983, and DH9.4 billion in 1984. As treasury accounts indicated, the central government budget has been in deficit. Because of the contribution of annexed budgets, ordinary receipts of state corporations, and external borrowing, however, revenues since 1981 generally have matched expenditures.

Balance of Payments

The balance of payments deficit has become a growing problem for Morocco, whose traditional imbalance in merchandise trade was usually offset by incoming remittances from Moroccan workers abroad and from tourism and foreign investments. But the severe drought the country has faced since 1979 has caused agricultural harvests to decline considerably, and Morocco has had to pay increasingly larger import bills for staple foods. Higher energy prices, the rising value of the United States dollar, growing protectionism in the EEC, and a sluggish world demand for phosphates since 1975 have been equally responsible for the growing trade deficits. In 1982 the deficit reached a high of DH13.5 billion, increasing by DH3.8 billion in only a year. The situation was not entirely attributable to external forces, and the application of strict measures prescribed by the World Bank and the IMF did help lower the trade deficit in 1983 to around DH11 billion. The international lending agencies advised that austerity

measures be taken by the government, which basically meant decreases in public spending, a creeping devaluation of the dirham and, for the long run, a general decrease in domestic industry protectionism to increase competitiveness in world markets and a reallocation of capital expenditures to strengthen the export industries.

The government has counted on income from tourism, new foreign investments, foreign aid, and worker remittances to offset the deficit in the trade balance. Tourist receipts were up in 1983, as were remittances from Moroccan workers abroad. These increases helped the current account show a much lower deficit than did the trade balance: DH7 billion, down from DH11.4 billion in 1982.

The remittances of Moroccan workers abroad have been an important source of foreign exchange. They have been growing steadily (from DH4 billion in 1979 to DH6.1 billion in 1983) despite the increased difficulty for Moroccans in finding jobs outside their own country. For those who succeeded, the government offered financial advantages to encourage sending remittances back home. A premium of 5 percent over the prevailing exchange rate was granted for foreign money remitted through the banking system, rather than directly by mail to the recipients. In order to make optimal use of the remittances and rechannel them to investment rather than to purchases of real estate or consumer goods, the government was also considering offering higher interest rates on remittances sent to blocked saving accounts. Moroccan officials have expressed hope that the new political union with Libya would also have economic benefits whereby it would offer Libya the labor force it needed and Morocco a new source of remittances.

The capital accounts balance has usually been positive and almost equal to the amount of foreign aid and investment spent in Morocco. That amount in the past few years, although considerable, was still not enough to eliminate a balance of payments deficit, and the net change in reserves from 1980 to 1982 ranged from US\$277 million to US\$431 million, respectively.

External Financing

A large inflow of foreign capital in the form of aid, investment, or loans has become indispensable in Morocco's attempts to overcome its trade and budget deficits. Indeed, if that influx were eliminated or even moderately reduced, the country's economic situation would be disastrous. Most of the foreign

capital reserves have come from the loans granted Morocco since the late 1970s, although the value of foreign investment and foreign aid in the form of grants injected into the Moroccan economy yearly was also considerable.

Some accounts were not made public, but it was estimated that Morocco received about US\$1.8 billion in 1981 from foreign governments and public agencies in addition to US\$1 billion in arms purchases financed by various Arab governments. Some aid came in the form of commodities. In 1981, for example, the EEC agreed to send to Morocco 7,500 tons of grain, 1,200 tons of powdered milk, and 200 tons of butterfat. Many agencies, such as the United States Agency for International Development (AID), gave loans to Morocco at such favorable terms that they were more like grants than formal debts. In 1984 AID granted US\$45 million to Morocco to finance purchases of cereals and other foodstuffs.

Foreign investment in Morocco was encouraged by the government in all sectors of the economy. In January 1983 a new investment code designed to stimulate the inflow of foreign capital superseded the 1973 Moroccanization decrees. The 1983 code allowed complete foreign ownership of local companies, unrestricted transfer of capital, and various tax breaks for foreign investors. In the first year of the new decree, foreign investment rose by 132 percent to a total value of DH453 million. The Mobil Oil Corporation signed an agreement for oil prospecting, in 1983, and the value of that investment was expected to total US\$117 million. The government hoped that foreign investment would contribute 39 percent of total investment in the 1981-85 development plan. In 1980, before the new code was introduced, the amount of private foreign investment was around US\$90 million. The new inflow of investment came primarily from Tunisia, which provided 37 percent, France (29 percent), Britain (4.1 percent), Spain (3.8 percent), and Switzerland (3.6 percent). The balance came from a variety of other countries. Most foreign investment went to industries associated with food processing, chemicals, mechanical and electrical engineering, and textiles and leather. The largest amount of foreign investment (69 percent) went to the Casablanca area.

In late 1983 the total foreign debt figure, including interest due, was around US\$13.5 billion, of which US\$1.8 billion was due by 1985. That made the debt-service ratio 47 percent when the average of all non-oil-producing Third World countries was 21.7 percent. The principal lenders have been France, the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and international agencies, such as the

World Bank and the IMF.

The situation has been worsening since the late 1970s. Morocco has continually rescheduled its debts while borrowing more to offset the drain in its foreign exchange reserves. In 1981 the foreign debt amounted to US\$7.9 billion. It increased to US\$11.7 billion in 1982 and reached a high of about US\$13.5 billion in late 1983.

When Morocco almost depleted its foreign reserves, which had reached a low of US\$27 million in 1983, the government started negotiations with its creditors on the debts due by the end of 1984. Agreement was reached in October 1983 on US\$820 million of government-to-government loans, i.e., the debts Morocco owed the Club of Paris (a group of representatives of the Western industrialized nations and Japan). The agreement stipulated that Morocco would make a down payment of 15 percent of the total principal and interest payments due and then reschedule the balance over eight years with a five-year grace period. Another agreement with the Club of London (a group of commercial creditor financial institutions) on the US\$530 million Morocco owed in commercial loans was a little more difficult to reach. The 10-bank committee chaired by Citibank and the Banque Nationale de Paris (National Bank of Paris) demanded a guarantee by Banque du Maroc (Bank of Morocco), which held the hard currency reserves, before it would agree to reschedule, a condition to which the Moroccan central bank objected. The charter of the Banque du Maroc prohibits borrowing abroad or guaranteeing foreign debts owed by the Ministry of Finance. The matter was resolved in early 1984 when Morocco was allowed to reschedule over eight years all debt payments due in 1984. All repayments would begin after a grace period of three years. A compromise solution was reached on the guarantee issue whereby the Banque du Maroc would sign a foreign exchange availability letter indicating that it would strive to make the necessary foreign exchange funds available for the payments. Morocco was expected to start talks to reschedule both official and commercial debts due in 1985; it was agreed that new loans would not be needed in 1985.

The rescheduling agreements went rather smoothly because until this crisis, Morocco had been a moderate borrower and had a good credit history. But the process was aided by an IMF standby arrangement that was granted Morocco in return for following strict austerity measures prescribed by the international lending agency and intended to decrease gradually the external deficits. The arrangement covered the period from

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September 1983 to March 1985; the total loan amount agreed to was the equivalent of US\$313 million. At the end of 1984 the unused balance equal to US\$93.9 million was expected to be used by early spring 1985.

The Banking System

The urban areas in Morocco have been well served by a highly developed banking system of public credit institutions and private banks. A large number of Moroccans still put their savings in jewelry or real estate or, as is the case in the rural areas, in livestock or land, and they did not make use of the banks' credit facilities for private consumption purchases. Nonetheless, Morocco was very monetized, and currency was widely used, even in remote local markets.

When Morocco regained its independence in 1956, it created a new monetary institution and a new currency, the Moroccan dirham. The dirham was divided into 100 centimes, and dirhams were issued in denominations of five, 10, 20, and 50 centimes. The banking system consisted of the central bank (Banque du Maroc), commercial banks with about 170 branches around the country, a number of miscellaneous banks, and several government specialized financial institutions. The financial system also included insurance companies and a stock exchange in Casablanca.

The central bank was created in 1959 as a public institution having all of its capital subscribed by the state. The bank, which was the sole issuer of currency, held and administered foreign exchange, extended credit to commercial banks, and acted as a banker to the government, to other banks, to credit institutions, and to certain state enterprises. Paper money issued by the central bank was backed by gold or convertible currency (or the currency of Morocco's major trade partners) in the amount of at least one-ninth of all dirhams in circulation.

The central bank had a broad array of monetary policy instruments, such as interest rate levels, obligations to purchase treasury bonds, and the maintenance of reserves. Unlike other developing countries Morocco has had a history of effective monetary and credit policy.

The central bank determined the foreign exchange rate, and until 1973 the exchange rate between the dirham and the French franc was fixed. Since then, buying and selling rates against the franc have been established daily on the basis of the movement of a basket of currencies from Morocco's principal trade partners.

The rate of exchange of the dirham against all other currencies has therefore been established on the basis of the daily dirham-French franc rate and the cross rates between those currencies and the French franc. Commercial banks have been permitted to offset purchases and sales of foreign currencies on behalf of their customers but must use the rates established by the central bank and must report daily the balance of their foreign exchange operations. No foreign exchange market existed in Morocco to permit banks to trade with each other, and imports or exports of the dirham were not permitted.

In 1985 Morocco had 15 commercial banks, two specialized private institutions, and two savings banks. There was a high degree of concentration in total bank assets; two commercial banks—Banque Centrale Populaire (Popular Central Bank) and Banque Commerciale du Maroc (Commercial Bank of Morocco)—accounted for 44 percent of total assets, and six others for another 47 percent. The number of commercial bank branches totaled 643 in 1982. Banks were concentrated along the Atlantic coast, and 25 percent of the branches were in Casablanca. Commercial bank lending was predominantly short term.

The Exchange Office, an agency under the Ministry of Finance, more directly controlled the foreign exchange transactions through import certificates and export licenses. Import orders required a signed commitment from the importer and a visa from the Exchange Office, which also made sure they were in accordance with trade restrictions. In addition, since 1983 most import businesses were required to deposit with a bank for a period of six months 25 percent of the value of the imported goods. Exports of most goods did not need a license; the proceeds were not subject to taxes but had to be received within 90 days of the arrival of the products at their destination and had to be deposited immediately at the central bank.

The Exchange Office also had to approve the transfer of money from foreign employees working in Morocco to their country of origin. The amount allowed was 30 percent if the family of the employee was living with the individual and 50 percent if the family was in the country of origin. Again with prior authorization of the Exchange Office, nonresident aliens could open accounts either in convertible dirhams or in foreign currency denominations as long as the latter was not in currency notes but in bank drafts or traveler's checks.

The nominal exchange rate of the dirham has gone through three stages since 1973. It remained stable between 1973 and 1980, declined in 1980 and 1982, and has been depreciating

further since 1983. Overall, from 1976 to 1982 the dirham appreciated against the currency of France, its main trading partner, and against that of Spain, its main competitor. The real exchange rate, which took into account the increasing cost of imported products in Morocco, showed a considerable appreciation of the dirham against the French franc, the Tunisian dinar, and the United States dollar. A devaluation of the dirham was recommended by the IMF to improve the trade deficit, and the government was able to devalue its currency by around 12 percent in 1983 against the dollar and another 12 percent during the first six months of 1984. The nominal exchange rate of the dirham against the dollar was DH6.26 to US\$1 in late 1982, DH8.06 to US\$1 in late 1983, and DH9 to US\$1 in late 1984, and DH9.5 to US\$1 in early 1985.

A large number of public financial institutions that specialized in different sectors of the economy offered loans at favorable terms for sectors in which investment was desired. The most important of these institutions were the Deposit and Investment Fund (Caisse de Dépôt et de Gestion—CDG), the National Economic Development Bank (Banque Nationale pour le Développement Économique—BNDE), the National Agricultural Credit Bank (Caisse Nationale de Crédit Agricole—CNCA), and the Construction and Hotel Credit Organization (Crédit Immobilier et Hôtelier—CIH). The CDG was established in 1959 as an autonomous public entity to receive and invest public sector deposits. Certain savings and retirement funds, including the National Social Security Fund, were legally bound to hold their deposits with the CDG, and other cooperative and mutual institutions could voluntarily do so. The CDG used its resources to purchase treasury bonds or other government securities, to make loans to public enterprises and local governments, and to make direct investments in various sectors, including tourism.

The BNDE was also established in 1959 for the purpose of promoting the economic development of the country. Half its capital has been subscribed by the state and the other half by private Moroccans, foreign banks, and international lending authorities. The BNDE has been particularly active in financing manufacturing, although legally it could provide loans for any purpose. For example, in 1977 it was designated the sole source of lending to the fishing industry. By 1977 it accounted for two-thirds of all industrial loans in the country. Although it could enter into equity participation with private investors, it acted mainly through loans that were limited to new investment. The

BNDE could make long-term loans, could rediscount short- and medium-term loans, and could guarantee them. It was considered a well-managed banking organization by international financial agencies.

In 1961 several state agricultural credit institutions were absorbed into the CNCA, which at the headquarters level made loans only to credit organizations, public institutions, and cooperatives. Loans to individual farmers were made by regional or local branches or, if the borrower was in the low-income group, by agricultural credit and provident societies. The regional offices of the CNCA catered to medium and large farms, while the rural local branches lent to farmers with farm income under the equivalent of US\$1,750. Losses on loans by the local branches were small, but the branches generally lost money because of the difference between administrative costs of the loans and the low interest rates charged. The whole pyramid of regional and local offices and societies was funded by the CNCA, and their lending activities were directed by it. The credit societies performed a training and educational function as well as a financial one.

Since the 1973 Moroccanization decrees all previously owned foreign commercial banks have become domestic banks. Most of them transferred part of their equity to Moroccans and changed their names. The financial system also included some 40 insurance companies and a stock exchange in Casablanca, where some capital needs could be met. The stock exchange was not very active, however, because most persons with investment funds preferred to invest in tangibles or in real estate, rather than in securities. Banks often traded securities between themselves, bypassing the exchange.

Monetary policy since independence has generally been liberal except for some temporary instances, such as the 1981-84 period in which the rising budget and balance of payments deficit required direct intervention. The money supply grew only moderately in 1982 to hold inflation in check but grew much faster in 1983 as a result of the imposition of import deposits. Price inflation, however, was reduced from about 12 to 14 percent in 1982 to about 10 percent in 1983 as a result of the latter year's austere budget. The largest price increases were those of foodstuffs, transport, and housing. The poor were the hardest hit.

Quantitative controls that had been imposed on credit beginning in 1969 were removed in 1972 but were reimposed in 1976. At that time the government was forced to intervene again and channel capital to the most productive economic sectors because too much money had been spent for short-term

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nonproductive purposes. Since then these controls had not been totally removed.

In 1984 the interest rates in Morocco were relatively low, ranging from 7 percent for short-term loans to 14 percent for long-term ones. Some loans benefited from a 2-percent rebate under the investment code to encourage particular investment projects. In any case, the real interest rate was negative because the inflation rate was between 10 and 11 percent. The rate really should have been raised to reflect the relatively high cost of capital in Morocco where labor was still the most abundant of the two resources.

In addition to organized credit, an appreciable amount of unorganized credit was extended throughout the economy. For example, it was traditional to provide credit in domestic trade; many wholesalers provided credit to retailers, and until the end of World War II interest often was not charged by the wholesalers. Retailers, in turn, extended credit to their customers. Landlords, professional moneylenders, and local merchants—particularly in rural areas—all extended credit and, although difficult to quantify, probably provided a large part of credit made available to small-scale farmers and low-income groups.

Agriculture

Agriculture, including livestock, forestry, and fishing, has long been a dominant sector of the Moroccan economy. In the early 1980s about 60 percent of the population lived in the rural areas, and agriculture alone provided employment for about half the nation's labor force. The contribution of agriculture to GDP, however, has been declining somewhat, from an average of 22 percent in the late 1960s and early 1970s to 17 percent in 1983. It was expected to decline further to about 16 percent in 1985 and to 14.8 percent by 1990. Agriculture's share of total exports has also declined, from 54.1 percent in 1971 to only 28.6 percent in 1981. That decline, however, was more a result of the increase in the share of phosphate exports and of the EEC restrictions on foreign imports than of lower agricultural production.

The state has had an agrarian reform program since independence, but the primary economic preoccupation of the government has been to increase the agricultural output. Meeting the goals of land reform has been secondary. Realistic land reform and balanced growth of the agricultural sector could relieve Morocco of many serious economic and social problems.

For example, difficult living conditions in the rural areas and irregular employment have caused a massive exodus from agricultural work by young people, who have sought a more rewarding life in the cities and have ended up in the bidonvilles, where public-order problems arise. In the mid-1980s the country had a potential for self-sufficiency in the production of cereals, the staple of the Moroccan diet. With proper development agriculture could do much to alleviate the problems of the trade balance.

Land Tenure

In the early 1980s there were a variety of land tenure forms, some dating from the time before the protectorate period and rooted in concepts and usages common to the Arab world. All land owned by the king or the central government was called *makhzan* land. It included land in the public domain, most forestland, all unused land and wasteland, and a considerable area of arable land. Rights to unused *makhzan* land could be gained by improving and utilizing it. The *jaysh* (tribes that traditionally had supplied the government with military contingents) have had permanent usufruct of *makhzan* land on a collective basis. Favorite court servants could also be given usufruct of state-owned land.

A small percentage of arable land and most of the grazing land were collectively owned by tribes or clans. Individual members had leasehold rights to a specific plot of collective land and constituted more than one-third of all landowners in the country. Strictly private land was called *melk* land and under Muslim Arab usage had to be worked or it was no longer treated as privately owned land. Much *melk* land was worked under several forms of sharecropping, except for irrigated land in government water-control projects, which had to be owner-occupied. There were some renters of *melk* land, but most tenants rented *makhzan* land or *habus* land (land donated to religious institutions). Sharecropping of *melk* land generally was done under one of three common methods. The most common system was called *khammes*, under which the sharecropper received about one-fifth of the crop in return for his labor. The landowner, who supplied the land and some of the inputs—sometimes even clothing and food—received the remainder. Landlords under the *khammes* system often worked part of the farm. Where the farm was owned by an absentee landlord, the sharecropping system was called *khobza*. Several sharecroppers worked the farm for the landlord and shared the crop in a fixed proportion. Under the third

sharecropping system, the sharecropper acted more as a labor foreman. He provided a reliable work force for the farmer in return for a share of the crop, usually one-fourth, and might or might not provide any labor himself.

Habus land was land donated under Islamic law to a religious institution by the state or by an individual. If given by an individual, the land could continue to be farmed by the family as long as there were male descendants of the original donor. The family thus avoided payment of taxes on the land. State land donated to the institution could be rented out to any farmer, as could privately donated land where there were no longer male descendants. *Habus* land was in principle inalienable, but during the protectorate period the government permitted institutional holders to exchange or sell it in order to acquire other property.

Registered land, or ownership with a clear, registered title, was an outgrowth of colonization. Although some registration of titles existed before the protectorate, the local procedure was not adequate for the needs of European settlers. Therefore, in 1914 the French introduced a system under which registration of land became compulsory in cases where changes in ownership involved non-Moroccans. Some Moroccan landowners, mainly those with large farms, also had their land titles registered. Since independence the extent of Moroccan-owned land with clear, registered titles has been augmented both through the purchase by Moroccans of European-owned land and through the expropriation and redistribution of foreign-owned land. The state has been encouraging registration of *melk*, *habus*, and collective land, but the procedures have been lengthy and costly. The land must be surveyed, boundaries established, and public notice given to alert possible claimants. If no counterclaims are filed within a fixed time, the land is registered in a land book, and a title-deed is issued. All subsequent changes in ownership also must be entered in the land book.

Although large-scale colonization was discouraged in the early years of the protectorate, settlers later began to arrive in large numbers, both with and without assistance from the French government. By independence in 1956 there were nearly 6,000 European-owned farms totaling around 1 million hectares, most of them in the fertile coastal areas around Fès, Meknès, and Marrakech. At the outset the new government's approach to the problem took the form of a number of restricted programs that met with only limited success. The first was a series of land distributions beginning a few months after independence in response to popular demands for the confiscation and

redistribution to landless peasants of the lands belonging to Europeans and Moroccans who were considered to have collaborated with the French or to have profiteered under the protectorate. Because of the resistance and political power of large Moroccan landowners and Morocco's desire to maintain friendly relations with France, only about 8,000 of the nearly 20,000 hectares initially distributed were former *colon* (settler) lands; the remainder was state land.

Acceding to internal pressure, the government in September 1963 issued a decree providing for the gradual government takeover of all European-owned lands that had been received as grants under official colonization schemes during the protectorate. Land that had been purchased privately by Europeans was not affected by the decree. In March 1973 another decree made all foreign-owned land (except urban property) the property of the state. Not all the lands originally owned by foreigners were recovered by the state; an estimated 296,400 hectares were said to have been sold to Moroccan farmers by Europeans before the state could take them over. Such sales were subject to regulations beginning in 1959 but continued subsequently despite the decrees. By 1973 about 441,000 hectares of foreign-owned land had gradually been acquired by the state and reallocated mainly to peasants grouped into cooperatives.

French financial aid, which had been blocked after the takeovers in 1963 and again in 1973, was resumed after agreements were reached providing for indemnification to French citizens for livestock, machinery, and other assets apart from the land. In 1976 Morocco signed a similar agreement with Belgium to pay Belgian citizens for land confiscated from them.

In addition to former *colon* lands, several thousand hectares have been expropriated from Moroccan farmers because they exceeded the upper limit for the holding of land irrigated by the state, under the terms of a 1966 general land reform law. That law also established the basis for redistribution of expropriated land. Land was to be distributed in four- to seven-hectare parcels for irrigated land and 10 to 25 hectares for unirrigated land, and wage-earning agricultural workers and sharecroppers received first preference. In return, the recipients had to renounce all rights to any other land, had to follow an approved cropping pattern on three-fourths of their land (they could plant whatever they wished on the remaining land), and had to join a local production and marketing cooperative. The 1966 law also provided for the consolidation of fragmented holdings and conversion of tribal holdings into freehold plots. Not all the lands

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recovered by the state had been redistributed; some were being operated as state farms pending their eventual distribution. Only about 2 or 3 percent of the country's farmers had received any benefit under the various land reform programs; because of the lack of suitable land and limitations imposed by the government's administrative capacity, no more than another 2 percent would enjoy such benefits in the near future.

The distribution of land in 1985 was unequal, and it was also inefficiently used because of the fragmented nature of Moroccan farms. The average farm size was about five hectares, and some contained no cultivable land. The vast majority of farms (almost 80 percent) each covered an area of five hectares or less and together constituted about one-quarter of Morocco's cultivable land. About 74 percent of all cultivable land was owned in freehold, about 14 percent was collectively owned, and the balance belonged to the state or to religious institutions.

Land Resources and Use

Of the total land area of the country—not including the portion of the Western Sahara claimed by Morocco—only about 18 percent (8 million hectares) was arable in 1985. About 45.5 percent (20 million hectares) was made up of forests, scrub, and grazing land, and the large balance consisted of nonarable desert, mountains, and urban areas. Most of the cultivated land lay west of the Rif and the Atlas Mountains toward the Atlantic Ocean and in the intermontane valleys of the Middle Atlas range. Of the arable land, about half received no more than 350 millimeters of rainfall each year. About 73 percent of the total arable land, or 5.8 million hectares, was under cultivation in 1980, of which between 800,000 and 1 million hectares was irrigated. Land left fallow in 1980 had a surface area of almost 2 million hectares. The government claimed in 1983 a net decrease in the fallow-land surface of about 560,000 hectares, and in 1984 the king declared that the irrigated land had increased to 3.5 million hectares. Other sources, however, estimated that the area of permanently irrigated land in 1984 was only about 800,000 hectares.

The major crops grown in Morocco were cereals, pulses, sugar beets, sugarcane, citrus fruits, and vegetables. In 1983 cereal plantations covered an area of about 4.6 million hectares, or 80 percent of the cultivated land. The main cereals were barley, which covered 2.2 million hectares, hard wheat (1.3 million hectares), soft wheat (690,000 hectares), and maize (440,000 hectares). Small quantities of sorghum, millet, and oats

were also raised, and sufficient rice has been grown in irrigated areas to meet the small local demand. In general, though by no means exclusively, wheat was planted north of the Atlas ranges in the Fès, Meknès, and the Chaouia regions and the Rharb and Tadla plains, where rainfall was greater than 250 millimeters annually. The cultivation of barley, which resists drought better than wheat, predominated south of the Atlas from eastern Morocco to the El Jadida, Marrakech, Safi, Essaouira, and Agadir regions.

The main pulses were lentils, chick-peas, and broad beans; in 1983 they covered an area of about 450,000 hectares. Sugar beets and sugarcane were the crops on about 60,000 hectares. There has been a traditionally heavy sugar consumption in Morocco, as it accompanies tea, a very popular drink. Consumption levels of cereals and sugar have increased as people have become poorer because of the drought and shifted to less expensive foods. Fruit trees covered 140,000 hectares; they were mostly citrus trees that grew lemons, oranges, and tangerines. Other fruits included cherries, pomegranates, figs, apples, apricots, peaches, pears, dates, and plums. Most vegetable production was carried out in truck gardens near the large cities, particularly Casablanca; they covered about 143,000 hectares of land, of which 40,000 hectares were planted with potatoes, 15,000 with tomatoes, and 12,800 with onions. Citrus fruits and vegetables were the major crop exports. Morocco also had some cultivation of cotton, grapes, oilseeds, olives, and nuts. In 1983 grapes covered an area of about 49,000 hectares; almonds, walnuts, and pecans were planted on 87,500 hectares and olives on 320,000. The latter were the country's principal source of vegetable oil.

Crop Production

Two distinct crop production methods were carried out more or less side by side in Morocco. The traditional subsistence agriculture carried on by the bulk of the farm population was found in the rain-fed areas of the country, and a modern and efficient form of agriculture first introduced by the Europeans was found mostly on the irrigated land. Cereals and pulses were grown in the rain-fed areas where limited use was made of high-yield seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, and machinery. Cereal crops, and to a lesser extent pulse crops, were extremely vulnerable to weather conditions and depended on rain for needed moisture. The industrial and export crops—sugar beets, sugarcane, citrus fruits, and some vegetables—were grown primarily on large-scale

farms managed by regional development offices, and they benefited from the introduction of modern farming techniques, including irrigation, and a consistent price and marketing structure. These farms produced about 80 percent of all agricultural exports and one-quarter of the gross value of all crops, including 80 percent of that attributable to wine and citrus, 33 percent of the vegetables, and 15 percent of the cereals.

A fairly large share of the vegetables were grown in the protected environment of large commercial farms. In 1983 production under plastic coverings included about 660 hectares, an increase from about 246 hectares in 1980. The irrigation schemes were either large and very modern or smaller and traditional. The largest irrigation project in the country—the Sebou scheme, affecting 201,000 hectares—concerned the Gharb perimeter and covered the area from the Middle Atlas mountain range around Fès and Meknès down to the Atlantic coast at Kenitra and Rabat; it was to involve the construction of 13 dams over a 25-year period. Slightly farther to the east, the Beht project has already seen 28,000 hectares irrigated. To the north of Fès, the Loukkos project affecting 40,000 hectares covered the western Rif region down to the Mediterranean coast at Tétouan; its aim was primarily to stop erosion in the area and, through a national promotion scheme, to provide jobs for the inhabitants. Other important irrigation projects were spread over the country—in the arid east, the northeast, on the south Atlantic plains, in the central High Atlas, in the Anti-Atlas region, and south of Agadir.

Farmers in Morocco used little agricultural machinery. In 1981 there were 23,500 tractors and 2,400 combine harvesters, or only about one tractor for every 330 hectares of cultivable land and one combine for every 3,000 hectares. Moreover, most of the mechanized equipment was used in the modern irrigated sector, which included only about 12 percent of the total arable land. The potential contribution of tractors and combines was very important in the rain-fed areas. Most farmers used animal traction to prepare the land, a task tractors could accomplish more efficiently to ensure that all the seed would be planted before the rainy season started. Combines would permit timely harvesting; the method of cutting and gathering by hand prevails, however, and has been too slow and has resulted in considerable grain losses.

Agricultural production grew at a slow rate—1.5 percent per annum in the 1970s—and decreased by around 2 percent in the early 1980s. During this period the Moroccan population was growing at a rate of 3.1 percent per annum, resulting in a serious



*Wheat is cut and gathered by hand.
Courtesy Richard Rosenman*

gap between domestic demand and the national supply of food. A closer look at the performance of individual agricultural sectors during the late 1970s and early 1980s typically reflected the dichotomy between the methods used and the availability of water for irrigation. Morocco has suffered a severe drought since 1979, and the cereals crops have therefore decreased dramatically. The output of pulses, however, has not fallen as sharply because of an increase in the amount of land allocated for their cultivation. Citrus fruits and vegetables, grown mostly in irrigated areas, have shown satisfactory production levels, as have most crops that have had the benefit of permanent irrigation and modern techniques.

In the 1979-81 period, cereals and pulses contributed 36 percent of agriculture's share of GDP; citrus fruits and vegetables each provided 11 percent, and industrial crops and forestry together added about 6 percent. In 1983 the production of cereals fell by 27.2 percent compared with the 1981-82 production level, which was lower than that of the late 1970s. Industrial crop yields rose by 17.7 percent from 1981 to 1983; the output of pulses increased by 23.9 percent and that of fruit plantations by 2.8

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percent (see table 8, Appendix A).

Once an exporter of wheat, Morocco has relied more and more on imports for its basic foodstuffs. The imports of wheat increased by 27 percent in 1983 compared with 1981-82, and the imports of maize grew by 49.3 percent. The imports of wheat were expected to rise to 2.5 million tons, most of it from the United States. As the population continued to increase, Moroccan dependency on imports was not expected to decrease within the near future. The World Bank estimated in 1984 that for the next 15 years, Morocco's demand for cereals, vegetable oils, dairy products, and meat would surpass domestic production. The consumption of sugar in Morocco ranked among the highest in the world. Emphasis on enhancing sugar production has led to a significant improvement, whereby domestic output, which satisfied only 28 percent of the demand in the late 1960s, was meeting about 53 percent of it in 1980. Current production trends were expected to ensure self-sufficiency in sugar as well as fruits and vegetables by the late 1980s. In general, however, the trade imbalance in foodstuffs was expected to continue to put strains on foreign exchange reserves.

Drought has been the major cause of the lower production level of rain-fed crops; the system of land tenure and poor technology have also contributed to the situation. In the early 1980s the government was concentrating its investments on the rain-fed areas because 80 to 85 percent of the irrigable land's potential had already been achieved. A comparison of the economic rate of return between the irrigated and the rain-fed areas favored the rain-fed areas, where a 20 percent rate of return on investment was also accompanied by considerable social benefits for the 80 percent of Morocco's rural population who were dependent on rain-fed agriculture. In the 1981-85 development plan, 18 percent of the total agricultural investment went to the rain-fed agricultural projects, compared with only 2 percent in the previous plan.

Inadequate technology has resulted from many factors. The most important of these were inefficient research services, inadequate transmission of know-how to the farmers; inability of the farmers to afford better seed, fertilizer, pesticide, and machinery; and lack of motivation on the part of the farmer to invest in the land being cultivated. In 1980 the government created the semiautonomous National Institute for Agricultural Research to organize physical and financial resources for the development of modern farming techniques to ameliorate Morocco's problems. More efforts have also been made to

disseminate improved technology to the farmers, and the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform has established its Directorate of Extension for that purpose. In particular, it has begun improving the training of its extension agents, increasing their accountability, and providing better motivational techniques.

Funds have been allocated to spread technology, and farmers are offered price subsidies on agricultural inputs and machinery. Prices of wheat and barley were also officially subsidized to guarantee the farmers a minimum return on cereal crops. In the early 1980s the government considered reorienting its subsidy funds to the needs of the smaller farmers in rain-fed areas after determining that previous subsidies benefited only the larger farmers in the irrigated zones. The government was also giving easier credit terms for any investment in agriculture for the next 20 years. Further, Hassan announced on March 3, 1984, that agricultural revenue would be exempt from taxation until the year 2000 in an attempt to alleviate the difficulties of the peasant population. But that measure might only aggravate the disparities between the large modern farms and the small traditional ones while also taking away a major source of income to the government.

In the early 1980s most of the smaller farmers did not derive any income from their crops, and agriculture as a whole contributed only 2 percent of Morocco's total tax revenues. In general, savings in the rural sector were very low, and whatever small amount was available was usually invested by the farmers in livestock rather than savings accounts, which offered very low interest rates. The larger farmers' surpluses were not all available either because they were often diverted to consumption or investment in urban-based projects. Nevertheless, the agricultural credit bank had made commendable efforts to mobilize savings for investment. Since 1975 its deposits had grown at an annual rate of 22 percent, reaching DH544 million in 1982. In 1978 about 43 percent of the CNCA's financial resources had been raised from domestic borrowing, accumulated profits, and deposits while 26 percent came from foreign borrowings. The remaining capital was provided by the state.

Traditional moneylenders often acted as banks, accumulating capital and making it available to farmers in the form of short-term loans. Commercial banks have not really attempted to attract rural savings; they provided about 50 percent of the short-term credit to farmers but no medium- or long-term loans. The savings programs of the CNCA have started increasing since it has begun attracting savings from the urban workers and from other sectors and services that complement agriculture.

Availability of credit in the mid-1980s was but one factor responsible for the lack of farmers' motivation for greater productivity. Insecurity of tenure, little contribution by landowners toward the cost of production, and very small shares of the resulting revenue returning to farmers were other essential factors. In 1979 a series of land reform measures were undertaken; included were efforts to consolidate farmers' scattered holdings, a limitation on partition of land area beyond a minimum size, creation of privately owned viable holdings where there was collective land, and the imposition of a land tax to ensure that land was not left fallow indefinitely. In early 1985 the land reform measures still had not been implemented.

Livestock

Livestock constituted about one-third of the share that agriculture contributed to GDP. For small farmers livestock raising was important as a source of food and income. The landless and the farmers who had less than five hectares of land owned about 63 percent of the cattle and 46 percent of the sheep.

In 1983 Morocco had about 2.4 million head of cattle, 12.6 million sheep, 4.9 million goats, and 65,000 camels. A few thousand pigs were raised annually for use as meat by non-Muslim residents as well as by tourists. Poultry raising was developing fast, the number of birds increasing from 200 million in 1980 to an estimated 415 million in 1984. Many animals starved during the drought, especially in 1981; by 1982 the total numbers of cattle, sheep, and goats had decreased by 22, 35, and 25 percent, respectively, and Morocco had been obliged to import significant amounts of meat and milk.

Livestock raising was carried out primarily on marginal pastureland or on crop stubble after harvests. Because little feed was raised or stored, many animals starved during the dry season. The large numbers of sheep and goats represented a threat to the natural pasture and state forests and to the delicate balance between crops and livestock. Intensive livestock production was rapidly becoming important in irrigated regions and high-rainfall areas. Morocco could be self-sufficient in meat and milk, but if forage production and range management remained insufficient, it would have to rely increasingly on imports. The government was promoting herd development on traditional grazing land. Extensive help was given to farms that were able to produce adequate forage and feed crops for livestock. Moreover, in order to stimulate dairy production, the government has constructed

milk collection centers, around which dairy cooperatives have been created and which provided animal health care services. The government also has consistently subsidized milk prices. To improve the genetic characteristics of the country's cattle, it has been importing cows noted for their high milk yield.

There was significant production of wool, which was used chiefly by local craftsmen in making rugs and other textiles. Hides and skins were used to meet the needs of the domestic leatherworking industry, but quantity and quality often were less than desired. Camels, mules, and donkeys were used as work animals.

Fishing

Fishing has become a major industry in Morocco. In 1981 the government created the Ministry of Ocean Fisheries (present-day Ministry of Ocean Fisheries and Merchant Marine) to promote fishing, which was expected to provide large export earnings and employment potential. The fish-canning industry in early 1985 had 72 major factories and, in addition, there were 100 freezing and processing plants. In 1984 the total labor force employed in fishing was about 71,500, of which some 33,000 worked with the fishing fleet. Fish exports represented about 6 percent of total export earnings. The Atlantic coastal waters abounded in sardine, tuna, mackerel, and anchovies, and in the early 1980s the minimum annual landings of fish often reached 400,000 tons. Morocco exported canned and processed fish—mostly sardines—but also exported other fish meat and fish oil. Because of recent fierce competition it encountered from the EEC, Morocco was trying to encourage domestic consumption, which absorbed only 10 to 12 percent of production.

Beginning in the late 1960s the fish catch closer to shore along the southern coast began to decline, and in 1973 Morocco extended its territorial waters limit to 70 nautical miles, banning foreign fishermen from the area. A dispute with Spain immediately ensued because Spanish fishermen from the Canary Islands traditionally fished in that area. An attempt to resolve the dispute was made the next year when Morocco and Spain signed an agreement permitting a specific number of Spanish fishing boats to operate within the 70-nautical-mile limit. In 1981 the government extended the limit of its territorial waters to a 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone because the larger schools of fish, particularly sardines, appeared to be located farther offshore. In order to be able to fish so far away from shore,

major firms within the Moroccan fishing industry formed associations to charter deep-sea trawlers.

In 1984 Morocco had about 878 trawlers and smacks and some 7,000 other fishing boats. Trawling companies were operated jointly by the government and foreign companies or by the associations formed by major Moroccan fishing firms. The number of Spanish fishing boats in the area has been reduced, but Morocco received fees from Spanish fishing fleets and important financial aid from Spain, totaling around DH550 million in 1984, in return for the use of Moroccan waters.

The ports of Agadir, Essaouira, and Safi were the center of the fishing industry, although many of the canneries were located in Casablanca. Morocco has been developing other landing ports and more storage capacity for frozen fish. France contracted to construct and develop an integrated fishing port at Tan-Tan during 1984-85. The complex was expected to have equipment to clean and pack some 50,000 tons of fish each year as well as to contain refrigeration units, fish meal factories, and a trawler repair yard. Spain was considering an agreement that included the improvement of Agadir's port facilities. Delegations from the United States and the Republic of Korea (South Korea) have discussed the possibility of establishing new joint-fishing ventures with Morocco.

In addition to ocean fishing, some inland fishing existed. A number of lakes, reservoirs, and rivers have been stocked with food fish by the government, and fresh water fishing was strictly controlled so as not to deplete the stocks. Despite the low domestic consumption of fish the government hoped to increase local use through an intensified marketing program. A state fish-marketing company operated retail outlets across the country, which were supplied with fresh fish by refrigerated trucks.

Forestry

Natural forests covered an area of about 7.7 million hectares, a small percentage of the total land area. About 3.5 million hectares of the national forests had significant potential for commercial exploitation. The most valuable trees were fir, oak, and cedar; other varieties included *argan*, eucalyptus, acacia, and pine. All forests were owned by the state, but exploitation was permitted under license. Industrial plantations covered about 370,000 hectares, three-fourths of which belonged to the state and the balance to cooperatives and the private sector.

About 150,000 disadvantaged rural people depended on the



*Fish being packed at dockside in Agadir
Courtesy Government of Morocco*

forests as a principal source of income in the mid-1980s. The forestry sector employed about 65,000 people full time. A little more than half of this labor force worked in wood-processing industries. Such industries produced timber, cork, panels, crates, roundwood for poles, and pulp, which was either exported to Western Europe or sold domestically to produce paper and cardboard. The other main products of the forests were wood for fuel and forage for animals. The contribution of forestry to GDP was underestimated at 0.3 percent because the value of fuelwood and forage was often unrecorded.

The cork oak forests, which covered 300,000 hectares, produced cork for local use and for export; eucalyptus trees, introduced into the country initially to combat erosion, supplied cellulose for the textile industry. The *argan*, a tropical tree unknown outside Morocco, covered 680,000 hectares of scattered forest in the Sous region of the southwest. A spiny, evergreen tree of the ironwood family, the *argan* produces a fruit about the size

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of a plum that Moroccan cattle and tree-climbing goats eat. Oil extracted from the fruit kernel is used in place of olive oil by southern Moroccans. The oak and pine forests have generally been unexploited, but more attention was being paid to their development. Esparto grass covered large areas of eastern Morocco and the Moulouya River valley and was baled and exported for the paper pulp industry. Vegetable horsehair, a fiber obtained from the leaves of the dwarf Mediterranean palm, had wide foreign markets as a stuffing for mattresses and upholstery. Morocco was the world's leading producer of vegetable horsehair, which since World War II has become southern Morocco's most valuable forest product.

Trade in wood products has been increasing, both imports and exports. But because of increasing domestic use of timber, Morocco's trade balance in wood has deteriorated, and wood imports had doubled during the early 1980s. Forestry resources, however, have remained significantly underdeveloped, mainly because of the paucity of detailed information available to the government. The Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform has been mapping and taking inventory of the forest areas, of which only 10 percent were covered in 1982. Overgrazing and cutting for fuelwood have rapidly eroded forest resources at an estimated rate of about 20,000 hectares annually. In 1984 it was estimated that 60,000 to 85,000 hectares of new forests would need to be planted annually to keep pace with increasing domestic consumption and to reach self-sufficiency by the year 2000. Wood was the only fuel for cooking and heating that was within the means of most of the rural population and a small section of the urban population as well.

Depletion of the forests has been a national problem since the eleventh century. During French rule about 400,000 hectares were replanted, and since independence the Moroccan government has consistently worked on reforestation programs. The 1981-85 development plan aimed at planting 25,000 hectares per year, but only 4,000 to 6,000 hectares were replanted annually because of national budgetary restrictions.

Mining

Morocco has a variety of minerals, but phosphate has played the dominant economic role. The government has hoped that receipts from phosphate exports would eventually help widen the base of the economy. In 1983 the mining sector provided only 4

percent of GDP but was the major source of export revenues; with a 65-percent share of the total, it provided 52 percent of foreign exchange earnings. The mineral industry was virtually under government control through the Ministry of Energy and Mines; several public and semipublic organizations managed the principal subsectors of energy and mining under ministerial supervision. Phosphate deposits were nationalized under the Sharifian Office of Phosphates (Office Chérifien des Phosphates—OCP), which was established in 1920 and started mining phosphate rock in 1921. Some mines were privately owned and operated, but the government financed most of them. The mining industry—phosphates in particular—was the single largest customer of the Moroccan rail network. Conveyor belts were commonly used for minerals transport, but transportation from the mines to the ports by trucks was also available. The major ports involved in the mineral trade were in Casablanca, Safi, and Mohammedia; a new port near Jorf Lasfar was near completion in early 1985. A large share of the mining output was exported.

The mining sector employed relatively few people. In the early 1980s mine workers, most of them unskilled, totaled about 40,000; the OCP alone had about 24,000 employees. The industry had a shortage of both skilled and semiskilled labor. Half the miners worked irregularly, turning to agriculture when mineral prices were low. The rest of the miners were organized into three formal cooperatives or several small miners' organizations. The income levels of miners were virtually at the rural poverty level.

Phosphate production accounted for 75 percent of the mineral sector's share of GDP and 90 percent of the sector's export revenues. Morocco was the world's third largest phosphate producer after the United States and the Soviet Union and the largest exporter. Reserves in Morocco and the Western Sahara have been estimated at about two-thirds of the world's total reserves.

Phosphate rock of a very high quality was found mostly in the center of the country in the so-called phosphates plateau. The main mining facilities were at Khouribga and Youssoufia. A new mine has opened at Benguerir, one at Sidi Majaj was virtually ready for operation, and a major mining facility at Meskala, financed by investments from the Soviet Union equivalent to US\$2 billion, was scheduled to start operating in 1987–88. In the Western Sahara the Bu Craa mine was reopened in 1982 for the first time since the war began in 1976. Phosphate ore in the Western Sahara was the purest in the country, and the deposits there constituted about one-eighth the volume of the deposits in

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
Morocco proper. The Bu Craa mine was operated by a company owned partly (35 percent) by Spain and partly (65 percent) by the Moroccan government. Output from Bu Craa, however, remains low compared with its potential as a result of serious damage to the 104-kilometer-long conveyor belt, one of the largest in the world, during the war. As a result, phosphate ore has been transported by truck between the mines and the El Aaiún port. In 1984 the volume exported was only one-fourth of the 1975 output. The government has decided to rebuild both the conveyor-belt system and the port at El Aaiún.

Phosphate production averaged about 18.5 million tons annually between 1977 and 1982, and the government aimed for an annual output of 38 million tons in 1985. In 1983 exports of phosphate and derived products earned about DH6.4 billion in foreign exchange. Revenues from exports of minerals have been very important sources of development funds and, hence, the Moroccan economy has been vulnerable to the world demand. After the OCP suddenly tripled the price of phosphate rock from the equivalent of US\$14 to US\$42 per ton in 1973 and to US\$68 in 1975, world demand decreased significantly by about 12 to 15 million tons a year between late 1975 and 1978. Then the price of phosphate fluctuated widely, and the OCP cut back the price to around US\$32 a ton by late 1979. In 1980 world demand increased, and the price of phosphate was raised to US\$49.50 per ton. Subsequently, the price decreased to US\$40 per ton but was expected to increase by 9 to 12 percent in 1985 as a result of efforts mounted by both Morocco and the United States.

While the demand for phosphate rock has been falling, that for processed phosphate products, such as fertilizers, has risen. It was also a much less elastic demand and therefore allowed Morocco better market control and higher revenues as the price increased. The government was investing heavily in phosphate processing; four plants—Maroc Chimie I, Maroc Chimie II, Maroc Phosphore I, and Maroc Phosphore II—producing phosphoric acid, monoammonium phosphates, and sulfuric acid were already in operation. In addition, a contract valued at US\$200 million with a consortium of Japanese and Spanish firms had begun the construction of sulfuric acid plants expected to be completed by 1986. In early 1985 there were plans under way between India, Saudi Arabia, and Morocco to build fertilizer complexes in Saudi Arabia that would buy 1.4 million tons of phosphate rock yearly from Morocco, process it, and sell the output to India. Exports of phosphate derivatives have been rising steadily since the late 1970s and have compensated for



Phosphate mining at Khouribga



Phosphate plant at Bu Craa
Photos courtesy Government of Morocco

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smaller sales of phosphate rock.

Morocco has other minerals, but in 1985 most of them were untapped. Metals included silver, antimony, and cobalt, which was found mostly in mines in Bou Azzar; lead and zinc, which existed at Boukber, Touissit, Aouili, and Mikbladen; manganese at Bou Arfa and Siroua; iron ore at Nador, Uixan, and Ait Amar; and copper at Blida. Nonmetals included barite, cement, fluorspar, salt, and pyrrhotite (a ferrous sulfide from which sulfur is extracted). Salt was found near the port of Mohammedia. Mineral fuels included coal, petroleum, and natural gas.

In terms of world production Morocco ranked fourth in output of cobalt until 1982, when its output ceased; it was the sixth largest producer of barite, the eighth largest of lead, and the tenth largest of manganese. Exploration for uranium was carried out at a number of mining sites, particularly in the Meskala region.

The second and third most important minerals after phosphate were lead and zinc, which contributed 4 percent and 0.5 percent of the mining sector's export revenues, respectively. Copper, silver, and manganese were also important export minerals. The Moroccan government was emphasizing nonphosphate mineral production and has allocated the equivalent of US\$150 million in its 1981-85 development plan for that purpose. The output of other minerals, unlike that of phosphates, has been increasing. Sulfur output, however, decreased just as demand for it went up; it was used extensively in the production of phosphate fertilizers. Consequently, a large volume of sulfur had to be imported, and more imports were expected because of the increased emphasis on fertilizer production and the construction of a sulfuric acid plant at Jorf Lasfar. Cement was produced in plants at Agadir, Tangier, Meknès, Casablanca, Tétouan, and Oujda. Cement output has been rising steadily; it was around 3.7 million tons in 1982. High local demand in the late 1970s has exceeded the domestic supply, but the subsequent government austerity program and growth in production capacity have significantly reduced this imbalance.

In terms of mineral fuels Morocco had large quantities of oil shale estimated at around 100 billion tons that could yield 213 billion barrels of oil with the application of extraction technology; in the early 1980s the principal deposits were at Timahdit, Tarfaya, and Tangier. At Timahdit there were proven reserves of about 3.3 billion tons of oil shale having an average oil content of 65 liters per ton of shale. With financial assistance from the World Bank, Morocco's Office of National Petroleum Research and Exploitation (Office National de Recherches et de l'Exploitation

du Pétrole—ONAREP), a state organization created in 1981 for the production and sale of oil and hydrocarbons, was assessing the economic feasibility of exploiting this oil source. Producing oil from shale was an extremely expensive process, because the techniques were still elementary. Nevertheless, ONAREP had signed an agreement with the Royal Dutch/Shell Oil Company to develop oil in Tarfaya in a three-phase project that would ultimately cost about US\$4.5 billion and be completed in 1992, producing 70,000 barrels a day. Another contract for a US\$7 million oil shale plant in Timahdit was signed with the Davis McKee Company of the United States.

A very important discovery of natural gas was made in December 1981 at Meskala in the Essaouira basin, 31 kilometers east of Essaouira. The initial exploration was done by ONAREP and was financed by a loan of US\$50 million from the World Bank. Another loan of US\$75.2 million was granted by the World Bank in 1982 for drilling nine wells. In 1984 there were plans to drill a total of 30 wells at a cost of US\$540 million, financed partly (25 percent) by the World Bank and partly (75 percent) by foreign sources. Once the fields are developed, the gas is expected to supply about 60 percent of the fuel needed by Casablanca and Marrakech; reduce the share of energy imports from 80 percent of domestic demand to 60 percent; and serve some of the energy needs in cement plants, sugar mills, and a copper refinery. Estimates of natural gas at Meskala have been placed at 21 billion cubic meters. Natural gas has also been discovered in the Gharb basin near Mechra bel Ksiri. Exploration was under way in the foothills of the Rif by the state-owned Bureau of Mining Research and Participation (Bureau de Recherches et de Participations Minières—BRPM) and other Moroccan government entities with the assistance of the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation.

Although the total extent of coal deposits was unknown in 1985, the Moroccan company Charbonages du Maroc had anthracite mines at Jerada and was exploring for lignite in the region of the Ghafsai basin. About 50 million tons of lignite had been discovered at Oued Nja, but the mine at Jerada remained the major source of coal. Production of coal totaled about 700,000 tons a year and was used almost entirely to fuel thermoelectric plants. The government expected to increase production to an annual level of 1.2 million tons in the near future. Nonetheless, the demand for coal for the production of electricity has continued to exceed domestic supply, creating a modest requirement for imports of the commodity.

Morocco was the first African country in which petroleum

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was discovered; but production gradually declined, and in 1985 some experts believed the reserves had been depleted. Extensive exploitation, however, has been carried out both onshore and offshore by many of the world's major oil companies in conjunction with ONAREP and financed in part by the Moroccan government. The expected cost of exploration during 1981-85 was DH2 billion, of which DH1.5 billion was to be financed by the state. Geological and geographical characteristics in the Essaouira basin, the shoreline in the Ifni and Sous areas, the Tadla Plain, and the region in the Middle Atlas known as the High Plateaus all suggested the possibility of oil reserves. Many companies have shown interest in exploiting the region of the offshore basin from Essaouira in the north to Tarfaya in the south, which was virtually unexplored.

The Mobil Oil Corporation was exploring off Tarfaya, the Atlantic Richfield Company was engaged similarly off Agadir, and the Amoco Oil Company was negotiating a contract to explore offshore in the Mediterranean. Amoco already had projects in the Essaouira basin, offshore in Nada, and onshore in the Rif and in the south at Tan-Tan. North-South Resources of Canada also had signed an agreement to explore in the Essaouira region. ONAREP, which has entered into all concessions with the foreign companies, was exploring alone in the Atlantic coastal area.

Despite all this exploration, national petroleum sources supplied only about 3 percent of domestic primary energy production in the early 1980s. Morocco, therefore, has had to import most of its crude petroleum. It had the facilities, however, to refine most petroleum products. The two state-owned refineries, one at Mohammedia and the other at Sidi Kacem, had increased their combined refining capacity from 5 million tons annually in 1979 to 7.8 million tons in 1984; the plant at Sidi Kacem accounted for 6.8 million tons of the total output. Two other refineries, one at Nador and the other at Jorf Lasfar, were to be completed by 1986 and to have refining capacities of 6.2 million tons and 4 tons per year, respectively.

Production of lubricating oil was developing owing to the construction of a new plant in Mohammedia to produce 100,000 tons per year; 50,000 tons would be exported, and the other half would satisfy local demand. The plant would also produce bitumen, paraffin, and fuel oil; it would provide employment for 300 people.

Energy

Morocco has always consumed more energy than it has produced, and the deficit has continued to grow. In the early

1980s domestic energy production was only 15 percent of demand, down from 20 percent in 1977. The gap between supply and demand has been filled by imports, putting further strains on the foreign trade balance. Oil imports have constituted about 30 percent of the cost of all imports and have used up about one-half of export receipts. In the early 1980s the primary sources of energy for commercial production and their share of the total were coal (54 percent), water (35 percent), natural gas (8 percent), and oil (3 percent). Traditional sources of energy—fuelwood, agricultural residues, and charcoal—were believed to satisfy about one-third of the total domestic demand.

Electricity constituted about 90 percent of commercial production and satisfied about 28 percent of the demand for energy; its share of the demand was expected to rise to 40 percent by 1995. In order to alleviate the cost of oil imports, the Moroccan government was trying to shift from oil-fired electric generators to thermal or hydroelectric power plants. The total installed capacity of electric plants was 1,840 megawatts. Thermal plants produced twice as much electricity as the hydroelectric plants. Although Morocco's hydroelectric power potential was only partially developed, the drought had reduced power output considerably.

In addition to 23 hydroelectric plants, there was one major coal-fired plant at Jerada, which had been built with financial and technical assistance from the Soviet Union and was being further expanded to increase its capacity. A new hydroelectric plant was under construction at Ain Chouarit on the northeastern flank of the Atlas Mountains; it was expected to also have irrigation uses. In Morocco the use of water for irrigation usually has had priority over the generation of electricity. Major oil-fired plants existed at Kenitra, Mohammedia, and Casablanca. The latter two were being modified to accept coal as well. Although Morocco would have to increase its coal imports, the final energy bill, including oil imports, was expected to be lower.

The National Electric Authority (Office National de l'Électricité—ONE) provided over 91 percent of the total electricity generated; part of the balance was produced by and for industrial enterprises from their own power plants, and about 1 percent was provided by small plants operated by the Ministry of Interior in isolated communities.

The ONE was also responsible for the distribution of electricity; 60 percent of its production went to the large industrial customers and to the *régies*, which were government enterprises responsible for redistributing and managing utility

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services in the large cities. About 40 percent of the production went to the rural areas and smaller cities. By the late 1970s the ONE had about 4,775 employees and was a modern and efficiently run facility. The *régies* alone provided employment for 2,300 people in electricity distribution. The ONE and the *régies* maintained training programs to teach employees needed skills.

In the early 1980s industry consumed 58 percent of the demand for electricity; the cement and phosphate producers were the largest customers. Transportation and services, including the government sector, consumed 15 percent of the total; agriculture required 5 percent, and households used about 22 percent. The 1982 census reported that 74 percent of Moroccan households had electricity. In rural areas, however, only 4.5 percent of the homes had electric power. Rural households derived much of their energy from traditional sources.

Manufacturing and Construction

In the early 1980s the manufacturing sector, like agriculture, consisted of modern and traditional subsectors. Modern manufacturing included production of foodstuffs, chemicals, metal products, and construction materials. Clothing and other textiles, leather goods, and handicrafts were manufactured according to traditional methods. The modern sector had a few large-scale production units, and the traditional sector had many small-scale producers. The distinction between the two, however, was less sharp than in agriculture and had been diminishing as traditional artisans and their handicrafts had either disappeared or joined to form larger, more mechanized operations. The basis of modern manufacturing was established during World War II when many French businessmen fled France and brought their capital and managerial talents to Morocco. In general, the modern subsector has had the greatest concentration of skilled and semiskilled labor and has always paid the highest wages.

In 1983 the manufacturing sector accounted for about 17.5 percent of GDP, and the construction sector for about 7 percent of the total. Despite Morocco's high unemployment rate, industry contributed only 11 percent of the country's jobs. About 200,000 Moroccans worked in the modern industrial sector—700,000, if one-person enterprises were included. Wages in manufacturing were relatively good when compared with those in agriculture and mining. But there were large interindustry disparities in wages,

particularly in the chemical and clothing subsectors, which formed the upper and lower limits, respectively.

Manufactured products constituted almost one-third of Morocco's total exports. Chemical products were the leading exports, making up about 34.4 percent of the industrial share; textiles and clothing were 26.9 percent of all manufactured exports, and food products made up 24.5 percent. The balance was accounted for by all the other manufacturing subsectors combined.

The manufacturing industry was centered in the urban areas, particularly Casablanca and the northwest part of the country around Tangier and Rabat. Some plants were in Marrakech and Safi, and a few were scattered in the other regions. Most manufacturing firms were very small, and their number had grown to slightly more than 2,800. Only 55 of them employed more than 500 people, and some 2,000 firms had a maximum of only 50 workers. Although the chemical industry's share of manufacturing output was about 33 percent, it employed only about 51,100 people. The textile and leather industry, which constituted a mere 14.8 percent of manufacturing output, was the largest employer, having some 68,700 workers. Thus, the traditional sector employed more people, while the modern sectors of food processing and chemicals were capital intensive.

The most important agro-industries refined sugar; processed and canned vegetables, fruits, and fish; produced and bottled wine; produced and packaged oilseeds; and packaged tobacco products. Morocco had 12 sugar refineries that had a combined production capacity of 400,000 tons per year and five major refineries that produced about 600,000 tons annually. The government owned shares in most large manufacturing companies.

Flour mills could meet all domestic needs, but much wheat had to be imported. More than 100 factories processed fruits and vegetables. Most of the factories utilized unexportable fresh fruits and vegetables that have not met export standards, although the government was trying to encourage manufacturers to process better quality crops. The oilseed industry was controlled by a consortium of private and state-owned refineries, which had the sole right to import oilseeds and unrefined vegetable oil. The consortium, Moroccan Cooperative for Edible Oils (Coopérative Marocaine des Huileries Alimentaires—COMAHA), also had responsibility for stabilizing the domestic price of vegetable oils. The production, importation, distribution and sale of all tobacco products was monopolized by the state-owned Tobacco Authority (Régies des Tabacs).

The textile industry produced cotton, wool, and synthetic

fiber from which hosiery and finished clothes were made. It has been a dynamic industry, growing at an annual rate of 50 percent during 1982-84. Although faced with severe EEC restrictions, textile exports have increased steadily since the late 1970s. About one-fourth of the industrial work force was employed in textile mills. There were over 760 textile establishments, and the country was almost entirely self-sufficient in clothing and textiles. About 80 percent of the textile plants were concentrated in Casablanca and Tangier. The industry has become highly modernized, and new equipment has been installed in most plants, although about 20 percent of all production came from small producers and artisans. The 30 largest textile firms produced more than half of the industry's output. There was very little government participation in the textile industry; almost all plants were privately owned. The domestic shoe industry met most local requirements, producing plastic, canvas, or rubber footwear, which was cheaper to manufacture.

Morocco has long been a country with a reputation for rich and diversified handicrafts. Because of competition from manufacturers, the once relatively prosperous artisans have fallen from middle-class to lower-class economic status, particularly those making utilitarian articles that could be mass-produced in factories. By the late 1970s it was estimated that there were between 200,000 to 250,000 craftsmen still practicing their trades. Urban craftsmen lived and worked full time in specific neighborhoods based upon their trade; rural artisans worked part time between harvests.

Some of the better known Moroccan handicrafts were rugs, blankets, robes, pottery, leather goods, and metalware. Production of leather goods was highly labor intensive, although some craftsmen used modern equipment. Carpetmaking was one of the trades that provided large numbers of women and girls with employment; most other crafts were dominated by men. The government has established a number of training centers to help apprentices in different crafts learn modern techniques and quality control, particularly for goods that have found markets and ready acceptance abroad. There were also a number of government-sponsored cooperatives and retail shops that sold handicrafts to tourists and guaranteed fixed prices to artisans for their wares.

Although its share of GDP has been almost constant throughout the years, the manufacturing sector has grown irregularly since Morocco's independence. In the 1960s and early 1970s a policy of import substitution protected the local



*Basketweaving, a
traditional handicraft
Courtesy
Government of Morocco*



*Leather tanneries
in Fès
Courtesy
Paul I. Tartter*

manufacturers from the import of competing products and subsidized the import of capital equipment. That action, coupled with a healthy local demand, spurred a rapid growth in manufacturing. Since 1977 and the ensuing austerity programs, however, the manufacturing sector has stagnated. The rate of growth fell from an annual average of 5.7 percent during 1969-77 to 1.1 percent during 1977-81. An exception, however, occurred in the chemical subsector, which became much stronger as a result of increased investment. Its rate of growth registered an annual average of 17 percent during 1977-81 compared with 2.4 percent during 1969-77.

Preferential import taxes have resulted in a highly protected domestic market and have caused Moroccan manufacturers to discriminate against production for export. But the incentives offered for import capital equipment during the 1970s also resulted in underutilization of capital in a country where labor was abundant. In the mid-1980s the Moroccan government was

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considering export promotion measures, advocated by both the International Labour Organisation and the World Bank, to provide more employment—210,000 new jobs by 1986—and to alleviate balance of payments problems. It has been estimated that efficient export promotion policies could reduce the deficit from US\$2 billion in 1985 to about US\$1.3 billion in 1986.

The protectionist measures also resulted in lower quality products and less output for domestic manufacturers—except those in textiles—during the early 1980s. Most industries also suffered from a serious shortage of skilled labor and middle-management employees. The government has established vocational schools for the different industries, particularly textiles and leather, that taught, among other things, design and management.

The construction industry has long been a dynamic sector of the economy. Because of the rapid increase in population and the persistent migration to the cities by rural Moroccans, the government has had to embark on a vast housing construction project; 58,000 new housing units and attendant health and education facilities were produced in 1983, a rise of 43 percent from 1982. Booming tourism also has stimulated construction activity. In particular, the government plans to clear most of the bidonvilles around the cities—especially Casablanca and Rabat—and it has already embarked on a project to build a new town at Salé with financial help equivalent to US\$72 million from the EEC. Ten percent of the money had already been invested in excavations for water and sewerage systems by early 1985. A major tourist complex was being developed at Marsa Samir near Tangier, including a 500-bed hotel, 250 luxury apartments, 100 villas, a commercial center, and a marina. At a cost of US\$56 million, the project was being funded jointly by the Moroccan government and a Saudi investment group. Construction contributing to improvement of the country's economic infrastructure received DH7 billion in the 1984 budget; 22 percent was invested in developing roads, 30 percent in improving or building new port facilities, 32 percent in developing and maintaining rivers and canals, and the balance for various public works.

Transportation and Telecommunications

In the early 1980s Morocco's relatively well-developed transportation network connected most parts of the country (see fig. 12). Some of the system's services were owned by the

government and some by private companies. The government established the infrastructure, supervised the operation, and established the fares of all modern modes of transportation. The Ministry of Equipment and Vocational and Cadre Training was responsible for roads and ports; the Ministry of Transportation supervised the rail system, civil aviation, state-owned buses, and the freight companies as well as regulated private road transport services. The Ministry of Transportation had been established in 1977 to promote coordination of transport policies with foreign countries and to keep data on costs and rates.


The road network totaled some 66,000 kilometers, but at least 39,000 kilometers of the system consisted of dry-season roads or tracks. Of the 27,000 kilometers that were surfaced for all-weather use, there were 8,749 kilometers of main roads, 6,648 kilometers of secondary roads, and 11,724 kilometers of tertiary roads. Most of the network lay in the plain between the Atlantic coast and the Atlas Mountain ranges; there were fewer roads in the mountainous regions and in the southern areas of the country. The government was constructing new roads to link the urban centers of the Western Sahara. Work on the Casablanca-to-Rabat highway was well advanced, and work has started on a beltway around Casablanca.

Traffic density in Morocco has been increasing. In 1982 some 464,000 passenger cars and 217,000 commercial vehicles were registered. All transportation of goods and passengers by surface means was under the jurisdiction of an autonomous public agency, the National Transport Office (Office National de Transport—ONT), which was also responsible for setting the fares and freight rates. Regular bus service linked most cities. Small taxis were restricted to operation within urban boundaries, but larger taxis were permitted to transport passengers anywhere in the country. About 95 percent of all travelers and 60 percent of all commercial services used the road system and, as a consequence, the network required almost constant maintenance and renewal. The 1981–85 development plan allocated about DH4.6 million for that purpose.

The country's rail system was operated by the National Railways Office (Office National des Chemins de Fer—ONCF). Trackage totaled 1,700 kilometers; 40 percent of the trains were powered by electricity, and the rest operated on diesel power. Almost all of the rail system was single-track, except for the Rabat-to-Casablanca double-track service completed in 1984. The Moroccan rail system connected with its Algerian counterpart, which in turn connected with the Tunisian system. It was also

[illegible]

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possible to go by train from Casablanca to Paris via ferry service across the Strait of Gibraltar. As proposed, the project would cost about US\$3 billion, and construction was to take 30 years to complete. The total traffic using the Moroccan rail line registered about 3.6 million ton-kilometers of freight annually and 1.4 million passenger-kilometers. In early 1985 a Moroccan firm was laying track between Marrakech, Agadir, and El Aaiún with United States assistance. Work on a rail line between the Meskala phosphate mining area and the port at Essaouira was also under way. A new project to link Nador with the existing Fès-to-Oujda rail line and a spur between Jorf Lasfar and Nouasseur were under construction.

The rail system operated at an overall deficit, although it made a small profit from those aspects of its activities that were connected with services to the phosphate industry. Freight rates charged by the rail system were well below those of commercial trucking companies. The Ministry of Equipment and Vocational and Cadre Training has tried to encourage more use of the rail system for freight in order to alleviate the high density of traffic on Morocco's roads and to eliminate the system's deficit; some consideration has been given to raising rail rates.

Morocco was served by six major ports and 10 smaller regional ports. The country's largest shipping line, the Moroccan Shipping Company (Compagnie Marocaine de Navigation), was almost entirely operated by the government. The company owned 53 ships and also operated passenger liners that provided regular service to many other countries. Merchandise handled in the ports totaled about 31.5 million tons in the early 1980s. The major ports were at Casablanca, Safi, Mohammedia, Agadir, Nador, and Tangier. Smaller ports included those at Tan-Tan, Tarfaya, El Aaiún, and Kenitra. The port at Casablanca handled about 75 percent of all shipping freight and was generally congested. It was served by more than 100 foreign maritime companies. The Casablanca facility specialized in the export of phosphates, citrus fruits, and vegetables and handled part of the country's passenger traffic as well as oil and cereal imports. The Mohammedia port handled almost all petroleum imports and was being expanded to accommodate bigger ships, possibly those as large as 150,000 tons. As the major passenger and tourist seaport, Tangier operated a duty-free facility and also served as a port of entry for food items such as cereals and sugar. The port at Safi was another site for phosphate exports; those at Agadir and Kenitra handled exports of citrus fruits and fish products. There were projects under way to build new ports at Jorf Lasfar and Nador and to expand the one at Agadir. Negotiations were under way by

the Ministry of Equipment and Vocational and Cadre Training to rebuild the port at El Aaiún in the Western Sahara to handle phosphate exports from that area.

The Moroccan air transport system, basically a passenger service, has become very important for the country's tourism industry. Morocco had more than 50 civil airports. Those at Casablanca, Rabat, Tangier, Marrakech, Fès, Agadir, and Oujda served international flights. Royal Air Maroc (RAM), the national airline owned by the government, provided service to 13 foreign countries in Western Europe and Africa as well as to the United States via direct flights from Casablanca and Tangier to New York. In the early 1980s RAM operated seven Boeing 727 aircraft, three Boeing 737s, three Boeing 707s, and one Boeing 747. Roughly 3 million passengers visited Morocco by air each year, and about 40 percent of them flew with RAM. Air freight handled by the airline was about 32,500 tons annually. Royal Air Inter, a subsidiary of RAM, provided all domestic air services.

There were projects in various stages of development to improve and expand the airports at Agadir, Al Hoceima, Casablanca, Tangier, Oujda, and El Aaiún. The new facility at Agadir, the largest of these projects, has been designed to handle 3 to 4 million passengers a year; but the program, at a cost equivalent to US\$100 million, was being delayed because of the financial difficulties Morocco was facing.

Morocco had a good communications network. Postal service and telecommunications were operated by the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications. The mail system was well organized, and airmail was much faster and more reliable than surface mail. Cable and telex services were also available, and a satellite relay ground station permitted communication with the rest of the world. The modern telephone system served about 230,000 subscribers in the early 1980s. Direct automatic dialing to several West European cities was available, and semiautomatic service with the United States was of good quality.

Trade and Tourism

In the early 1980s Morocco's commerce was characterized by both modern and traditional methods. Modern methods emerged during the protectorate owing to the entry of European settlers and a subsequent expansion in domestic and foreign trade and finances. Because it had little to do with the traditional system and relied basically on the industrial and agricultural production

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of Europeans and foreign trade, the modern system did not affect the economic life of the majority of the population. More than 25 years after independence, only about 6 percent of the population actively participated as modern consumers. Found almost exclusively in urban and industrial centers, modern methods dealt primarily with the sale of manufactures as well as with foreign trade and services. They were heavily concentrated in the Casablanca-Mohammedia area, which had replaced the traditional older commercial cities of Fès, Meknès, and Marrakech and was likely to remain as the country's main commercial and financial center in the near future.

Until independence practically all large business establishments were wholly owned by foreigners, mainly the French. Since then, and particularly since 1973, most commercial enterprises came under Moroccan control. In many cases, Moroccans who had been accepted as managers and minority partners became majority owners. Many of the large importers also operated retail outlets for their products. In the early 1980s over 400 import firms existed in Casablanca alone, and there were over 23,000 wholesale and retail outlets in Morocco's urban areas; almost all of the latter were family-run enterprises.

The Moroccanization decrees strengthened the private commerce sector, and the system has remained very much a free-market system. The government has only interfered in the pricing and marketing of basic consumer products.

Domestic Trade

The traditional market structure has dominated domestic trade. It was characterized both by the small permanent shops opened regularly during the week and by the souks (markets) where small local producers, farmers, and craftsmen gathered weekly to sell their produce to town or city dwellers. There were about 1,000 small-town souks. In both these and their rural counterparts a wide variety of domestic products were offered for sale. The souks in particular offered many of the goods and services available in Morocco. The merchandise included animals, food, spices, jewelry, textiles, clothing, utensils, and other goods, both new and used. Services were offered by porters, shoemakers, blacksmiths, tailors, and others. Throughout the country there were hundreds of thousands of petty merchants selling to the masses, all hoping to improve their lot. Price determination, except for merchandise for which prices were fixed by the government, depended on supply and demand.

and the buyer's skill in bargaining, a characteristic formality of the petty merchant.

The souks operated at three different levels: local, regional, and urban. Local souks usually drew a small number of buyers and sellers from a radius of 10 to 12 miles. Regional and city souks usually drew a larger number of buyers and sellers than local souks, resulting in a greater volume of sales. The city souks were found in the bazaars of the *medinas*, the old Arab quarters in urban areas. Bazaar shops were small, and customers could not enter but had to stand in the doorway and bargain with the owner, who sat inside amid his wares. Streets that were dominated by shops selling a particular kind of merchandise were also properly called souks. Some souks or streets formed an area of their own within the *medinas*, which were closed off at night by gates guarded by night watchmen. These closed off areas, known as *kissanias*, generally carried merchandise of a better quality than was found in other shops in the souks.

Most rural souks were held in the open at fixed sites that were vacant the rest of the week. These sites were named after the day of the week the market was held. People started gathering at the sites early in the morning, conducted their business, and returned to their homes after sunset. These tribal markets also served local social and political purposes. News was exchanged, and tribal matters were discussed, negotiated, and settled. If a merchant did not sell his goods before the end of the market day, he carried them to another local souk the following day. The exact locations where local and regional souks were held was determined by both convenience and habit. Local markets generally were sited near water sources or religious shrines, and regional souks were held at the convergence of transportation lines. Many merchants and customers traveled to these markets by buses that plied between town and market site only on market days. Some regional markets located near crossroads have grown in both size and influence over the years, and merchants there vended both Moroccan manufactures and imported items.

Marketing channels generally were in the hands of private enterprise, except for a number of products over which the government had a monopoly. The government monopolized the trade and marketing of most export fruits and vegetables, canned fish, wine, cotton, wheat, barley, tea, sugar, edible oils, tobacco, and petroleum products. For example, all cotton was purchased from farmers by a government entity that transported, processed, and marketed it. Food shortages sometimes occurred because of a breakdown in distribution or because of speculation—even of



*Jamaa al Fna square in Marrakech, site of souks
and entertainers presenting a unique show
that has been running daily for centuries
Courtesy Richard Rosenman*



*Water merchants
at Jamaa al Fna pose
for tips from tourists
and sell sips to the thirsty.
Courtesy Sally Ann Baynard*



*Shoppers at a souk in Tangier
Courtesy Government of Morocco*

government-controlled items, such as sugar, which as a staple was often cornered by speculators. Food hoarding by shopkeepers and professional speculators has become a national problem, particularly during Ramadan. Government sanctions against speculation seemed to be of little avail, especially for persons with connections high in the government.

Manufacturers of domestic products generally omitted middlemen and distributed their wares directly to wholesalers and retailers to keep prices as competitive as possible. For some items, such as construction materials, manufacturers sold only to independent wholesalers, who in turn sold to retailers or directly to consumers. Wholesalers paid cash to manufacturers and then financed their sales to retailers and consumers. Some wholesalers and manufacturers did not have their own means of transportation and relied on outside truckers. Paradoxically, many retailers had their own trucks and often engaged in distribution for wholesalers

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and manufacturers in addition to their own retailing. Farm-fresh vegetables were either sold by farmers directly from their fields to consumers or to merchants. Some farmers who had their own means of transportation brought their produce to markets or to packing plants if the item was of export quality. Produce offered to the export packing plants had to meet certain government-set standards. Middlemen who purchased from farmers at rural markets could sell in urban markets or to the packing plants.

There was some reporting of local market prices by the media, but the local trades people relied mainly on an informal intelligence network. Wholesale businesses, like farmers, checked prices and quantities in different markets daily. The distribution of goods throughout the country and the collection of information on prices and quality seemed to work efficiently, inasmuch as there were small disparities in quality and price, certainly of agricultural products.

There were a number of public and private warehouses where goods could be stored. Public warehouses generally were managed by a municipality or a chamber of commerce and were bonded by the Ministry of Finance and guarded by custom agents. Advertising was prevalent, and several modern agencies provided all the necessary services. Newspapers were the major medium for advertisements, but street posters, films, and television were also used. Urban posters were common, but highway posters were prohibited, as was radio advertising.

Foreign Trade

The composition of foreign trade has varied somewhat throughout the years. From its role as an exporter of cereals in the late 1960s, Morocco has become a cereal importer. The major export product of the mid-1980s was phosphate and had been since the early 1970s, although its share of exports had been falling because of declining world demand. Citrus fruits have been the second largest export item, but phosphate derivatives—particularly fertilizers—were of growing importance. Phosphoric acid exports in 1983 were twice as large in terms of value as were citrus fruits. Textiles were another dynamic export item. The World Bank believed that textiles, agro-industrial products, clothing, and fertilizers offered the best export prospects.

Total exports in the mid-1980s have increased considerably. The value of those exports in 1983 was DH14.7 million, whereas the average per year in the late 1970s had been DH6.3 million. Phosphate remained the most important export item, although

citrus fruits and fertilizers had gradually contributed larger shares to total exports. The total value of imports had also risen significantly, from DH10.4 million in 1975 to DH25.6 million in 1983. Moroccan imports were composed, to a large extent, of oil, petrochemicals and, increasingly, wheat. The rising cost of energy and the persistent drought were primarily responsible for the continuing trade deficit (see table 9, Appendix A).

Morocco's most important partners in trade have traditionally been the EEC members; France alone has accounted for almost one-quarter of the total. Of all Moroccan exports France bought 23 percent in 1983, West Germany purchased 7.7 percent, Spain received 7.1 percent, and 6.1 percent went to Italy. Other major customers were India (5.6 percent of the total) and Britain, which along with India has relied heavily on Morocco for phosphate. Morocco imported mainly from France, which provided 20 percent of all goods imported by Morocco in 1983. Saudi Arabia was the next largest supplier, having a 14.3-percent share of imports—mainly oil. The United States has gradually replaced France as a major supplier of wheat, and it was the third largest supplier of Morocco's imports in 1983. The Soviet Union was also an important source of Moroccan imports, having a 5.5-percent share of the total (see Communist Countries, ch. 4; table 10, Appendix A).

The first agreement with the EEC was reached in 1968 and came into effect in 1969. It allowed most of Morocco's exports preferential tariffs and quota treatment in return for Moroccan relaxation of tariffs on imports from the EEC; it also guaranteed a certain import level of items traditionally obtained from member countries. The agreement did not show any immediately favorable results in regard to an increase in volume of trade, and Morocco pressed for a new agreement of association. Opposition from Italy in 1975, however, prevented the treaty from being signed. Italy objected to certain aid and tariff concessions that it felt would hurt the earnings of farmers in southern Italy. Morocco also desired a separate treaty with France apart from the EEC, which the community was reluctant to grant because it was believed that the two countries would accord each other better tariff concessions. Finally, in 1976 an agreement was worked out between Morocco and the EEC under which the latter would drop most trade restrictions on Moroccan exports and would also help finance Moroccan industrial development. However, in 1977 the EEC imposed restrictions on the importation of Moroccan textiles, olive oil, citrus fruits, wine, and refined petroleum products, and the Moroccan government publicly

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raised doubts as to the EEC's desire to maintain balanced economic relations with the North Africa country. In late 1977 Morocco retaliated by suspending textile imports from the EEC.


Moroccans have been extremely concerned about the forthcoming EEC enlargement. It was suggested that the EEC market would not need to export from Morocco after the entry of Spain and Portugal. Producers of fresh fruit, fresh vegetables, and olive oil would be particularly affected. Spanish competition already has caused a decline in Morocco's canned fish exports of about 11,300 tons in 1982 from the 1974 figure, and exports of Moroccan oranges fell from 400,000 tons a year in 1970 to 350,000 in 1980. Meanwhile, the volume of Spain's orange exports to the EEC increased from 120,000 tons in 1970 to 1 million tons in 1980.

As a result of government efforts to diversify its sources of foreign trade, commerce with the United States, Eastern Europe, and Asian countries has increased. Morocco has entered into trade agreements with numerous countries, setting forth the parameters of long-term trade and aid. In 1978 an important trade agreement was signed with Moscow in which Morocco was to supply phosphate and phosphate derivatives to the Soviet Union for 30 years and the quantity of exports was to reach 10 million tons a year in return for Soviet development of the Meskala mine. A second trade agreement was reached in October 1984 concerning both petrochemicals and citrus fruits. The agreement was to run until 1990, at which time trade exchange between the two countries should have reached DH20 billion. The Soviet Union thus has been replacing EEC countries as the major customer for Morocco's citrus fruits.

In the mid-1980s Morocco was offering trade financing for its exports to certain Third World countries. Such a loan—valued at US\$20 million—has already been granted Iraq. At the same time, Morocco has secured credit agreements for imports from the United States, Japan, and France. In addition, it was trying to improve its trade deficit with the Persian Gulf countries; a Moroccan trade delegation visited that region in January 1984.

Trade with neighboring Algeria was limited (if compared with its potential), basically for political reasons. At one time Algeria had been a major supplier of crude oil, and Morocco could offer a large amount of the US\$1 billion worth of fish and agricultural products Algeria bought from Europe each year.

Trade agreements with Libya were reached in January 1984 after the so-called unification negotiations between Hassan and Qadhaafi were announced. Moroccan goods sold in Libya during the first four months of the year had a total value of DH120 million.



*Beachfront hotel at Al Hoceima,
one of many tourist facilities
Courtesy Government of Morocco*

Exports to Libya were made up to a large extent of textiles and leather goods. In an effort to encourage trade among the two countries, the Moroccan Center for the Promotion of Exports has offered domestic companies a detailed study of the Libyan market. On the import side, Morocco expected concessions on purchases of Libyan oil and agricultural machinery.

Some items could be imported freely, but the state was the only exporter. Imports, however, were regulated by the government, and commodities were classified according to three lists, labeled A, B, and C. List-A goods could be imported freely and included wheat, sugar, tea, and fertilizers, all of which were imported by government agencies. Imports of List-B goods were restricted by quotas and were subject to duties that ranged from 30 to 400 percent ad valorem. The importing of List-C goods was

prohibited. Various government agencies supervised the exporting of goods produced in the country. The Office of Marketing and Export (Office de Commercialisation et d'Exportation) was responsible for fruits, vegetables, canned goods, raw cotton, cotton by-products, and wine. Phosphate exports were managed by the Sharifian Office of Phosphates. Other state marketing monopolies and their areas of responsibility included the Inter-Professional Sharifian Office of Cereals (Office Chérifien Inter-Prof des Céréales) for wheat and barley, the National Office of Tea and Sugar (Office National du Thé et du Sucre), the COMAHA, the Tobacco Authority, and the National Association of Petroleum Products (Société Nationale des Produits Pétroliers).

Tourism

Tourism has long been an important source of foreign exchange for Morocco. Until phosphate prices were tripled in 1973, tourism brought in more foreign exchange than any export. A decade later it was the third foreign exchange earner after phosphates and remittances. In 1983 tourism brought in about DH2.9 billion. The expansion of tourism was attributed both to natural factors and to conscious efforts by the government and the private sector to increase and expand needed services and facilities. The country's location makes it accessible to Western Europe by air, sea, and land: two-thirds of all tourists arrive by automobile via ferries. In addition, Morocco is endowed with such natural assets as a favorable climate, historic sites, some 2,800 kilometers of white beaches along the Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts, and scenic mountains and countryside. The diversity in weather conditions in the different parts of the country, coupled with the moderate year-round climate in the lowlands, has made seasonal variations in tourist traffic less pronounced than in many other tourist countries.

In the early 1980s the tourism industry in Morocco was still underdeveloped when compared with other Mediterranean countries, such as Algeria, Spain, or Greece, and it attracted only 2 percent of the Mediterranean tourist traffic. Employment in the tourism industry in 1982 provided employment for about 120,000 Moroccans plus an unknown number associated with tourism-related activities, such as construction, handicrafts, amusements, and transportation.

The government encouraged investment in tourism where complete foreign ownership was allowed, where foreigners were guaranteed repatriation of capital and profits, and where tax

exemptions could be obtained for as long as 10 years. The Construction and Hotel Credit Organization (Crédit Immobilier et Hôtelier—CIH), a state bank, also offered low-interest financing for long-term projects. The CIH was permitted to grant loans of up to 85 percent of the cost of hotel-building or renovation and 70 percent of the value of furnishings and materials. The government also operated several training schools for middle- and lower-level hotel personnel.

Most tourists come from Western Europe; the total number in 1983 was about 1.3 million, of which 370,000 were from France, Spain, Britain, West Germany, and the United States were the other major sources of visitors. The French government in 1984 relaxed financial restrictions on French nationals traveling abroad, and this action, coupled with various investment projects, was expected to increase tourism in Morocco by about 20 percent by 1986.

* * *

Readers who have a continuing interest in Moroccan economic matters might wish to consult *Morocco: Economic and Social Development Report*, published by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in 1981. The statistical information is somewhat dated, but the study gives an encompassing review and analysis of the Moroccan economy. For detailed analysis of particular sectors of the economy, the publications of various United States government agencies, such as the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Labor, the Department of Commerce, and the Department of the Interior and its Bureau of Mines, are helpful. For readers interested in investment in Morocco, recent information on pertinent laws can be found in the IMF's *Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions* and the Price Waterhouse publication, *Doing Business in Morocco*. The Banque Marocaine du Commerce Extérieur's *Monthly Information Review* is a very reliable source of up-to-date detailed statistical data on national accounts, particularly foreign trade. The *Quarterly Economic Review: Morocco*, published by the Economist Intelligence Unit, provides current quantitative and qualitative analyses of the Moroccan economy. For discussions of current problems, the reader might wish to consult recent issues of such periodicals as *Africa Research Bulletin*,

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Marchés tropicaux et méditerranéens, *Middle East Economic Digest*, and Francis Giles' articles in the *Financial Times*. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

Chapter 4. Government and Politics



Official seal of the Kingdom of Morocco

MOROCCO HAS EXPERIENCED recurrent turbulence in its political life since the demise of the French protectorate in 1956. It has demonstrated, nonetheless, an underlying equilibrium that is owed in large part to the continuity of the throne and the strong personality of the constitutional monarch, King Hassan II. Historically fragmented and factionalized, the society since independence has been threatened by rural rebellion, military coups, border clashes with neighboring states, militancy by leftist students, and popular uprisings generated by economic grievances. Three constitutions have been promulgated, parliaments have been suspended, and political movements have been repressed. Through all of these events the king—the traditional, religious, and legal ruler—has succeeded in perpetuating his authority, keeping under control the forces straining the existing social order.

In 1977 the king brought to an end a period of rule by royal decree, invoking a new constitution that assigned lawmaking powers to a unicameral body, most of whose members were directly elected by universal suffrage. In elections that followed, royalists won a large majority in the new chamber, leaving Hassan and his handpicked cabinet free to govern the country with little more than nominal involvement of the legislature. Under the king's guidance political parties continued to proliferate, producing a divided and weakly organized opposition to his control. When dissent did break into the open in 1981, it was in the form of urban protests against economic hardships and against the flaunting of wealth by the privileged classes of society. Efforts by legally constituted opposition parties—the socialists and communists—to identify themselves with the demonstrators subjected them to arrests and suppression.

Although the legislature was initially elected for a four-year term, its life was extended by the king's direction, and a new one was not convened until another election was held seven years later, in 1984. By this time the socialists had made their peace with the king and were among the more successful of the 12 parties that nominated candidates. The king intended to assemble a broad coalition in the new cabinet formed after the September 1984 election, but the socialists and the Istiqlal party remained aloof. As a consequence, the cabinet consisted of a majority of nonparty figures long identified with the king. A smaller number of portfolios were distributed among three

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royalist parties. This could portend a more partisan political climate in which the socialists and the Istiqlal would collaborate in prudent opposition to the king's domestic policies.

Successive governments had shown little inclination to move seriously against unemployment, bureaucratic inertia, corruption, inequalities of wealth, and favoritism. As a result, no recognized institution was at hand capable of acting on the people's discontent. Without other means to alleviate their grievances, the disaffected classes could turn to extremism of the left or subversive Muslim groups.

The campaign to realize Morocco's historical claims over the Western Sahara (the Spanish Sahara until 1976) had rallied the nation behind the king with a renewed sense of national purpose and commitment. The need to repel a stubborn insurgency among Saharawis (inhabitants of the Western Sahara) seeking recognition as a sovereign state had, however, become a costly military and financial burden to Morocco. Although Hassan had accepted in principle a referendum by the residents of the disputed territory, his reluctance to proceed with its implementation had alienated Morocco from friendly African states and prompted its withdrawal from the Organization of African Unity. This setback was offset by a secretly negotiated alliance with Libya, aimed at neutralizing Libya in the Western Sahara conflict and administering a counterthrust to Algeria, Morocco's rival for primacy in North Africa. Hassan's opportunism in linking up with his former adversary, the revolutionary Libyan leader Muammar al Qadhaafi, was, however, damaging to his reputation as a reliable and moderate partner of the Western nations and nearby African states.

The decision to concentrate the nation's military power and its diplomatic means on enforcing its sovereignty over the Western Sahara was taken personally by Hassan, as were all other major political decisions. His ability to combine traditional sources of authority and prestige as a religious leader with modern implements of power accounted for the resilience and durability of the monarchy. But the king could not rely on the popularity of his forceful stand on the Western Sahara to hold in check persistent domestic dissatisfactions. The promise of a more open and democratic system after 1977 had been fulfilled only to a limited degree. Further expansion of debate and greater responsiveness to popular feeling seemed essential if the prevailing system was to accommodate itself successfully to the demands for reform.

Constitutional Development

Morocco has had three constitutions since it achieved independence in 1956, although for long periods the king has ruled without being bound by a charter defining governmental powers. Each of the constitutions was prepared by constitutional advisers appointed by, and acting under, the direction of the king. The constitutions were legitimized in national referenda, which were passed by wide margins. No opportunity was, however, presented for public input or scrutiny.

In 1958 King Mohammed V issued a royal proclamation reiterating his previously expressed intention to establish a constitutional monarchy. His plan to retain legislative power was later amended to provide in the constitution for Moroccan citizens to have elected representatives. In the same year the king issued the Charter of Public Liberties, comprising three separate decrees defining and guaranteeing basic civil liberties, such as freedom of association and freedom of the press. A royally appointed constitutional council, composed mainly of members of the independence party, the Istiqlal, was given the task of preparing a constitution but was replaced by a smaller group of personal advisers by Hassan after the death of Mohammed V. The draft of the first constitution was submitted to a referendum in December 1962 and was approved by a 95-percent favorable vote, in spite of opposition from some parties and organized labor, which felt that the constitution should have been drafted by an elected assembly. It was brought into effect on December 14, 1962, upon promulgation by the monarch.

The legislature that was subsequently elected was so factionalized that the government was unable to gain passage of its program. Partly to end the stalemate, the king declared a "state of exception" or national emergency, suspending the constitution on June 7, 1965. A period of direct rule began that lasted until 1970.

The negligible showing of the opposition parties against the political "independents" who favored the king in the local elections of 1969 encouraged Hassan to introduce a new constitution in 1970. The Istiqlal, then Morocco's largest party, had shifted to the opposition and joined in a campaign against approval. Nevertheless, the opposition was denied access to the state-controlled radio and television, and the ensuing referendum recorded a favorable vote of nearly 99 percent for the new constitution.

After the coup attempt of July 1971 by elements of the

military, Hassan expressed his willingness to implement reforms. The opposition leaders insisted that any rapprochement be based on substitution of a more democratic constitution for the document that had just gone into effect. In February 1972 the king unexpectedly produced a new constitution, drafted in secret by his own advisers but incorporating some of the reforms demanded by the party leaders. After a referendum in which the affirmative vote was again virtually unanimous, the constitution was promulgated on March 10, 1972. It was not until 1977, however, that elections were conducted for the first legislature to sit under the terms of the third Constitution.

The three Moroccan constitutions have had certain basic features in common. For example, the kingdom is described as a democratic and social constitutional monarchy in which Islam is the established religion and Arabic the official language. Numerous civil liberties, including free movement within the kingdom, free expression and association, inviolability of the home, and secrecy of correspondence, are guaranteed. Men and women enjoy equal political rights; all citizens have equal rights to education and employment. Freedom of worship is guaranteed to all. Each of the three constitutions explicitly prohibited a one-party state.

The constitution of 1962 provided for a parliament composed of two bodies: the Chamber of Representatives and the Chamber of Counselors. The bicameral parliament was replaced by a unicameral legislature (the Chamber of Representatives) in the 1970 document. Two-thirds of its members were to be indirectly elected, and one-third were to be directly elected. This ratio was reversed by the 1972 Constitution, which specifies that two-thirds of the members are to be elected by direct universal suffrage.

Without curtailing the powers of the king in any material respect, the 1972 Constitution defines more precisely the functions of the king, his ministers, and the legislature. Certain conditions are imposed on the monarch's right to dissolve the Chamber of Representatives. The king's power to issue *zahirs* (royal decrees) is to be exercised only within specific limits prescribed by the Constitution. A new article enumerates the matters on which the Council of Ministers (or cabinet) must be informed by the king before they become matters of state policy. All three constitutions decreed that the cabinet was to have a dual responsibility to the king and to the Chamber of Representatives. The 1972 Constitution undertakes to reinforce the role of the cabinet, stating, for example, that it is to control the administrative elements and that the prime minister is to appear

before the chamber to outline the king's program in the economic, social, cultural, and foreign policy areas.

Amendment of the Constitution, which may be proposed by either the king or the Chamber of Representatives in a two-thirds vote, must be submitted for public referendum. The monarchical system and provisions relating to the Islamic religion may not be the subject of proposed constitutional amendments. In 1980 two amendments put forward by the king were overwhelmingly approved. One extended the term of office for deputies of the chamber from four to six years and set the term of the body's president at three years, instead of requiring annual election. The second amendment lowered the age of majority for the heir to the throne from 18 to 16 years and changed the composition of the Regency Council (see *The Monarchy*, this ch.).

Structure of Government

The king is Morocco's head of state; the prime minister, who is appointed by the king, is the head of government. The Council of Ministers, whose members are selected individually by the king, customarily includes representatives of several parties as well as persons without political affiliation but having experience or technical qualifications. The Chamber of Representatives, the unicameral legislature or parliament, is subordinate, having a narrowly defined role in budgetary review and approval of laws sponsored by the king and the prime minister. A hierarchical system of local government units is administered by centrally appointed officials, assisted by assemblies at the provincial and prefectural level and councils at the communal level. The minister of interior exercises final authority over local matters, although the king has made efforts to assign more responsibility to local bodies. The judicial system enjoys formal independence but is strongly influenced by the king, who appoints judges and presides over the supervisory Supreme Council of the Judiciary (see fig. 13).

The Monarchy

The Moroccan governmental system does not conform to political practices of Western monarchies in which a constitution functions to circumscribe the royal office, in most cases to such a degree that its powers are only nominal. In the Moroccan situation, the Constitution strongly reinforces the preponderant role of the




Figure 13. Government Organization, 1985

monarch as both the secular and the religious leader, declaring:

the king, Commander of the Faithful [*amir al muminin*], supreme representative of the nation, symbol of its unity, guarantor of the perpetuity and continuity of the state, shall ensure that Islam and the Constitution are respected. He shall protect the rights and freedoms of citizens, social groups, and communities. He shall guarantee the independence of the nation and the territorial integrity of the kingdom within its authentic boundaries.

At the same time, the Constitution establishes modern political institutions yet assigns to the king sufficient powers to ensure his control over the system these institutions form. The monarch appoints and dismisses the prime minister and other government ministers at will. He presides over all important government bodies, including the Council of Ministers, the Supreme Council for National Development and Planning, the



*The imperial palace in Rabat
Courtesy Maurice I. Middleberg*

Supreme Council of the Judiciary, and the Supreme Council for Education. The monarch also promulgates laws, grants pardons and amnesties, and is authorized to dissolve the legislature by *zahir* and to call new elections.

Although the king does not possess absolute veto power over legislation, he may return a bill to the parliament for a further reading, accompanied by his explanation. Unless the bill is then adopted or rejected by a two-thirds majority as a result of that reading, the king may decree that the issue is to be submitted to a popular referendum. Given the king's prestige, as well as his influence over the news media, there is little chance that legislation could be sustained or rejected against his will.

The Constitution vests in the king authority to make civil and military appointments, although he delegates this right in the case of lesser positions. He accredits ambassadors and signs and ratifies international treaties. Treaties committing state funds must, however, have the prior approval of the parliament. The king is commander in chief of the Royal Armed Forces. He has the power to declare war after informing the Chamber of Representatives.

The king's domination over the political system is ensured by Article 35 of the Constitution. Under this provision, should there be a threat to the integrity of national territory or events that might threaten the constitutional order, the king may proclaim a state of emergency after consulting the president of the Chamber of Representatives and addressing the nation. He is thereupon empowered to take whatever measures he deems necessary to

defend the country's territory and restore the functioning of constitutional institutions. Article 35 was invoked by Hassan between 1965 and 1970.

The Constitution also prescribes that succession to the throne shall pass directly to the eldest son of the deceased king unless, while still living, the king designates another son as his successor. Should the king not have a son, succession passes to his nearest collateral male relative and subsequently to that relative's eldest son. In earlier times when a sultan died, a new leader was selected by the leading body of Islamic scholars and elders, called the *ulama*. In 1957, however, Mohammed V broke this precedent by officially designating his son Mulay Hassan the crown prince. The 1970 and 1972 constitutions provided for a Regency Council to rule in the event the royal successor was younger than 18 years of age.

A 1980 amendment to the Constitution ordained that the king would come of age when he became 16 years old, and the Regency Council would assist him in a consultative capacity until he reached 20 years of age. The amendment also changed the composition of the council. Its chairman was to be the first president of the Supreme Court (previously the position was held by the king's nearest collateral male relative), and the other members were to consist of the president of the Chamber of Representatives, the chairman of the regional Islamic council of Rabat, and 10 others appointed by the king. In explaining the change, which had the effect of removing his brother, Prince Mulay Abdullah, from chairmanship of the Regency Council, the king said he wanted to strip the council of its personal and family ties, to render it more democratic, and to link it with other national institutions.

The heir to the throne, Crown Prince Sidi Mohammed, had recently passed his sixteenth birthday when the amendments were introduced. In 1985 he became 21 years of age; his brother, Mulay Rashid, was 14. Sidi Mohammed had begun to represent the monarchy at important functions, such as a conference of Moroccan Jews in 1984 and a meeting of a committee of African foreign ministers set up to deal with the Western Sahara at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in 1983. The crown prince had as yet given little evidence, however, that he had inherited the dynamism or political artfulness of his father.

The Executive

Referred to in the European tradition as the government, the Moroccan executive comprises the prime minister, ministers

of state, and ministers, who collectively form the Council of Ministers or cabinet. The government is responsible to the king, who appoints and dismisses ministers, usually drawing from a relatively small pool of experienced administrators and public figures. The government is also formally responsible to the parliament through votes of no confidence and censure motions. As a practical matter, it is the king rather than the parliament who dismisses governments. A total of 20 new governments had been formed in the 28 years between independence and 1984. Hassan also frequently shuffles ministers without changing whole governments. The ministries themselves are subject to frequent changes and reorganizations from one government to the next. The cabinet has tended to increase in size, from fewer than 20 members before 1965 to an average of about 30 since 1974.

The cabinet appointed in early 1985 consisted, in addition to the prime minister, of two ministers of state, 20 ministers, six minister delegates attached to the prime minister's office, and the secretary general of the government. Sixteen members, including the prime minister, did not have party affiliations (see table 11, Appendix A).

The government is charged with administration of national affairs and with executing the country's laws. The prime minister coordinates ministerial activity and has the power to introduce legislation, although he may do so only after consideration by the Council of Ministers. The 1972 Constitution also gives the prime minister regulatory power, or the authority to enact rules on matters not specifically within the purview of the legislature. In such cases a regulatory decree must be countersigned by the minister charged with its implementation. Regardless of where the power is formally lodged for initiating legislation or introducing regulations, it is exercised according to the king's wishes. The prime minister also countersigns royal decrees, with the exception of those pertaining to basic monarchical powers.

The 1972 Constitution sets out to strengthen the collective nature of the Council of Ministers by requiring that it be informed of all matters of state policy before action is taken. These are to include declarations of a state of siege or state of war, bills to be submitted to the parliament, regulatory decrees, decree-laws enacted between legislative sessions, decrees convening and closing legislative sessions, the national development plan, and changes in the Constitution.


The Legislature

The Chamber of Representatives plays a secondary role in the machinery of government. Its lawmaking powers are narrowly defined in the Constitution. These include criminal law and civil procedure, commercial obligations, nationalization or privatization of firms, the judicial code, and the civil service code. In the French tradition the chamber may also pass *lois cadres* (framework laws or general guidelines), but the details of these measures and all other subjects not specified as within the legislative competence fall within the government's administrative or regulatory authority. The members of the chamber, or deputies, have the right to introduce legislation; the government may, however, oppose any legislative initiative it regards as outside the chamber's domain. In the event of a disagreement, the issue is to be settled by a ruling of the constitutional chamber of the Supreme Court.

The Chamber of Representatives may authorize the government for a limited purpose and for a specified period to enact by decree measures that would ordinarily necessitate formal legislative actions. These must be subsequently ratified by the chamber when the time limit expires. Legislation adopted by the legislature may be amended by decree, subject to agreement by the constitutional chamber of the Supreme Court that the matters involved are subject to regulation. The budget must be presented to the legislature, but if it has not been approved by December 31, the government may by decree make funds available to keep public services operating and collect revenues on the basis of the proposed new rates. Amendments tabled by legislators may not have the effect of decreasing public resources or incurring added public expenditures. After the chamber has adopted the government's development plan, subsequent investment expenditures arising under the plan need not be presented to it.

The Chamber of Representatives meets twice annually, the first session beginning in October and the second session the next April. The chamber's president and other officers are elected among the membership for a three-year term; their selection is loosely based on the relative strengths of the various parties represented in the parliament. Parliamentary sessions lasting more than two months may be terminated by royal decree without dissolving the chamber. An extraordinary session for considering a specific agenda item may be convened by *zahir* or on the demand of an absolute majority of the chamber's membership.

The government is answerable to the parliament, and one



*Morocco's parliament building, home of the
Chamber of Representatives
Courtesy Maurice I. Middleberg*

meeting each week may be scheduled by the chamber secretariat for the questioning of ministers. Members of the government may attend sessions of the chamber and its commissions (committees). An individual may hold concurrent membership in both the government and the legislature. Deputies enjoy limited legal immunity during legislative sessions and recesses. Arrests based on the expression of political views or for votes cast are explicitly forbidden. Significant exceptions to legislative immunity apply to the expression of views that are deemed to challenge the monarchy or the Muslim faith or that undermine respect for the king.

The Constitution stipulates that two-thirds of the members of the legislature shall be elected by direct ballot and one-third by electoral colleges representing various groups in the society (see Elections, this ch.). The size of the chamber and the number of members to be elected by each college is fixed by law. The first parliament under the 1972 Constitution consisted of 264 representatives to which were later added three representatives from the Western Sahara. The parliament seated after the 1984 elections was increased in size to 306—204 directly elected seats

and 102 indirectly elected. Five of the directly elected seats were held by representatives of Moroccans living abroad, and a further five were allotted to the Western Sahara.

After the new chamber convened subsequent to the 1984 election, Ahmed Osman, a former prime minister and leader of the party having the largest representation, was elected president (speaker). Seven deputy presidents, representing all the main parties, were elected at the same time as were the chairmen of the commissions. Each commission's responsibilities ranged over several ministerial areas, e.g., the Commission for Information, Culture, and Islamic Affairs and the Commission for Finance, Planning, and Regional Development. Six parliamentary groups were announced, corresponding to the main political factions.

In spite of its formally defined role in the lawmaking and budgetary processes, the parliament had not established itself as an independent branch of government, owing to the restrictions on its constitutional authority and the dominating influence of the king. The fact that the king has been able to govern for long periods by *zahir* after dissolving the legislative body has further underscored the marginality of the chamber. Not surprisingly, one of its problems has been poor attendance. Reforms of procedural rules were expected to be introduced in order to curb unjustified absences from committee and plenary sessions.

Through interrogation of ministers in an effort to clarify government strategy, the deputies exercise some oversight over the executive. It is almost unknown for the parliament to reject government initiatives outright, although the process of extensive debate may influence its evolution.

Elections

The national electoral process is a complex matter involving several stages and resulting in a legislative body that, in addition to 204 members directly elected, includes 60 representatives elected by provincial and prefectural assemblies and 42 elected by four bodies representing professional and wage-earning groups. A plurality of votes in each constituency is sufficient for election. In the 1984 election most of the winning candidates secured a majority of the votes cast, although there were instances of deputies going to parliament with the backing of less than 30 percent of the voters in their districts.

The holding of local elections is an essential preliminary step. In June 1983 the voters chose 15,480 community councillors. Because the electoral process was interrupted for a

full year by the king, it was not until August 1984 that these councillors elected from among themselves 729 members of the provincial and prefectural assemblies. These assemblies in turn designated 60 of their members to sit in the future parliament.

Elections were also held for representatives to four bodies: the Chamber of Agriculture, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Chamber of Crafts, and one for salaried employees. These bodies later elected representatives from among their memberships according to the following allocation of seats: agriculture, 15; commerce and industry, 10; crafts, seven; and salaried employees, 10.

In the past there have been widespread reports of vote-rigging by the government to ensure a balance of political forces acceptable to it. Several of the major parties, including even those in the governing coalition, bitterly criticized irregularities in the conduct of the communal elections in 1983. Perhaps as a consequence of the outcry in 1983, fewer objections were heard in 1984. Nevertheless, an experienced observer, Alain Claisse of the National School of Public Administration in Rabat, has contended that the apportionment of seats has continued to be discreetly manipulated according to some predetermined objective, although a portion of the seats—perhaps one-quarter—have been left entirely to the voters' preference. Local officials have often been used to muster support for officially approved candidates. The authorities could also employ their powers to prevent parties from taking root in certain electoral districts or regions to discourage local fiefdoms or undesired rivals to historically strong parties.

The most striking feature of the 1984 election was the plurality won by the Constitutional Union (*Union Constitutionnelle*—UC), which had been created only 18 months earlier. The UC results, when combined with the other centrist parties, gave a healthy majority to parties considered unswervingly loyal to the throne. The steady decline of the *Istiqlal*, the preeminent party during the first decade after independence, continued, although its loss of seats was less marked than its drop in voting strength from 1 million to less than 700,000. The outcome for the socialist opposition party, the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (*Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires*—USFP), was ambiguous. Its voting strength also declined from 740,000 to 550,000 between 1977 and 1984, but it more than doubled its representation to 36 seats (see table 12, Appendix A).

An average of seven candidates contended for each seat in

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1984, two more than in 1977. Parties contesting a sufficient number of seats, including the Party of Progress and Socialism (Parti du Progrès et du Socialisme—PPS), were granted national radio and television time a few days before the election to explain their platforms. Judged by the standards of other countries of the Arab world, most of which do not have openly elected legislative bodies, the Moroccan chamber is democratically constituted and represents most of the political tendencies found in the country.

A total of 12 parties participated in the election of 1984, but five of these were of little consequence, nominating candidates in less than one-third of the 199 electoral constituencies. Eight parties succeeded in electing deputies to the new parliament, although two of these, the communist PPS and one other party of the left, were together represented by only three seats.

Local Government

The principal characteristic of subnational administration during the protectorate period was a highly centralized authority leading from the colonial resident general down to the district officers in the military and civil zones. A double structure of colonial administrators and Moroccan officials appointed by the Europeans descended in parallel lines, but in every case ultimate power resided with the colonial authorities (see Administration of the Protectorate, ch. 1). After independence the double structure disappeared, but the basic administrative system remained a hybrid combination of European procedures adapted to Moroccan institutions. The protectorate's loose system of rural administration gave way to increased central government supervision, the integration of Berber tribesmen into a national administrative system being of major importance.

The Constitution prescribes the local divisions of government consisting of provinces, prefectures, and communes, all with elective assemblies for managing their affairs. Other local government units may be created by law. The number of provinces—16 in 1960, along with the two prefectures of Casablanca and Rabat—had grown to 35 plus eight prefectures in the two cities by 1984. Four provincial administrations had also been organized in the Western Sahara. The steady increase in the number of provinces has brought public services closer to the people, created jobs, and improved internal security. The riots in 1981 induced the government to subdivide Casablanca into five prefectures, enabling it to keep a closer check on the inhabitants. In some cases, provincial boundaries have been changed to

conform to traditional communities of ethnic groups. Each province was divided into *cercles* (circles or districts), which in turn were divided into communes, the basic unit of local government. In 1971 another administrative subdivision—the region—was superimposed as a means of carrying out planning and development among groups of provinces. The local government structure has remained centralized under the overall supervision of the minister of interior, although the communes are vested with a degree of local autonomy in providing certain services and raising specified revenues.

Regions

The seven regions (South, Tensift, Center, Northwest, Center-North, East, and Center-South) are planning units rather than administrative entities. They act through consultative assemblies made up of the chairmen of the provincial assemblies; representatives of the chambers of agriculture, commerce and industry, and crafts; and five members elected by each provincial assembly from among its members. The consultative assembly is chaired by the provincial governors on an annual rotation basis; it meets at the seat of the home assembly of the current chairman. Some of the central ministries and agencies are also represented to help the regional delegates carry out their main function of preparing the investment proposals of the region for inclusion in the national plan.

Provinces and Prefectures

The provincial and prefectural governors are responsible to the minister of interior, who has delegated certain powers to them, including the supervision of communes in their domains. The governor has a considerable measure of autonomy stemming from the resources placed at his command for distribution to the communes and other public and private agencies. The governor coordinates the activities of central government ministries and state agencies operating within his province. The rapid expansion of their operations has made this task increasingly difficult. Under the governor, a secretary general is in charge of the provincial administration, composed of divisions of public safety, economic and social affairs, local authority finances, and personnel. Governors are generally senior administrators selected from within the ranks of the Ministry of Interior and do not have any personal links to the province.

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The members of the provincial and prefectural assemblies are elected by the commune councillors. The size of the assemblies ranges from 11 delegates for provinces or prefectures with populations below 300,000 up to a maximum of 31 members for those with populations of 2 to 3 million. In addition, the chambers of agriculture, commerce and industry, and crafts each elect one member. The assemblies meet each spring and fall for sessions not to exceed two weeks and three weeks, respectively. At the fall session the initial budget prepared by the governor is debated, followed in the spring session by review of the supplementary budget. The governor sits beside the assembly president and may speak at any time. Other matters on which the assembly may deliberate include provincial services, new construction, road maintenance, and regional development plans. Resolutions on these matters must be approved by the minister of interior within two months to be effective. Most revenues are in the form of subsidies from the central government, although the provinces and prefectures are empowered to raise additional funds by taxation.

Elections for the 729 seats in the provincial and prefectural assemblies held in August 1984 as a preliminary to the national election a month later resulted in a strong majority for the three parties supportive of the monarchy, along with 98 independents, most of whom were also regarded as royalists. The opposition socialist USFP secured only 41 seats, and the PPS none.

Communes

In 1982 there were 846 communes, 761 of which were in rural areas and 85 of which were urban. A dual system of authority was in effect—the popularly elected commune council on the one hand and the local executive official on the other representing the Ministry of Interior. The latter is known as a *qaid* in rural communes and a pasha in municipalities. Before independence the sultan directly appointed *qaid*s who had significant personal authority, including certain judicial powers. Their judicial authority has been rescinded, but the role of the *qaid* is still wide ranging and important, involving responsibility for conducting criminal investigations, for maintaining law and order, and for holding elections. Serving as an intermediary between the commune and the central government, the *qaid* can call upon the resources of local and regional agencies of the state.

In practice, *qaid*s are chosen by the governor and carry out his instructions. Their power comes in part from their authority to

issue building permits and licenses and to approve agricultural loans. *Qaids* and *pashas* also function as mediators in disputes over rents, property, divorce, and other matters for which the justice system is regarded as too remote, expensive, or time-consuming. As administrators of cities the *pashas* control relatively autonomous municipal service departments and public works, although major social services, including education, continue to be supervised by the central authorities. Above the *qaids* and *pashas* are the *chefs de cercle* (district chiefs), also known as *super qaids*. Below them are the *khalifas*, who oversee small subdivisions in urban areas; the *shaykhs*, in charge of tribal or clan factions; and the *muqaddams*, usually the headmen of small villages. The *muqaddams* and *shaykhs* are not full-time employees but receive allowances from the state and sometimes illegal payments to facilitate issuance of permits or for other services. The *muqaddams* are more specifically responsible for order and security. Supervising an average of 1,200 persons, they are generally acquainted with each family for the purpose of assessing land taxes. The *muqaddams* and *shaykhs* are often people with standing and prestige in the community who can be relied on to both articulate local interests before the *qaids* and report to them on developments in their areas.

The commune councils are elected for six-year terms by direct majority vote. The council meets at least four times a year with the *qaid* or *pasha* present. The communes are able to finance only about half of their operating expenses, the remainder coming as grants from the Ministry of Interior. Urban communes are in better condition than those in rural areas, being able to impose property and development taxes. The Local Community Development Fund is the main source of capital financing. The smaller Special Regional Development Fund finances small-scale infrastructure and services in the least developed regions.

Communes provide sewerage, street cleaning, and trash removal services as well as facilities, such as bus stations and markets. Utility services are provided by autonomous enterprises, known as *régies*, capable of covering their operating costs and most of their development needs through service fees. The *régies* are under administrative control of the Ministry of Interior.

More than 15,000 seats were at stake in the elections held in June 1983 for seats on the commune councils, which ranged in size from nine members in lightly populated areas up to 51 in Casablanca. Although nearly all major parties participated, nonparty candidates (most of them conservatives) were the most numerous, especially in rural areas where individuals enjoying

local prominence frequently found it more advantageous to avoid a party label. The Istiqlal showed the greatest strength with 18 percent of the total vote but was weak in the cities, winning control of the council only in Marrakech. The UC was successful in Casablanca, Rabat, Kenitra, and Tangier. Although the opposition USFP gathered only 6 percent of the total vote, it achieved majorities in the cities of Fès, Agadir, and Meknès.

The Legal System

Based on separate Islamic and Judaic legal systems and on Berber customary law, traditional Moroccan law was well established before the advent of the French protectorate. The Islamic sharia, the revealed law of God, focused primarily upon personal status and morality, succession, and land. The Code of Personal Status and Succession (1957), implemented soon after independence, codified law on these matters on the basis of Islamic principles.

In earlier times the sultan had traditionally granted Jews the right to maintain rabbinical courts whose decisions involving personal status and succession were based on Jewish law. Rabbinical courts no longer exist, but Jewish law has been preserved through the inclusion of rabbinical sections within various postindependence Moroccan courts that base judicial decisions on Jewish legal sources.

Although most Berber-speaking tribes converted to Islam, they attempted to maintain their own customs as the source of their law. Berber law was more secular in nature and varied significantly by tribe and region. After independence, Mohammed V replaced Berber courts with traditional Islamic judges, at the same time calling for local Berber customs to be respected when rendering judicial decisions.

During the 1912-56 protectorate period, the French both modified the existing Moroccan judicial systems and superimposed on them new laws and courts based on European traditions. In 1913 *zahirs* promulgated 10 legal codes drafted by the French to serve as the protectorate's basic laws. The codes included such major subjects as judicial organization, civil obligations and contracts, commercial law, and criminal procedure. In addition to the combination of colonial and traditional legal systems in the French zone, the Spanish zone and the international zone of Tangier enjoyed relative autonomy and developed their own legislative and judicial systems. After independence the Moroccans first extended the French legal system

to the Spanish and international zones and then began replacing parts of that system through new legislation. The 1962 Penal Code established the presumption of innocence, prohibited confinement for more than 48 hours without indictment, and guaranteed the right of the accused to legal counsel.

Judicial Hierarchy

After independence in 1956 the Moroccan government began a process of reform and modernization of its court system. Along with abolition of the Berber customary courts organized by the French, the foreign and traditional courts in the former Spanish zone and in Tangier were replaced. The *makhzan* (see Glossary) courts presided over in rural areas by *quids* and in cities by pashas were reorganized along French lines as courts of general jurisdiction, although the French courts continued to function. A hierarchy of local, regional, and appeals courts was introduced in 1965. At the lowest level were the *sadad* courts, divided into four sections: sharia, civil, commercial and administrative, and penal. These were courts of first instance for minor criminal and civil cases. Additional reforms and organizational changes in 1974 established communal and district courts to deal with minor offenses punishable by fines of less than DH1,000 (for value of the dirham—see Glossary). The courts cannot impose prison sentences. Their procedure is oral, relatively swift, and costs nothing. The judge is not trained in law, and his decisions may not be appealed. He is supposedly well versed in local custom.

More serious offenses and those not specifically assigned to other courts fall within the purview of 30 tribunals of first instance. All felony and misdemeanor charges punishable by prison terms of up to five years are tried in these tribunals.

Nine courts of appeal are located in the largest cities in various regions of the country. Decisions of the tribunals of first instance may be appealed to the correctional chamber of the courts of appeal. In addition to its appellate jurisdiction, each courts of appeal has a chamber of accusation. The chamber functions much like a grand jury, determining whether evidence is sufficient to try persons accused of criminal offenses, which are defined as acts punishable by more than five years' imprisonment or the death penalty. Each court of appeal had a contiguous criminal court for trying these cases.

The Supreme Court sits in Rabat and is composed of five chambers: criminal, civil, administrative, social, and

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constitutional. The constitutional chamber is empowered to resolve disputes between the government and the parliament regarding the constitutionality of legislation. Its other powers include the right to adjudicate charges of irregularity in parliamentary elections, verify referendum results, and approve all organic laws before their promulgation. Three of the six members of the constitutional chamber are nominated by *zahir*, and three are chosen by the president of the Chamber of Representatives after consultation with the deputies.

The other chambers of the Supreme Court function primarily in a review capacity. There is no appeal to the Supreme Court against judgments of the courts of appeal, but the accused may apply for abrogation (*cassation*) of the verdict on the grounds of improper procedure or improper application of the law. The Supreme Court may also review and nullify actions of administrators who have abused their public powers. The court has consistently ruled that it cannot review actions of the king inasmuch as in his role of commander of the faithful he is not merely an administrative authority.

The 1972 Constitution provides for the High Court, sometimes referred to as the High Court of Justice or the Special Court. Its function is to try members of the government for crimes committed in the exercise of their authority after charges have been brought by a two-thirds vote of the full Chamber of Representatives. The Special Court of Justice was established to try crimes by civil servants and judges faced with accusations of corruption or malfeasance.

Social courts were established in 1972 alongside *sadad* courts to replace 12 previously existing labor courts and have similar jurisdiction, notably over labor contract disputes, social security matters, and claims arising from industrial accidents and illnesses. Social courts attempt to resolve disputes by conciliation, but when decisions are rendered, they may be appealed to the appropriate regional court. Military courts are competent to try individuals accused of offenses against the external security of the state and to try military personnel both for offenses under the Penal Code and for specifically military offenses. Large numbers of army and air force officers were tried before military courts in 1972 and 1973 for complicity in coup attempts against King Hassan.

According to Moroccan data, the tribunals of first instance were by far the most active of the various judicial bodies. Over 600,000 cases were presented to them in 1983; comparable figures for the local courts for minor offenses were 110,000 and for the

courts of appeal and their associated chambers, 114,000. About 15,000 cases were submitted to the Supreme Court, but fewer than 10,000 cases were adjudicated in that year.

The king presides over the Supreme Council of the Judiciary, which advises him regarding the appointment of judges, and exercises general supervision over the judicial services. Other members of the council include the minister of justice as its vice president, the first president of the Supreme Court, and judges representing the other levels of the judiciary, all elected by their peers.

Civil and Human Rights

The rights of individuals set out in the Constitution guaranteeing freedoms of speech, assembly, and association, protection against search, and secrecy of correspondence have generally been observed. Moreover, the Constitution's mandate that arrest or imprisonment must take place in accordance with procedures prescribed by law has been widely complied with, although violations of legal norms have occurred in cases of persons accused of plotting against the king or inciting disorder. Views critical of the government are found in the press and are expressed openly by politicians. Statements or actions construed as attacking the monarchy or the Muslim faith are punishable under the Constitution. Such infractions usually result in a charge of "threatening the public order."

Based on the French model, the criminal court system permits a defendant the right to counsel of choice and to be informed of the charges. Even sensitive political cases have, with few exceptions, been tried in open court. International observers have been permitted to attend important political trials and to interview persons who have complained of mistreatment or false arrest.

Sporadic incidents of intrusions into private homes and arrests without warrants of political figures in their homes have occurred during periods of tension. Campus demonstrations and unrest led to a ban on the leading student association between 1972 and 1978. An independent organized labor movement has been in existence for many years. A general strike called by the socialist labor federation in 1981, which degenerated into rioting, resulted in the arrest and imprisonment of a number of the federation officials on charges of instigating the disorders, and the federation's offices were closed for a time. A communist party has been permitted to function, vigorously contesting the government's domestic policies. Leaders of the socialist USFP

were imprisoned for several months in 1981 on the grounds that their criticism of the government with respect to the Western Sahara amounted to an attack on the king.

A detailed examination of human rights practices in Morocco was conducted by an Amnesty International mission in 1981 to investigate reports of imprisonment for the expression of political beliefs, mistreatment during extended pretrial detentions, and disappearances of persons arrested by security personnel. The mission's report, published in 1982, found that Moroccan officials had not fulfilled their legal obligations and had arrested people without warrants, failed to notify families and lawyers of those arrested, and extended the preventive detention period for months and sometimes more than a year. The mission charged that judges failed to investigate claims by prisoners of ill-treatment during custody. The mission also contended that more than 100 individuals then in prison and many prisoners convicted in connection with the disorders of 1981 were in fact tried for nonviolently exercising their rights of expression and association. It also noted that at least 15 military prisoners convicted of involvement in the assassination attempts against the king in 1971 and 1972 had not been released after serving their sentences and that "appalling" conditions of imprisonment and lack of medical care had led to some deaths. The accusations in the Amnesty International report were fully related in the Moroccan press, which has freely discussed these and other charges of human rights violations. A number of political prisoners, including officials of the USFP and the socialist labor federation, were amnestied in May 1983 to take part in the elections planned for the following month. Amnesty International continued to express concern over the conditions under which other political prisoners were being held and the failure of the Moroccan government to respond directly to its charges.

Political Dynamics

The formal structure of government in Morocco—the institutions of the parliament, the Council of Ministers, and the parties ostensibly representing a multitude of social, political, economic, and ethnic interests—reveals little about the way policies are adopted and power is exercised. In spite of recurrent challenges emanating from various groups, the only meaningful political instrumentality since independence has remained the monarchy itself. Observers of political events in Morocco necessarily

concentrate their attention on the actions of the king, as he blends his constitutional, religious, and traditional roles in wielding his authority.

A governing elite serving under the umbrella of the king—royal advisers, members of the cabinet, senior ministry officials, and political party leaders—forms a homogeneous group largely descended from urban commercial Arab families. Many are progeny of activists in the nationalist movement before independence, often linked by business, marriage, or common educational experience. A class of rural elites, many of them Berbers, are prominent mainly at the level of local politics, their members frequently holding office as *qaid*s. These Berber families with rural roots have become increasingly active in national politics. A predominance of urban individuals having a modern liberal arts or legal education was substantiated in an analysis in the Casablanca monthly, *Lamalif*, of the national unity cabinet named in November 1983 by the king. Of 32 members of the government for whom data were available, 27 were born in metropolitan areas. With the exception of one graduate of the traditional Al Qayrawaniyin University in Fès, all had completed studies at the modern universities. The cabinet was not well balanced geographically, the central area of the country (Fès, Meknès, etc.) accounting for nearly half of the ministers. A further seven came from the heavily populated west, and only four from the south, three from the east, and one from the north.

Smaller circles of advisers have been created to assist the king in policy formulation. The National Defense Council formed in 1979 was intended as a more broadly based body embracing the heads of the opposition USFP and PPS as well in an effort to unite all political forces in prosecution of the war in the Western Sahara. The council soon became inactive although the king's later action of bringing the heads of political parties into the cabinet as ministers without portfolio served a similar symbolic purpose. The Royal Cabinet, composed of the most faithful subordinates of the king, was apparently disbanded after most of its members were given other appointments in 1978. Since independence, a principal adviser of the monarchy has been Ahmed Reda Guédira. Ahmed Bensouda, a veteran diplomat, was also known to be close to the king, as was Abdellatif Filali, who headed the foreign ministry in 1985. The minister of interior, Driss Basri, had been entrusted by the king with an increasingly powerful role in government. Former United States ambassador to Morocco Richard B. Parker has written that "Hassan is smarter than most people around him, but they have been picked more

for loyalty than for brains." Parker observed that the king's advisers have been unwilling to contradict him and, in any event, Hassan is intolerant of unsolicited advice.

The parliament has not been accorded a full share of responsibility in the conduct of government. The king has found it expedient to rule for extended periods without calling the legislature into session. The parliament elected in 1963 was disbanded by the king in 1965. When new elections were held in 1970, they were boycotted by the opposition parties. The legislature was dismissed again after the 1971 coup attempt. When new elections were organized in 1977 under the 1972 Constitution, it was widely anticipated that the king intended to introduce more vitality into the parliamentary system. By 1985 the legislature appeared to have become more firmly established and recognized as a body in which notables representing authentic forces in the political spectrum could address national issues and problems. But it had not gained real autonomy or a direct role in the shaping of government policies.

In some respects the practice of politics had been liberalized since 1977, although any form of opposition that presented a direct challenge to the king's authority was liable to suppression. A mutually beneficial patronage system among the social and economic elites reinforced their interest in preservation of the existing system. The king's role as the ultimate dispenser of privileges and high office was unquestionably a prime factor in maintaining his commanding position at the apex of the power structure.

King Hassan II

The sources of Hassan's prestige and power have been both traditional and contemporary. They were based traditionally on kinship (his leadership of the royal Alawite family) and that family's sharifian status; religion (his status as imam, or spiritual leader, and his position as commander of the faithful); and custom (the acceptance of his temporal authority). Hassan also enjoyed a legacy of his father, Mohammed V, whereby the monarchy became the unifying symbol of the nationalist movement. The successive constitutions reiterated the traditional sources of monarchical power and established contemporary sources, especially the king's patronage and appointment authority and his control over the organs of the bureaucracy, including elections, government contracts, and the police. It is, perhaps, the successful merger of both traditional and contemporary

King Hassan II
Courtesy
White House Photo/
Karl Schumacher



determinants of power and prestige that explains the resilience of Morocco's monarchy, a form of rule that had become anachronistic in most countries long before 1985.

A major source of support for the king has been the rural Berber tribes. The Berbers' royalist orientation has been pragmatic in nature. They support the king primarily as a counterweight to possible domination by the urban bourgeoisie, a counterweight whose need was evident in the early years after independence, when the Istiqlal controlled the government and challenged the king's primacy. Pragmatic support was not, however, to be confused with total devotion. Berbers staged the coup attempts against the king in 1971 and 1972. Their grievances were not particularly Berber in nature, but neither did the fact that they were usually members of royalist Berber tribes prevent the army officers from acting against the king (see Stress and Crisis, 1970-72, ch. 1).

The king's position is that of a supreme arbiter above the special interests of particular parties, groups, and factions. He controls the overall political system; rather than aggressively dominate, he orchestrates the participation in that system by the other political actors. He has deliberately encouraged a multiplicity of competing interests because to permit several

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interests to combine into a single force—even one that supports the crown—could create a base for eventual unified opposition. The king's talent for balancing sectarian interests and neutralizing organized opposition by alternating repression and liberalization has been widely recognized. His popularity had peaked after the success of the Green March in 1975, encouraging him to relinquish press censorship and re-launch parliamentary politics. His position later seemed less secure when, bogged down by the Western Sahara conflict, disorders broke out in 1981 over the economic hardships brought on in part by the war. He reacted by sternly suppressing the rioters and jailing opposition figures, whether they were involved or not. As Morocco's fortunes in the war improved in 1982 and 1983, the king ushered in a relaxation in the political climate, even to the extent of inducing the previously detained socialist leader, Abderrahim Bouabid, to join the cabinet.

Hassan nevertheless continued to regulate political life, removing the senior progovernment party from the cabinet and directing it to conduct itself as the official opposition. His prime minister, Maati Bouabid was then encouraged to create yet another new party loyal to the king, which was victorious in the ensuing elections of 1983 and 1984. Hassan, having already contrived to blunt the effectiveness of the socialists as a credible opposition, went even further by pressing them to lead the government coalition. This was rejected, although it was suspected that the socialists' improved electoral showing and the setback suffered by the Istiqlal provided further evidence of the king's ability to juggle party fortunes.

The king has been conscious of the extremes of wealth and poverty in Morocco, yet his personal commitment to overcoming these disparities has seemed less apparent than his determination to retain power. His policies have brought limited economic growth and social development and perhaps less flagrant corruption at higher levels. Nonetheless, a pervasive restiveness is found, particularly among those urban and educated elements that have not been beneficiaries of the economic system and have, by choice or circumstance, remained outside the accepted political structure. As economic grievances sharpen, these disaffected elements could provoke new outbreaks against the king's method of rule, with little regard for his historical, religious, or constitutional legitimacy.

Political Normalization, 1977-85

The contemporary era of Moroccan political life can be viewed as having been launched by the 1976-77 electoral process. Normal political activity had been suspended during the

"state of exception" proclaimed by the king between 1965 and 1970. An effort to revive parliamentary activity had failed because the two leading parties had boycotted the elections in protest against the 1970 constitution's failure to modify the king's powers. Hassan substituted another constitution in 1972 that had some liberalizing features but did not contain enough concessions to win the cooperation of the parties opposing him (see Royal Reform Program, ch. 1). Buoyed by improved domestic conditions and a wave of nationalism generated by the Western Sahara question, Hassan was finally successful in restoring the conventions of political life by holding communal and national elections in 1976 and 1977, respectively.

In the 264-member Chamber of Representatives that sat for the first time in the fall of 1977, independent candidates formed the largest single bloc, having won 45 percent of the total vote. The Istiqlal was the largest organized formation, with 49 seats, followed by the Popular Movement (Mouvement Populaire—MP), a party of rural Berbers. Hassan drew his cabinet from representatives of these three groupings, which were generally supportive of the monarchy. Opposition to the king was crystallized in the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires—USFP), in spite of the fact that it had won only 16 seats (see Parties and Politics, ch. 1). At the king's behest the independents were organized into the National Rally of Independents (Rassemblement National des Indépendants—RNI) in 1978 under Ahmed Osman, the prime minister and the king's brother-in-law. By 1981 the divisions and personal conflicts within the RNI had led to the defection of 61 of its 142 deputies to form what came to be known as the National Democratic Party (Parti National Démocratique—PND).

The process of limited democratization launched by Hassan in 1977 was interrupted by an outbreak of protests and strikes accompanied by rioting in June 1981. The immediate cause was the rise in prices of basic food commodities, averaging 30 percent. A serious balance of payments crisis had forced Morocco to turn to the International Monetary Fund (IMF—see Glossary) for a US\$1.2 billion loan. The IMF had insisted that, among other measures to correct its financial situation, the government should reduce food subsidies (see External Financing, ch. 3). The resulting jump in food prices evoked a call for a general strike by the Democratic Confederation of Labor (Confédération Démocratique du Travail—CDT), a labor federation affiliated with the USFP. The strike became the pretext for mobs from the bidonvilles encircling Casablanca to roam the streets attacking

symbols of wealth: banks, shops, and expensive cars. The government blamed both the CDT and the USFP for the violence. A large number of people, said to total 186 members of the party and the CDT, were arrested and sentenced to terms of up to three years, in spite of the fact that many had been in cities where no violence occurred. Both communist and socialist journals were banned, although the communist newspaper was permitted to resume publication after several weeks.

A few weeks later, the leader of the USFP, Abderrahim Bouabid, and two members of the party's political bureau were given one-year sentences on charges of disturbing the public order. The USFP had issued a declaration implicitly criticizing the king for accepting a proposal of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) for a referendum to decide the future of the Western Sahara. Tension between the king and the USFP had been mounting over the social and economic injustices that had ignited the 1981 riots and over the severe punishment meted out with little regard for evidence of direct incitement. The USFP formally withdrew its small parliamentary contingent in October 1981. The king then turned to the RNI, hitherto the main progovernment faction, to undertake the mission of an opposition party in the legislature. The purpose, said Hassan, was to replace a "bad opposition" (the socialist USFP), which had been against the monarchical system, with a constructive opposition that would demonstrate awareness of its responsibilities. Not surprisingly, the RNI's opposition role in the parliament was no more than pro forma. Subsequently, yet another party enjoying royal patronage—the UC—was formed by the prime minister, Maati Bouabid.

The year 1982 brought a respite from domestic political turmoil. Although the Western Saharan war was stalemated, the damaging guerrilla raids were successfully countered by a defensive barrier using electronic detection equipment provided by the United States (see *War in the Western Sahara*, ch. 5). All lawful political groups supported the king on the Western Sahara issue, binding the nation in a common enterprise. A partial reconciliation was effected between the king and the USFP. Abderrahim Bouabid and the two other detained party leaders were granted a royal pardon in February 1982, and the CDT and the USFP were allowed to reopen their offices. The socialists also returned to the parliament when it convened in October 1982. The king met with Bouabid in January 1983 to seek assurances that the USFP would participate in the pending communal and parliamentary elections, which the socialists made conditional on

the lifting of the ban on their press and the release of the remaining USFP and labor union detainees. With the exception of the secretary general of the CDT and the editor of the USFP newspaper, the other prisoners were released in May 1983, shortly in advance of the municipal elections. After violent clashes between USFP moderates and radicals, necessitating police intervention, the less militant majority under Bouabid decided to contest both the communal and the parliamentary elections.

In the communal voting preparatory to the parliamentary election, the largest number of seats was won by independents, an outcome ascribed to the irrelevance of partisan politics to local affairs and the popularity of local notables who lacked party affiliation. The new government party—the UC—won the largest number of council seats among the parties, followed by the Istiqlal and the RNI. The USFP managed to win only 6 percent of the seats overall but 16 percent in urban areas, mainly in Rabat, Fès, and Marrakech. It charged massive vote-rigging designed to prevent it from winning control of city councils. The government did not deny that irregularities and errors had occurred. The Istiqlal was also disappointed with the outcome and joined the USFP in protesting election irregularities.

The second parliamentary election under the 1972 Constitution, scheduled for 1981 but postponed as a consequence of the prolongation of deputies' terms from four to six years, was subject to a further one-year delay until 1984 by Hassan, purportedly to avoid interference with a referendum on the Western Sahara. The king subsequently formed a national coalition cabinet to govern in the absence of a parliament between 1983 and 1984. Headed by Mohamed Karim Lamrani, a veteran nonparty officeholder who had served twice before as prime minister, the cabinet included leaders of the six major parties—the UC, the Istiqlal, the RNI, the PND, the USFP, and the MP—as ministers of state without portfolio. The cabinet was to have the task of organizing the referendum on the future of the Western Sahara and preparing for the parliamentary election.

A further setback to the holding of the election occurred when a repetition on a smaller scale of the 1981 riots broke out in the northern cities of the Mediterranean coast. The king blamed a "multifaceted conspiracy perpetrated by Marxist-Leninists, Zionist agents, and Khomeinists" (followers of the Iranian Shia leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini). It was widely accepted, however, that the new outbreak was rooted in economic discontent, unemployment, fear of further rises in food and education costs, and anger over the ostentatious life-style of the

upper classes while general living standards continued to sink. Although Hassan had earlier warned that further food price increases were inevitable to meet the IMF's conditions, he sought to defuse inflamed public feeling by promising that no further rises in the price of staples would be permitted.

When the parliamentary elections were finally held on September 14, 1984, four centrist parties supporting the king (the UC, the RNI, the MP, and the PND) won an absolute majority of the 204 seats filled by direct election. The Istiqlal suffered a resounding setback, winning only 24 seats, compared with 45 seats seven years earlier. The USFP improved its standing from 16 to 35 seats between 1977 and 1984. When the results of the indirect balloting were included, the dominance of the centrist parties was even more pronounced, accounting for 215 of the 306 seats.

Political Parties

A distinctive feature of Moroccan party politics has been the preponderance of amorphous, shifting, and sometimes transitory political formations, ostensibly representing various interests but essentially conservative and royalist. These parties have ensured the king ample majorities for whatever initiatives he proposes. The parties to the left and center-left have had smaller followings but were more significant because of their frequently adversarial relationship to the king. Adroitly employing his powers, the king chooses freely among the parties in forming his governments, disciplining parties whose criticisms have exceeded ill-defined bounds and exploiting factionalism and political ambition to prevent a coalescence of forces that might be able to confront him successfully. The weakness of the parties was compounded by internal disunity, personal rivalries, and lack of organization. The great mass of Moroccans was generally apathetic about party politics, in part because of poverty and high illiteracy rates and in part because of the realization that national politics is a vocation limited to a privileged few.

Further enfeebled during the lengthy period from 1965 to 1970 and again from 1972 until 1977 when the king governed without a parliament, the party system was mildly invigorated by the reinstatement of parliament after the 1977 election. The monarchist parties and the independents supporting the throne have predominated in the cabinets assembled by the king. The Istiqlal was well represented in the post-1977 governments, in spite of its aloofness from many of the king's policies. In 1985, however, neither the Istiqlal nor the socialist USFP accepted the

king's terms for joining the cabinet coalition, presumably because of their reservations over his social policies and economic austerity program. The MP also remained outside the government reportedly because of dissatisfaction over the number of portfolios it was offered.

Constitutional Union

The Constitutional Union (Union Constitutionnelle—UC) was the newest major party, having been brought into being by the prime minister, Maati Bouabid, in March 1983. Calling itself "liberal with a social conscience," the party sought to trace a modern, center-progressive program. Bouabid said the party's objective was to attract voters not adequately represented by the traditional parties, especially the younger postindependence generation. Claiming to be pragmatic and nonideological, the party favored the interests of small and medium-sized enterprises in the private sector and reinforcement of the existing constitutional monarchy. It professed nonalignment in foreign affairs and balance between East and West. The UC's rapid emergence—winning more seats than any other party in the communal elections of 1983 only three months after it was formed and defeating all other parties in 1984 with 56 direct and 27 indirect parliamentary seats—was thought to have been possible only with official blessing.

National Rally of Independents

The National Rally of Independents (Rassemblement National des Indépendants—RNI) had been launched by Prime Minister Osman in 1978 under circumstances similar to those of the emergence of the UC five years later. It was formally constituted as a party in 1978 from the loose coalition of supporters of the king who, running as independent candidates, had formed the largest grouping in the 1977 parliament. Many of its members were from the corps of established elites having technical or professional qualifications, including high-ranking officeholders in the national government. A faction representing aristocratic rural landholders under Abdelamid Kassimi broke away in 1981 to form the PND after differences arose over the party's platform and Osman's leadership was found wanting. The program of the majority bloc was probusiness, antisocialist, and pro-Western in foreign policy. It favored rapid industrialization and modernization of the economy and encouragement of

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
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
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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
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Western capital by more liberal investment laws.

Osman was dismissed as prime minister in 1979, but six members of the RNI continued to hold cabinet portfolios until November 1981, when the party was asked by the king to become the official opposition. The reason for the reduced status of the party, in spite of its strong parliamentary stake, was not clearly evident but was believed to reflect differences that had developed between Hassan and Osman. The king was reportedly disappointed with his brother-in-law's efforts at welding the RNI into a cohesive and effective supporter of the monarchy.

Originally assuming the 141 seats controlled by the independents after the 1977 election, the RNI representation in the chamber was reduced to 84 in 1981 after the defection of Kassimi's faction and the by-elections held in that year. The RNI emerged from the 1984 parliamentary election as the second-ranking party with a total of 61 seats.

Popular Movement

The Popular Movement (Mouvement Populaire—MP), created in 1957, was a manifestation of rural and tribal resentment against the monopolization of government by the Arab- and urban-oriented Istiqlal during the late 1950s. It aimed for a direct relationship with the king as the best means of countering Istiqlal influence over the central government. Conservative in outlook, it was nonetheless a proponent of "Islamic socialism" dedicated to eliminating gross differences between rich and poor and establishing greater equality between social classes. The MP stood for the preservation of Berber culture and Berber traditional life. In urging improvement of conditions in the countryside, it backed efforts to encourage tribal farming cooperatives. Its loyalty to the king assured it a place in various governments. Before the 1984 election, it had 41 deputies in parliament and five cabinet positions. It improved its standing slightly in the election, gaining a total of 47 seats to become the third largest group in the legislature.

An offshoot of the MP, the Constitutional and Democratic Popular Movement (Mouvement Populaire Démocratique et Constitutionnel—MPDC) did poorly in the 1977 election, winning only three seats. Although it contested the 1984 election, the MPDC was unable to gain any representation.

The Istiqlal

The party that led Morocco to independence, the Istiqlal grew out of the nationalist movement of the 1930s and was formally organized in 1943. The Istiqlal's program during the first

decade of independence when it was the preeminent party included a high degree of nationalism and irredentism applied to the Spanish Sahara, the Spanish enclaves, and the border dispute with Algeria. Expounding its version of Islamic socialism, it adopted a program embracing some radical features, such as the redistribution of wealth, especially land, selected forms of state enterprise, and free medical care for all citizens. It advocated Arabization of education and strict adherence to Islamic principles, condemning foreign ideologies like Marxism but also rejecting many Western ideas as being imperialistic.

Although regarding itself as democratic socialist in orientation (it is a member of the Inter-African Socialist Organization), the Istiqlal has generally been led by individuals conservative in outlook. Traditionally it has been urban based, with strongholds in the cities of Fès and Meknès, and appealing to landowning interests, the middle class, teachers, and religious authorities.

Highly conscious of its former role in the independence struggle, the Istiqlal tends to treat other parties as lacking its legitimacy or permanence. One weakness has been that, in trying to satisfy a heterogeneous group of voters, it has couched its program in vague terms—economic, social, and cultural independence, reduction of social and regional disparities, and religious and moral values. The Istiqlal had been the main opposition party between 1963 and 1977 and was strongly represented in the cabinet even after 1977 when eight members held portfolios, including party leader Mohamed Boucetta, who was minister of foreign affairs. Nevertheless, its support seemed to be fading, notably in the urban areas where the USFP had been gaining strength.

Socialist Union of Popular Forces

As a result of a split in the Istiqlal in 1959, a breakaway faction, the National Union of Popular Forces (Union Nationale des Forces Populaires—UNFP) set itself up as a new party based on Marxist ideology. Differences over tactics and personalities caused the Rabat section to split off from the Casablanca branch and to form the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires—USFP) in 1974. The USFP's leaders regarded it as being in the tradition of the social democratic parties of Western Europe. It demanded land reform, control over rents, large-scale public housing, and the nationalization of the principal means of production. It adopted a firm stand on the Western Sahara, objecting to any form of negotiated withdrawal.

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The USFP appealed to urban intellectuals, youth, salaried employees, and lower-level government workers, giving it greater significance as a political movement than was evident from its relatively limited voting strength.

The USFP has been handicapped by divisions between its older moderate leadership, dedicated to gradual reform within the prevailing system, and a younger, radical wing, demanding confrontation with the monarchical establishment. The party has also been debilitated by government harassment arising from its role in the general strike of 1981 and internal discord over its reconciliation with Hassan. After the 1984 election it announced that it would continue in an opposition role but maintained that its differences with the government were confined to domestic issues, in particular its disagreement with the economic belt tightening to meet Morocco's commitments to the IMF. The USFP refrained from further criticism of the king's policy over the Western Sahara and declared that it supported unification with Libya.

The UNFP was no longer a viable political force, having been weakened by internal dissension and having boycotted the election of 1977 and the municipal and parliamentary elections of 1983-84. The country's largest labor federation, the Moroccan Labor Union (Union Marocaine du Travail—UMT), which had retained its alliance with the UNFP, secured five of the indirectly elected seats in the 1984 parliament.

National Democratic Party

The National Democratic Party (Parti National Démocratique—PND), a product of the split within the RNI in 1981, was a moderate royalist party with a distinctively agricultural outlook. It advocated state aid to encourage commercial agriculture and favored government subsidies to maintain low and stable food prices. It resisted more liberal investment laws that would encourage competing foreign agro-industry. Although it had previously been allotted five ministerial portfolios, the PND demonstrated little voter appeal in the 1984 election, slipping back to a marginal status with only 15 of the directly elected seats. It was awarded two portfolios in the 1985 cabinet.

Party of Progress and Socialism

The Party of Progress and Socialism (Parti du Progrès et du Socialisme—PPS) was the successor to the Moroccan Communist Party, which had been banned on several occasions, most

recently between 1969 and 1974. The PPS claimed a membership of 40,000 in 1983, but independent estimates of its following ranged from 1,500 to 4,000. In the 1984 election it increased its parliamentary standing from one to two seats and obtained a vote of about 50,000, amounting to 1 percent of the total returns. Most of its supporters were said to be students and teachers. Communists were also active in some unions affiliated with the UMT and were represented in the largest student organization.

At the third national congress of the party in 1983, Ali Yata, its longtime leader, was reelected secretary general. A program was adopted demanding nationalization of the main sectors of the economy, reform of the agricultural system, and freezing and control of prices. On major international issues the PPS has generally followed the Soviet line. It has openly and vigorously attacked government policies in the parliament, in local councils, and in its press organs. Except for brief periods when its newspaper was suppressed, the PPS has escaped repression by refraining from criticism of the monarchy and by firmly supporting the king on the Western Sahara. As a member of the National Security Council, Yata joined other party leaders on missions abroad to explain the country's position on the Western Sahara; Yata visited capitals in Eastern Europe.

Several clandestine fringe groups of Marxist-Leninist or Maoist inspiration had been only partially suppressed by arrests during the mid-1970s, allegedly for plotting to form a so-called Red Army and forcibly replace the monarchy with a socialist "people's democratic republic." They also advocated self-determination for the Saharawis and condemned Moroccan military operations there. One of these groups, *Ilal-Amam* (Forward), had split off from the PPS. Its leader, Abraham Serfaty, remained in jail, although others had been released. A companion organization, the 3 March Group, which had split off from the UNFP, had splintered into two factions in 1978-79, one joining the USFP and the other remaining outlawed because of its antigovernment position on the Western Sahara. A new leftist party, the Organization of People's Democratic Action (*Organisation de l'Action Démocratique Populaire*—OADP) was formed by Mohamed Bensaid, a political exile who took advantage of a royal amnesty to return to Morocco in 1981. The OADP was said to be composed mainly of former partisans of the 3 March Group. It did not nominate candidates in the 1983 communal elections, advising its followers to vote for the USFP or the PPS. Bensaid was the only OADP member to be elected to the parliament in 1984.

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Interest Groups

In his article "Morocco: Institutional Pluralism and Monarchical Dominance," political scientist Mark Tessler describes the political elites of Morocco in terms of a series of concentric circles. The monarchy is at the center. An inner core of somewhat over 200 individuals is composed of party and union leaders and senior ministry officials. A broader general elite of 600 to 700 individuals includes persons of rural origin who have achieved prominence at the national level, senior army officers, leaders of private associations and religious institutions, and others who are outside the formal political system. The outermost circle consists of the local and rural subelites—*qaid*s, pashas, shaykhs, local council leaders, party officials, and parliamentary deputies with only local influence—perhaps 5,000 Moroccans in all.

In addition to these elite groupings and to the formal party structures are various organizations that serve to articulate the political strivings of identifiable groups in the society. Channels for the expression of interests by these groups are not well defined. Those that have been most successful in influencing the political authorities have generally done so through the personal ties their senior members have established at higher political echelons. In some cases these members are themselves part of the governing elite. The business associations tend to be well connected to the leadership ranks, as is the largest labor federation. Student organizations and groups associated with the Islamic revival have been among the primary centers of dissent, denouncing the elite establishment, the social inequities, the *bureaucratic mismanagement*, and the materialism that they find in the existing order. The army, with its history of intervention and its more recent expansion to prosecute the war in the Western Sahara, remains in the background of civilian politics, latently powerful yet enigmatic.

Labor and Employer Organizations

The Moroccan Labor Union (Union Marocaine du Travail—UMT) was created in 1955 in close association with the Istiqlal. When the leftists abandoned the Istiqlal in 1959 to form the UNFP, the UMT became allied with the latter party. The Istiqlal subsequently formed a new labor confederation, the General Union of Moroccan Workers (Union Générale des Travailleurs Marocains—UGTM), to replace the UMT. In 1978 a third union organization, the Democratic Confederation of Labor (Confédération Démocratique du Travail—CDT) was established

under the auspices of the USFP.

The UMT was the largest of the three federations, enrolling over 60 percent of Morocco's 1 million organized workers, mainly from the industrial and commercial sectors. The UMT has been among the largest and strongest trade union bodies of the Middle East and North Africa; it represents Moroccan workers annually at the International Labour Organisation. The UGTM and its federations, representing teachers, hotel and restaurant employees, and railroad and municipal workers, upholds Istiqlal policies, stressing pro-Islamic and pro-Arab elements in its program. CDT affiliates include many public employee unions as well as phosphate miners and farm laborers.

The UMT has always been cautious regarding strike actions, especially a strike for political purposes. High unemployment and slender union resources, coupled with a government unsympathetic to extended strikes, have limited the bargaining power of the unions. The UMT and, to an even greater extent, the UGTM have concentrated on jobs, wages, and benefits, rarely intruding on broader political matters.

The CDT adopted a more militant approach than did its two predecessors. It has been willing to confront the government over broad social issues, embroiling itself in periodic conflict with the authorities. It was blamed for the riots and subsequent police repression that followed its call for a general strike to protest food price rises in June 1981. The government retaliated by detaining all members of the CDT central bureau and many other unionists. The CDT offices were closed down for a 10-month period. The king's rapprochement with the USFP was followed by amnesties for the imprisoned leaders of the CDT. The CDT was subsequently successful in regaining its standing as the second-ranking federation as a result of victories in plant delegate elections.

The unions were not involved in the 1984 demonstrations, fearing official retribution and reluctant to antagonize the king when national elections were pending. The trade union movement nonetheless retained a measure of independence and could find itself in contention with the government again if the austerity program imposed an unacceptable economic burden on working people.

Corresponding to the union federations have been a group of associations representing the interests of businessmen and manufacturers by communicating the concerns and objectives of employers to the political authorities. These bodies may be influential in particular areas of activity but are thought to have little effect on overall economic policies, in view of the centralized

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management of major sectors and foreign trade. Individuals connected with them, however, have held strategic official positions and often carry weight in the king's economic councils. The General Moroccan Economic Confederation is made up of member organizations representing various industrial and commercial interests. Chambers of commerce and industry in Moroccan cities are member bodies of the National Federation of Chambers of Commerce. Many operators of large- and medium-sized farms belong to the Moroccan Farmers' Association.

Students

Education is perhaps the most politicized and radicalized of the social sectors. Alienated by the manifestations of corruption and venality in political life and confronted by declining job prospects after graduation, students have been recruited to leftist causes, often rejecting the USFP and the PPS for illegal and more radical Marxist-Leninist groups. Since the early 1980s many students attracted by religious fundamentalists and disenchanted by the left, especially after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, have deserted the Marxist movements. The appeal of militant Muslim sects has been greatest among students of modest means and social background, often from the science and engineering faculties.

The concentration of students in Rabat and other centers of power has helped to dramatize their protests. Acting with a strong sense of idealism and less vulnerable to government coercion, the students are among the most politically sensitive forces in society because of their greater means to disrupt the normal course of government. Studies of student attitudes have revealed a cynicism about the possibility of influencing official behavior through legal channels. In the mid-1980s a very small percentage of students were members of political parties, and few acknowledged attending political rallies. Only half as many students troubled themselves to vote as did the general population.

The National Union of Moroccan Students (Union Nationale des Étudiants Marocains—UNEM) has been in the forefront of student activism since its formation by Mehdi Ben Barka in 1956. Although successful in mobilizing students on behalf of left-wing campaigns, the domination of the movement by radical factions beyond the fringes of national politics, coupled with the government's stern restraints, has prevented the UNEM from extending its influence.

As a result of discontent over social and educational conditions, university strikes became endemic in the period 1970-73, and extreme leftists gained control of the UNEM. The union was officially banned in 1973, and many of the student leaders were given long jail sentences. The government's harsh reaction provided the students with new grievances. Reforms were announced in 1976 to meet many of the demands of students and teachers. The Moroccanization of secondary schools by replacing foreign teachers (mainly French) was to be accelerated, teachers' wages and working conditions were to be upgraded, and the universities were to be democratized by giving them autonomy with respect to their management, curricula, and budgets. In 1978 the ban on the UNEM was lifted after the government took measures to ensure that it would be under the control of "responsible" members of the USFP and the PPS. Student unrest broke out again in early 1981 in protest against overcrowding, inadequate accommodations, and the low level of subsistence grants. The students also opposed government plans for selective enrollment, insisting that the *baccalauréat* (high school diploma) remain the sole qualification for university entrance.

As a result of determined efforts by the Marxist extremists, the far left swept the elections to union bodies on the main campuses. The internal struggle reached a climax at the UNEM's congress in September 1981, when the six USFP members on the UNEM executive commission withdrew, leaving two PPS members and three from outlawed leftist factions. After a strike in December that paralyzed the main campuses, three members of the executive commission and many other students were jailed.

Less militant and politicized student groups were associated with other political parties. Accordingly, the General Union of Moroccan Students aligned itself with the Istiqlal, the People's Movement of Moroccan Students with the MP, and the Democratic Union of Moroccan Students with the PND.

Women

Despite having the constitutional right to vote, Moroccan women in 1985 had yet to become an overt, distinct political force. Political parties and labor unions, however, usually had women's branches. The overall management of such women's political auxiliary groups was generally left to a male member of the parent body. Political activity by women has been encouraged by the king and other leaders, although the king continued to

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observe the traditional Muslim prohibition against allowing a man's wife to be seen in public. The minister of interior attributed the negligible role of women to "shyness" and rural tradition. Throughout society, however, the persistence of male and female subcultures meant that only the most exceptional women were ready to defy the traditions of their communities (see *The Individual, the Family, and the Sexes*, ch. 2).

Where Berber influences were strong, rural women have taken a somewhat more active political role than have their urban counterparts. No woman has ever held a cabinet position in Morocco, nor have there been any women in parliament. Sixteen women were unsuccessful candidates for the Chamber of Representatives in 1984; eight had run in 1977. A considerable increase in the number of female candidates for local office did occur in 1983. Some were elected to communal councils in 1976 and 1983 and to the Consultative Council on the Sahara in the Western Sahara in 1981.

The Jewish Community

The Jewish community in Morocco is some 2,000 years old. It has always enjoyed a special relationship with the royal dynasty. At the time of Moroccan independence a small group of Jewish activists who had worked with the Istiqlal encouraged Jews to join all parties and to participate in politics. For the most part, however, Jews preferred to remain in the background of politics. Jewish participation in patronage networks required a Muslim patron at some point; their highest patron was the sultan, later the king. Their loyalty to the king was cemented by their fears of any alternative situation without him. In 1984 a Jewish candidate of the UC party, Joseph Ohana, was elected to parliament. Ohana was the first Jewish deputy since Moroccan independence.

The size of the Jewish community declined from over 200,000 in 1948 to 11,000 to 14,000 in the mid-1980s. The decline resulted from emigration after the creation of the state of Israel and after such events as the Arab-Israeli wars and the 1971 coup attempt. In 1976 Jewish émigrés were officially invited to return. Although few Jews took advantage of the offer, the invitation did reassure the resident Jewish population.

Hassan's positive relationship with his country's Jewish community was underscored by his backing of a congress of the Jewish Communities Council in Morocco held in Rabat in 1984. Drawing Jews of Moroccan origin from all parts of the world, it was attended by 40 representatives of Moroccan Jewish settlers in

Israel, including 11 members of the Israeli parliament, the Knesset. Both the Moroccan prime minister and the crown prince participated in the event, and many private discussions were reportedly held about negotiating Arab-Israeli differences. Hassan's interest in the Jewish community and its expatriates in Israel, combined with his moderate stance on Arab-Israeli issues, has had significant ramifications for Morocco's foreign policy (see *Other Arab Countries*, this ch.).

The Armed Forces

Until 1971 the Royal Armed Forces (*Forces Armées Royales—FAR*), or, more specifically, the senior military officers, were the source of the monarchy's staunchest support. These officers, generally of wealthy, rural Berber families, could be unquestionably relied upon by the king. They were regarded as an important counterweight to the modern elites of the cities and the ambitions of the *Istiqlal*. The assumptions of political neutrality and unbounded loyalty to the king had to be cast aside, however, when the 1971 and 1972 coup attempts destroyed the special relationship between Hassan and the armed forces. Trials and purges eliminated the immediate problem for the king, although the many executions and the abasement of the army may have resulted in a permanent sense of alienation among officers innocent of complicity in plots against the king (see *Loyalty, Deceit, and Royal Control*, ch. 5).

The warfare in the Western Sahara has focused favorable national attention on the FAR. Benefits and pay supplements granted to enlisted personnel mitigated the boredom and harshness of the desert campaign. There was little evidence in 1985 that more senior officers were dissatisfied. A reversal of Morocco's military fortunes, or a draining away of the soldiers' morale if the struggle were not resolved over a protracted period, could bring a new upsurge of discontent. The death of Brigadier General Ahmed Dlimi, a pivotal army figure and a close confidant of the king, in an unusual traffic accident in early 1983 gave rise to suspicions that his death was somehow connected with a plot against the king, although corroboration of this never materialized.

Changes in the officer corps by the mid-1980s, including the elevation of younger officers of Arab and urban background to more senior ranks and the increasingly high educational requirements for advancement, made it even more difficult to predict the future behavior of the military establishment. As a powerful yet outwardly passive and apolitical institution, it was

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weighted on the side of the status quo and the preservation of a strong monarchy. Yet no one could be certain what events—whether arising from the security situation, economic distress, corruption and favoritism in political life, or from the king's foreign policy—might trigger an intervention that could totally disrupt civilian politics.

Islamic Groups

Although religious fundamentalism had become established in Morocco, it did not appear to be sufficiently widespread or unified in early 1985 to present an urgent threat to the regime. Orthodox Islam is closely linked to the civil government and to the monarchy. The king enjoys legitimacy as a direct descendant of the Prophet Muhammad. He conducts himself as an active Muslim, participating in religious ceremonies throughout the country. He is president of the High Council of Ulama and appoints both its members and those of the regional councils that are convened at his request. The ulama, many of whom are employed in publicly supported institutions, form part of a religious establishment at the national and local level that is directed from the Ministry of Religious Endowments and Islamic Affairs. The council's purpose is to preserve the purity of dogma, although the orthodoxy of Friday sermons is controlled by ministry officials. The fact that Moroccans adhere to the mainstream Sunni branch of Islam rather than the Shia form dominant in Iran is regarded as further protection against the radicalism preached by the followers of Khomeini.

The Islamic fundamentalism movement is represented by more than 20 associations of both political and nonpolitical character but having in common their insistence on a return to Muslim orthodoxy, sharia law, and Islamic institutions as the basis of the state. They reject Western material values and denounce the economic disparities of Moroccan society. Their collaboration with similar movements elsewhere in the Arab world is limited, but views of well-known militants are widely disseminated through the circulation of cassettes containing recorded sermons. A prominent Islamic scholar, Adessalam Yacine, was given a two-year prison sentence in 1984 for publishing views interpreted by the government as calling for an Islamic revolution. Yacine's journal, *Al Jamaa*, had appeared intermittently since 1979, but its circulation was reported to be only 3,000.

Fundamentalism has established a foothold among high school and university students and has been embraced by many

educators. Rising economic and political discontent has nourished the movement. It was reported in 1982 that several of the more extreme organizations were secretly undergoing physical training in preparation for eventual confrontation with the authorities. As part of a campaign to counteract the growth of fundamentalism, the king and his government spokesmen have counseled the public against extremist philosophies and have admonished religious scholars against departure from orthodoxy.

In an analysis of a survey of 400 Moroccan university students, Henry Munson, Jr., an anthropologist at the University of Maine, concluded that at least 30 percent of all students were sympathetic to many of the basic themes of the militant Islamic movement, even though a much smaller percentage was probably actively engaged on a regular basis. Most of these were from middle class backgrounds, with an admixture of some from aristocratic families. The less educated segments of society were exposed to the teachings of fundamentalist popular preachers to some degree, but the latter tended to interpret Islam in a more traditional manner than the militants and avoided questioning the king's role. Acknowledging the existing political impotence of the fundamentalist movement, Munson nevertheless cautions against underestimating the force of its message condemning the Moroccan elite for its exploitation of the poor and its willingness to subordinate Morocco to Western economic and cultural influence.

Politics and the Media

By the standards of the Arab world, the Moroccan press has considerable variety and freedom. More than 10 daily newspapers appear in French and in Arabic, about half of them supporting the government and the others able to express critical attitudes toward official policies without being subjected to retribution. Circulations are limited, however, to the educated strata of the major cities. Radio and television broadcasts reach much larger audiences. The government operates the electronic media, which is oriented toward presenting a positive and optimistic view of the national administration and the monarchy.

Newspapers

Most major parties have at least one official publication (see table 13, Appendix A). The costs of publication are subsidized by the sponsoring parties or by the government itself in the case of

newspapers giving it their support. Because commercial considerations are secondary to giving expression to various political and ideological viewpoints, little effort is made to enliven the content or to popularize news treatment. For more comprehensive coverage of international news, many educated Moroccans turn to *Le Monde* of Paris or the Saudi-backed *Al Sharq al Awsat* published in London. Foreign newspapers and periodicals are imported freely, although individual issues are seized from time to time. Moroccan publishers have strongly opposed the plans of some French and Arab publishers to turn to facsimile printing in Morocco. Because the market for newspapers is small—it is estimated that fewer than one of every 10 Moroccans purchases a newspaper even occasionally—it has been feared that greater competition from foreign journals would have undesirable political, economic, and cultural consequences. Ownership of publishing enterprises within the country is restricted by law to Moroccan nationals.

Free expression has been seen as something of a safety valve by the authorities. There have been, however, significant limits on the latitude of the press, which officials were not hesitant to invoke if they felt that the language used posed a threat to public order. Self-censorship on issues known to be sensitive has also been common.

Freedom of expression was proclaimed in Mohammed V's 1958 Charter of Public Liberties. However, a press code formulated at the same time and later strengthened permits strict government control. The minister of interior can seize any newspaper or periodical that he perceives to endanger social stability. Criticism of Islam, the monarchical system, the king, or Morocco's claims to sovereignty over the Western Sahara is not permitted.

Continuous censorship was imposed on the opposition press after the dissolution of the parliament in 1971 until it was lifted in 1977 as part of the democratization process leading to parliamentary elections in that year. During this time, the Istiqlal's influential French-language daily, *L'Opinion*, seemed to run afoul of censorship most frequently. The foreign press was also subjected to regulation, and *Le Monde* was often impounded. After the disorders of June 1981, the newspapers of the socialist USFP, the daily *Al Moharrir* and the weekly *Liberation*, were suspended on grounds of inciting violence, and the chief editor of *Al Moharrir* was imprisoned. The two newspapers of the communist PPS were also banned but were permitted to resume publication within a month. The communist press has been the most outspoken in exposing official shortcomings and injustice

and in demanding an end to repressive measures. It was permitted to cover the trial and sentencing of USFP leaders.

In 1983 a new USFP daily, *Al Ittihad al Ichtiraki*, replaced *Al Moharrir*. The newly formed government party, the UC, also began publication of its own Arabic daily, *Rissalat al Oumma*, and a French weekly, *Le Message de la Nation*.

Radio and Television

In the mid-1980s radiobroadcasts emanated from 14 transmission centers over three networks: A—Arabic; B—French, Spanish, and English; and C—Berber dialects. Transmissions originating in Rabat totaled 61 hours a day as of late 1982. Of these, 24 were in Arabic, 19 in French, 12 in Berber, three in Spanish, and three in English. Independent programming for two or three hours daily was provided by provincial stations. Broadcasting of both radio and television is controlled by Radio-Diffusion Télévision Marocaine (RTM), an agency of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cooperation, and Information. A private network, MEDI-1 (Radio Méditerranée Internationale), was established in 1980 under agreement between the Moroccan government and a French organization. Its headquarters was in Tangier, and its most powerful transmitter was in Nador on the Mediterranean coast; others were shared with RTM in Rabat, Casablanca, Tangier, and Marrakech. The MEDI-1 broadcasts, over 100 hours weekly in both French and Arabic, could be heard throughout Morocco and northwest Africa. It was officially estimated that, given an estimated 9.5 million receivers in the country, the potential radio audience was 20 million.

Television programming was provided in Arabic and French, on a ratio of about 60 to 40. A system of transmitters, boosters, and relay stations enabled the television signal to be received by more than 85 percent of the country. As of 1982, it was claimed that there were 1.5 million television receivers, resulting in a potential viewing audience of 17 million. The daily programming was limited to seven hours daily on a single channel but was expanded on weekends for sports and special events.

The government controlled access to RTM's radio and television broadcasts and used this frequently to its political advantage. The electronic media were exploited to propagandize in favor of the referenda approving new constitutions and constitutional amendments, as well as to ensure an overwhelmingly favorable vote for the unification with Libya

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while consistently denying air time to the opposition. The opportunity provided political party leaders to explain their programs on television and radio on the eve of the 1984 election was an innovation. Television has also been used to enhance the religious significance of the monarchy and the popularity of Hassan. During religious periods such as Ramadan, for example, television has shown the king in ceremonial attire engaged in serious discussions with important religious figures.

Television has been criticized for the poor quality of its programming and for technical weaknesses. RTM produced little more than newscasts and some plays. In early 1985 over 50 percent of non-news programs were imported, largely in the form of serials and movies from the Arab countries, France, and the United States. Presentation of the news was uniformly judged to be dull and uninformative. Activities of the king and flattering reports of government actions predominated. Allusions to bureaucratic abuse, corruption, or other sensitive topics were avoided. Even achievements of other Arab countries were said to be ignored to avoid generating dissatisfaction. Radio programs were livelier, more diversified, and largely domestically produced. The Arab language network stressed traditional values with a strict Islamic tone in its treatment of political and social subjects. The Network B in French and other Western languages was heavily devoted to popular music—much of it American—interspersed with news. The commercial Tangier station, MEDI-1, cultivated a more international tone, although Arabic predominated. Its news programs were relayed from RTM.

Foreign Relations

By the early and mid-1980s the military and diplomatic struggle over the Western Sahara had become the paramount determinant in the conduct of Morocco's foreign affairs. In considerable measure Morocco's bilateral relations with individual countries were governed by their actions and votes in international bodies bearing on the Western Saharan territories. A subordinate feature of Morocco's foreign relations was its effort to become more directly involved with other countries of the Islamic world in the search for a formula to deal with the conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors.

The management of Morocco's foreign affairs has remained within the monarchical establishment, all significant initiatives being directed by the king himself with the aid of intimate palace

advisers. The king's presence and negotiating skills have amplified the Moroccan role at important Arab and Islamic meetings. He has superintended the intense diplomatic maneuvering in African councils in defense of Morocco's Western Sahara policy. The startling rapprochement with Libya beginning in 1983 was carried out in secret negotiations by the two heads of state and a few confidants. Any questioning of the results of this personalistic diplomacy is liable to be treated as criticism of the monarchy itself, as the USFP discovered in 1981. The great flexibility of the king in his foreign dealings is, on the one hand, an advantage. On the other hand, he risks blame for sudden shifts that may prove to be unpopular with important interests or for setbacks arising from policies that go awry.

A founding member of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), Morocco also cultivated close bilateral relations with many of its members in Sub-Saharan Africa, especially among the more moderate French-speaking states. Its adamant opposition to the seating of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) as an independent state gradually isolated Morocco, leading to its withdrawal from the organization in November 1984 (see Western Sahara, this ch.).

Morocco had been less directly involved in issues of white minority rule that preoccupied most of the OAU's Sub-Saharan African members. In 1977 Hassan sent troops in French military aircraft to help Zaïre stem mercenary attacks in its Shaba Province that were purportedly engineered by the Angolan government (see Security Concerns Beyond the Maghrib, ch. 5). By this action Hassan felt he had helped prevent the loss of Zaïre's rich mineral resources to Cuban-trained, pro-Soviet Marxist forces. Zaïre reciprocated by staunchly supporting Morocco's stand against seating the SADR.

Morocco has nominally followed a policy of nonalignment between East and West, maintaining positive relations with nations of both the communist and the noncommunist worlds. It shares important commercial interests with the Soviet Union, centered on the development of phosphate mining and the export of citrus fruits, but Moscow's supply of modern arms to the guerrilla force in the Western Sahara through Algeria and Libya has chilled political relations. Morocco regards itself as being close to the West, with which it has some cultural affinity as a result of the French protectorate and from which it receives the bulk of its military and economic assistance. Rabat enjoys special association status with the European Economic Community (EEC) but has been frustrated by the gradual erosion of the

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market for its agricultural crops in Western Europe, owing to the encroaching protectionism of the EEC.

Friendly relations with the United States, which can be traced to the early years of American independence, reached a new stage with the signing of a military cooperation agreement in 1982 governing the use of Moroccan airports by transiting United States forces. Although Washington did not support Morocco's claims to the Western Sahara—it urged a settlement along lines of the OAU-proposed referendum—earlier restrictions on the supply of United States equipment were eased, and air defense weapons were provided on a grant basis.

Morocco's development needs and deepening economic problems have obliged it to turn increasingly to Western countries, private banking consortia, and multinational agencies for help in relieving its distress (see *External Financing*, ch. 3). Faced with external debts exceeding US\$12 billion, Morocco entered into agreements with the IMF in 1982 and 1983 to finance its deficits. In conjunction with the IMF credits, it adopted a broad range of austerity measures to reduce subsidies and curtail government spending. Reschedulings of private and of public debts were negotiated, but large additional amounts of concessional credits were needed from the United States and other Western supplier nations.

Morocco has been active among the moderate group of Arab countries in the search for peace in the Middle East. Although an early supporter of Egyptian president Anwar al Sadat's visit to Israel in 1977, Morocco joined the Arab consensus in condemning the Camp David Agreements of 1978. Hassan was instrumental in the adoption of a peace plan by the Arab heads of state at a summit meeting chaired by him at Fès in September 1982. He was also chosen as president of the Jerusalem Committee (Al Quds Committee) of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, which lobbied in Europe and the United States for the return of Jerusalem as the capital of a Palestinian state.

The concept of regional cooperation in the Maghrib, the Islamic world of northwest Africa, has been given lip service by Morocco and the other neighboring states, but rivalries and disputes have prevented its realization. Morocco has been embittered toward Algeria, the major advocate for, and supplier to, its adversaries in the Western Sahara. Moroccan-Libyan relations had likewise been antagonistic as a result not only of the Western Sahara issue but also of the mutual distrust between Libya's erratic and radical Qadhafi and the Western-oriented moderate Hassan. By 1984, however, as a result of Hassan's prag-

matic diplomacy, the two countries had concluded a "unification" agreement in which both nations retained their sovereignty but were to collaborate in a wide range of matters through joint consultative mechanisms. The ultimate significance of the agreement was in doubt, but the immediate effect was to formalize a division of the Maghrib into two rival blocs.

Western Sahara

Under pressure from the three independent African states bordering on the Spanish Sahara—Morocco, Mauritania, and Algeria—Spain announced in 1975 that it would withdraw from its Saharan colony as soon as possible. Morocco had laid historical claim to the territory, as did Mauritania, although the latter had supported self-determination for the area. The International Court of Justice, which had been requested by a United Nations (UN) resolution to judge the Moroccan and Mauritanian claims, found that historical ties did exist in both cases but that they were insufficient to establish sovereignty. After negotiations among Spain, Mauritania, and Morocco, it was agreed that the Saharan territory would be divided, the northern two-thirds coming under Moroccan control and the remainder going to Mauritania (see Morocco and the Western Sahara, ch. 1).

By 1973 a number of guerrilla organizations had begun operating in the territory. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Río de Oro (Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el Hamra y Río de Oro—Polisario) became the dominant insurgent body. It advocated Western Saharan independence and was strongly supported by Algeria. Contesting occupation by Mauritania and Morocco, the Polisario conducted highly effective guerrilla operations, raiding deep into southern Morocco and forcing the king to increase dramatically his military commitments to the region. Mauritania, crippled economically by the attacks, signed a peace treaty with the Polisario in 1979, renouncing its territorial claims and removing its occupation forces. Morocco then moved into the area evacuated by the Mauritania (see Appendix B).

On another level, the war in the Western Sahara reflected the rivalry between antagonistic regimes, that of Morocco's Western-oriented constitutional monarchy and that of socialistic Algeria. The diplomatic struggle for recognition of the SADR was carried forward by Algeria, which also provided a lifeline for the Polisario in the form of supplies, fuel, military equipment, training, and sanctuaries against Moroccan attacks. Most of the

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Western Sahara civil population had taken refuge from the fighting at camps in the Tindouf area of Algeria. Morocco claimed, however, that only a minority of the residents of the camps were bona fide Saharawis, the rest having fled the drought from elsewhere in the region.

The Mauritanian withdrawal threatened to isolate Morocco in the UN and OAU over its claims to the Western Sahara. A majority of OAU members endorsed the Polisario, which had proclaimed itself as the SADR to be qualified for full membership in the OAU. It was only Morocco's threat of withdrawal from the organization that blocked the seating of the SADR delegation. In 1980 the UN General Assembly approved a resolution deploring Morocco's continued occupation and calling upon it to join in a peace process in which the Polisario should fully participate. The OAU recommendation, spelled out in decisions of a seven-nation Implementation Committee in 1981 and early 1982, proposed a referendum to choose between independence and integration with Morocco, to be carried out by an interim administration of the Western Sahara appointed by the committee and receiving full cooperation from the existing Moroccan administrative apparatus and facilities in the territory. In compiling voting lists, the committee stated that account should be taken of the Spanish census of 1974. It proposed that the OAU or the UN should organize a peacekeeping force to supervise a cease-fire and the confinement of troops to bases.

In a reversal of his position, Hassan agreed at the OAU summit in mid-1981 to a referendum over the future of the Western Sahara. The OAU's plan met Morocco's conditions in part because it did not insist on evacuation of the territory by Moroccan forces or dismantling of the Moroccan administration. Its reference to the Spanish census was likewise a concession to Morocco because it had listed only 72,000 Saharans. The Polisario claimed that they numbered up to 1,500,000; the Moroccan census of 1982 cited a figure of 130,000.

Although both Morocco and the SADR had formally agreed to a referendum under international supervision, they remained far apart on practical implementation. There was disagreement over the role of an international military force, over the continued presence of the Moroccan military and administration, over who should be regarded as Saharan (most of the individuals polled would be in the Algerian camps), and over the wording of the question to be posed. Morocco rejected direct negotiations with the Polisario, whereas the latter regarded Moroccan acknowledgment of its legitimacy as a genuine nationalist

movement as indispensable to carrying out the OAU plan.

The Polisario program of political indoctrination in the refugee camps has provided an opportunity to convert traditional tribal loyalties into a previously nonexistent national consciousness. It is widely believed that an impartially conducted referendum would result in a massive vote for independence. Hassan has committed himself to be bound by the results of a referendum. Observers have questioned, however, whether it would be politically feasible to withdraw from the territory in compliance with the results of the referendum in view of the intense commitment to incorporation of the former Spanish colony that the king himself inspired.

The SADR was admitted as a full member state on the basis of a majority vote when the OAU Council of Ministers met in February 1982. Morocco, followed by 18 other states, left the conference, forcing it to adjourn for lack of a quorum. The subsequent summit meeting scheduled to be held at Tripoli, Libya, with Qadhaafi presiding, had to be postponed. Rescheduled for later in the year after a pledge by the SADR that it would not attend, the meeting was blocked when a similar crisis erupted over the seating of rival delegations from Chad. The paralysis of the OAU served Morocco's purposes. Its change of tactics in 1981 and 1982, evacuating its isolated bases and garrisons to concentrate its resources behind a sand wall defending the "useful triangle" in the north, proved to be effective (see *War in the Western Sahara*, ch. 5). Morocco's new understanding with Libya reduced the Polisario's arms supply and removed an important source of funds. The Polisario still controlled large areas and could mount damaging raids but seemed to have declined as a major force.

The threat by 22 other nations to join with Morocco in preventing a quorum delayed the opening of the 1983 OAU summit meeting at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, for two days until the SADR delegation agreed "voluntarily and temporarily" to withdraw. Patience was ebbing, however, with Hassan's continued obduracy over direct negotiations with the Polisario and the failure to fulfill his 1981 commitment to a referendum. Sympathy for the Moroccan position declined further when its delegation walked out of a meeting convened by the heads of state of the seven countries on the OAU Implementation Committee (Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Nigeria, Mali, Sudan, Guinea, and Ethiopia) in September 1983 to bring the two parties together. By the time of the OAU summit in November 1984, only one other country—Zaire—stood by Morocco in voting against the SADR's

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seating. When Morocco carried out its longstanding threat to withdraw from the organization, it was not followed by any other member nation.

Libya

Following the military coup of 1969 that brought Qadhaafi to power in Libya, the previously close relationship between the two countries, reinforced by the affinity of Hassan and the king of Libya, was allowed to deteriorate. Espousing his unique brand of radical Arab socialism, the Libyan strongman was disdainful of Morocco's monarchical system and the king's conservative, pro-Western policies. Libyan radiobroadcasts during the 1971 Skhirat coup attempt sought to incite Moroccans to rebel against Hassan, who responded by suspending diplomatic relations. The king was deeply distrustful of Qadhaafi's acceptance of Soviet military advisers and arms, calling Libya "a vast Soviet arsenal." He linked Moscow's assistance to Algeria and Libya with a general Soviet attempt to undermine pro-Western regimes in the Middle East and Africa.

Libya had sided with the Polisario during its struggle to drive Spain out of the Western Sahara, encouraging the guerrilla movement with matériel and financial help. It continued to back the insurgents against Moroccan occupation after 1975, meeting the major portion of the Polisario's expenses and acting as a conduit for Soviet arms. Actuated by his fervent belief in the unity of the Arab world and skeptical of the economic viability of the Western Sahara, Qadhaafi cherished the hope that the territory could be united with Mauritania, whose tribes shared a similar culture and common Arabic dialect with the Saharawis. He delayed in recognizing the SADR until the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front, a loose coalition of the more militant Arab states, jointly agreed to do so in April 1980. Viewing this action as deliberately provocative, Morocco again severed relations with Libya, which had been restored in 1975.

A year later Morocco mounted a concerted diplomatic offensive, dispatching special envoys to more than 80 countries to denounce the Polisario movement as part of a Libyan-directed effort at subverting African governments. In an unexpected reversal a new understanding was reached between the two countries in June 1981 whereby relations were again normalized. Morocco dropped its anti-Libyan campaign, and Libya suspended military shipments to the Polisario, although its financial aid continued. Libya's action was apparently prompted

by the desire to avoid Moroccan obstruction of its bid to host the 1982 OAU summit conference and to encourage Morocco to take a more benign view of its involvement in Chad.

Qadhaafi's visit to Rabat in July 1983 was marked by the signing of a general cooperation agreement that helped to further consolidate relations between the two countries. Whether or not it was consciously desired by Hassan, the effect of the agreement was to underscore the division of the Maghrib into two groups. Algeria and Tunisia had negotiated a Treaty of Friendship and Concord in March 1983, to be joined by Mauritania later that year.

In his public utterances, Hassan adopted a more moderate view of Qadhaafi. He still faulted the Libyan ruler as a man whose "inconsistencies sometimes go to extremes" for indulging in terrorism and for arming the Polisario. Nevertheless, the king showed sympathy for the Libyan role in Chad. He asserted that Libya had been dispossessed of much of its territory in the same way Morocco had been. Libya's failure, he felt, was in not explaining adequately the reason for its intervention in Chad.

Notwithstanding the gradual reconciliation between the former adversaries, the news that Morocco and Libya had secretly negotiated a unification agreement came as a profound shock. Signed on August 13, 1984, at Oujda, Morocco, close to the Algerian border, the new alliance was to be officially described as the "Arab-African Federation." Hassan said the treaty had been proposed by him only a month earlier on the spur of the moment and its text, largely prepared by Morocco, had been negotiated by two trusted officials, apparently without even the knowledge of the cabinet.

The treaty stated that it was to serve as a springboard for wider institutions of unity of the Arab and Islamic people and a cornerstone of Arab Maghrib unity. Numerous bodies having executive, legislative, and judicial features were provided for. They included a general secretariat under a secretary general designated by each country for a two-year term on an alternating basis. Its headquarters would alternate between the two countries. There would be four councils (defense, economic, political, and educational and cultural) to study issues referred to them and to propose solutions. A body composed of members of Morocco's Chamber of Representatives and Libya's General People's Congress was to put forward proposals for the strengthening of the federation. An executive committee composed of the Moroccan Council of Ministers and the Libyan General People's Committee, meeting regularly on an alternate

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basis in each country, was to execute and follow up decisions. A federal court would rule on disputes in the implementation of the pact. At the head of the federation would be a presidency exercised jointly by Hassan and Qadhaafi.

As set out in the document, the objectives of the federation were to strengthen ties of unity and establish firm diplomatic cooperation. In the defense field, the independence of both countries would be maintained. Cooperation through joint institutions in the economic field was foreseen. Exchanges of lecturers and students and the creation of joint educational and research institutions were also contemplated. Both countries were to accord absolute respect for each other's sovereignty and were not to interfere in the other's affairs. Any aggression directed against one of the signatories was to be regarded as aggression against the other. (The Western Sahara was not interpreted as falling under this clause because the Polisario was viewed by Morocco not as an aggressor state but as a group of mercenaries.) The federation was to be open to other Arab or African states with the consent of both parties.

Some foreign observers greeted the treaty cynically, noting that Libya had previously entered into unification agreements with six other Arab countries, all of which had proved to be ephemeral. Although called a federation, the accord was of lesser scope than Libya's earlier unions. It did not place formal restrictions on the sovereignty of the two signatories with respect to either domestic or foreign affairs. Hassan's action in allying himself with Qadhaafi was seen as motivated by his rivalry with Algeria and a desire to administer a counterthrust against the 1983 treaty among the other Maghribi states. The new partners were also expected to extend reciprocal support in their disputes in the Western Sahara and Chad. The treaty could potentially bring economic benefits to Morocco in the form of new job opportunities for Moroccan workers in Libya, markets for Moroccan agricultural products, and petroleum imports under concessional terms.

The unlikely collaboration between the traditional monarch and the revolutionary Arab leader of Libya was widely regarded as opportunistic on both sides. Qadhaafi's attitude was ambiguous, his remarks implying that the treaty could quickly unravel if differences developed. Questions were raised in hitherto friendly nations of the West and Africa over Hassan's dependability. The United States, in particular, did not view favorably an alliance with a ruler implacably hostile to the United States and whose record of terrorism and revolutionary plotting

elsewhere in the Arab world was well known.

The pact was to come into force after approval by referenda in both countries. According to the officially announced results of the ballot taken on August 31, 1984, participation by registered Moroccan voters was well over 90 percent in most areas and was almost unanimously favorable (11,490,514 to 2,134). Whether or not public sentiment was as unified as the official returns implied, it was felt that the king's initiative was indeed popular. It promised to bolster the country's situation with respect to the Western Sahara and to lighten the nation's economic burdens.

Algeria

Before Algeria achieved independence in 1962, Morocco supplied its independence movement—the Algerian National Liberation Front—with military, financial, and political aid, as well as sanctuary for its forces fighting the French. Postindependence relations were strained, however, because of boundary disputes and Algeria's dislike for the Moroccan monarchical system. In 1972 agreement was reached providing for mutual recognition of the French colonial border between the two countries, undisputed Algerian sovereignty over the iron-ore-rich region of Gara-Djebilet, and a joint company with Morocco to exploit the iron ore (which was never formed). Notwithstanding this brief reconciliation, relations again cooled. Both countries provided forums for expatriate critics of each other's systems during the 1960s and 1970s.

Morocco broke diplomatic relations with Algeria when the latter recognized the SADR in 1976. Bitterness between the two countries mounted as a consequence of Algeria's involvement as the principal backer of the Polisario movement and a staging area for guerrilla raiders. Private talks were held between officials of the two countries in 1980 over possible solutions in the Western Sahara, but no progress was recorded, owing to Morocco's unwillingness to negotiate directly with the Polisario. When Hassan and Algerian president Chadli Bendjedid came together in early 1983 for the first heads of state meeting since the breach in relations, hopes for a reconciliation were high. Bendjedid succeeded in persuading Hassan to approve informal contacts with the Polisario, but a brief secret meeting at the ministerial level did not produce results. It was also reported that Bendjedid had proposed a broad regional alliance but, after Morocco's rejection, went ahead a month later with the 20-year Treaty of Friendship and Concord with Tunisia and Mauritania. Algeria.

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surprised by the accord between Morocco and Libya—its neighbors to the west and east—declared this new “axis” made the prospect of Maghribi unity even more remote.

Mauritania

Morocco has made it a tenet of its foreign policy that its sovereignty should extend over Mauritania on the basis of historical claims predating the French protectorate. In 1969 Hassan renounced the Moroccan claim, and a treaty of solidarity, good neighborliness, and cooperation was signed the following year.

Although Mauritania at first supported Saharan self-determination, it later reversed itself and in 1976 agreed to a specific division of the territory with Morocco. Polisario attacks on the Mauritanian section of the Sahara drew the two countries closer together. In 1977 discussions aimed at integrating the two economies got under way. It was agreed that Morocco could intervene militarily in Mauritania in their mutual campaign against the Polisario and that the high commands of the two armies would be unified. These understandings became moot, however, when Mokhtar Ould Daddah was deposed as president by the Mauritanian military in July 1978. Resistance to Moroccan influence and the strains that the war against the Polisario imposed on the fragile Mauritanian economy were thought to have precipitated the overthrow. A year later Mauritania and the Polisario signed a peace treaty in Algiers by which Mauritania in effect abandoned its claims to the Western Sahara.

Diplomatic relations were broken in March 1981 after the Mauritanian military rulers accused Rabat of supporting a coup attempt by the Moroccan-based Alliance for a Democratic Mauritania. The basing of Polisario forces on Mauritanian territory further complicated relations. The sympathy of the new Mauritanian rulers for the Polisario cause led to their formal recognition of the SADR in February 1984. Although this action had little tangible significance for Morocco's war against the insurgents, the complete reversal of position by Morocco's former cobelligerent in that war contributed further to the erosion of support for the Moroccan cause in the UN and the OAU. Fearful that its recognition would provoke retaliation by Morocco, Mauritania declared that it remained faithful to the OAU plan, based on self-determination and direct negotiation between Morocco and the SADR.

Other Arab Countries

Morocco has succeeded in maintaining positive relations with most of the Arab states not directly involved in the Western Sahara conflict. Hassan has emerged as a leading participant in attempts to find a solution to Israeli-Palestinian issues. Chairing a summit of the Arab heads of state at Fès in September 1982, the king was reportedly influential in persuading the countries represented (only Libya was absent) to unite behind a plan that called for withdrawal of Israel from the territories occupied after the June 1967 War and the dismantling of settlements on the West Bank but was considered moderate because it would have implicitly recognized the Israeli state. The king, joined by the foreign ministers of seven Arab states, traveled to Washington to explain the proposals. In his approach to the United States government, Hassan underscored the willingness of the Arab states to live in peace with Israel and the fact that their plan was intended as a basis for further bargaining.

Hassan had supported Egyptian president Sadat's direct diplomatic initiative toward Israel. Sadat reciprocated by backing Morocco's efforts against the Polisario with the delivery of military equipment. When the Arab countries agreed to sever formal relations with Cairo over the Camp David Agreements with Israel in 1978, Morocco joined the consensus, presumably because to have acted otherwise would have jeopardized financial aid from Saudi Arabia. Cordial contacts were nevertheless maintained with Egypt. Hassan did not conceal his desire to see Egypt readmitted to Arab councils. In January 1984, over the objections of some of the radical Arab members, Egypt was permitted to rejoin the Organization of the Islamic Conference, which groups 45 Arabic and non-Arabic Muslim states. The council was chaired at the time by Hassan. The following month Sadat's successor, Husni Mubarak, was received by the king in Rabat, and it was announced that the two countries had agreed in principle to resume relations.

Morocco has been the beneficiary of loans and grants from Arab nations of the Persian Gulf and from Arab financing institutions. Hassan has maintained a warm personal relationship with the king of Saudi Arabia, who has regularly vacationed in Morocco. In addition to funding a number of development projects, the Saudis have provided indispensable financial backing for Morocco's Saharan campaign. However, neither Saudi Arabia nor other Arab countries joined Morocco in opposing the resolution on the Western Sahara sponsored by Algeria in the UN General Assembly in 1982. Most of the Arab

delegates abstained, although four—Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, and Syria—voted affirmatively.

Morocco recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian Arabs, and it supported the concept of a separate Palestinian Arab state. But Hassan's moderation in his attitude toward Israel has earned him reproof from the more militant Arab nations. Criticism was muted during the October 1973 War, in which a large contingent of Moroccan troops fought well on the Syrian front and other units were dispatched to the Egyptian front. Hassan has, nonetheless, maintained discreet contacts with Israel as part of his concern that continued Arab-Israeli conflict threatens the stability of the Middle East. His action in receiving an official Israeli delegation to a conference of Moroccan Jews in early 1984 brought him condemnation from some Arab sources, although no objection was voiced by Saudi Arabia or other friendly Arab nations.

Western Europe

Morocco has maintained wide-ranging traditional links with Western Europe, but its concerns in the 1980s had an economic focus. Both public and private sources of funds from West European countries were essential for developmental and balance of payments purposes. The area was also the natural export market for Morocco's agricultural products. Relations have generally been good with all the European states since independence, although Morocco's sensitivity over the Western Sahara has caused recurrent friction with France and Spain, the former colonial powers with which it retains many common interests. Morocco pays particular attention to its economic relations with the EEC, the market for over 60 percent of its exports. Its formal association with the community, dating from 1969 and expanded in 1976, assures it preferential trade access, developmental aid, and fair treatment of its workers in EEC member countries. Nonetheless, the mounting restrictions on Moroccan agricultural products to EEC markets have contributed to a worrisome trade deficit with the community as a whole and with its main trading partner, France. The Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) was the second-ranking market for Moroccan products after France, mainly for phosphates and agricultural products. West German credits under advantageous terms assisted the development of agriculture, potable water, energy, and mining. The pending accession of Spain and Portugal to full membership in the EEC



*Spanish enclave of Ceuta on the Mediterranean coast
Courtesy Richard Rosenman*

was expected to accentuate trade problems because they, along with the newest EEC member, Greece, competed with Morocco in the sale of Mediterranean crops to Europe.

France

French influence has strongly affected Morocco's economic, cultural, intellectual, and social life. This influence has been reinforced through continuing efforts by France in accordance with its policy of cultivating privileged links with its former African colonies. Trade with France—accounting for more than one-fifth of Morocco's imports and exports in 1983—was marked by a persistent imbalance in France's favor. Receipts from French tourism and remittances of Moroccan workers, while significant, did not fully compensate for the trade deficit.

Hassan maintained excellent personal relations with French president Valéry Giscard d'Estaing during the latter's term of office, from 1974 to 1981. Close economic collaboration and expansion of scientific and cultural exchanges followed state visits by the two leaders. The resident French population of Morocco, which had amounted to 400,000 in the 1940s, continued its steady downward course, however, falling to less than one-tenth that number by 1982. About one-half of the French citizens were

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located in Casablanca, most of them representing the French business community. In 1984 there were 2,900 cultural "cooperants," mostly teachers, although their numbers too were slowly declining owing to the Arabization of secondary schools.

France has been a leading source of developmental financing through both public and private channels. Equivalent to about US\$250 million in 1983, it took the form of subsidized government loans, guarantees of private bank loans, and grants.

The election of François Mitterand, a socialist, as president of France in 1981 ushered in a period of uneven relations between the two countries. The new Mitterand government had set out to refurbish its previously strained relations with Algeria. Morocco feared that such a rapprochement with its arch rival might be at Morocco's expense, possibly leading to an unwelcome shift in the French position on the Western Sahara. Although the SADR was permitted to open an office in Paris, the French did not depart from their official position that the future of the Western Sahara should be determined by referendum on self-determination, thus neither accepting the Moroccan claims nor recognizing the SADR. The socialist government of France did not interfere with sales on concessional credit terms to the Moroccan military, which was largely dependent on French equipment (see Foreign Military Cooperation, ch. 5).

The arrests of USFP leaders after strikes and rioting in June 1981 were sharply condemned by the French Socialist Party. Behind-the-scenes efforts by the Mitterand government possibly contributed to their prompt release and resumption of political activity. In 1984, after the surprise announcement of the union between Morocco and Libya, Mitterand paid a hurried visit to Rabat (he had made a state visit earlier, in January 1983), presumably to obtain a personal explanation of the new alliance from Hassan. In spite of latent mistrust and areas of disagreement, France and Morocco had strong practical reasons for keeping their economic and cultural links in good repair. Both countries seemed anxious to avoid any serious political breach that could disrupt these long-standing ties.

Spain

Until the mid-1970s Spanish possession of the Western Sahara territory (known as the Spanish Sahara until 1976) and several small islands and coastal enclaves, the best known of which were the Mediterranean ports of Ceuta and Melilla, hindered the development of close links between the two

countries (see Reunification, ch. 1). Moroccan demands regarding the enclaves were deemphasized after 1975 when Spain, Morocco, and Mauritania reached agreement on the Western Sahara. Hassan stated that Morocco would not expect to gain control of the enclaves until Spain acquired Gibraltar. He argued that if Gibraltar were ceded to Spain, its retention of Ceuta and Melilla would be unacceptable to the Soviet Union because Spain, a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, would then possess the "three keys to the straits." Beyond drawing attention from time to time to its claims, usually in reaction to some gesture by Spain regarded as unfriendly, Morocco has avoided actions that could inflame the issue.

Differences have also arisen over fishing by Spanish vessels based in the Canary Islands after Morocco claimed in 1973 a 70-nautical-mile coastal fishing limit (expanded to a 200-nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone in 1981). A series of interim agreements stipulated the number of Spanish vessels permitted to engage in fishing, the minimum number of Moroccan sailors to be employed, royalties, and Spanish aid to develop the Moroccan fishing industry. In August 1983 a four-year agreement was signed in which Spain consented to reduce by 40 percent the tonnage of ships permitted to fish in Moroccan waters and to increase sharply the fees paid.

Spain absolved itself of all responsibility in the Western Sahara when, in February 1976, it transferred administration, although not sovereignty, to Morocco and Mauritania. The Spanish Socialist Workers' Party, then in opposition, denounced the 1976 agreement and maintained its own contacts with the Polisario. However, after the socialist party came to power under Prime Minister Felipe González Márquez in 1982, the Spanish government continued to withhold diplomatic backing for the SADR. Moroccan moderation over Ceuta and Melilla was regarded as a factor in Spain's continued neutrality over the Western Sahara. When González Márquez paid a successful official visit to Morocco in 1983, neither Gibraltar nor the Western Sahara war emerged as a source of contention. Combined maneuvers have been held by Spanish and Moroccan armed forces, and small amounts of military equipment have been transferred to Morocco by the Spanish. Although the Moroccan-Libyan agreement of 1984 revived fears among the Spanish public and the military over the security of Ceuta and Melilla, the Spanish government sought to dismiss these concerns.

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European Economic Community

After lengthy negotiations Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia concluded association agreements with the EEC in 1969, which were in fact restricted to trade arrangements. Morocco was given free access to community markets for nearly all industrial products and preferential markets for certain agricultural products. Far more comprehensive agreements were signed in 1976 after three years of discussions, to include not only trade but also economic, technical, and financial cooperation. The agreement provided for a Cooperation Council—composed of members of the European Communities Council of Ministers, the Commission of the European Countries, and the Moroccan government—to meet annually.

Under the 1976 cooperation agreement, industrial products continued to enter the EEC duty free, and quotas and tariff concessions of 20 to 100 percent were granted for a wider range of agricultural products than under the 1969 agreement. Various EEC quotas, safeguard clauses, and seasonal schedules restricted the value of these concessions as they affected wine, olive oil, fresh fruits and vegetables, and tinned sardines.

The agreement laid down principles concerning Moroccan laborers in the EEC, forbidding discriminatory wages and working conditions and guaranteeing a full range of social security benefits, including allowances for workers' families living in community countries. Rights and benefits were to be calculated by adding together all periods of residence in various EEC states. In a separate financial protocol Morocco received a five-year package of development aid totaling 130 million European Currency Units (ECU, defined as a "basket" of the currencies of the EEC member states; one ECU equaled US\$1.12 in 1976). A second five-year protocol beginning in 1982 amounted to ECU199 million. It included ECU90 million in loans from the European Investment Bank having an interest rate subsidy of 2 percent, loans totaling ECU42 million on special terms for rural development and social infrastructure, and grants of ECU67 million.

A source of preoccupation for Rabat has been the prospect that pending full membership in the EEC by Spain and Portugal will cause Moroccan sales to the EEC to suffer further. These countries are competitors of Morocco in the marketing of citrus fruits and tomatoes. As members of the EEC they will enjoy the advantage of free entry for their products into other member countries, as well as subsidies and other benefits, and both will have a voice in the EEC's policy on agricultural trade. They will have the benefit of free circulation of labor within the community,

possibly to the detriment of Moroccan workers. The EEC has consented to reexamine the 1976 agreements with the three Maghribi countries when the new situation created by the accession of Spain and Portugal can be assessed.

United States

The spirit of cordiality that has marked United States-Moroccan relations had its origins in the treaty of peace and friendship signed at Marrakech in 1787 between the two nations (see *Sharifian Dynasties*, ch. 1). In the period after Moroccan independence, the principal matters that jointly concerned the two governments were the provision of American economic assistance and the withdrawal of the United States military presence, which dated from the North African campaign of World War II. Long-range bombers of the United States Air Force were subsequently based in Morocco. Morocco's insistence that the United States remove its military forces produced an agreement in 1959 whereby all American-occupied bases were to be evacuated by 1963. Small American contingents remained to operate three naval communications stations; all had been deemed obsolete and were closed by 1978.

Relations between the two countries became progressively closer during the 1970s and early 1980s. The United States perceived Morocco as a reliable and constructive influence in Arab councils and a factor for moderation in dealing with Middle Eastern peace initiatives. In addition to compatibility in their foreign policy objectives, the United States respected Morocco's religious tolerance and the progress it made after 1976 in institutionalizing democratic processes. Rabat's willingness to receive naval visits was appreciated, and the fact that Mediterranean access from the Atlantic Ocean was in friendly lands was viewed as strategically important.

The United States had no advance warning of the Oujda treaty between Morocco and Libya and was perturbed over its implications for future cooperation, especially in the military field. In a statement before a congressional committee on February 19, 1985, Secretary of State George P. Shultz expressed disappointment over the "unwelcome" news of the alliance. Shultz said the United States had told the Moroccans that it "discounted the possibility that association with King Hassan could influence Qadhaafi constructively." There was, moreover, evidence that Morocco had shifted to a more independent position in the aftermath of the treaty. The episode underscored

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the fact that, in spite of the firmness of bilateral relations between Washington and Rabat, there was a danger of mutual misperception of underlying interests, which could become reflected in future disagreements.

The issue of supplying arms and military equipment to Morocco that might have a bearing on the fighting against the Polisario has been a matter of controversy in the United States. Washington recognized neither the SADR nor Moroccan sovereignty over the Western Sahara territory, having endorsed the OAU plan for a cease-fire, a UN peacekeeping force, and a referendum on the question of independence or annexation by Morocco. Arms supplied by the United States were subject to the condition that their use be limited to internal security and legitimate self-defense. Use of such arms beyond Morocco's internationally recognized borders would be regarded as a violation of these provisions.

Morocco's request in 1977 for counterinsurgency aircraft and attack helicopters was rejected because of Rabat's failure to heed these conditions. Equipment unrelated to the conflict with the Polisario, including a coordinated air defense system, continued to be provided. Nevertheless, differences over the supply of weapons generated some resentment on Hassan's part. The position of the United States administration under President Jimmy Carter yielded somewhat in October 1979 when a US\$235 million sale of armed reconnaissance aircraft, jet fighters, and helicopters was approved. It was argued that repeated Polisario attacks inside Morocco's recognized territory had changed the legal status of the war. Moreover, at a time when the administration was being criticized for its failure to act more aggressively to protect the shah of Iran against being overthrown, the need to be responsive to the threats facing Hassan became apparent (see *Foreign Military Cooperation*, ch. 5).

Opposition to the plan developed in the United States Congress based on the grounds that supply of the aircraft would reward Moroccan aggression and contradict basic American principles of encouraging national self-determination. In defending its decision, the Carter administration contended that the weapons would give Morocco a sense of support that could contribute to a solution reflecting the wishes of the territory's inhabitants. As part of its efforts to promote a settlement, the United States Department of State held informal meetings with the Polisario in Washington and at the Polisario's bases in the Tindouf region of Algeria.

A Moroccan request for more than 100 heavy tanks during

*President Ronald Reagan
and King Hassan II
during the Moroccan
monarch's working visit
to Washington in May 1982
Courtesy
White House Photo/
Bill Fitz-Patrick*



*The president and the king on horseback in Virginia during
the monarch's working visit to Washington in May 1962
Courtesy White House Photo/Michael Evans*

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the final months of the Carter administration was approved after President Ronald Reagan assumed office in 1981. The Polisario's victory at Guelta Zemmur in October 1981, in which several Moroccan aircraft were brought down by modern Soviet surface-to-air missiles, produced a series of intense consultations between senior Moroccan and United States officials. As a result, the United States agreed to supply electronic countermeasures to be fitted onto United States-supplied fighter aircraft as well as training in evasive maneuvers for Moroccan pilots.

In May 1982 relations between Morocco and the United States took a new turn when an agreement was concluded whereby United States forces would have the transit use of certain airports during emergencies and for periodic training. The United States would be authorized to construct facilities or improvements but would not permanently station armed forces or establish bases in Morocco. The agreement was to have an initial term of six years but would continue in effect unless terminated by one of the parties with two years' notice. Military sales in fiscal year (FY) 1983 amounted to US\$68 million and assistance on a loan basis to US\$75 million. Military aid offered on a grant basis for the first time in FY 1983 amounted to US\$25 million and rose to US\$43 million in FY 1985. Much of the equipment earmarked for Morocco was intended to strengthen air surveillance and antiaircraft defenses.

United States economic aid to Morocco for FY 1985 was expected to total US\$34 million for development efforts in agriculture, education, family planning, and low-cost housing as well as to alleviate balance of payments strains by financing imports of agricultural equipment and supplies from the United States. A further US\$45 million under Public Law 480, Title I (Food for Peace), was earmarked for import of surplus cereals from the United States, and about US\$9 million under Title II focused on nutrition programs for children of low-income families.

Commercial relations between the United States and Morocco remained out of balance. Morocco shipped only US\$34 million worth of goods to the United States in 1984. Trade in the other direction was US\$526 million, establishing the United States as the third-ranking supplier to Morocco after France and Saudi Arabia. More than half of the American exports consisted of grain. American direct investments in Morocco were at a relatively low level of US\$65 million to US\$70 million, although an investment treaty initialed in 1984 would accord protection to American investors and enable them to take advantage of government incentives. The Mobil Oil Company was conducting

offshore drilling for hydrocarbons in the Atlantic off Tarfaya in the southernmost part of the country. The Amoco Oil Company had signed an agreement for drilling rights just above the Mobil concession. In late 1984 agreements were concluded with both companies for exploratory drilling in specified inland zones.

Communist Countries

Morocco and the Soviet Union have established mutually advantageous economic relations in a number of activities, notably mining and fishing. Political relations have been correct but lacking in cordiality. To safeguard their economic interests in Morocco, the Soviets have carefully adhered to a neutral posture on the Western Sahara, neither accepting Morocco's claim nor extending recognition to the SADR. In November 1981 Moscow voted for the Algerian-backed resolution in the UN General Assembly reiterating the right of the Saharan people to self-determination. Morocco could not overlook the fact that the Soviets must have given tacit approval for the transfer of Soviet-provided arms to the Polisario by Algeria and Libya but has not allowed this to impede relations as long as Moscow distances itself from the insurgent movement. Hassan has regularly voiced his suspicions of Soviet conduct in Africa and was active in obtaining passage of a resolution by the Organization of the Islamic Conference against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

A limited amount of commercial activity based principally on exchanges of industrial goods for phosphates was carried out with the countries of Eastern Europe. Joint ventures have been undertaken in various fields, notably plant construction and mining. The East Europeans have pursued a policy of noninvolvement in the Western Sahara dispute. By contrast, Morocco promptly severed diplomatic relations with Cuba and Yugoslavia when they recognized the SADR in 1980 and 1984, respectively. Nearly 2,200 East European doctors, teachers, and other technical personnel were working in Morocco in 1981, along with 150 or more from the Soviet Union. About 650 Moroccan students were being trained in the East European communist countries.

Soviet-Moroccan trade has been governed by a series of trade agreements; two such accords were signed in October 1984 for terms of six years. The first covered Soviet petrochemicals and Moroccan phosphate, and the second related to other products, including citrus fruits, for which the Soviet Union has become one of Morocco's largest customers. Moroccan exports rose

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significantly between 1977 and 1981, when they reached a level of DH685 million but then fell sharply to DH258 million in 1983. During the 1977-81 period, Soviet exports to Morocco rose from DH861 million to DH1.4 billion.

Overshadowing other Soviet activity was a loan agreement equivalent to US\$2 billion signed in 1978 during a visit to Moscow by the Moroccan prime minister. It covered the financing of construction of a phosphate complex at Meskala and a 100-kilometer railroad linking it to the Atlantic port of Essaouira. Repayments were to begin immediately in the form of phosphates, although production from the mine was not expected to commence until the late 1980s. When the investment was paid off, phosphates would continue to be exported in exchange for Soviet oil, timber, and chemical products. The prices were to be renegotiated annually over a 30-year period.


Morocco's relations with China were quite friendly but not extensive. As it had done in a number of other African countries, China sponsored the construction of a DH450 million sports complex in Rabat consisting of a large stadium and an indoor "sports palace." China supplied half the cost on a credit basis, and Morocco financed the remainder. The finished complex was dedicated by the crown prince in mid-1983. The Chinese premier, Zhao Ziyang, paid a visit to Rabat in December 1982 as part of a tour of African countries. It was agreed that bilateral cooperation, hitherto confined to student exchanges, health, and agro-industry, should be expanded to mining, industry, fisheries, and economic infrastructure, although no specific projects were announced. The Chinese leader refrained from endorsing Morocco's claims to the Western Sahara, prudently limiting himself to the observation that the 1981 OAU resolution at the Nairobi summit meeting provided a logical ground for settlement of the issue.

* * *

An informative overview of the Moroccan political scene and of Moroccan relations with the United States can be found in *North Africa: Regional Tensions and Strategic Concerns* by Richard B. Parker, former United States ambassador in Rabat. Domestic and international political events preceding the 1984 elections are analyzed in two reports by Mark Tessler published by Universities Field Staff International. An earlier report by

Tessler published by American Universities Field Staff appeared in 1981. The *New Yorker* of July 9, 1984, carried a readable account of King Hassan's singular role in Moroccan public life by E. J. Kahn, Jr. Reports by Paul Balta in the *Manchester Guardian Weekly* and articles in *Le Monde* have also been well informed on domestic politics. Translations of articles in the Casablanca periodical *Lamalif*, available through the Joint Publications Research Service, have analyzed such topics as Muslim fundamentalism and the 1984 election results. *Conflict in Northwest Africa: The Western Sahara Dispute* by John Damis is a comprehensive and relatively up-to-date treatment of Morocco's preeminent foreign policy issue. Additional details on this and other foreign relations matters can be found in the monthly *Africa Research Bulletin*. Official announcements and addresses are carried in the Foreign Broadcast Information Service's *Daily Report: Middle East and Africa*. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

Chapter 5. National Security



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Antique rifle and powder horns

SEEN FROM ONE PERSPECTIVE, Morocco is among the most stable of countries. A state with a 1,200-year history as an independent national entity, the North African kingdom has been led since 1666 by the 1,400-year-old Alawite Dynasty. In early 1985 it continued to operate under the skillful political control of King Hassan II, long after most of the rest of the world had adopted more "modern" forms of government.

Viewed on another level, Morocco's stability is more tenuous. Since its independence from French and Spanish domination in 1956, Morocco has had to cope with a wide range of situations that have threatened national security and the viability of Hassan in particular. The king's security concerns have included at least two—possibly three—identifiable plots against his reign (in 1963, 1973, and 1983), two attempted but unsuccessful military coup attempts, seemingly perennial student and worker unrest in the urban areas, occasional threats of military confrontation with neighboring Algeria and Libya, and the drawn out war for control of the Western Sahara (formerly the Spanish Sahara).

As 1985 began, Hassan remained firmly in command, ruling in a fashion in many ways as authoritarian as that of his traditional predecessors. Confronted throughout his 24-year reign with crises of the sort that have toppled other regimes, he had succeeded in maintaining his primacy over the nation's political affairs. As the preeminent dispenser of patronage, the ultimate arbiter of justice, the commander in chief of the military and other security services, and the religious leader of the country's Muslim population, Hassan left little doubt in the minds of observers that Moroccan national security was equated with the perpetuation of a strong monarchical system.

The king possessed an extensive system of military and police forces to defend territorial integrity, maintain public order, and contend with domestic and foreign threats to the regime. The Royal Armed Forces in 1985 included an army, an air force, a navy, and the Royal Gendarmerie, which was used primarily as a police force in rural areas. Those domestic security forces under the Ministry of Interior included a national police force known as the Sûreté Nationale, the Auxiliary Forces—Morocco's version of a national guard—and smaller intelligence and protective services. Having survived two known coup attempts by military personnel, the king had reorganized the

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security forces to ensure that they were closely controlled by the palace to minimize the opportunity for further subversive activity.

External Security Perceptions and Policies

Morocco's world view and external security interests from the time of Hassan's ascension to the throne in 1961 can be characterized by two main themes that have reflected the king's interests and point of view. First, as a traditional Arab and Islamic monarch in the twentieth century, Hassan has regarded "socialist" and "revolutionary" states warily, particularly when it has appeared that they might undermine—by force, by subversion, or by example—Morocco's more conservative system. Based on this criterion as well as on their proximity in the Maghrib (see Glossary), Libya and Algeria have long been the most conspicuous foreign sources of concern to Hassan. The Soviet Union, although it has had generally good bilateral political and economic relations with Morocco, has been regarded cautiously because of its ties with some of the king's most strident critics—notably Libya and Algeria—and because of its policies elsewhere in the world.

The second theme defining Moroccan security interests has been defense of the country's territorial integrity. The Moroccan definition of its national territory, however, has been based on the maximum extent of territory considered to be under the control or influence of the central government at any time before the imposition of the French protectorate in 1912. Moroccan claims at independence thus included part of Algeria, part of Mali, all of Mauritania, and all of the current and former Spanish possessions in North Africa. This interpretation, almost universally accepted by Moroccans, has been modified by subsequent bilateral agreements, but it has contributed to persistently uneasy relations with neighboring countries. It has also led directly to Morocco's military involvement in the Western Sahara (see *War in the Western Sahara*, this ch.). Together and separately, these two sets of external security concerns—tempered by a generally nonideological, extremely pragmatic appreciation of domestic, regional, and international politics—have shaped the monarchy's security policies since 1956.

Problems with Algeria, Libya, and Spain

Since the time of Algeria's independence from France in 1962, the perceived threat posed by that country has been a recurrent preoccupation of the Moroccan leadership. During Algeria's

struggle for independence from the French, Moroccans provided Algeria's National Liberation Front (Front de Libération Nationale—FLN) with financial assistance, volunteers, and some military supplies, and the Moroccan government gave sanctuary and diplomatic support to the Algerian revolutionary leaders. After Algeria became independent, however, relations between the two countries deteriorated rapidly, largely because of Moroccan claims on Algerian territory. The Moroccans insisted with some justification that the French, in drawing the border between the two countries, had blatantly favored Algeria (which had long been a French colony and eventually a department of metropolitan France, not merely a protectorate as Morocco had been). In pursuit of his claims, the king in July 1962 moved Moroccan regular forces into an area where the French had never specifically defined the border. Occasional skirmishes between Morocco's Royal Armed Forces (Forces Armées Royales—FAR), Algerian regular troops, and local partisan forces culminated in sharp fighting in October 1963 for control of the towns of Colomb-Bécher and Tinjoub. Although the Moroccans fought well, a stalemate ensued, and the two sides agreed to a cease-fire, which was established with the assistance of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in November 1963. This so-called war of the sands proved to be the opening of a long period of fluctuating hostility between the two countries that continued into the mid-1980s.

Algeria has also concerned Hassan because the ideological gulf that has separated the two neighbors has also intensified their rivalry. Almost immediately after national independence, Algerian leader Ahmed Ben Bella loudly began to proclaim his country's socialist-revolutionary politics and opposition to conservative Third World governments such as Morocco's. When an alleged plot by Moroccan leftists to overthrow Hassan was discovered in July 1963, Algerian complicity was suspected because the plotters had close ties with the Algerian leadership. The Algerians and Hassan continued to be divided by ideology after Houari Boumediene succeeded Ben Bella in a 1965 coup d'état, but tensions began to ease somewhat, as evidenced by an agreement in 1972 that defined the common border.

Beginning in 1974, relations between the two countries again became strained because of Morocco's move to annex and possess the Western Sahara and Algeria's strong support for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Río de Oro (Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el Hamra y Río de Oro—Polisario) that was fighting the Moroccan military there. Despite their long antipathy and involvement on opposite sides in


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the Western Sahara war, both Morocco and Algeria seemed determined in the mid-1980s to avoid escalation of their differences. After the death of Boumediene and his replacement by President Chadli Bendjedid in early 1979, Algerian foreign policy in tone and substance appeared to be markedly less "revolutionary" and ideological than previously. Although Moroccan sources have alleged the frequent involvement of Algerian regular forces in the Western Sahara fighting, informed observers have reported that Algerian units have only been involved in two clashes with Moroccan troops, which occurred near Amgala in the Western Sahara in early 1976. For his part, Hassan has overruled his military commanders and has forbidden hot pursuit into Algerian territory or the bombing of Polisario bases in Algeria. Despite the caution on both sides, in June 1984 Moroccan and Algerian soldiers exchanged shots when a 60-man Moroccan patrol crossed into Algerian territory far north of the tense Western Sahara area. Two Moroccans were killed, and 31 others were captured in that incident, which was termed a "slight skirmish" and a "mistake" by Moroccan authorities. The fact that the problem was quickly and quietly settled without recrimination reflected an attitude of restraint on the part of both countries.

Although Moroccan-Algerian relations were better in the mid-1980s than they had been previously, the Moroccan leadership remained concerned by Algerian support for the Western Sahara rebels and by the balance of military power in the Maghrib. The Moroccan and Algerian armed forces in 1984 were about the same size in terms of manpower, but the Algerians possessed a tank force three times the size of Morocco's, a far larger navy, and an air force with three times as many combat aircraft (see fig. 14). Given Algeria's stronger economy, it was likely that its military's material advantage over the Moroccan armed forces would continue. Moreover, almost all of the Moroccan army was committed to the conflict in the Western Sahara.

The unfavorable military balance was matched by an apparent polarization of political alignment among countries of the region in the early 1980s. Within weeks of a 1983 meeting between Hassan and Bendjedid, the Algerian government signed the Treaty of Fraternity and Cooperation with Tunisia. Morocco's isolation in the region was further pointed out in December 1983 when Mauritania joined in the pact, which was heralded by the signatories as an important step toward unifying the countries of the Maghrib (see Foreign Relations, ch. 4).

The Algeria-Tunisia-Mauritania alliance, combined with Hassan's political flexibility, helped produce in August 1984 what



Source: Based on information from *The Military Balance, 1984-85*, London, 1984.

Figure 14. Balance of Power in the Maghrib, 1984

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Algerian spokesmen called an "alliance against nature" between Morocco and Libya. Before a limited thaw had commenced in 1981, relations between Hassan and Libyan leader Muammar al Qadhaafi had been unrelentingly hostile for a decade. Hassan had viewed Libya with suspicion from the time Qadhaafi had come to power in 1969 by overthrowing a fellow monarch. Relations worsened after the two unsuccessful military coup attempts against Hassan in 1971 and 1972 and the so-called 3 March Plot in 1973, in which some observers suspected Libyan complicity (see Royal Government, 1973-77, ch. 1). Even if Libya was not involved in the coup plots, Qadhaafi had made no secret of his support for Hassan's opponents and began a 10-year propaganda barrage against the monarchy. Relations were also strained by Libyan financial and matériel support for the Polisario, which in most years outweighed even Algeria's assistance.

Through his new "unification" agreement with Qadhaafi, Hassan hoped to gain tangible economic benefits from oil-rich Libya and to wrest the political initiative in the Maghrib away from Algeria. Most important for Morocco, Libya was expected to refrain from further support to the Polisario, although in late 1984 the front's spokesmen were claiming that Libyan financial aid continued despite a curtailment of military supplies.

Along with Algeria and Libya, Spain has also figured prominently in Moroccan security calculations because of its territorial possessions in North Africa. Morocco and Spain have been closely linked since they were both conquered and converted by Islamic armies in the eighth century A.D. (see *Islam and the Arabs*, ch. 1). In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Spain, by then Roman Catholic, established several enclaves along the coast, and in the early twentieth century it took possession of a western section of the Sahara and established a protectorate over part of northern Morocco. When the protectorate was ended, the Moroccan government immediately laid claim to the territories considered to be its own by historical right. At independence Spain's North African possessions—all claimed by Morocco—included the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla on the Mediterranean coast, the enclave of Ifni on the Atlantic, and the territories of Tarfaya, Saguia el Hamra, and Río de Oro, which together composed the Spanish Sahara.

Regaining North African territory held by the non-Muslim European power became one of the Moroccan government's earliest and most important priorities, and over time the Moroccans have been largely successful in their efforts. Beginning in 1957, Moroccan irregular forces affiliated with the

Army of National Liberation (*Armée de Libération Nationale*—ALN) attacked Ifni and raided the Spanish Sahara before a joint Franco-Spanish military sweep crippled their capabilities early the following year. Immediately afterward, a treaty was concluded between Morocco and Spain allowing the former to take possession of Tarfaya in 1958. There were no significant outbreaks of armed conflict between the two countries during the 1960s, and Ifni was peacefully ceded to Morocco in 1969. Hassan then turned his attention to the Spanish Sahara and threatened military action before the territory was formally handed over to Morocco and Mauritania in early 1976. After giving up North African territory, Spain remained aloof to the problems in the Western Sahara, which became the central security preoccupation of Hassan and his military leaders in the late 1970s and early 1980s (see *War in the Western Sahara*, this ch.).

In the early 1980s, after all of Spain's North African territories except for the Mediterranean enclaves had been incorporated by Morocco, relations between the two countries appeared to improve dramatically. This was demonstrated in 1984 when, for the first time, Morocco and Spain held joint military maneuvers. Despite the thaw, an element of suspicion remained between the two countries. Moroccan military forces continued to train for an attack on the enclaves and prepared for the possibility—however remote—that the Spanish might launch an attack on Moroccan soil from Ceuta and Melilla. In 1984 a leading Spanish general was dismissed for commenting on his country's limited capacity to defend the two territories and for criticizing his government's unwillingness to commit more to their defense against Moroccan attack. Hassan has stressed that he would not use force to reclaim Ceuta and Melilla but that if Spain gained control of Gibraltar, then Morocco would press its claims to the enclaves (see *Foreign Relations*, ch. 4).

Security Concerns Beyond the Maghrib

Although primarily concerned with regional issues, Morocco has been a middle power whose political and material interests ranging beyond the Maghrib have also influenced national security policies. The kingdom has not faced a direct threat from outside the region, but it has been willing to commit security forces in defense of what Hassan regards as the broader national interest.

The desire to make a gesture of solidarity with other Arab nations in their conflict with Israel induced Hassan to contribute Moroccan military forces in the October 1973 War in the Middle

East. Several months before the outbreak of fighting the king had dispatched an expeditionary force consisting of two tank brigades to supplement Syrian troops arrayed against Israeli units on the Golan Heights. During the war these units, in position since July 1973, reportedly engaged in sharp fighting against Israeli armor and artillery. After the outbreak of hostilities Hassan sent a second force consisting of Morocco's best infantry and armored units and a squadron of fighter aircraft to Egypt. A cease-fire went into effect before these units could be committed to action, but the king's quick and timely actions and his troops' performance won him praise in the Arab world and at home. Some observers have indicated that the king's sending troops to the Middle East was basically a political move—a show of solidarity with the Arab cause designed to enhance his domestic and international status, particularly with the troublesome radical critics—rather than an indication of Morocco's direct national security concerns. Indeed, the sending of Moroccan troops to the Middle East came during a relatively brief period in 1973–74 when the king was seeking to reemphasize Morocco's role in Arab, African, and Islamic affairs and its policy of nonalignment in the political conflict between the superpowers. This contrasted with his usual tendency to identify his country with Western values and policies.

Moroccan attitudes were more sharply defined, and Moroccan troops had far more effect when on two occasions—in 1977 and 1978—they were sent to Zaïre's Shaba Province to help repel invasions launched from neighboring Angola. A self-proclaimed Marxist-Leninist state with close ties to the Soviet Union and some 20,000 Cuban troops and advisers assisting its government, Angola was suspected of supporting the destabilization of Zaïre, which was more closely linked to Western interests. In April 1977—with the assistance of France, which provided an airlift capability—1,500 of Morocco's best troops were dispatched in quick order to Zaïre. Hassan declared that Morocco's intervention was necessary to prevent Soviet-influenced forces from "encircling, weakening and neutralizing West Europe by controlling its sources of key minerals in Africa." As the king further reasoned, "If the Shaba operation had succeeded and if the Middle East were allowed to continue to drift, not one moderate regime would survive." It was thought that Hassan was also motivated by a desire to improve Morocco's security relations with Western nations that had become somewhat distant at the time because of increasing international criticism of the kingdom's human rights violations and its controversial annexation of the Western Sahara.

The following year, after a second invasion of Shaba Province by the Angolan-based secessionists was halted by the intervention of French paratroops, Moroccan soldiers returned to Zaïre as part of a pan-African peacekeeping force. Hassan was unwilling for Morocco to be the only outside power to commit troops, as it had been in 1977, saying that "we want friendly countries neighboring Zaïre to make at least a symbolic effort to show that it is not a problem that concerns only [Zaïrian] President Mobutu and me. It is a strategic problem for the entire region." In June 1978 the first of a 1,500-man Moroccan contingent began arriving to join nearly 1,000 troops from several other moderate African states in maintaining order in Zaïre. These troops, which were withdrawn in 1979 were widely praised by outside observers for their disciplined performance in difficult conditions.

By his actions in Zaïre, Hassan reinforced his reputation as a reliable partner of the West. This image of an anticommunist defender of Western interests was further bolstered by Morocco's reported involvement in furnishing arms and other supplies to Jonas Savimbi's guerrilla movement—the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)—directed against the Angolan government. In addition, the king strengthened military ties with the West through agreements with the United States in 1982 that established a joint military commission and allowed the American military to have transit privileges at certain Moroccan airfields (see Foreign Military Cooperation, this ch.). His 1984 pact with Qadhaafi's Libya—no friend of the United States—demonstrated, however, that Moroccan security interests could vary significantly from those of Washington.

Hassan has also committed Moroccan security personnel to serve in the personal guard forces of various friendly Arab and African leaders. Notably, in the early 1980s it was reported that a French-trained, 2,000-man contingent of Moroccan guards provided security for the members of the Saudi Arabian royal family and that a smaller number of Moroccans helped protect the leader of the United Arab Emirates. These two examples were seen by some as a demonstration of Hassan's ideological fellowship with his fellow Arab monarchs. Others preferred to emphasize the dispatch of Moroccan guards as a means for Hassan to help pay Morocco's financial debts to these countries. Moroccan troop commitments to certain African countries, including the stationing of 300 to 400 FAR troops in Equatorial Guinea in the early 1980s, were widely regarded as a means of bolstering the kingdom's influence and prestige in those areas. This was especially true when Hassan was seeking African

diplomatic support for Moroccan claims to the Western Sahara.

War in the Western Sahara

The war has been a central preoccupation of Hassan since he organized the 1975 Green March of 350,000 Moroccan civilians into what was then the Spanish Sahara. The march, a crusade to pressure Spain into transferring administration of its Saharan territories to Morocco and Mauritania, was successful not only in achieving that aim but also in unifying Moroccans of all political affiliations in support of the same nationalist goal and in increasing the king's popularity among his people. Morocco and Mauritania, however, soon found themselves fighting a costly war against the Polisario, a movement that claimed to be the sole legitimate representative of the Western Sahara people.

The Polisario commenced its operations in the Western Sahara on May 10, 1973—just 10 days after the front's formation—with an attack on an isolated Spanish post at El Khanga. During the first two years of its existence, it carried out occasional small-scale raids on outlying military and administrative stations and at least one against the conveyor belt connecting the Bu Craa phosphate mines to the El Aaiún anchorage. The military arm of the Polisario—the Saharawi Popular Liberation Army—was, during this period, a small, poorly equipped force having little international support. According to British journalist Tony Hodges, Libya was the first country to aid the front and initially supplied a small shipment of arms and broadcasting facilities. The Mauritanian government in 1973 allowed some of the Polisario's political leaders to live in the capital city of Nouakchott, where they established an informal headquarters, but it did not give military assistance to the fledgling movement. Algerian support for the movement did not commence until mid-1974, and initially it was limited.

By the time of the Green March in late 1975, the Polisario's political and military standing had improved substantially. The front's consistent stance in favor of total independence as opposed to the internal autonomy arrangement the Spanish were proposing helped win the Polisario wider support among the Saharawi (inhabitants of the Western Sahara). Large organized demonstrations in favor of the front greeted the United Nations (UN) Visiting Mission's tour of the territory in May 1975. In its report the UN mission noted that the Polisario "appeared as a dominant political force in the country." Mauritanian assistance

to the Polisario had ended when that country began to coordinate its Spanish Sahara policies with those of Morocco, but this was more than compensated for by the increase in Algerian support in early 1975. Using motorized vehicles, light weapons, gasoline, and sanctuary provided by the Algerians, the Polisario was able to step up its military operations against the Spanish forces and establish itself as the territory's preeminent independence movement. Under pressure, Spanish troops withdrew from some of the smaller outlying towns, allowing the Polisario to take over.

Moroccan and Polisario forces first clashed on October 31, 1975, when the FAR moved into the Polisario-held towns of Farsía, Haousa, and Echdeiria in the northeastern sector of the Spanish Sahara. Given the location of the fighting and the timing—six days before the start of the Green March—some observers have speculated that the operation was intended to divert the Polisario from attacking the marchers 800 kilometers to the west. The Moroccan military occupation began in earnest after the signing of the Treaty of Madrid on November 21, when Spain transferred administration of the Spanish Sahara to Morocco and Mauritania. By the end of 1975 nearly 20,000 troops of the FAR under the command of Colonel Ahmed Dlimi had moved into the territory, where they occupied the bases and barracks being vacated by the Spanish before moving to the more remote areas. They initially met little resistance and captured the last Polisario-held town, Guelta Zemmur, in April 1976.

In February 1976, immediately after the last Spanish soldiers had withdrawn from the Western Sahara, the Polisario-controlled Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) was formally proclaimed. Its military strength was augmented by the absorption of the great majority of the Saharawi who had served with the Spanish army and police in the region—some 1,300 to 3,000 men, according to various estimates. The front's potential supply of military manpower was also vastly increased by the Polisario-led migration in 1976 of tens of thousands of Saharawi to refugee camps in and around Tindouf, Algeria. Estimates of the population living in the camps since that time have varied greatly, as the Algerian authorities have not allowed the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to conduct a census. The Polisario claimed that 100,000 to 150,000 Western Sahara refugees resided in the camps, whereas most international relief agencies estimated that there were 40,000 to 100,000. Based on a 1979 visit to the Tindouf camps, John Damis, a noted American authority on the Western Sahara, estimated that only 17,000 to 35,000 lived there.

The Moroccans have consistently claimed that, in addition to

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the Saharawi, the Polisario has consisted of large numbers of "mercenaries" from other countries in the region. According to a Moroccan military source in 1984, only 40 percent of the Polisario fighters were born in the Western Sahara; another 25 percent were Mauritaniens, 25 percent were from Algeria or Mali, and the remainder came from other Saharan countries. While the authenticity of these specific figures could not be verified, the presence of a large number of outsiders in Polisario ranks was not surprising; historically, the nomadic peoples of the greater Sahara have paid little respect to national borders.

After the Spanish withdrawal the Polisario initially concentrated its military activity against Mauritania, which was the weaker of its two opponents. By the Treaty of Madrid, Mauritania had been given control of the southern third of the Western Sahara, which it renamed Tiris al Gharbia. The area was a desert without known economic potential apart from the fish off its coast, and the tiny Mauritanian army proved incapable of defending it against the Polisario's hit-and-run tactics. Mauritanian vulnerability and Polisario strength were first dramatically demonstrated in June 1976, when a Polisario column of 500 to 600 fighters staged an attack on Nouakchott after traveling across 1,500 kilometers of open desert from Tindouf. In that raid the Polisario secretary general was killed, but the front again raided the Mauritanian capital in July 1977. The Polisario also launched attacks against the Mauritanian iron ore mines of Zouérate and the rail line that linked that facility to the coast at Nouadhibou.

The Polisario's success against Mauritania prompted increased Moroccan and French support for the beleaguered Mauritanian army. In May 1977 Morocco and Mauritania signed a defense pact that led to the sending of nearly 9,000 FAR troops to reinforce the port of Dakhla and isolated garrisons in the interior of Tiris al Gharbia. The French government also signed a military agreement with Mauritania in September 1976, but its participation in the conflict was minimal until several French citizens were captured and killed by the Polisario in raids the following May. French assistance to Mauritania eventually included 75 military advisers, arms, and communications equipment. In addition, French jets based near Dakar in Senegal carried out a series of air strikes against Polisario formations raiding Mauritanian settlements in December 1977 and May 1978.

The air attacks reduced the Polisario's ability to stage large raids, but the front's political victory over Mauritania was sealed by the military coup against Mauritanian head of state Mokhtar Ould Daddah in July 1978. Two days later the Polisario

unilaterally declared a "temporary" cease-fire in Tiris al Gharbia in preparation for negotiating a peace settlement. When a bilateral agreement was not achieved, the Polisario resumed hostilities in July 1979 on the anniversary of the cease-fire. Shortly afterward, in the Treaty of Algiers of August 5, 1979, the Mauritanian government renounced its claim to Tiris al Gharbia and formally withdrew from the war. Morocco promptly laid claim to the area renaming it Oued ed Dahab, and augmented its forces that had been there assisting Mauritania.

After the Mauritanian coup, the Polisario directed its attentions toward the Moroccans, who had previously encountered only sporadic attacks in their section of the Western Sahara. As they had done against the Mauritians, the mobile Polisario forces, using equipment, sanctuary, food, and logistics supplied by Algeria and Libya, completely controlled the tempo of the fighting. Equipped with light four-wheel-drive vehicles armed with heavy machine guns, 81mm mortars, and 106mm recoilless guns—instead of camels and rifles—the Saharawi employed raiding tactics reminiscent of the raiding style of warfare practiced by their ancestors. The raiders, who numbered 10,000 to 12,000 in 1980, were able to circulate freely through the nearly unpopulated region and to focus their attacks on the Moroccan forces stationed in isolated garrisons. Even when they had concentrated these activities in the Mauritanian zone, the Polisario had managed to keep the Bu Craa phosphate mine out of action since 1976. By 1979 they were conducting strikes behind Morocco's internationally recognized borders and had isolated the 5,000-man garrison at Zaag in southern Morocco, so that it had to be resupplied from the air. For its part, the FAR—whose numbers committed to operations in the Western Sahara grew from some 20,000 in early 1970 to 120,000 in the 1980s—was consistently unable to engage the Polisario on favorable terms.

The Moroccan ground forces, designed for a conventional conflict with Algeria, were weighed down with heavy equipment ill-suited for dealing with the Polisario. The air force had complete control of the Western Sahara skies, but its effectiveness was limited by the inappropriateness of its jet fighters for ground attack, by the Polisario's increased use of Soviet-made portable surface-to-air missiles and, perhaps most importantly, by an overcentralized command structure in which the king made decisions that should have been left to local commanders. In order to regain the initiative, the Moroccans used their limited foreign exchange reserves to buy new military hardware (see Foreign Military Cooperation, this ch.). They also

deployed light mobile forces of their own in 1979–80, but these units were less mobile than those of the Polisario. Moreover, Moroccan soldiers were less knowledgeable about the desert terrain, and the search-and-destroy tactic proved unsuccessful in practice. For a short time in 1979–80 the Moroccans also tried, without apparent success, to support an anti-Algerian insurgency. This force, called the Association of Native Saharans. Formerly under Spanish Rule, had first been formed in 1976. According to spokesmen, the organization's purpose was "to release fellow Saharans held [by the Algerians] as refugees in the Tindouf concentration camps." Apart from the FAR's presence in some of the more heavily fortified towns, Moroccan control over the Western Sahara in 1979–80 was a costly illusion.

The military situation began to improve for Morocco shortly after Dlimi, by this time a brigadier general and the king's most trusted military leader, assumed command of the FAR's Southern Zone in mid-1980. In contrast to the earlier situation, in which all major and many minor tactical decisions were made by the king, Hassan entrusted Dlimi with full operational responsibility as theater commander. The general immediately ordered the strengthening of the fortifications protecting the major Moroccan-held settlements in the Western Sahara and in December 1980 publicly announced that his forces were building a surveillance and obstacle line that became known simply as the wall, or the berm. "We intend to move forward in force," declared Dlimi, "establishing heavily entrenched support points and building sand barriers, laying mines, and setting up barbed-wire obstacles equipped with radar as we progress." Beginning different sections of the berm near Semara, east of Bu Craa, and at Ras el Khanfra, the Moroccans built north toward Lemseied in Morocco proper—where the rise of the Ouarkiz Plateau, part of the Anti-Atlas range, forms a natural barrier—and south and west toward the ocean. Despite incessant attacks by Polisario forces using heavier weapons than they had in the past—light tanks, wire-guided missiles, and "Stalin Organ" multiple rocket launchers—construction proceeded apace. In 1980 the passes through the Ouarkiz Plateau were sealed; by March 1981 the line was 200 kilometers long; by June it extended 450 kilometers and stretched from south of Bu Craa to Lemseied; by November it was joined to the outer defense perimeter of El Aaiún; and in April 1982 an extension was built incorporating Boujdour on the Atlantic coast and enclosing what the Moroccans called "the useful Sahara" (see fig. 15).

The system of defense represented by the berm, innovative




Figure 15. The Western Sahara and the Wall (Berm), Early 1985

in the context of the late twentieth century when fixed defense lines were scorned by most tacticians, was designed to be invulnerable against likely Polisario attacks. Carved by bulldozers, the berm was, for most of its length, a double barrier of sand varying from two to five meters in height. Foxholes were dug along its crown, and every five to six kilometers were solidly

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built stone bunkers housing artillery and infantry units equipped with machine guns, mortars, antitank guns, and wire-guided missiles. Outside the berm stretched lines of barbed wire and mine fields. Inside, a road network linked the line with armor, mobile artillery, and mechanized infantry units that could be called up quickly from rear areas in emergencies. French-built ground surveillance radars overlooked terrain that, for the most part, permitted good visibility and clear fields of fire for the defenders.

The Polisario was unsuccessful in its attempts to halt construction of the berm and, later, in its efforts to breach it, but it was able to mount successful attacks against Moroccan-held towns outside the berm. In October 1981, in their biggest operation of the war to that point, the Polisario briefly took the heavily defended town of Guelta Zemmur after fierce fighting. The battle was notable for the Polisario's use of Soviet-made heavy artillery, T-54 and T-55 main battle tanks, and SA-6 surface-to-air missiles. The latter, a radar- and infrared-guided missile launched from a vehicle built upon a tank chassis, was one of the more sophisticated weapons of its kind in the world, and its use temporarily neutralized Moroccan air power. The FAR lost several aircraft, and some 400 men were killed or captured; but a Moroccan relief column was quickly able to retake the town. A month later, however, the Moroccans abandoned Guelta Zemmur as well as Bir Enzarán, the only two interior towns beyond the berm that they had continued to hold. After Boujdour was enclosed by the berm some months later, fortified Dakhla on the coast remained the sole Moroccan-held town outside the defense line.

Although the Polisario continued to dominate the rocks and desert beyond it, construction of the berm allowed Morocco to assert unquestioned control over the useful Sahara. Peace and a semblance of regularity returned to the interior areas and were symbolized by the reopening of the Bu Craa mines in 1982. It was estimated that 6,000 to 10,000 FAR troops were killed in the 1976-84 period, but casualties were sharply reduced in the new environment.

Early in 1985 the Moroccans appeared to have the upper hand in the Western Sahara fighting. Only once, in an October 1984 attack near Zaag, had Polisario fighters been able to penetrate the line in force, and in that instance they were quickly stopped by Moroccan reinforcements. Years of fruitless attacks on the berm had killed experienced Polisario soldiers and sapped the survivors' morale; it was estimated in early 1985 that only 2,500 to 3,000 Polisario troops were militarily active in the Western Sahara, down from 6,000 to 8,000 in 1982 and 10,000 to 12,000 in

1980. Successive Moroccan extensions of the berm, which came to enclose almost the entire Saguia el Hamra, further strengthened Moroccan control and brought the fighting closer to Algerian territory.

The war, however, seemed to be far from over. Despite the fact that Libya had renounced its commitments to the Polisario, the front's diplomatic strength had been boosted by the recognition of the SADR as a state by the OAU (see Appendix B). In early 1985 the two sides showed no signs of coming to an accommodation, and the Algerians were giving no indication that they would cease their relatively low-cost assistance to the Polisario. Because Morocco had been unable to defeat the front decisively, years of Polisario raids against the berm seemed a possibility. Moroccan control of the areas behind the berm, however, did not appear vulnerable to threats of this kind unless, for reasons of economy or in the illusion that the berm itself could provide an adequate defense, the FAR withdrew large numbers of troops from their positions along and behind it. In that situation, and in the absence of a satisfactory political settlement, the berm could become merely an easily crossed sand dune, no more impregnable than the ancient Roman walls or the Great Wall of China in the twentieth century.

The Royal Armed Forces

In 1985 all four branches of the FAR had the dual mission of protecting the country from external threats and of maintaining domestic order. For the 160,000-member army, the air force of 13,500, and the navy of 6,500, defense of the country's frontiers was the primary mission. By contrast, the Royal Gendarmerie, although technically a branch of the military, was primarily concerned with internal security (see Police and Intelligence Services, this ch.). Since its formation, the FAR has undergone several reorganizations. Initially, changes in the structure reflected improvements in the quality and quantity of equipment and manpower as the force was built up on conventional lines using the French army as a model. Later changes were based on the king's desire to head off potential security threats from the FAR by putting practically all units under the direct control of the palace. More recently, the FAR was tripled in size and had to be reorganized to fight effectively against the Polisario in the Western Sahara. Because of its combat experience, the FAR was considered by some observers to be the most powerful military

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establishment in North Africa despite Algerian and Libyan numerical advantages in equipment.

Development of the Modern Armed Forces

Moroccans, particularly the Berber tribes, have a long-standing international reputation for martial prowess. This tradition has been suggested as one of the attractions that prompted French interest in Morocco in the early twentieth century. Having already experienced satisfaction with their use of Algerian troops, the French viewed Morocco as a ready source of soldiers with which to bolster their own military strength at home and thus better equip themselves to deal with an increasingly militaristic Germany.

For its part, the Moroccan government did not object to the establishment of a protectorate in 1912. Before the period of the protectorate, the traditional authority of the sultans had been backed by military contingents from *jaysh* tribes that performed military service in exchange for land and tax concessions (see Almohads, ch. 1). The system, however, was not without a certain element of uncertainty. The sultan was never really sure of the loyalty of his forces inasmuch as their direct allegiance was to the individual *qajids* (tribal governors). It has been suggested that this questionable loyalty was one of the reasons the sultan had looked with favor on the establishment of the protectorate—an arrangement in which his security was assured by the French and Spanish.

The Protectorate Period

After occupying various Moroccan power centers beginning in 1907, the French began to augment their own forces with Moroccan recruits, which they organized into four elements: *tirailleurs*, *goums*, *maghzanis*, and *partisans*. In addition, a traditional military element known as the Sharifian Guard was retained as a royal bodyguard to the sultan; the guard's duties, however, were primarily ceremonial. Separately, special irregular forces were recruited by and operated under the authority of the senior *qajids*. Pay for those *maghzanis* assigned to the rear areas and for the *partisans* was included each year in the protectorate budget. All of the other Moroccan forces were paid from funds included in the French military budget.

The *tirailleurs* were the regular soldiers, and their role was strictly military. Although used for domestic pacification operations as the occasion warranted, these regulars, some of

whom rose to high rank, were primarily liable for service abroad and served with courage and distinction in such divergent spots as France, the Levant, and Indochina. As integral elements of the French army, the *tirailleurs* produced many officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs), who were trained in French military schools.

Other elements of the early Moroccan security forces served the French pacification effort in political as well as military roles. The mission of the *goums* was to strengthen the irregular troops of the senior *qaid*s by exhibiting greater discipline and training and using machine guns and other modern weapons. A *goum* consisted of roughly 160 men and several French NCOs; they were organized variously as cavalry and infantry units, providing their own horses and food. *Goumiers* (members of the *goums*) served as their own recruiters, and one authority described them as "the best propagandists for the French cause and indefatigable missionaries of civilization." Between periods of active pacification operations, the *goums* served as a gendarmerie, maintaining peace and order in the tribal areas.

The *maghzanis* were assigned to the rural sections of the protectorate. Composed of 25 to 30 men, each unit was recruited by the local French authorities from among the most prominent and influential local families to serve as bodyguards and messengers. Others consisted of people the local French administrators wished to keep under close surveillance. The *maghzanis* lived with their families and were not subject to military discipline. During their service they were often entrusted with missions demanding intelligence and responsibility, and many eventually served as *qaid*s.

The *partisans* were the local forces of the remote rear areas, recruited by the *qaid*s for special missions and demobilized when the operations were completed. Often recruited from among the traditional *jaysh* tribes and dominated by Berbers, they were customarily invited by the French to serve as the vanguard of rear area advances, spurred on by the promise of excitement, looting, and the satisfaction of continuing old blood feuds with neighboring tribes. The *partisans* were usually chosen for their physical strength and knowledge of the local terrain.

It has been estimated that approximately 40,000 Moroccan *tirailleurs* served in France during World War I and suffered heavy casualties. In World War II before the French collapsed under the onslaught of Hitler's forces, Moroccan troops again fought against the Germans in Europe. Their tenacity and military prowess earned the Moroccans the respect of the

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German high command, and as part of the occupation agreement with Germany. France was forced to deactivate the Moroccan *goums*. Although formal dissolution was achieved at least on paper, the *goumiers* simply disappeared into the Moroccan mountains, where they operated clandestinely as guerrilla bands and retained meager stocks of weapons. Eventually, after the Allied liberation they were re-equipped, and approximately 12,000 *goumiers* aided in the fight against Axis forces in Tunisia. By the end of World War II some 300,000 Moroccans had fought with the Allies in the North African campaigns, the invasion of Italy, and the liberation of France.

Money sent home by Moroccan troops during World War II, together with the pensions paid to former soldiers, had a beneficial effect on the economy of many rural areas of their homeland. Moreover, the French protectorate authorities gave assistance to the veterans in obtaining employment and loans and aided in the care of war widows and orphans. The immediate demobilization of about 45,000 veterans of World War II was carefully undertaken. In 1954 it was estimated that some 126,000 former soldiers of all ages were living as civilians in Morocco, mainly in the rural tribal areas that had served traditionally as sources of recruits for the French army.

Postindependence Developments

On the eve of independence the country was still occupied in its respective protectorate zones by approximately 85,000 French troops and some 60,000 Spanish soldiers. As Morocco had no national military establishment of its own, Mohammed V entered into formal agreements with France and Spain to get them to assist in the development of a military force adequate to meet his country's needs. The achievement of this end, however, was fraught with the need to act with utmost speed.

Domestic internal security requirements were exacerbated by a growing political struggle for control of the future Moroccan military arm by the nationalist forces of the independence party, the Istiqlal; the king, who was nominally allied with the Istiqlal; and the guerrilla fighters of the Army of National Liberation (Armée de Libération Nationale—ALN). In neighboring Algeria the French were defending their position against an independence struggle mounted by the Algerian nationalist movement, which also threatened pressures on Morocco. Thus, as Morocco became an independent state, Mohammed V gave utmost priority to the creation of the armed forces.

From the outset the structuring and the development of the FAR were dependent primarily on the decisions of Crown Prince Mulay Hassan. The future King Hassan II declared that his goal was the creation of a military establishment that would assist in stabilizing the country. Left unstated was the royal family's desire to acquire a monopoly of power to secure and perpetuate the monarchy.

In early March 1956 a military commission was appointed by Mohammed V to work out the details of establishing a viable armed force. The commission included the sultan, his son Crown Prince Mulay Hassan, ranking cabinet ministers, French army officers, and senior Moroccan officers from the French army. Shortly thereafter, the sultan announced the creation of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff (*État-Major Général*). Ahmed Reda Guédira, a close associate of the sultan who remained as one of Hassan's closest advisers in the mid-1980s, was named minister of defense, and Hassan was appointed chief of the General Staff.

In subsequent negotiations with the French and the Spanish, the commission adopted as its goal the formation of a 20,000-man army by the end of 1956, to be formed by the transfer of Moroccan units from the French army. By May 1956 the new force comprised 14,000 officers and men and 200 vehicles. Included were 10 infantry battalions of former French *goumiers*, one infantry battalion of former French *tirailleurs*, two infantry battalions of former Spanish units, one cavalry battalion, one armored group, one artillery group, one engineer battalion, one mule company, one signal detachment, one transport company, and one logistics group. All units were under authorized strength in both personnel and equipment, and uniforms were a diverse mixture of French and Spanish origin. During the next year it was expanded by the integration of 10,000 additional Moroccans who had served in the Spanish protectorate forces and by the absorption of elements of the ALN who agreed to join.

Because the new army initially lacked sufficient numbers of trained Moroccan military leaders, the French supplied nearly 1,000 commissioned officers and a like number of NCOs on one-year contracts to satisfy the immediate requirement. A longer range solution eventually was provided by agreements under which the French and Spanish governments opened their national military academies at Saint Cyr and Toledo, respectively, to Moroccan officer candidates for one-year accelerated training programs; about 200 officer candidates entered each school in the summer of 1956. The French also

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undertook to staff and conduct officer training at the Royal Military Academy at Dar al Bayda near Meknès and provided instructors for a new school for NCOs that was established at Ahermoumou.

In the first years after the ending of the protectorate, the army was employed on several occasions to assist in maintaining internal security. Most significantly, during the autumn and winter of 1958-59 the FAR was called upon to suppress a widespread rebellion in the Rif led by dissident elements of the ALN. Hassan took personal control of the operation and led 20,000 army troops against rebels concentrated in the area between Al Hoceima and Taza. Promises to the rebels of a review of grievances and the giving of pardons, combined with military intimidation, helped end the revolt. The army was used relatively sparingly in internal security situations after the quelling of the Rif uprising, although troops were used to back up the police on occasion, notably during the severe riots in Casablanca in 1965. According to a view commonly held by analysts of Morocco and summarized by political scientist Wilfred Knapp, "for internal security, the importance of the army was in its potential."

The army in its early years was also used occasionally along and beyond the country's borders. In July 1960 Morocco responded to a UN appeal for troops to aid in quelling an outbreak of violence in the Congo (present-day Zaïre) by airlifting a complete army battalion to the troubled area in four days. These Moroccan military forces included 3,700 of the country's best troops, most of the General Staff, and an army brigadier general who served for a time as deputy commander of the UN forces. Moroccan troops served with distinction in the Congo under UN command until they were withdrawn in January 1961.

Moroccan forces were also used to press the kingdom's irredentist claims against its neighbors in the early postindependence period. The presence of large numbers of French and Spanish troops serving on secondment as officers and NCOs in the FAR prevented the regular army from being usefully deployed against neighboring French and Spanish possessions during this time, although irregular forces raided across the borders into Ifni and the Spanish Sahara. Morocco was less circumspect with Algeria after the latter's independence from France in 1962. In the sporadic engagements that characterized the war of the sands, most analysts concluded that the Moroccans performed somewhat better than the Algerians, but the effectiveness of both armies was hampered by their reliance on long and inefficient supply lines.

The FAR underwent numerous changes in its organizational philosophy as it steadily grew to a manned strength of about 50,000 by 1970. Originally based on strategic strongpoints and scattered garrisons inherited from the French, army control of the country was organized on a regional basis in 1959. Sixteen military zones, approximately contiguous with administrative provinces at the time, were established. A shortage of trained senior officers relegated most of those available to the General Staff. Consequently battalions were scattered around the country under the command of junior officers. The result, although not optimal, was generally in keeping with Hassan's wariness of a powerful intermediate command level within his military establishment. He had been greatly disturbed by an army revolt that had toppled the throne in Iraq in 1958 and was quoted as saying on one occasion, "In Morocco there will be no generals' and colonels' revolt as there was in Iraq, because I do not give command of troops to my generals and colonels."

Despite Hassan's stated concerns, successive reorganizations in the 1960s placed ever more control of the FAR in the hands of professional military officers. By 1965 the army had enough trained senior officers to permit a more centralized territorial organization, and the country was divided into three military zones and one independent sector. By 1971 this arrangement had been changed to six military zones, each commanded by a general having the title of military governor. The trend toward a strong military command was abruptly ended by the coup attempts of 1971 and 1972.

Loyalty, Deceit, and Royal Control

The bloody coup attempt at the king's Skhirat summer palace in July 1971 and the nearly successful attempt one year later to kill him by shooting down his personal aircraft mark a watershed in the relationship between the monarchy and the military (see Attempted Coup d'État of July 10, 1971; Attempted Coup d'État of August 16, 1972, ch. 1). Before the plots were revealed, most observers and apparently the king himself did not question the loyalty of the upper echelons of his officer corps. After the two coup attempts, in which most of the king's leading generals—including General Mohammed Oufkir, who was widely regarded as Hassan's most loyal and trusted commander—were implicated or killed (or both), the king began to treat his military with suspicion. "Henceforth," he stated in an interview one week after the second attempted coup, "I must never place my trust in

anyone." Military appointments, the structure of the FAR and the high command, and the dispersal of forces have thus come to reflect Hassan's concern for the potential threat to his power inherent in the Moroccan military.

During the first 15 years after the end of the protectorate, the FAR—far from being a threat to the monarchy—was considered to be a pillar of the king's strength. Most observers saw the upper levels of the officer corps as basically apolitical, fiercely loyal to the monarchy and, in contrast to other elements of the elite, generally uncorrupt. The apolitical nature of the FAR was strongly encouraged by the monarchy. A *zahir* (royal decree) issued in 1958 forbade the affiliation of the military or any individuals in it with any political movement. This move was taken without consulting the Istiqlal and effectively blunted the politicians' attempts to politicize the officer corps. Military loyalty to the throne was also reinforced by the knowledge that the king was responsible for the power, prestige, and position that his military leaders were able to attain. Because virtually all of them had previously served with the foreign military forces occupying Morocco, the military leaders had no political base independent of the king. Moreover, they distrusted the civilian political leaders and resented their factionalism. For their part, according to political scientist John Waterbury, the civilian political leaders feared the military, which "enables the king to curb civilian elements of the elite and to present himself as the most feasible alternative to military rule." By thus playing on the anxieties of both the politicians and the military leadership, the monarchy was able to undermine the civilian opposition and accumulate a virtual monopoly of power during the 1950s and 1960s.

In the late 1960s, when the parliament (the Chamber of Representatives) was dismissed and the country was run by royal fiat during the "state of exception," the king increasingly placed military officers in important administrative and advisory roles. General Oufkir, who had been appointed minister of interior in 1964, emerged as the king's closest security adviser. By 1970 most of the provincial governors were soldiers, and military officers served in mid- and upper-level administrative positions in government departments and as *qaid*s.

The danger of placing his trust in the military leadership was first revealed to Hassan in the Skhirat coup attempt. After this nearly successful plot was put down, it was discovered that five of Morocco's 13 serving generals were implicated. The reasons for the rebellion have never been fully established, but apparently they involved a combination of disgust at official corruption as

well as personal ambition. Hassan downplayed the significance of the coup, but he completely reshuffled the government, designating Oufkir as minister of defense and FAR chief of staff.

After the second coup attempt, the king instituted a sweeping reorganization of the military designed to consolidate his power over all of its elements. Three days after the unsuccessful attack on his aircraft, Hassan told his top officers that the reputation of the army had been "degraded" and announced the abolition of the posts of minister of defense, chief of staff, and deputy chief of staff. "From this day," he stated, "you will deal directly with me." In addition to those executed and jailed, officers close to Oufkir, who was implicated in the plot, were dismissed or retired. The air force colonel who had skillfully landed the badly damaged royal aircraft after the attack was appointed commander of the air force, and the commander of the navy and the deputy commander of the army were also replaced. Unwilling to accept, as he put it, a pattern of annual attempts on his life, Hassan virtually disarmed his army. Allowing them to retain their weapons, he directed that all ammunition be kept in locked depots scattered throughout the country under the control of the civilian provincial governors and guarded by the Auxiliary Forces. Only the army's Light Security Brigade, which had played a decisive role in quelling the Skhirat attack in 1971, and the members of the Royal Guard were allowed to retain control over their ammunition.

In Hassan's wave of reforms the Ministry of Defense was transformed into the National Defense Administration, which concerned itself exclusively with procurement and logistics matters. Headed by the general secretary for national defense—a military officer—this body was completely divorced from operational control of the armed forces, which was vested exclusively with the king, who again assumed the responsibilities of the chief of staff (see fig. 16).

In addition, the FAR was completely restructured. Before 1971 it had been organized around military regions whose forces were commanded by officers chosen for their loyalty. After the 1971 coup attempt, Hassan dissolved the military regions; later he reorganized the military so that no units existed that were larger than battalion size. He also instituted a policy of shifting these forces around the country to avoid concentrations of troops in any one place. The artillery units were deployed a great distance from Rabat, and an increased number of FAR units were assigned to civic action projects.

FAR personnel policies were also overhauled. No new




Figure 16. Organization of the Moroccan Security Forces, 1985

generals were appointed for several years, and most of those on active duty were quickly retired. Officers were no longer allowed to remain at assigned posts for long periods as in the past. At the same time the king established more personal contacts with his senior military officers in an effort to improve his relations with them.

Hassan also moved to facilitate his ability to communicate directly with his field commanders without having to rely on the regular military chain of command and communications. The so-called Forward Headquarters (*État-Major Avancé*) was established in the mid-1970s and included specially selected, loyal officers that transmitted the king's orders directly to units in the field. This system was designed to provide to the palace intelligence on troop movements and officers' political sympathies. The Forward Headquarters also included the king's cousin Mulay Hafid, Guédira, Dlimi, and other close advisers, who served as his military cabinet. As a consequence, the General Staff in Rabat was, in fact if not in name, removed from operational responsibility for the FAR's combat units.

In an attempt to support a new ethos and repair the tarnished image of his military establishment, the king issued a *zahir* in August 1974 containing regulations relating to discipline in the FAR. The comprehensive regulations covered such wide-ranging subjects as rank and precedence, command and control, military courtesy, leaves and passes, political and union involvement—which was prohibited—and other matters pertaining to the behavior of military personnel. The pronouncements in the *zahir* superseded all previous regulations on these subjects. Of particular interest was the preamble that stated "No serviceman may invoke his own ignorance of current laws or regulations, or his superior's position, to justify carrying out orders contrary to the defense of the Country or its institutions." This portion of the *zahir* apparently was written in response to the defense used at the trials after the two military coup attempts of 1971 and 1972, when some of the accused pleaded not guilty on the grounds of having merely followed orders from higher ranking personnel. Those who used this plea were strongly criticized by the king.

After the wave of reforms centralizing control of the FAR in the palace, civilian politicians' participation in military decisionmaking continued to be severely circumscribed. Inputs from the political parties and the governmental ministries were assured in theory through the existence of the Supreme Council on National Security, an interministerial body created by *zahir* in November 1957 to lessen political party pressure in matters affecting high-level military decisions. Composed of seven

ministers whose governmental agencies were related functionally to the FAR's missions, the council operated in an advisory capacity to the king until the government was disbanded during the state of exception of the late 1960s. In 1979 the king established the National Defense Council, including representatives of all the major political parties to unite them in the war effort. The council, under Dlimi's chairmanship, was also nominally responsible for directing the activities of Morocco's preeminent intelligence service (see *Intelligence Services*, this ch.). Although it remained a formally constituted body in the mid-1980s, the National Defense Council ceased to be politically useful and seldom met in full session.

The limitations of the highly centralized structure of the FAR were apparent in the Western Sahara war. The fact that the military action against the lightly armed, highly mobile enemy could not be effectively directed from Rabat gradually led to some modification of the king's close control over FAR combat units. The most significant change was the 1980 establishment of the Southern Zone of military operations under the command of Dlimi, who was given unprecedented power to control the forces under his authority. These included up to 80 percent of the FAR's combat ground forces as well as certain air units temporarily assigned to the Southern Zone.

Dlimi, who was the first officer to be appointed to general grade since the 1971 coup attempt, apparently had been able to win a degree of trust from the cautious monarch after many years of faithful service. In addition to his role as Southern Zone commander, he also served as director of the *Sûreté Nationale*, director of the Royal Aides de Camp, and director of the nation's most important intelligence service, as well as being one of the king's closest advisers. His death under mysterious circumstances in a January 1983 automobile accident fueled considerable speculation that the king suspected Dlimi of plotting against him. Although dozens of officers were arrested immediately after the general's death, there was no major restructuring of the security forces. With the partial exception of the semiautonomous, geographically distant Southern Zone, the king retained the strict system of royal command and control that had been imposed a decade earlier. Dlimi's command responsibilities were simply parceled out to four officers, none of whom appeared to rival his predecessor in terms of power, influence, or access to the king.

The relationship between the king and his soldiers was the subject of considerable conjecture in the two years after Dlimi's death. There was, however, little hard information available on

soldiers' attitudes toward the king, the war, or political matters in general. The improvement in Morocco's fortunes in the Western Sahara beginning in 1981 appeared to have lessened the likelihood that the war would degenerate in a manner that could lead demoralized soldiers to turn against their ruler. Another view, however, held that military opposition to the king could grow out of the armed forces' success in the war. Contrasting their battlefield achievements with the king's failure to achieve diplomatic recognition of Morocco's annexation of the Western Sahara and his inability to solve the country's vexing socioeconomic problems, military leaders might conclude that they could do a better job of running the country. Some observers have also noted the possibility that the military might contain organized cells of radical Islamic reformists, republicans, political leftists, or others opposed to the monarchy. Although such groups may exist, they have not left publicly known signs of their activity. Indeed, the possibility remained that the FAR was a staunchly loyal, strictly apolitical force, much as it was thought to be before the coup attempts of 1971 and 1972.

The Military and the Economy

Defense costs, which have constituted a serious drain on the Moroccan economy during the Western Sahara war, have been closely monitored by the king. The military budget was prepared annually by the National Defense Administration on the basis of the needs of the armed forces as interpreted by the palace. The palace also coordinated discussions on the budget between the National Defense Administration, the Ministry of Finance, elements of the General Staff, and the commander of the Southern Zone, who was responsible for nearly all of the FAR's fighting units. Since the reestablishment of democratic institutions in 1977, adoption of the defense budget has been subject to the approval of the parliament. In reality, however, the king has been the key actor in formulating the defense budget by virtue of his *de facto* control of the relevant institutions.

In the period after Morocco's 1976 annexation of two-thirds of the Western Sahara, defense spending and other costs associated with the war grew astronomically. In 1975, according to figures supplied by the International Monetary Fund, total spending classified as defense, which included all security forces, was DH1.7 billion (for value of the dirham—see Glossary). This accounted for 13.5 percent of total central government expenditures. By 1983 Moroccan government figures indicated

that allocations in the current budget earmarked for defense administration had grown to some DH4.24 billion, which made up 21 percent of the current budget. Additionally, the capital budget included DH2.77 billion—some 15 percent of the total—that was devoted to the military. The DH7.01 billion in total military spending amounted to some 18 percent of the government is capital and current budget and 7.4 percent of the estimated gross domestic product. In comparison, the Ministry of National Education, which spent DH7.05 billion in 1983, was the only government ministry that spent more than the National Defense Administration. Central government expenditures on health, by contrast, amounted to DH1.2 million in 1983, only 2.7 percent of the total budget.

Official figures on military spending, however, must be viewed with caution. Estimates by local observers, which are generally given more credence by analysts, put spending on the security forces at 35 percent to 40 percent of the national budget during the early 1980s. Neither the official figures nor the higher unofficial estimates include considerable expenditures for arms financed by other states. Nor do they include investment in civilian infrastructure projects in the Western Sahara, which themselves were estimated to account for about 7 percent of central government spending.

Defense costs weighed heavily on the Moroccan economy in the 1970s and early 1980s. Hassan cited costs related to the war when in 1978 he put aside Morocco's 1978-82 development plan in favor of a three-year austerity plan. The military adversely affected the civilian economy mainly because scarce foreign exchange was spent to purchase fuel, ammunition, and equipment abroad. Despite significant foreign financial grants for military purchases—mainly from Saudi Arabia and the Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf—military purchases contributed an unknown but significant amount to the country's foreign debt. In the early 1980s defense costs appeared to level off after the construction of the berm stabilized the front in the Western Sahara. The prospects for a significant near-term decrease, however, appeared to be slight. Although purchases of new military equipment declined between, 1982 and 1985, foreign exchange outlays to replace aging equipment and otherwise supply an army that had ballooned to more than three times its prewar size would likely remain high unless the government ordered large-scale demobilizations, which could have dangerous security implications.

Increased military spending had few demonstrably positive

effects on the economy. Because Morocco had no military-related industries, production was not directly stimulated by government spending related to the war. The increased size of the military, however, did not constitute a drain on the labor force. To the contrary, it was asserted that any significant reduction in the manned strength of the FAR would only exacerbate the country's acute unemployment problem. The spending patterns of the 120,000 soldiers in the Southern Zone were thought to be a major factor in stimulating development of the Western Sahara economy, complementing other government investment in the region.

Before the Western Sahara war escalated in the mid-1970s, the costs of defense had been eased somewhat by a coordinated policy to involve FAR units in civic action projects. This policy began in the late 1960s at a time when the king was appointing large numbers of FAR officers to civilian administrative positions. The program was launched in order to make the military less of a burden on the economy, as well as to provide civilian job skills to recruits. In addition, FAR units had been active in relief and rescue work in times of natural disaster and in various aspects of public works, such as roadbuilding, bridge construction, assistance on irrigation projects, and similar activities. Later, after the attempted coups, the program was intensified, presumably to divert unarmed units to isolated areas and to discourage further plotting. As more and more units and military resources were committed to the Western Sahara war, however, military involvement in civilian projects practically ceased. In the mid-1980s it appeared that FAR units might again be called upon to engage in civic action, particularly construction in the Western Sahara.

Sources and Quality of Manpower

Whether the FAR should be a professional force based solely on volunteers or an institution dependent at least in part on a selective service system has historically been a matter of great political concern. At issue in this question have been two opposing viewpoints. On the one hand the king has been determined to maintain personal control of a loyal armed force, and it is generally believed that volunteer forces would be more likely to be unswervingly dedicated to the monarchy. On the other hand the civilian political parties and activists have favored obligatory military service, which, they felt, would not only result in a truly national army but would also afford their adherents access to influential ranks within the FAR. In the early 1980s the struggle

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appeared to have been resolved: conscription was enforced, the king maintained unquestioned control of the military, and the politicians were apparently irrelevant in military affairs.

At independence in March 1956 Hassan, backed by the newly created General Staff, had decided that the army would be professional rather than conscripted, a move recommended to and accepted by his father, Mohammed V. Maintaining such a volunteer force at necessary manpower levels proved not to be difficult. In a country beset with a high rate of unemployment, military service offered considerable security; moreover the high prestige of a military uniform was an attraction of some value in a society proud of its long-standing fighting tradition. In the 1960s, during the few enlistment periods that occurred to increase the size of the army, the commanding officers of the military units operated their own recruiting services, a system borrowed from the French. Under this system renewable enlistments of five years' duration were permitted, and the resulting reenlistment rate was invariably high. Enlistees, most of whom could neither read nor write, were assisted in filling out occupational questionnaires and were given medical examinations, including X-rays, but there were no clinical or aptitude tests.

The army's traditional status as a professional service changed somewhat after the king's *zahir* of 1967, which introduced a system of conscription, and especially after the reforms instituted in the wake of the coup attempts of the early 1970s. Since then the FAR has consisted of a carefully selected corps of volunteers serving as a cadre augmented by conscripted personnel, who under the king's *zahir* have been required to serve for 18 months in the armed forces after reaching the age of 18.

The FAR benefited from a high rate of reenlistment, and many soldiers preferred to remain in the service until forced out by age. Maximum age-in-grade limits, ranging from 41 for lieutenants to 61 for generals, have been fixed by law. Statutory age limits for NCOs and enlisted men ranged from 45 for privates to 50 for warrant officers. Highly qualified NCOs or enlisted men who performed special duties were authorized to serve beyond their statutory age limit. This occurred less frequently with officers.

Morocco has not experienced difficulty in meeting its need for military manpower. According to United States government estimates, from a population estimated at 23.6 million in 1984 there were some 5.2 million males aged 15 to 49. Of these, an estimated 3.2 million were considered to be fit for military service. Roughly 255,000 reached the age of 18 annually and were subject to the system of limited conscription. In 1985 the number

of physically eligible youths conscripted annually was not known with any degree of certainty.

Persons classed as Berbers made up the bulk of Moroccans in the French and Spanish armies during the protectorate period. As late as 1971 they were estimated to constitute about 80 percent of the troops in the FAR and over half of the officers. Their predominance in the officer corps, particularly at its upper levels, ended, however, with the coup attempts of 1971 and 1972 when the involvement of leading Berber officers belied their reputation for loyalty to the king.

The numerical dominance of Berbers in the officer grades had actually begun to decline soon after independence. At that time newly instituted standards favoring a candidate's academic background and test performance rather than noble birth discouraged the entry of rural Berbers from prominent families and increased the proportion of better educated townspeople, most of whom were considered Arabs. Accelerating in the period after the coup attempts, the proportion of Arabs in the FAR as a whole reportedly had increased to some 40 percent in the early 1980s; their proportion in the officer corps was believed to be much higher.

Observers have classified members of the officer corps in terms of generational differences, often labeled them by the year in which they graduated from the Royal Military Academy. The first generation of officers, who initially served as soldiers in the Spanish and French armies, were generally characterized by a relatively low level of education and by an apolitical conservatism. Few of these remained in the FAR in 1985. The most prominent was Brigadier General Driss Ben Aissa Faqir, inspector general of the FAR, who had been retained in the service beyond retirement age by the king. A second generation of officers, trained in the early classes of the Royal Military Academy or military schools in France and Spain, had generally come from an urban environment where they had enjoyed better educational advantages; many were the sons of government bureaucrats or from families associated with commercial industries. Subsequent groups—those who joined in the late 1960s and 1970s—generally came from middle-class backgrounds, mainly in urban areas. Another intergenerational group of officers was made up of NCOs who had earned commissions, primarily in the army.

Historically, most educated urbanites have tended to view a military career with suspicion and disdain, partly because of the repressive role of the army during the protectorate period and

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partly because of its occasional use in suppressing student and worker riots. The rural population, however, has always been attracted to the military, which is viewed as an honorable vocation and one that offers economic security. Some observers thought that the widespread support for the Moroccan cause in the Western Sahara war may have altered the views of some groups of urban Moroccans toward a military career.

Organization and Equipment

Hassan, as FAR commander in chief, has taken active responsibility for all aspects of the military. Despite the existence of the General Staff and smaller staffs within the air force and the navy that were led by the inspector of each service, most decisions came under the close personal scrutiny of the king and the Forward Headquarters.

The inspector general of the FAR was the highest ranking regular military officer. Major General Ben Aissa, the incumbent in 1985, was the only general officer on active duty with the FAR, but he had little real power. The inspector general did not have troops under his command but supervised the activities of the FAR General Staff. The General Staff administered the FAR's inspectorates of infantry, signals, artillery, armor, transport, and ordnance. It also included the FAR headquarters staff, many of whose policymaking functions duplicated those of the Forward Headquarters and were thus largely irrelevant. The headquarters staff was functionally divided into sections concerned with operations and training, intelligence and security, personnel, and logistics.

The most powerful regular military officer in the field has been the commander of the Southern Zone. The incumbent since Dlimi's death in 1983 has been his former deputy, Brigadier General Abdelaziz Benanni, who served as acting commander until the king gave him full command in mid-1984. Benanni was responsible for almost all of the army's combat elements, as well as air force units that were rotated under his command on a temporary basis. To maintain royal control, the king was thought to remain in almost constant contact with Benanni, who had emerged as an important military adviser.

The Army

The Royal Moroccan Army, which by 1985 had nearly tripled in manned strength from its level 10 years earlier, did not have

separate command or staff elements. Rather, as a consequence of policy and the army's status as the predominant military service, the FAR inspector general and the FAR General Staff were formally regarded as the commander and headquarters staff, respectively, of the army. In reality, of course, the king and the Forward Headquarters performed these functions.

The army in 1985 was the product of almost constant reorganization and expansion since its formation nearly 30 years earlier. The most recent changes had been made as a result of the war in the Western Sahara. The number of battalion-size units was expanded, and brigade-size units were reinstituted as part of the order of battle. Initially three brigades had been established in 1979-80 as task groups to conduct the war against the Polisario more effectively, but the brigades were formalized after Dlimi took control of the Southern Zone.

The overwhelming majority of the army—about 120,000 men, or some 80 percent of the army's manned strength—was committed to the Southern Zone in 1985. The Southern Zone included all areas south of Agadir on the Atlantic coast and, inland, all areas south of the ridge of the Ouarkiz Plateau. According to available sources, Moroccan army units committed in the south included four mechanized infantry brigades, nine mechanized infantry regiments, nine artillery groups, four armored groups, four engineer battalions, and a variety of other light and specialized battalions. Each of the mechanized infantry regiments was manned by about 2,000 soldiers, and the armored groups were each equipped with about 50 tanks or heavy armored reconnaissance vehicles.

The mechanized infantry brigades, each of which had a strength of about 6,000 men, constituted a strategic reserve behind the front lines. Each brigade was assigned to a specific Western Sahara province and was under the authority of the civilian provincial governor; three brigades were stationed behind the berm in Saguia el Hamra, and the fourth was at Dakhla. Most of the remaining units in the south were deployed in defensive positions along the berm or constituted ready reserves stationed close to the line to bolster the defenses immediately in case of trouble.

Very few army units remained outside the Southern Zone in 1985. Perhaps the most prominent was the brigade-size Royal Guard, a descendant of the former sultans' Sharifian Guard. This elite military unit was not assigned combat duties but engaged exclusively in ceremonial and protective duties for the king. At least one battalion of the Royal Guard—whose members were

recognizable by their red berets—was supposed to accompany the king at all times when he was on Moroccan soil.

Other units operating in the north included the Light Security Brigade, one armored group at Berrechid, one mechanized infantry regiment, one antiaircraft group, and the Parachute Brigade. The antiaircraft group, equipped with guns and surface-to-air missiles, was based at Meknès. The Parachute Brigade, stationed at Rabat, was an elite force that acted mainly as a protective service for the king. The 2,000-man Light Security Brigade, which was considered part of the king's security force, had been deployed as an internal security force in street demonstrations in 1965, 1981, and 1984.

In the decade of the Western Sahara war, the quantity and quality of army equipment had improved somewhat. Few of the 120 Soviet-made T-54 and T-55 tanks that had formerly constituted the core of Morocco's armored strength remained in inventory. Their place had been taken by a like number of reconditioned M-48A5 tanks delivered by the United States. These were supplemented by AMX-13 light tanks and a large number of armored reconnaissance vehicles, mainly of French design. The army also had taken delivery of a quantity of artillery, including modern self-propelled 155mm guns from France and the United States. Portable antitank missiles had entered the inventory in large numbers and had proved to be effective against Polisario vehicles. Chaparral surface-to-air missiles delivered by the United States in 1979–80 for the antiaircraft group had been placed in storage. Given the lack of an immediate airborne threat, it appeared that FAR officials had decided it would be prudent to maintain the missiles while they were in storage rather than expose them to damage in the field (see table 14, Appendix A). Although the king could field a well-equipped army in 1985, deliveries of new weapons had dropped to a trickle because of Morocco's inability to pay for them. Unless replaced, aging equipment would eventually depreciate the capabilities of the FAR.

The Air Force

Hassan kept particularly close control over Morocco's 13,500-man Royal Air Force (Force Royale de Aérienne—FRA) after its fighters attempted to shoot down his jet transport in 1972. Since that time, it has been strictly against regulations for any air force fighters to be scrambled without permission from the king or Mulay Hafid. Despite Hassan's restrictions, the inspector of the air force in 1985—Brigadier General Muhammed Kabbaj—



*Moroccan troops in the Western Sahara
Courtesy Government of Morocco*



*Great wall of sand, known commonly as the berm,
in the Western Sahara
Courtesy Michael Maren/AFRICA REPORT*

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was considered to be a strong and effective leader who enjoyed the loyalty of his men and the king's favor.

The air force was formed in 1956 as Sharifian Royal Aviation with assistance from French advisers. Its first combat aircraft were donated shortly afterward by Iraq, and the force began a steady expansion that continued until the early 1980s. The first jet aircraft were MiG-15 and MiG-17 fighters supplied by the Soviet Union in 1961. Since that time, however, France and the United States have provided the bulk of the FRA's aircraft and other equipment.

According to *The Military Balance* published in 1984 by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, the FRA inventory included 106 combat aircraft. The air force had been almost completely reequipped during the late 1970s. The heart of the force was five squadrons of fighter-bombers. Three of these were equipped with Dassault Mirage F1-Cs and F1-Es delivered by France in the late 1970s; the other two squadrons flew Northrop F-5As and F-5Bs sent by the United States in the late 1960s and more modern F-5Es and F-5Fs delivered a decade later. The F-5Es and F1-Cs operated mainly as interceptors in an air defense role. The air defense network in 1984 consisted of these aircraft and an array of 16 AN/TPS-43 early warning and coastal surveillance radar located at different sites.

There was also a squadron devoted to counterinsurgency (COIN) and reconnaissance operations that used Aérospatiale Magister and North American OV-10 Bronco aircraft. The transport squadron had been reequipped with American-built C-130H Hercules to replace the C-119s that had been used until 1979 (see table 15, Appendix A).

By the early 1980s the FRA buildup and modernization had ground to a halt largely because of Morocco's financial limitations. In an interview in late 1984, Hassan stated that his country was in the market to buy Mirage 2000s and Northrop F-20s to supplement the Mirage F-1s and Northrop F-5s.

The FRA units were permanently stationed at several bases in northern Morocco, but elements of them were sometimes sent to the Southern Zone for short periods. Facilities in the north included bases near Salé, Meknès, Marrakech, Kenitra, Nouasseur, and Sidi Slimane. Bases in the south that operated FRA aircraft included Agadir and Goulimine in Morocco proper and El Aaiún and Dakhla in the Western Sahara.

The Navy

The Royal Moroccan Navy has always operated essentially in a coast guard role. Its mission required that it provide assistance

against external naval threats and a capability to deal with internal security matters affecting coastal areas and territorial waters. Formed in 1960, the navy has relied primarily on France for its equipment and technical training, although some assistance has been provided by Spain. In early 1985 its leading officer, Commander Tahcan Duhirra, was inspector of the navy and took his instructions directly from the palace.

Operating from bases at Casablanca, Safi, Agadir, Kenitra, and Tangier, the navy was acquiring new equipment designed to expand its operational capabilities. The most significant addition to the fleet was a 1,270-ton frigate of the Spanish Descubierta class that was to be delivered to Morocco in early 1985. This ship, armed with Exocet surface-to-surface missiles, Aspide surface-to-air missiles, and guns, will be the first Moroccan combat vessel to have a blue-water capability. If additional vessels of this type were delivered, as the Moroccans reportedly desired, the Moroccan navy would be one of the most powerful in North Africa. There was no indication, however, that Morocco had the financial resources to undertake further purchases of this kind.

The navy also had recently acquired four Spanish-built, Lazaga-class, fast-attack craft armed with guns and Exocet missiles. These vessels supplemented patrol and attack craft delivered in the 1960s and 1970s. The navy maintained a limited amphibious capability through its possession of four large amphibious transports (see table 16, Appendix A). These vessels were designed to carry the navy's complement of 500 to 600 marines (naval infantry), who were trained and equipped to strengthen the country's capacity to react in crisis situations.

The navy's responsibilities for coastal protection were significantly broadened in 1973 when Morocco increased the limits of its territorial waters to 70 nautical miles. Further pressures were put upon the service in 1981, when the government adopted an Exclusive Economic Zone and restricted the ability of foreign fishing fleets to operate within 200 nautical miles of Morocco. Since that time the navy has been kept busy patrolling Moroccan waters, and there were numerous reports of Spanish, Portuguese, Soviet, and South Korean trawlers being detained and taken to Moroccan ports for having violated the country's restrictions on foreign fishing. The navy also has assisted in attempts to stem traffic in contraband and drugs that has moved through Moroccan ports.

Education and Training

In 1985 training and education in the FAR were designed to prepare officers for a military career. This represented a change in

policy from the early 1970s when, after the time of the two coup attempts, the king and the FAR had begun to reprogram military instruction and personnel policies so it would be easier for officers to give up their military service and undertake a new career. In December 1972 the king had stated that "we have to fight against routine, and we must readapt the officers who will become civilians once their service period is over . . . If at the conclusion of their studies at the [military] academy [officers] do not want to join the army, they will be able to become lawyers or doctors; they will be able to resettle . . ." The plans to diversify the training were not carried through during the 1970s, however, apparently in part because of the increased demand for officers in the Western Sahara.

The Royal Military Academy at Dar al Bayda near Meknès has been the major training institution for the Moroccan officer corps since it was founded by the French in 1918. Beginning in 1956 it operated to turn out officers for the fledgling FAR on an accelerated basis. After the pressing need for Moroccan officers had been satisfied, the course at Dar al Bayda was lengthened from 10 months to two years, and since 1965 it has been three years in length.

In 1985 it was believed that all Moroccan officers had attended the academy. The three-year program turned out some 300 to 350 young officers for all branches of the FAR each year. After graduation, the officers could go directly to the field or undertake more specialized training. Naval and air force officers were sent from Dar al Bayda to schools operated by those services in order to obtain the appropriate technical training. There was also a school of army health services, which trained personnel to serve as medical technicians and specialists in military dispensaries and hospitals. Five years of active duty were required after graduation from a military training school, but almost all officers stayed for the duration of their careers. According to a foreign military observer, "Once in, it is difficult for the Moroccan officer to leave the service."

As a general rule, the instruction received at the Royal Military Academy was the highest level attained by most Moroccan officers. A few of them, however, could be tapped to attend staff colleges abroad, usually in France or the United States, and about 20 to 25 each year, along with eight to 10 foreign students, were sent to the Headquarters Staff College of the Armed Forces at Kenitra. Attending the FAR staff college or one of its foreign counterparts was seen as a prerequisite for promotion to higher command or staff positions in the service. The school



*Weapon instruction at an FAR training center
Courtesy Government of Morocco*

operated under the command of Brigadier General Abd el Kader Loubaris, one of the FAR's most prominent officers, who had commanded the Moroccan expeditionary forces in Zaïre in 1977-78 and who had been wounded in the 1971 coup attempt. The school was staffed by a core faculty of five French officers on secondment, and its curriculum included training in tactics, logistics, and terrain analysis, as well as verbal and written communication. Graduates of the one-year program were usually favored with assignment to higher level command and staff positions.

Enlisted training was usually conducted by the battalion, regiment, or brigade to which the recruits or draftees were assigned. During the required minimum service of 18 months, the first three months were supposed to be spent in military training. It was believed in 1985 that a significant portion of this training was accomplished in the Southern Zone, either in southern Morocco or in the rear areas of the Western Sahara.

Conditions of Service

The general physical conditions and environment

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surrounding military life in the 1980s were of sufficiently high quality to make assignments within the FAR an attractive alternative to disadvantages often encountered in the civilian economy. For most military members the conditions of service—except perhaps for those associated with the lengthy tours of duty in the Western Sahara—provided a higher standard of dignity and comfort than many had found before the reforms that followed the attempted coups of 1971 and 1972.

Members of the Moroccan armed forces were paid a basic monthly salary augmented by certain allowances. Within each rank there were several base pay steps determined by length of time in grade, total years of service, or a combination of both. At the time of commissioning and throughout their military careers, officers with credentials indicating completion of secondary school or higher education received two years of service seniority for pay purposes. Married officers received slightly higher housing allowances than bachelors. Other allowances were based on the number of children in the family. Rations and pay compared favorably with standards in the civil sector and in most cases were considerably better. Other advantages, such as medical care, retirement benefits, and in-service training for civilian career specialties, also made military service attractive.

The favorable pay structure, however, has not always been a reliable feature of military service. As an example, officers' pay rates established in 1956 were lower than those offered to civilians performing similar duties in the government. This discrepancy, plus the fact that military pay scales were not increased for the first seven years after independence and promotions came more slowly than for workers in other government agencies, created growing dissatisfaction among the officers, particularly those in the lower grades. Some junior officers consequently resigned their commissions and sought higher paying positions in the civilian branches of government service. Prompted by the drop in officer morale, Hassan approved a new pay scale in mid-1963 that was retroactive to several months.

An important element of the reforms instituted after the coup attempt of 1971 was the implementation of a new pay scale designed to place the compensation received by military personnel on a par with that of the civil service. Pay for military personnel sent to the combat zone in the Western Sahara after 1976 was reported doubled for the period of the three-month tours they served in the area. As a result, service in the Western Sahara was a much sought-after assignment in the mid-1980s. According to the 1983 budget, DH3.06 million, or 72 percent of

the military current budget, was devoted to expenditures related to personnel.

The pension program for all military personnel was based on length of service and rank at retirement. In addition, disability pensions were provided for all who became incapacitated through injury or disease incurred while on active duty; rates of pay depended on military rank and degree of disability. Widows, orphans, and parents of those military personnel who died or were killed while on duty also were entitled to financial compensation.

























All members of the FAR and their families received free medical attention from a series of dispensaries and hospitals operated by the FAR Health Services. The health services of this system were also available to members of the Auxiliary Forces, former members of the ALN, and retired military personnel and their families.

The ranks and insignia of all branches of the FAR reflected the long influence of the French military as well as that of the United States (see fig. 17; fig. 18). The rank structures of the army and the air force were patterned on those of France and the United States, except that there were fewer enlisted ranks. The navy rank structure's similarity to that of the French navy was largely attributable to the fact that until 1965 this branch of the FAR was commanded by a *capitaine de frégate* (equivalent to a United States Navy commander) on loan from the French fleet. The rank structures of all services were modified in the mid-1970s when the FAR adopted a new officer grade—colonel-major—that has been unique to Morocco.

After the military coups of 1971 and 1972 Hassan had frozen promotions to general officer grade. The new rank of colonel-major was conferred on Dlimi in 1976 when the king chose to promote him in recognition for his influence and responsibility but did not wish to give him status as a general officer at that time. Later, in 1980, Dlimi became the first officer promoted to brigadier general (*général de brigade*) in nearly a decade. After Dlimi's demise, Ben Aissa, who had been a brigadier general before 1971, was the only general officer in the Moroccan military establishment. In early 1985 this situation changed when Hassan announced that Ben Aissa would be promoted to major general (*général de division*) and that six colonel-majors—including Benanni, Kabbaj, Royal Military Academy commandant Loubaris, the director of the Royal Gendarmerie, the director of the Royal Aides de Camp, and the general secretary of the National Defense Administration—would be promoted to brigadier general.

NOTE No United States equivalent for army colonel-major, or navy captain or lieutenant-major.
no means information available for grades of air force colonel-major, general de corps aérien, général d'armée aérienne,
or army colonel-major de transmission.

Figure 17. Officer Grades, Insignia, and United States Equivalents, 1985

| Rank | Soldat de Deuxième Classe | Soldat de Première Classe | Caporal | Caporal-Chef | Sergent | Sergent-Chef | Sergent-Major | Adjudant | Adjudant-Chef |
|---|------------------------------|--|--|---|--|--|--|--|--|
| ARMY UNITED STATES EQUIVALENT | |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| AIR FORCE UNITED STATES EQUIVALENT | |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| NAVY UNITED STATES EQUIVALENT | |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

NOTE: The insignia were in use by the United States Navy from 1910 to 1912. The insignia shown are for the United States Navy.

Figure 18. Enlisted and Warrant Officer Ranks, Insignia, and United States Equivalents, 1985

| Rank | Soldat de Deuxième Classe | Soldat de Première Classe | Caporal | Caporal-Chef | Sergent | Sergent-Chef | Sergent-Major | Adjudant | Adjudant-Chef |
|--|------------------------------|------------------------------|---------|--------------|---------|--------------|---------------|----------|---------------|
| ARMY Green Silver Gold UNITED STATES EQUIVALENT | | | | | | | | | |
| AIR FORCE Red Silver Gold UNITED STATES EQUIVALENT | | | | | | | | | |
| NAVY Red Silver Gold UNITED STATES EQUIVALENT | | | | | | | | | |

NOTE: No insignia worn by army, militia or civilian class on force medals of decoration class or navy medals of decoration class.

Figure 18. Enlisted and Warrant Officer Ranks, Insignia, and United States Equivalents, 1985

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Foreign Military Cooperation

Because Morocco does not have an arms industry, the FAR has had to depend exclusively on foreign countries for its weapons and other equipment. Since the end of the protectorate period, Morocco has purchased arms and entered into military arrangements with several countries, the most prominent of which have been France, the United States, the Soviet Union, and Spain. The FAR's initial requirements were met by the transfer of stocks of weapons and matériel from the French and Spanish armies in Morocco. The French contribution was estimated to be equivalent to US\$40 million; the value of the Spanish matériel was not known but was considerably less.

After independence Mohammed V's government sought further military supplies from France and the United States, but when the General Staff felt this assistance was inadequate and arriving too slowly, Morocco turned toward the Soviet Union. The first large shipments of Soviet equipment, accompanied by Soviet advisers, arrived in late 1960 and early 1961. Weapons from the Soviet Union eventually included 12 MiG-17 jet fighters and two MiG-15 jet trainers, which were delivered in 1962. After relations between Algeria and Morocco began to deteriorate toward the end of that year, the Soviet Union stopped its aid to Morocco. Later, limited Soviet assistance was provided in the form of spare parts for the equipment previously sold. In the late 1960s the FAR acquired some 120 Soviet T-54 and T-55 tanks, most or all of which were acquired in a barter exchange with Czechoslovakia. It was estimated that Soviet grants and sales totaled nearly US\$20 million; this figure did not include the Czechoslovak tanks.

Whereas the Soviets sold relatively little equipment and did not enter into security arrangements with Morocco, the United States was able to forge a much closer military relationship with the kingdom. Even before Morocco had become independent, the United States had maintained extensive military facilities on Moroccan soil dating from the North African campaign of World War II and subsequent agreements with France. These bases were located at Kenitra, Nouasseur, Benguerir, and Sidi Slimane; for a time the latter three served as forward deployment sites for operational bombers of the United States Air Force's Strategic Air Command. After achieving independence from France, the Moroccan government in 1958 negotiated for the withdrawal of American forces from the country by 1963. After that time the United States continued to maintain two communications stations that were manned by civilians and used by the Sixth Fleet until

they were closed in 1978.

Morocco began to receive military equipment from the United States in 1960, but deliveries were limited until the late 1960s. At that time the United States delivered 24 Northrop F-5A and F-5B fighter-bombers and antitank weapons. Later sales included C-130H Hercules transport aircraft, 50 M-48 tanks, and 330 M-113 armored personnel carriers. These acquisitions were intended to reinforce Morocco's position against Algeria's more powerful armored and air forces.

The United States was far more reluctant to provide weapons that could be used in Morocco's war in the Western Sahara. In 1977 and 1978 the administration of President Jimmy Carter rejected Moroccan requests to provide assault helicopters and fixed-wing COIN aircraft because this equipment was particularly suited for operations against the Polisario forces and because there were indications that American equipment supplied previously had been used in the Western Sahara. Weapons classed as strictly defensive, including air defense and communications equipment, continued to be sold by Washington during this period.

In a reversal of previous policy, the administration proposed a US\$235 million arms package to Morocco in October 1979 that included six OV-10 Bronco COIN aircraft, 20 F-5E fighter-bombers, and 24 Hughes MD-100 light helicopters. Observers pointed to several reasons for the shift in policy: the Carter administration was seeking to assure friends abroad that the United States was a reliable ally; Moroccan troops had recently played an important role backing Western interests in the 1977 and 1978 interventions supporting the beleaguered government of Zaïre; Hassan had offered asylum to the exiled shah of Iran, an American ally; and Saudi Arabia, an influential friend of the United States, strongly supported the sale. Moreover, Polisario attacks against positions within Morocco proper had demonstrated a new threat that could justify, in certain situations, the use of American arms against the front as being "defensive." After considerable debate the United States Congress approved the sale on the written condition that the actual deliveries would be contingent upon progress in negotiations for settlement of the war. These arms, except the helicopters, were delivered in 1981 and 1982.


An increased willingness to sell arms to Morocco on the part of President Ronald Reagan's administration was counterbalanced by a reduced Moroccan ability to pay for the imports. This was demonstrated after the new administration

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announced, shortly after it took office, that it would approve a Moroccan request for 108 M-60A3 tanks and associated tank transporters. Because of Morocco's inability to pay for the equipment, however, less expensive M-48A5 tanks—an upgrade of the older M-48—were later substituted for the M-60s. Earlier weapons purchases from the United States had, to a large extent, been bankrolled by financial assistance from Saudi Arabia and, to a lesser extent, by Kuwait. Although exact amounts were unknown, it was estimated that Saudi Arabia provided between US\$500 million and US\$1 billion annually to Morocco between 1975 and 1982. United States military credits, which varied between US\$30 million and US\$45 million annually from 1976 to 1982, were insufficient to cover payments on all new equipment acquisitions. During this period no American assistance was provided on a grant basis. In the mid-1980s Saudi financial assistance was reduced somewhat as a consequence of the declining world price of oil—that country's major export. As a result, it appeared in early 1985 that any further Moroccan purchases of military equipment from the United States in the near future beyond those classed as munitions or spare parts would be greatly limited.

Military cooperation between Morocco and the United States the two countries intensified in 1982. In part this reflected American concern over Moroccan aircraft losses to the Polisario's SA-6 missiles in the October 1981 battle for Guelta Zemmur. United States military advisers were sent to Morocco to train its pilots in missile evasion techniques and electronic countermeasures equipment was installed on the Moroccans' F-5E aircraft. Military credits increased to US\$75 million in 1983 from US\$30 million the year before but fell again to US\$39 million in 1984.

The most significant demonstrations of increased military cooperation between Morocco and the United States were the establishment of a joint military commission in April 1982 and an agreement in May providing for United States Air Force access in emergencies to certain Moroccan air bases. In the words of the statement establishing the mission, it was set up because "the growth in the United States-Moroccan military relationship [has progressed] to the point where a more formal structure is required to address security matters of mutual interest." The major purpose of the mission, which was similar to those established between the United States and Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and Jordan, was to coordinate the delivery and maintenance of military assistance and to engage in joint military planning.



*FAR equipment reflects
Morocco's dependence on
foreign military assistance.
Courtesy
Government of Morocco*

By virtue of the access agreement of May 1982, United States military aircraft in emergency situations would be permitted to transit the Moroccan air bases, provided that Moroccan authorities gave specific permission. In return for this limited access to Sidi Slimane Air Base and to Mohammed V International Airport near Casablanca, the United States made financial improvements at the two airfields and at Kenitra that cost some US\$85 million over three years. These improvements included building and repaving taxiways, increasing fuel storage capacity, upgrading electrical systems, and improving the water supply. The United States requested permission to use the facilities for the transit of two C-5A aircraft during the Middle East "Bright Star" exercises of 1983. Permission was denied, however, as the Moroccan government sought to indicate its displeasure over an impending loss of military assistance funds.

French military assistance to Morocco has far outweighed that supplied by the United States. The military ties that grew out of the protectorate period have continued despite sometimes

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strained political relations between Paris and Rabat. In 1977 and 1978 French Jaguar fighter-bombers based at Dakar, Senegal, attacked Polisario columns in Mauritania and in the Western Sahara. Although this amounted to de facto military support for Morocco and Mauritania in the war, the French government was careful to describe its actions in terms of protecting the Mauritanian government from external attack and defending the lives of French citizens working at the Mauritanian iron ore mines at Zouérate. The raids ceased after Mauritania withdrew from the war.

French equipment has predominated in the FAR since 1956. Weapons delivered in the late 1970s and early 1980s included 60 Mirage F-1 fighter-bombers, 24 Alpha Jet light strike/trainers, 40 Puma troop-carrying helicopters, numerous Stentor ground surveillance radar units, and several hundred armored personnel carriers and reconnaissance vehicles. Political scientist John Damis has estimated that the total value of French arms sold to Morocco between 1974 and 1982 probably ranged between US\$1.5 billion and US\$2 billion.

The future of French arms sales to Morocco could be hurt by the latter's inability to pay. For several years Paris demonstrated a willingness to provide substantial credits in spite of Morocco's record of not making on payments on prior loans. France, unlike the United States, has received little in payment from Morocco for the arms it has supplied. The United States, in an amendment to the Foreign Military Assistance Act of 1961, was required by law to stop all economic assistance if a recipient country went into arrears on payments to the United States government for military purchases. Thus Morocco, concerned about a complete cutoff of American aid, has paid the United States with its scarce foreign exchange and has not paid France. French impatience was demonstrated in 1981 when Paris stopped the delivery of 76 AMX-10RC armored cars, 126 VAB armored personnel carriers, and 24 Gazelle helicopters. The armored cars and Gazelles were later delivered, but in early 1985 the French government appeared to show decreased interest in making further military sales to Morocco.

Apart from the Soviet Union, the United States, and France, other countries also have provided military assistance to Morocco. The most prominent of these has been Spain, which reinstituted its military relationship with Morocco after its withdrawal from the Western Sahara in 1976 improved relations between the two countries. Spanish assistance supplied on credit has mainly included naval vessels. In the late 1970s Morocco also obtained armored personnel carriers from Austria and South Africa.

Public Order and Internal Security

Under the leadership of King Hassan, independent Morocco has passed through periods of social and political tumult interspersed with times of relative domestic calm. The potential for political upheaval has been omnipresent in Morocco, a country characterized by rapid urbanization, vast and visible differences in the wealth of its people, rapid population growth, economic stagnation, serious unemployment, and a political system dominated by one supreme leader. Hassan, however, has consistently demonstrated an ability to detect and neutralize potential sources of opposition, and in early 1985 his position appeared relatively strong.

Since he declared a "state of exception" in 1965 and assumed full executive and legislative powers for five years, Hassan has been the country's supreme arbiter of justice and the ultimate authority on what has constituted a national security threat. Hassan's dominance was reinforced by the Penal Code of 1962 as well as by various *zahirs* that identified opponents of the king as enemies of the state and authorized harsh punishments against them. The death sentence was mandatory for those convicted of an attempt to assassinate the king and was authorized for attempts against the lives of other royal family members. Life imprisonment was specified for anyone guilty of trying to alter the form of government or to disrupt the established order of succession to the throne. Laws authorized penalties of five to 20 years in prison for conspiring to start a civil war, for insurrection, and for forming groups hostile to the state. Conspiracy against the regime included the publication of material offensive to the king, a crime that could be punished by a minimum sentence of five years in prison despite constitutional guarantees of free speech and assembly. Even at the lower end of the scale of punishments, many penalties appeared harsh by Western standards. Persons guilty of disturbing the peace could be punished with prison sentences that varied from one month to one year.

The monarchy and its agencies occasionally demonstrated that they could act harshly against real and suspected opponents. Most notably, they were linked by their leftist critics and by French authorities to the 1965 abduction in Paris of Mehdi Ben Barka, an opposition politician who was suspected of involvement in a 1963 plot against the king (see Emergency Period, 1965-70, ch. 1). Although there have not been any officially sanctioned

executions in Morocco since 30 persons accused of involvement in the coup attempts and in the 3 March Plot were put to death in 1973, the government held 140 to 300 political prisoners, according to the United States Department of State's human rights report for 1983. Some of these had been tried and convicted as criminals for their involvement in the 1971 and 1972 coup attempts, some had been jailed for participating in the June 1981 Casablanca riots, and others had been detained on lesser offenses.

The king has not used his powers of social control gratuitously. On the contrary, political scientist Mark Tessler has described political repression in Morocco as "episodic" and has pointed out that Morocco has permitted more dissent than many other states in the Middle East and Africa (see *The Legal System*, ch. 4). The king apparently has preferred to rely on royal patronage to co-opt opponents and reward allies. A relatively free press has existed, student demonstrations have been allowed, and a range of political parties—including the socialist and the communist—have been permitted to function. Criticism from groups and individuals, however, could not be directed at the king, the institutions of the monarchy, or Islam. In this environment a coherent political opposition has never been allowed to develop to the point of threatening the regime.

Many observers in the early 1980s noted, however, that a strong source of potential opposition to the king and the political system could be found in the poorer areas of the large cities. The Moroccan population was increasingly characterized by urban poverty; by 1982 it was estimated that some 30 percent of the national population lived in shantytowns on the outskirts of the cities—the so-called bidonvilles. Life in these areas was characterized by high unemployment and a relatively high incidence of crime (see *Structure of Society*, ch. 2). Statistics on criminal activity in Morocco were unavailable in the mid-1980s, but it was generally believed that crime had been steadily increasing for over a decade, especially in the bidonvilles. In addition to crimes against property, the residents of the bidonvilles, who had migrated to the cities in search of jobs, were especially affected by drug abuse, prostitution, and other antisocial behavior. Violent crimes were not thought to be numerous by United States urban standards, but they had reportedly increased sharply during the 1970s and early 1980s.

Resentment over the highly visible wealth and privileges of the king and the Moroccan elite were observed to be far greater among the poor of the bidonvilles than among those in rural areas, where Hassan has traditionally found his strongest support. This

was thought to be a function of education and experience on the part of the urbanites as well as a result of frustration encountered by those who had migrated to the cities. Others have also noted that the loosely structured, more libertarian patterns of life among the young urbanites contrasted with the more structured, relatively stable lifestyles and world views common among the conservative people of rural areas.

Although crime and student demonstrations had been a feature of urban life for several years, widespread popular discontent was first sharply demonstrated in the Casablanca riots of June 1981. The problems that began with a demonstration to protest the government's reduction in food subsidies quickly turned violent. Thousands of youths from the shantytowns roamed the streets of the modern sections of Casablanca, looting and vandalizing banks and businesses associated with elite privilege and fighting police and military units for control of the streets. In order to put down the rioters, who reportedly almost took over the city, the authorities reacted forcefully. According to a Moroccan government statement, 66 persons were killed, but other observers estimated that at least 200 died.

The demonstrations and calls for a general strike that preceded the riots were organized by the Democratic Confederation of Labor (Confédération Démocratique du Travail—CDT), which was affiliated with the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires—USFP). In the wake of the riots, several CDT leaders were jailed for their involvement, although party and union officials later expressed their surprise and regret at the demonstration's violent turn. The USFP leadership, which had strongly opposed the king's leadership in the 1960s and may at that time have been considered a security threat, subsequently had come to conduct itself as an opposition party within the established political framework. Younger, more radical members of the party and its agencies who had been involved in organizing antigovernment strikes and student demonstrations, however, were still considered a threat by the monarchy. They were thought by some to have been deliberately attempting to provoke a confrontation between urban poor and authorities in Casablanca (see *Political Parties*, ch. 4).

A wave of protests, less intense but more widespread than the Casablanca riots, swept through the country in January 1984. Initially they began with secondary-school students in Marrakech protesting against a rumored increase in school registration fees, but demonstrators soon began denouncing the king with banners

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and slogans. Protests also broke out in central and southern Morocco involving mostly university and secondary-school students. Within 10 days the protests had spread to much poorer cities of the north and turned into riots in Al Hoceima, Tétouan, Oujda, Berkane, and especially in Nador. According to government sources, 24 people were killed, and 114 were wounded in these disturbances. Most outside observers reported far higher estimates.

There were no clear-cut instigators of the 1984 riots and demonstrations; apparently a great degree of spontaneity was involved. During and after the disturbances some 1,500 to 2,000 persons—many of them students and opposition politicians—were arrested for fomenting the rebellion; but their roles were not made clear, and many were released shortly thereafter. Few people gave credence to Hassan's charge, in a televised address to the nation, that a combination of Marxist-Leninists, Israelis, and the Iranian government was to blame for the uprisings. He also lashed out at the people of Marrakech as being unfit to receive a monarch and threatened those in the north by referring to his earlier use of force to crush separatists in the Rif in 1958.

Although there was little evidence that the Iranian government was involved in the 1984 disturbances, the king's display on television of pro-Iranian leaflets that had been circulated among demonstrators pointed to the potential threat posed by Islamic fundamentalist opponents. The growth of religious-based opposition to the commander of the faithful (*amir al Muminin*) began in the late 1970s and early 1980s; before then, the Moroccan government was believed to have given support to Islamic groups as a counterbalance to the influence of Marxist-Leninists in the universities. Observers linked the growth of radical Islamic fundamentalism to the 1979 overthrow of the shah of Iran, in which Islam was displayed as a revolutionary force, and to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan later that year, which badly damaged the prestige of the Soviet Union and its Marxist-Leninist allies in the Third World. The fundamentalists were generally characterized as young, educated, and often strongly militant. Some were university students, and some had formerly been Marxist-Leninists who had embraced Islam partly because of their disenchantment with the Soviet Union or with the USFP and its leadership's cooperation with the monarch.

More than 20 Islamic fundamentalist groups were said to be active in the mid-1980s. Many of them, while urging a purification of Muslim practices and greater morality, remained loyal to the king. Others were more militant, demanding an end

to corruption, Western influence, social injustice, and the monarchy. Among the best known of the radical Islamic associations was the League of Islamic Youth, which had been officially banned after being linked to the murder of a leading USFP politician in 1975. Its senior personality, Abd al Karim Mati, was in exile, but in 1983 the group returned to prominence when 71 members of an activist element—the "Jihad Squad"—were arrested on conspiracy charges after circulating literature calling for the overthrow of the government; some were sentenced to death and others to long prison terms. Another prominent politico-religious expatriate, Mohammed el Basri, has served variously as an Istiqlal resistance leader, newspaper editor, and founding member of the socialist party. From a base in Switzerland, Basri reportedly maintained contact with radical religious groups elsewhere in the Islamic world and with the Iranian revolutionary government. Perhaps the most widely known Islamic dissident within the country was Abdessalam Yacine, a writer and an editor whose activism had brought him harassment and prison sentences.

The authorities reacted to the perceived threat mainly by attempting to keep track of the Islamic associations and their members. Although the government believed that it had the groups thoroughly penetrated, it was reported that during the early 1980s many of the radical fundamentalists, in a desire to avoid government surveillance, had become more discreet, meeting secretly and discarding the beards and garments that had previously made them easy to spot.

Most observers in the mid-1980s did not believe that the fledgling Moroccan fundamentalist sects had the potential to develop into a broad-based movement of the kind that had swept to power in Iran. Although figures on membership were unavailable, it was generally thought that the fundamentalists constituted only a small minority in Morocco. Expansion was hampered by the authorities' actions as well as by the lack of unity among the fundamentalists themselves. Most importantly, the continued popularity of established Moroccan religious institutions and the widespread acceptance of the king as commander of the faithful appeared to rule out the coalescing of religious forces against the government, as had occurred in Iran. The further growth of fundamentalism among the radical intelligentsia, however, seemed likely.

Political and religious radicals, in combination with the urban poor, threatened Morocco with increased turmoil of the kind that had been evidenced in the 1981 and 1984 riots. If civil

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
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disturbances were to become a recurring feature of Moroccan life, the political institutions that Hassan has fostered could be undermined; it seemed far less likely that such disturbances would cause him to fall from power. Experience elsewhere, however, indicated that the possibility of violent actions—such as coup or assassination attempts—made in the name of political or religious extremism could not be completely ruled out.

Police and Intelligence Services

Primary responsibility for the maintenance of law and order and for conducting internal security operations has been exercised jointly by the country's three separate police organizations: the *Sûreté Nationale*, the *Royal Gendarmerie*, and the *Auxiliary Forces*. Beyond its chief mission of providing defense against external threats, the *Royal Moroccan Army* could also be used to back up the police in quelling internal disorders in emergency circumstances. In addition, the Moroccan government relied upon the *General Office of Research and Documentation* (*Direction Générale des Études et Documentation—DGED*) and the *Office of Territorial Surveillance* (*Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire—DST*), which gathered and analyzed intelligence on national security.

All of the three police organizations were constituted after independence in 1956 and have been modeled on counterparts within the police system of metropolitan France. Because of the participation of Moroccan military officers and technical personnel who have assisted in the development and training of the police elements over the years, as well as the missions and operational philosophies involved, all of these forces were regarded as paramilitary organizations.

The *Royal Gendarmerie* was considered to be a branch of the *FAR*, while the *Auxiliary Forces*, the *Sûreté Nationale*, and the intelligence services were attached to the *Ministry of Interior*. The minister of interior in 1985, Driss Basri, was considered to be one of the most powerful and influential of Hassan's subordinates; one observer described him as "the closest thing to Dlimi since Dlimi." In addition to responsibility for most police and internal security affairs, his ministry was charged with provincial and local government administration (see *Local Government*, ch. 4). The king's personal control, however, was evidenced by his power to appoint the commanders of the police forces, and he was closely involved in making all important decisions regarding police

organization, finance, and operations. Furthermore, the long-standing institutional rivalry between the Auxiliary Forces and the Sûreté and the surveillance of both by the separately administered Royal Gendarmerie were thought to provide a counterbalance of force and to preclude possible threats to the government—and the monarchy—from any one security force element.

Sûreté Nationale

The Sûreté Nationale, having a personnel strength of some 11,000 in 1984, exercised primary policing authority in the main urban centers and in the more important towns. It was responsible for the maintenance of law and order, protection of life and property, investigation of crimes, and apprehension of offenders. It shared in the patrolling of highways in collaboration with the Royal Gendarmerie and shared responsibility for frontier security with the army, the gendarmerie, and the mobile units of the Auxiliary Forces. The Sûreté also conducted overt and clandestine operations nationwide to detect and counter activities mounted against the security of the state. To accomplish these tasks, the Sûreté was allocated a budget of DH593 million in 1983, 82 percent of which was directed toward providing for its personnel.

The Sûreté traced its roots to the beginning of the protectorate period. In 1913 the French, exercising the greater authority granted them under the Treaty of Fès in an effort to consolidate control of Moroccan affairs, nationalized all federal and municipal police agencies and formed a general police service under the administrative control of a secretary general. During the protectorate period the national police force underwent a series of reorganizations and was known by several different names. During this period the organization was nominally subordinated to various government directorates, but the French resident general always exercised the final measure of control.

After Moroccan independence the Sûreté Nationale was established by *zahir* in May 1956. The new organization, modeled on and named for its counterpart in metropolitan France, was subordinated administratively to the Ministry of Interior and was commanded by a director general. Its structure, procedures, and operational concepts were undeniably French. By 1960 the last of the French experts who had earlier staffed most technical positions in the Sûreté had departed, and they were replaced by young Moroccans who had undergone on-the-job training or had graduated from the police school at Mont-Doré in France.

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The Sûreté has had few major modifications to its structure and responsibility. The most important of these occurred during the period after the disastrous Casablanca riots of 1965, when a comprehensive evaluation of police control measures and intelligence capabilities was conducted and the Sûreté removed from the Ministry of Interior. Of primary interest to the army officer who served at that time as director general, the change afforded him direct access to King Hassan, the only authority to whom he was responsible. In the late 1970s the Sûreté was again placed under the responsibility of the Ministry of Interior.

In the mid-1980s the Sûreté employed four basic police units: the Urban Corps, the Mobile Intervention Companies (Compagnies Mobiles pour l'Intervention—CMI), the Judiciary Police (Police Judiciaire), and an internal security service called the Subdirectorate for Internal Security. The uniformed Urban Corps, the largest of the Sûreté elements, provided most of the police service in the cities and major towns. Routinely armed with automatic pistols and rubber truncheons, the Urban Corps policemen patrolled on foot, on bicycles, on motorcycles, and in automobiles. They manned traffic control stations, responded to emergency requests for protection, and provided crowd control during parades, ceremonial functions, and public gatherings. In certain of the larger cities the Urban Corps was also used extensively to augment the Judiciary Police. The Urban Corps operated as the first line of defense in the control of civil disturbances in urban areas, where they were charged with the protection of vital installations and with crowd control.

The uniformed CMI operated as a motorized police unit. Deployed in Morocco's major cities, its primary missions included furnishing assistance in the maintenance of public order, policing public functions, and providing police services in civil emergencies or during natural disasters. Its motorcycle-equipped companies also shared with the Royal Gendarmerie the responsibility for coordinated patrol of the country's intercity highways. In addition to its motorcycles, each company had its own transport vehicles for moving its personnel and their equipment during field operations; the units also had a mobile radio communications capability. A number of water pump trucks were available for use in controlling demonstrations and riots.

In the mid-1980s criminal investigation was the responsibility of the Judiciary Police, who were not only police officers but also officers of the court. All nonuniformed employees of the Sûreté from the director general through the rank of assistant police officer were certified to act as Judiciary Police

officials. In practice about 3,000 were accredited by the courts at any one time. The mission of this unit has been defined in a circular issued by the director general: "conduct investigations and operations leading to the identification and arrest of the perpetrators and their accomplices guilty of the following crimes and misdemeanors: crimes against the security of the state, counterfeiting and trafficking in gold, counterfeiting the state seal, escape of criminals and concealment of criminals, criminal associations, homicide, drug traffic, and acts of banditry such as armed robbery or attacks with explosives, etc." The Judiciary Police was the only element of the police or security services authorized to make arrests.

The Judiciary Police conducted investigations in all areas of Sûreté jurisdiction and could, on request or on instruction of the king's prosecutor, assist the Royal Gendarmerie in important cases. Members of the Judiciary Police were also charged with interrogating arrested suspects in special detention centers; in this they acted under the technical supervision of the prosecutor and his deputies assigned to the appellate courts (see Prisons, this ch.). Some observers noted that members of the Judiciary Police have felt a stronger sense of attachment to the court system and its prosecutors than to the police force; the working relationship with court officials reportedly was close and cordial.

The least publicized element of the Sûreté was the police intelligence service. This organization had countrywide responsibility for countersubversion and counterespionage activities and operated clandestinely in its monitoring of potential threats to state security. The service operated under the direct supervision of the Sûreté's director general. Known as the Subdirectorate for Internal Security, its functions were purely investigative in nature. Its members did not make arrests or conduct interrogations but developed and passed information to the Judiciary Police for followup, arrest, and prosecution.

When Morocco first became independent, a limited number of Moroccan police personnel were qualified by training and experience to assume command positions. There was a shortage of technical specialists, and the bulk of the enlisted force had received insufficient training in law and order procedures. Using French assistance, training facilities for enlisted personnel were established at two sites: Sidi Otmane near Casablanca and Salé on the outskirts of Rabat. The Sidi Otmane facility, having a capacity of 150 students, became the principal training school, and Salé was used for specialized instruction, such as motorcycle use, emergency patrolling, and first aid techniques. In late 1965 a

national police academy was established near Meknès. Assisted by a permanently assigned group of French police advisers and using equipment obtained largely from France, the academy staff began carrying out a program that eventually would consolidate within the institution all police training, including that given to officer and enlisted recruits and specialists as well as that offered to upgrade the quality of in-service personnel.

Auxiliary Forces

The Auxiliary Forces consisted of provincial and municipal guards—collectively referred to as the Administrative Maghzani—and a contingent known as the Mobile Maghzani. An organization resembling what many other countries term a *national guard*, the Auxiliary Forces numbered 9,000 in 1984 and were in some ways a modernized version of the two quasi-military groups found in the French zone of Morocco during the protectorate period: the *maghzanis* and the *partisans* (see Development of the Modern Armed Forces, this ch.). Like their earlier counterparts, the Auxiliary Forces of the mid-1980s operated under the control of the civil administration authorities at various levels of provincial and municipal government. At the national level the Auxiliary Forces were administered by an inspector general and his staff, who were assigned to the Ministry of Interior. Their annual budget of DH593 million in 1983 represented the largest amount allocated to any one of the country's police forces.

Military in character, the plainclothes Administrative Maghzani was staffed by men recruited mainly from the local areas to which they were assigned. Most of them had undergone some military training but little if any instruction in law enforcement duties. All member of the Administrative Maghzani assigned to provinces were under the command of provincial governors, each of whom could redeploy them within his jurisdiction as he deemed necessary. At lower echelons of local government, control was exercised either directly by the civil administrator or through an Auxiliary Forces liaison officer assigned for that purpose. Responsibilities of the organization included guarding buildings, bridges, wells, and other similar areas; acting as messengers and minor clerks for local authorities; patrolling souks (markets); serving as arbitrators of grazing and water disputes; and performing related supplemental and support duties for the uniformed police. Many members of the Administrative Maghzani were army or gendarmerie retirees,

who, in addition to their pensions, received a small stipend for their services with the Auxiliary Forces.

To the extent that the Administrative Maghzani was armed, it was equipped with sidearms, rifles of World War II origin, or rubber truncheons. It had a limited number of vehicles, such as jeeps, light trucks, motorcycles, and bicycles. Some units reportedly still used camels for patrolling in desert areas. On occasions when these guards were called upon to support either the gendarmerie or the Sûreté Nationale, these latter organizations customarily provided the necessary arms, equipment, and transportation.

The larger Mobile Maghzani was a well-equipped modern paramilitary force. Its companies, each having about 150 officers and men, were motorized, well-armed, and specifically trained to control riots and other civil disorders. The companies were deployed throughout the country and in the Western Sahara; some were stationed near the major population centers as in-place reserves, others in each of the provinces. These mobile forces were assigned to patrol and screen key border areas and could rapidly intervene to quell disorders that could not be handled satisfactorily by the Sûreté, the gendarmerie, or the Administrative Maghzani. As in-place reserves, the Mobile Maghzani companies were controlled operationally by the provincial or prefectural governors. When employed as intervention forces, they were under the operational control of the Sûreté regional chief in urban areas or the gendarmerie commander in rural situations.

Royal Gendarmerie

The Royal Gendarmerie served simultaneously as the FAR's military police and as Morocco's main rural police unit. In 1983 the 10,000-member force had a budget of DH278 million, 68 percent of which was allocated for its personnel. Technically, the gendarmerie was under the operational control of the FAR, but in practice direction of the organization was supervised personally by the king. The gendarmerie commander in 1985, Brigadier General Housni Ben Slimane, was considered to be a vigorous leader who acted as a rival to the minister of interior for important assignments and the confidence of the king.

The concept of the gendarmerie as rural police was a carryover of the French use of military *goums* for this purpose during the protectorate period. In addition to its general mission of enforcing public order, the gendarmerie performed a variety of

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tasks in support of a number of other government agencies. It fulfilled military police responsibilities within the FAR; served the Ministry of National Education by checking on truancy among schoolchildren in rural villages; collected unpaid taxes in rural areas for the Ministry of Finance; provided other ministries with statistics on highway traffic accidents; and checked the registration of automobile radios.

The gendarmerie, whose national headquarters was in Rabat, was organized into companies that were deployed throughout the country. The companies were in turn subdivided into sections and brigades; the latter were its basic operating units. The motorcycle brigades shared responsibility for highway traffic control with the Sûreté's CMI. Jeep-mounted brigades were employed in patrolling assigned segments of rural territory, and dismounted brigades manned police posts in the small villages. Special brigades were assigned the duties involved in conducting criminal investigations within their assigned jurisdictions, often with the assistance of the Judiciary Police of the Sûreté. The centrally located Mobile Group of the gendarmerie was maintained for rapid-response deployment to assist in riot control or other special projects. Gendarmerie units were all based in rear areas and had not been used in the fighting against the Polisario.

After the coup attempts by elements of the army and air force in 1971 and 1972, Hassan modified his traditionally primary dependence on the army, giving instead greater credence to the reliability of the gendarmerie. Turning to this rural police unit in the segment of the kingdom where his popularity was a reliable factor, he expanded its size and enhanced its operational capability. By 1975 new units had been established throughout the country, advanced training for its NCOs had been introduced, and an improved system of criminological research and intelligence had been initiated. New units and responsibilities included two companies assigned to the rapid-response requirements of the centrally located Mobile Group; five new territorial brigades; one additional brigade to assist the Sûreté's Judiciary Police; one parachute squadron to assist isolated communities and to be used in national emergencies; four depots for stockpiling arms, ammunition, and other equipment in strategic areas; and, for the first time, air and maritime units, which were charged with aiding in suppressing violations of the country's navigation laws. There were no indications that the gendarmerie had been expanded further since that time.

Officers in the gendarmerie, like those of the other branches

of the FAR, were graduates of the Royal Military Academy; the enlisted personnel were volunteers who had elected to serve five-year tours of duty. Officers received practical training appropriate for duties in the gendarmerie at the service's own postgraduate school in Marrakech. To meet the need for specialized training of its NCOs, the gendarmerie established a system of regional instruction centers; each region was thus in a position to train its personnel in accordance with its own individual needs. The Royal Gendarmerie School for Professional Training, which at one time had trained NCOs, concentrated on the training of young recruits and supervised further instruction at regional centers. Compared with service in the other military branches, the gendarmerie reportedly provided young officers greater opportunities for advancement and responsibility (and, some contended, corruption).

Intelligence Services

Two intelligence services existed in Morocco and operated, at least nominally, under the Ministry of Interior. The Office of Territorial Surveillance was established by *zahir* in January 1973. Known locally as the DST (for Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire), this service was formed during the period when the Sûreté was separated from the Ministry of Interior, and it was believed to be a domestic intelligence-gathering operation that reported to the minister of interior and the king. The DST's intelligence activities duplicated to a degree those of the Sûreté's Subdirectorate for Internal Security and had a budget of DH54 million in 1983.

The General Office of Research and Documentation, known locally as the DGED (for Direction Générale des Études et Documentation), was the most secretive of the Moroccan security services. It was believed to be concerned exclusively with national security affairs as opposed to matters involving crime or the maintenance of public order. For nearly a decade it had been headed by Dlimi, but at his death in 1983 the post of DGED director passed to Colonel Abd al Hak Kadiri. Although technically under the authority of the National Defense Council, the DGED director, who served as secretary general of the council, reported exclusively to the king.

Prisons

During the period of the protectorate, operation of the

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prison system was the responsibility of the police, but at independence this function was transferred to the Ministry of Justice. In the late 1970s the ministry's Department of Penitentiary Administration operated 34 prisons and correctional institutions. Among these establishments were central prisons in the main urban centers of Rabat, Meknès, Fès, Beni Mellal, Settat, Oujda, Marrakech, Casablanca, Kenitra, and Tagounit. Prison Ain Borja and Prison Civile in Casablanca and Prison Centrale in Kenitra were maximum security institutions; the remainder were medium security prisons. There was one correctional institution in Kenitra, to which convicted juveniles were usually committed. In addition Amnesty International in 1982 reported the existence of a prison in Tazmamert, where over 50 military prisoners accused of involvement in the coup plots of the early 1970s were being subjected to particularly harsh treatment.

People arrested on charges—or suspicion—of offense against the state or the monarchy or for acts deemed by the Judiciary Police to be threats to public security were initially held incommunicado in local detention centers (usually police stations). After one to two days in important cases, prisoners were normally transferred to central detention centers, usually in Rabat or Casablanca, for more systematic interrogation by the prosecutor and the Judiciary Police. According to Amnesty International, there have been numerous reports of "secret" detention centers in other cities, but the existence of these has not been confirmed. The period of incommunicado detention was by law supposed to last no more than 96 hours, unless the case involved state security, in which case the period could be doubled. In practice the incommunicado detention could be extended if consented to by the prosecutor, and Amnesty International has reported that often prisoners have been held incommunicado for more than a year. During this period, authorities were under no legal obligation to notify relatives of a prisoner's arrest and detention.

It was not clear from available sources what branch of the government was responsible for the care of the prisoners during the period of incommunicado detention. The report of a 1981 Amnesty International mission to Morocco stated that officials from the Ministry of Justice maintained that the Ministry of Interior was responsible during this period, whereas the Ministry of Interior insisted that responsibility lay with the Ministry of Justice and the prosecutor in particular. In the early 1980s most criticisms of the Moroccan penal system focused on the practice of incommunicado detention, and most accusations of police

brutality and torture were alleged to have occurred during the period of interrogation. If not released after the period of incommunicado detention, the prisoner was often transferred from a detention center to a prison and held under the authority of the trial judge while the trial was prepared.

Conditions in Moroccan prisons were believed to have improved greatly since the early 1970s, when the system was burdened with thousands of prisoners arrested in connection with the coup attempts, plots, and civil disturbances of that time. According to a 1977 Amnesty International report, the inadequate conditions within the central prisons were mainly the result of extreme overcrowding. Statistics published in Morocco in 1974 had indicated that these institutions were filled to five times their capacity. Subsequent transfers of large numbers of prisoners from police detention centers had reportedly resulted in the growth of the prison population to 10 times the ability of the institutions to accommodate it. Hygiene was termed poor because of minimal to inadequate sanitary facilities and the shortages of bedding and other basic equipment.

In protest against the poor prison conditions, inmates staged several hunger strikes in 1976-78 that drew some outside attention. Subsequent lessening of overcrowding and the results of an investigation into prison conditions ordered in 1980 by the prime minister and the minister of justice were believed to have altered conditions somewhat. The report on an Amnesty International mission to Morocco in 1981 indicated that conditions of Kenitra Central Prison had improved significantly and were considered "reasonably good" by Moroccan officials and prisoners alike. The organization indicated, however, that it had evidence that conditions at Laalou Prison in Rabat were "very uncomfortable," and it alleged for the first time the existence of the prison at Tazmamert for the convicted coup plotters.

Medical attention at the central prisons was provided largely by a small staff of doctors, dentists, and nurses, who were maintained on the staff or who visited the institutions on a regular basis. Prisoners requiring the treatment of a specialist or those who became seriously ill could be transferred to a prison hospital under special authorization of the prison director's office. Inmates of the central prisons were permitted visits from their lawyers and families, who were allowed to bring food to supplement a prison food ration that was reportedly low in quantity and nutritional quality. Prisoners were allowed to receive letters and books from friends or relatives outside the institutions, but inmates complained that this material was subject to censorship by prison authorities. Some

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students who had been imprisoned were permitted to continue their academic studies while serving their sentences.

* * *

A limited number of sources are available to the reader interested in researching Moroccan security concerns and the security forces. The Western Sahara war has been treated in numerous articles and books by British journalist Tony Hodges and American political scientist John Damis. *Conflict in Northwest Africa* by Damis is particularly comprehensive and objective. Bernard Exedit's "Western Sahara: Up Against the Wall," which appeared in the *African Defence Journal* and in its French-language counterpart, *Afrique Défense*, is also useful for its description of the construction of the berm and of the strategy defined by it.

More general Moroccan political and security issues are concisely covered in Richard B. Parker's cogent 1984 survey, *North Africa: Regional Tensions and Strategic Concerns*. Frequent articles by Paul Balta in *Le Monde* and reports in the newsweekly *Jeune Afrique* are also a consistent source of information and comment on a wide range of issues affecting Moroccan security. Earlier works by John Waterbury and William I. Zartman are also useful for their analysis of personalities and policies that have shaped the contemporary political and security situation. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

Appendix A

Table

- 1 Metric Conversion Coefficients
- 2 Urban and Rural Population by Province and Prefecture, 1982
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- 4 Gross Domestic Product and Gross National Product by Sector, Selected Years, 1978-83
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Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients

| When you know | Multiply by | To find |
|---|---------------------------|--------------------|
| Millimeters | 0.04 | inches |
| Centimeters | 0.39 | inches |
| Meters | 3.3 | feet |
| Kilometers | 0.62 | miles |
| Hectares (10,000 m ²) | 2.47 | acres |
| Square kilometers | 0.39 | square miles |
| Cubic meters | 35.3 | cubic feet |
| Liters | 0.26 | gallons |
| Kilograms | 2.2 | pounds |
| Metric tons | 0.98 | long tons |
| | 1.1 | short tons |
| | 2,204 | pounds |
| Degrees Celsius | 9 | degrees Fahrenheit |
| (Centigrade) | divide by 5 and add 32 | |

*Table 2. Urban and Rural Population by
Province and Prefecture, 1982*

| Province or Prefecture | Urban | Rural | Total |
|-----------------------------|---------|---------|-----------|
| Agadir | 245,860 | 333,881 | 579,741 |
| Al Hoceima | 59,490 | 251,808 | 311,298 |
| Azilal | 32,339 | 354,776 | 387,115 |
| Beni Mellal | 255,817 | 412,886 | 668,703 |
| Beni Slimane | 34,262 | 140,202 | 174,464 |
| Boujdour* | 3,597 | 4,884 | 8,481 |
| Boulemane | 12,493 | 118,977 | 131,470 |
| Chaouen | 26,499 | 282,525 | 309,024 |
| El Jadida | 150,037 | 613,314 | 763,351 |
| El Kalaa Srarkhna | 71,605 | 505,990 | 577,595 |
| Er Rachidia | 64,731 | 356,476 | 421,207 |
| Essaouira | 46,858 | 346,825 | 393,683 |
| Fès | 548,209 | 257,255 | 805,464 |
| Figuig | 36,452 | 64,907 | 101,359 |
| Guelmim | 42,886 | 85,790 | 128,676 |
| Ifrane | 44,547 | 55,708 | 100,255 |
| Kenitra | 294,370 | 421,597 | 715,967 |
| Khemisset | 115,135 | 290,701 | 405,836 |
| Khenifra | 130,862 | 232,854 | 363,716 |
| Khouribga | 241,457 | 195,545 | 437,002 |
| Laâyoune* | 96,784 | 16,627 | 113,411 |
| Marrakech | 482,605 | 784,090 | 1,266,695 |
| Meknès | 386,085 | 240,783 | 626,868 |
| Nador | 115,062 | 478,193 | 593,255 |
| Ouarzazate | 48,914 | 484,978 | 533,892 |
| Oued ed Dahab* | 17,822 | 3,674 | 21,496 |
| Oujda | 478,919 | 301,843 | 780,762 |
| Safi | 267,162 | 439,456 | 706,618 |
| Semara* | 17,753 | 2,727 | 20,480 |
| Settat | 143,956 | 548,403 | 692,359 |
| Sidi Kacem | 118,713 | 395,414 | 514,127 |
| Tangier | 312,227 | 124,000 | 436,227 |
| Tan-Tan | 41,451 | 5,589 | 47,040 |
| Taounate | 21,173 | 514,799 | 535,972 |
| Tarondant | 50,979 | 507,522 | 558,501 |

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Table 2. (Continued).

| Province or Prefecture | Urban | Rural | Total |
|----------------------------------|------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Tata | 3,142 | 96,808 | 99,950 |
| Taza | 108,260 | 505,225 | 613,485 |
| Tétouan | 364,725 | 339,480 | 704,205 |
| Tiznit | 40,650 | 272,490 | 313,140 |
| Casablanca prefectures | 2,263,469 | 173,195 | 2,436,664 |
| Rabat-Salé prefecture | 893,042 | 126,959 | 1,020,001 |
| TOTAL | 8,730,399 | 11,689,156 | 20,419,555 |

*Province established within Western Sahara by Morocco.

Source: Based on information from Morocco, Ministry of Planning, Directorate of Statistics, *Population légale du Maroc, d'après le recensement général de la population et de l'habitat de 1982*, Casablanca, May 1983, 31-40.

Table 3. Population Growth of Municipalities Having More Than 100,000 Inhabitants in 1982, Compared with 1971

| Municipality | 1971 | 1982 |
|-----------------------|-----------|-----------|
| Agadir | 61,192 | 110,479 |
| Fès | 325,327 | 448,823 |
| Kenitra | 139,206 | 188,194 |
| Khouribga | 73,667 | 127,181 |
| Marrakech | 332,741 | 439,728 |
| Meknès | 248,369 | 319,783 |
| Mohammedia | 70,392 | 105,120 |
| Oujda | 175,532 | 260,082 |
| Rabat | 367,620 | 518,616 |
| Safi | 129,113 | 197,309 |
| Salé | 155,557 | 289,391 |
| Tangier | 187,894 | 266,346 |
| Tétouan | 139,105 | 199,615 |
| Casablanca* | 1,506,373 | 2,139,204 |

*Comprises several municipal jurisdictions.

Sources: Based on information from, Morocco, Ministry of Planning, Directorate of Statistics, *Population légale du Maroc, d'après le recensement général de la population et de l'habitat de 1982*, Casablanca, May 1983, 41-42.

**Table 4. Gross Domestic Product and Gross National Product
by Sector, Selected Years, 1978-83**
(in millions of dirhams at current prices)¹

| Sector | 1978 | 1980 | 1981 | 1982 | 1983 ² |
|---|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|-------------------|
| Gross domestic product | | | | | |
| Agriculture, forestry, and fishing | 10,435 | 12,711 | 11,422 | 16,256 | 15,977 |
| Mining | 2,076 | 3,427 | 4,255 | 4,036 | 3,996 |
| Energy and water | 1,337 | 2,368 | 2,727 | 3,254 | 3,448 |
| Manufacturing | 9,367 | 12,010 | 13,416 | 14,570 | 15,954 |
| Building and public works | 4,507 | 4,841 | 5,364 | 6,597 | 6,802 |
| Transportation and telecommunications . . . | 2,470 | 3,121 | 3,429 | 3,982 | 4,478 |
| Other services | 7,560 | 9,730 | 11,192 | 12,658 | 13,730 |
| Trade | 11,263 | 13,357 | 14,974 | 17,196 | 17,709 |
| Public administration . . | <u>6,139</u> | <u>8,596</u> | <u>9,958</u> | <u>11,539</u> | <u>12,495</u> |
| Total Gross domestic product | 55,154 | 70,161 | 76,737 | 90,088 | 94,589 |
| Net external income | 1,375 | 1,424 | 451 | 1,249 | 859 |
| GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT | 56,529 | 71,585 | 77,188 | 91,337 | 95,448 |

¹For value of the dirham—see Glossary.
²Estimate.

Source: Based on information from Banque Marocaine du Commerce Extérieur, "The Moroccan Economy in Figures, 1982-1983," *Monthly Information Review*, Casablanca, No. 49, May-June, 1984, 5.

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*Table 5. Distribution of Economically Active Population
by Sector, 1977, 1980, and 1985
(in thousands)*

| Sector | 1977 | 1980 | 1985* |
|---|-------|-------|-------|
| Agriculture and fishing | 2,208 | 2,276 | 2,375 |
| Mining and energy | 1,104 | 86 | 108 |
| Industry | | 534 | 728 |
| Construction and public works | 883 | 307 | 524 |
| Commerce | | 974 | 1,310 |
| Administration | 221 | 420 | 495 |
| Unspecified | 0 | 178 | 203 |
| TOTAL | 4,416 | 4,775 | 5,743 |

* Estimate.

Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, *Quarterly Economic Review of Morocco*, London, 1984, 9.

Table 6. Central Government Budget, 1982-85
(in millions of dirhams)¹

| | 1982 | 1983 | 1984 | 1985 |
|---|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Current expenditures | | | | |
| King and personnel | 319.5 | 564.2 | 427.6 | 505.1 |
| Chamber of Representatives | 47.1 | 67.6 | 48.3 | 75.2 |
| Prime minister | 54.8 | 62.5 | 66.5 | 60.9 |
| Foreign affairs | 253.4 | 279.5 | 289.9 | 330.6 |
| Cooperation | 18.3 | 20.4 | 17.3 | 17.8 |
| Planning | 42.7 | 45.4 | 43.7 | 45.8 |
| Interior | 2,145.5 | 2,351.6 | 2,445.8 | 2,548.9 |
| Information, youth, and sports | 146.7 | 156.8 | 156.5 | 160.4 |
| Cultural affairs | 36.4 | 37.7 | 37.7 | 39.4 |
| Justice | 317.7 | 331.7 | 345.8 | 374.6 |
| Equipment and cadre training | 193.4 | 226.7 | 211.6 | 274.3 |
| Finance | 3,380.8 | 3,463.2 | 2,441.8 | 3,245.2 |
| Agriculture and agrarian reform | 796.3 | 788.7 | 725.6 | 749.4 |
| Islamic affairs | 14.7 | 17.4 | 18.1 | 27.4 |
| Labor and national training | 36.4 | 41.9 | 31.2 | 31.8 |
| Relations with Parliament | 1.6 | 1.8 | 1.6 | 1.6 |
| National education | 4,692.0 | 5,295.7 | 5,487.8 | 6,079.4 |
| Housing and land management | 38.4 | 59.1 | 62.8 | 64.5 |
| Handicrafts and social affairs | 33.7 | 31.5 | 59.9 | 89.0 |
| Transportation | 38.1 | 109.6 | 109.9 | 114.1 |
| Commerce, industry, and tourism | 79.9 | 85.8 | 85.2 | 85.1 |
| Ocean fisheries and merchant marine | 29.4 | 23.5 | 23.4 | 25.7 |
| Public health | 803.1 | 925.3 | 933.4 | 985.1 |
| Energy and mines | 39.8 | 45.7 | 47.5 | 50.3 |
| Secretary general of the government | 8.9 | 10.6 | 9.7 | 11.5 |
| National defense | 3,800.0 | 4,244.4 | 4,242.2 | 4,297.8 |
| Veterans | 9.0 | 11.1 | 10.9 | 11.2 |
| Posts and telecommunications | n.a. | n.a. | 6.6 | 6.0 |
| Other | 722.4 | 840.0 | 575.7 | 975.9 |
| Total current expenditures | 18,100.0 | 20,139.6 | 18,964.0 | 21,284.0 |
| Capital expenditures | | | | |
| King and personnel | n.a. | 117.7 | 120.0 | 130.0 |
| Prime minister | n.a. | 220.8 | 161.6 | 137.1 |
| Planning | n.a. | 172.6 | 131.5 | 41.3 |
| Administrative affairs | n.a. | 4.5 | 0.8 | 1.4 |
| Secretary general of the government | n.a. | 1.2 | 0.4 | 0.6 |
| Information | n.a. | 366.1 | 63.8 | 35.4 |
| Justice | n.a. | 70.7 | 31.4 | 14.0 |
| Foreign affairs | n.a. | 37.6 | 16.2 | 12.1 |
| Interior | n.a. | 291.6 | 378.2 | 535.2 |
| Housing and land management | 500.0 | 664.6 | 282.8 | 221.8 |
| Finance | 4,100.0 | 3,094.6 | 443.0 | 2,693.1 |

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Table 6. (Continued).

| | 1982 | 1983 | 1984 | 1985 |
|--|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Commerce, industry, and tourism . . . | n.a. | 150.4 | 81.0 | 89.6 |
| Ocean fisheries and merchant marine . . | n.a. | 42.2 | 10.7 | 11.5 |
| Energy and mines | 900.0 | 998.7 | 868.6 | 735.5 |
| Agriculture and agrarian reform | 1,900.0 | 2,293.7 | 1,416.3 | 1,592.0 |
| Equipment and cadre training | 3,500.0 | 4,039.4 | 2,780.9 | 2,831.5 |
| Transportation | 1,000.0 | 1,061.9 | 524.3 | 884.9 |
| Youth and sports | n.a. | n.a. | 53.1 | 10.8 |
| National education | 1,300.0 | 1,754.4 | n.a. | 1,153.0 |
| Handicrafts and social affairs | n.a. | 30.2 | 14.5 | 10.2 |
| Public health | 300.0 | 260.9 | 156.7 | 186.0 |
| Islamic affairs | n.a. | 5.0 | 1.0 | 0.2 |
| Cultural affairs | n.a. | 15.5 | 8.8 | 3.1 |
| National defense | n.a. | 2,768.7 | 587.0 | 947.6 |
| Veterans | n.a. | 5.9 | 1.9 | 0.9 |
| Labor and national training | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | 0.9 |
| Other | 3,306.0 | 245.0 | 2,020.3 | 0.0 |
| Total capital expenditures | 16,806.0 | 18,713.9 | 10,154.8 | 12,279.7 |
| Debt | | | | |
| Floating | n.a. | 1,200.0 | 1,750.0 | 1,901.1 |
| Redeemable | n.a. | 4,500.0 | 7,698.0 | 8,846.2 |
| Total debt | 4,450.0 | 5,700.0 | 9,448.0 | 10,747.3 |
| Total expenditures | 39,356.0 | 44,553.5 | 38,566.8 | 44,311.0 |
| Total revenues | 39,899.0 | 37,828.5 | 32,479.1 | 38,055.0 |
| Balance | -543.0 | -6,725.0 | -6,087.7 | -6,256.0 |

n.a.—not available.

*For value of the dirham—see Glossary.

*Figures may not add to total because of rounding. When the 1983 budget was revised, total current account was DH18,900 million, no further breakdown was available.

*When the 1984 budget was revised, total current account was DH19,266 million, no further breakdown was available.

*Includes youth and sports.

*When the 1983 budget was revised, total investment account was DH13,600 million, no further breakdown was available.

*When the 1983 budget was revised, total expenditures were DH39,100 million, no further breakdown was available.

*When the 1983 budget was revised, total revenues were DH33,100, no further breakdown was available.

Table 7. Balance of Payments, 1982 and 1983
(in millions of dirhams)¹

| | 1982 | 1983 |
|--|----------------|---------------|
| Current accounts | | |
| Trade balance | -10,674.5 | -8,836.5 |
| Services | -6,672.3 | -4,517.1 |
| Private remittances | 5,697.3 | 6,786.9 |
| Government transfers | 212.1 | 158.3 |
| Current account balance | -11,437.4 | -6,408.4 |
| Capital account | | |
| Private | | |
| Commercial credits | 900.2 | -564.9 |
| Loans and investments | 506.6 | 329.0 |
| Other | 543.6 | 26.6 |
| Total private | 1,950.4 | -209.3 |
| Public | | |
| Commercial credits | 1,222.1 | 2,569.7 |
| Loans (to be paid in foreign exchange) | 6,587.7 | 2,697.6 |
| Loans (to be paid in dirhams) | -33.9 | -51.1 |
| Other foreign liabilities | -5.4 | 34.4 |
| Total public | 7,770.5 | 5,250.6 |
| IMF facilities ² | 2,884.7 | 837.6 |
| Capital account balance | 12,605.6 | 5,878.9 |
| Balance of payments | 1,168.2 | -529.5 |

¹For value of the dirham—see Glossary.

²IMF—International Monetary Fund (see Glossary).

Source: Based on information from Banque Marocaine du Commerce Extérieur, "The Moroccan Economy in Figures, 1982-1983," *Monthly Information Review*, Casablanca, No. 49, May-June 1984, 20.

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Table 8. Production of Selected Commodities, 1982 and 1983
(in thousands of tons unless otherwise indicated)

| Commodity | 1982 ¹ | 1983 ² |
|---|-------------------|-------------------|
| Agricultural products | | |
| Wheat | 2,183 | 1,970 |
| Barley | 2,338 | 1,228 |
| Maize | 247 | 258 |
| Oats | 74 | 44 |
| Sorghum | 29 | 24 |
| Pulses | 222 | 285 |
| Sugar beets | 2,315 | 2,589 |
| Sugarcane | 510 | 735 |
| Cotton fibers | 20 | 24 |
| Citrus fruits | 1,002 | 958 |
| Grapes | 210 | 194 |
| Dates | 65 | 46 |
| Oilseeds | 397 | 462 |
| Potatoes | 539 | 572 |
| Tomatoes | 380 | 355 |
| Onions | 260 | 231 |
| Livestock (in thousands of head) | | |
| Cattle | 2,537 | 2,431 |
| Sheep | 10,155 | 12,611 |
| Goats | 4,091 | 4,911 |
| Fish | 361 | 439 |
| Mineral production | | |
| Phosphates | 17,092 | 19,845 |
| Anthracite | 735 | 751 |
| Barite | 537 | 275 |
| Iron | 224 | 252 |
| Lead | 148 | 145 |
| Manganese | 94 | 73 |

¹Figures for agricultural products are for fall of 1981 to spring of 1982.

²Figures for agricultural products are for fall of 1982 to spring of 1983.

Source: Based on information from Banque Marocaine du Commerce Extérieur, "The Moroccan Economy in figures, 1982-1983," *Monthly Information Review*, Casablanca, No. 49, May-June 1984, 8-10.

Table 9. Foreign Trade by Commodity, 1981-83
(in millions of dirhams)*

| Commodity | 1981 | 1982 | 1983 |
|--------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|
| Exports | | | |
| Phosphate | 3,827 | 3,445 | 3,331 |
| Phosphoric acid | 1,342 | 1,586 | 2,127 |
| Citrus fruits | 1,072 | 1,086 | 1,102 |
| Canned fish | 465 | 400 | 498 |
| Clothing | 420 | 549 | 683 |
| Carpets | 302 | 294 | 374 |
| Fertilizers | 288 | 467 | 920 |
| Tomatoes | 228 | 197 | 233 |
| Preserved vegetables | 226 | 255 | 328 |
| Lead ore | 208 | 120 | 154 |
| Hosiery | 156 | 193 | 239 |
| Unwrought lead | 145 | 176 | 161 |
| Paper pulp | 125 | 101 | 124 |
| Shoes | 103 | 168 | 194 |
| Cobalt | 92 | 57 | 6 |
| Imports | | | |
| Crude oil | 5,624 | 6,592 | 6,330 |
| Wheat | 2,044 | 1,444 | 1,834 |
| Sugar | 1,054 | 519 | 413 |
| Chemicals | 610 | 750 | 866 |
| Sulfur | 589 | 829 | 1,043 |
| Iron and steel bars | 588 | 763 | 688 |
| Machinery | 581 | 717 | 688 |
| Vegetable oils | 508 | 567 | 563 |
| Lumber | 470 | 537 | 435 |
| Sheet steel | 386 | 466 | 459 |
| Commercial vehicles | 347 | 343 | 292 |
| Plastics | 281 | 369 | 400 |
| Fertilizers | 253 | 327 | 274 |
| Paper and cardboard | 232 | 261 | 281 |
| Synthetic fibers | 241 | 273 | 272 |
| Automobiles | 201 | 293 | 309 |

*For value of the dirham—see Glossary.

Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, *Quarterly Economic Review of Morocco*, London, 1984, 24; and Banque Marocaine du Commerce Extérieur, "The Moroccan Economy in Figures, 1982-1983," *Monthly Information Review*, Casablanca, No. 49, May-June 1984, 17.

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Table 10. Foreign Trade by Country, 1983

| Country | Value* |
|-------------------------|-----------|
| Exports | |
| France | 3,387,560 |
| West Germany | 1,129,387 |
| Spain | 1,047,781 |
| Italy | 902,005 |
| India | 818,348 |
| Netherlands | 773,721 |
| Belgium | 638,043 |
| Turkey | 619,604 |
| Britain | 604,888 |
| Japan | 493,793 |
| Indonesia | 377,368 |
| Saudi Arabia | 298,135 |
| China | 292,664 |
| Imports | |
| France | 5,136,478 |
| Saudi Arabia | 3,658,214 |
| United States | 2,488,359 |
| Spain | 1,873,574 |
| Soviet Union | 1,399,872 |
| West Germany | 1,233,879 |
| Italy | 1,232,470 |
| Iraq | 1,155,915 |
| Britain | 958,184 |
| Belgium | 505,032 |
| Netherlands | 497,383 |
| Japan | 429,930 |
| Canada | 369,998 |

*In thousands of dirhams; for value of the dirham—see Glossary.

Source: Based on information from Banque Marocaine du Commerce Extérieur, "The Moroccan Economy in Figures, 1982-1983," *Monthly Information Review*, Casablanca, No. 49, May-June 1984, 24.

Table 11. Council of Ministers, 1985

| Position | Name and Party | Previous Positions |
|---|---------------------------------------|--|
| Prime Minister | Mohamed Karim Lamrani (independent) | Prime minister since 1983; previously prime minister, 1971 and 1972; director general of Sharifian Office of Phosphates. |
| Minister of State | Mohamed Bahmini (independent) | Various ministerial posts. |
| Minister of State | Moulay Ahmed Alaoui (RNI) | Various ministerial posts; newspaper publisher. |
| <i>Ministers:</i> | | |
| Agriculture and Agrarian Reform | Othman Demnati (independent) | Minister since 1981. |
| Commerce and Industry | Tahar Masmoudi (UC) ^a | President, provincial assembly of El Jadida. |
| Cultural Affairs | Mohamed Benaissa (RNI) | United Nations and Food and Agriculture Organization. |
| Energy and Mines | Mohamed Fettaï (UC) | n.a. |
| Equipment and Vocational and Cadre Training | Mohamed Kabbaj (independent) | Named minister of equipment in 1982. |
| Finance | Abdellatif Jouahri (independent) | Minister since 1982. |
| Foreign Affairs, Cooperation, and Information | Abdellatif Filali (independent) | Ambassador at London; named minister of information in 1983. |
| Housing | Abderrahmane Boufettass (independent) | n.a. |
| Interior | Driss Basri (independent) | Minister since 1979. |

Table 11. (Continued).

| Position | Name and Party | Previous Positions |
|---|---|--|
| Justice | Moulay Mustapha Balarbi Alaoui (independent) | Governor of Casablanca 1971-77; minister since 1981. |
| Labor | Hassan Abbadi (RNI) | President of Temara municipal council; Chamber of Representatives since 1977. Minister since 1977. |
| National Education | Azzedine Laraki (independent) | Minister since 1981. |
| Ocean Fisheries and Merchant Marine | Bensalem Smili (independent) | Minister since 1981. |
| Posts and Telecommunications | Mohand Laensar (MP) ^b | Various economic ministries. |
| Public Health | Taieb Bencheikh (RNI) | Professor of religious affairs at Rabat and Fès. |
| Religious Endowments and Islamic Affairs | Abdelkebir Alaoui Mdaghri (independent) | Named minister of energy in 1977. |
| Tourism | Moussa Saadi (PND)* | Elected to Chamber of Representatives in 1977. |
| Traditional Industry and Social Affairs | Mohamed Labied (UC) | Named minister of labor in 1977. Minister since 1981. |
| Transportation | Mohamed Bouamoud (RNI) | |
| Youth and Sports | Abdellatif Semlali (UC) | |
| Minister Delegates Attached to Prime Minister's Office for: Relations with European Community | Azzedine Guessous (independent) | Named minister of commerce and industry in 1979. |

Table 11. (Continued).

| Position | Name and Party | Previous Positions |
|-------------------------------------|----------------------------------|--|
| Economic Affairs | Moulay Zine Zahidi (independent) | Named minister of labor in 1983. |
| Development of Saharan Provinces | Khali Hanna Ould Rachid (PND) | Secretary of state for Saharan affairs since 1979. |
| Planning | Rachidi Ghazouani (independent) | Official at Ministry of Interior. |
| Relations with Parliament | Tahar Afifi (UC) | n.a. |
| Administrative Affairs | Abderrakim Ben Abdeljalil (UC) | Elected deputy from Casablanca, 1984. |
| Secretary General of the Government | Abbes el Kaissi (independent) | Secretary general since 1977. |

n.a. — not available.

*Rassemblement National des Indépendants (National Rally of Independents).

*Union Constitutionnelle (Constitutional Union).

*Mouvement Populaire (Popular Movement).

*Parti National Démocratique (National Democratic Party).

Table 12. Results of Legislative Elections, 1977 and 1984

| Party or Labor Federation | 1977 | | | 1984 | | |
|---|------------|-----------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| | Direct | Indirect | Total | Direct | Indirect | Total |
| Independents | 81 | 60 | 141 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Constitutional Union (UC) ¹ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 56 | 27 | 83 |
| National Rally of Independents (RNI) ² | 0 | 0 | 0 | 39 | 22 | 61 |
| Popular Movement (MP) | 29 | 15 | 44 | 31 | 16 | 47 |
| Istiqlal | 45 | 4 | 49 | 24 | 17 | 41 |
| Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP) | 16 | 0 | 16 | 35 | 1 | 36 |
| National Democratic Party (PND) ³ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 15 | 9 | 24 |
| Moroccan Labor Union (UMT) ⁴ | 0 | 6 | 6 | 0 | 5 | 5 |
| Democratic Confederation of Labor (CDT) ⁵ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 3 |
| General Union of Moroccan Workers (UGTM) ⁶ | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| Party of Progress and Socialism (PPS) | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 2 |
| Organization of People's Democratic Action (OADP) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Other | 4 | 2 | 6 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| TOTAL | 176 | 88 | 264 | 204 | 102 | 306 |

¹Formed in 1983.²Formed in 1978 among independents³Split from National Rally of Independents in 1981.⁴Affiliated with National Union of Popular Forces.⁵Affiliated with Socialist Union of Popular Forces.⁶Affiliated with the Istiqlal.

Appendix A

Table 13. Selected Daily Newspapers, 1984

| Name | Language | Circulation (1983) | Sponsorship or Orientation |
|---|----------------|-----------------------|--------------------------------------|
| Casablanca | | | |
| <i>Al Bayane</i> | French, Arabic | 5,000 | Party of Progress and Socialism |
| <i>Al Ittihad al Ichtiraki</i> | Arabic | n.a. | Socialist Union of Popular Forces |
| <i>Maroc Soir</i> | French | 35,000 | Monarchist |
| <i>Le Matin du Sahara</i> . | -do- | 70,000 | -do- |
| <i>Le Message de la Nation</i> (weekly) . . . | -do- | n.a. | Constitutional Union |
| <i>Rissalat al Oumma</i> . . | Arabic | n.a. | -do- |
| Rabat | | | |
| <i>Al Alam</i> | -do- | 50,000 | Istiqlal |
| <i>Al Anbaa</i> | -do- | 15,000 | Government information agency |
| <i>Al Maghrib</i> | French | 30,000 | National Rally of Independents |
| <i>Al Mithaq al Watani</i> . | Arabic | 15,000 | -do- |
| <i>L'Opinion</i> | French | 35,000 | Istiqlal |

n.a. —not available.

Source: Based on information from *The Middle East and North Africa, 1984-85*. London, 1984, 575-76.

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Table 14. Major Army Weapons, 1984

| Category | Estimated Number in Inventory | Country of Manufacture |
|---|----------------------------------|---------------------------|
| Armored fighting vehicles | | |
| M-48 main battle tank, equipped with 105mm gun | 120 | United States |
| T-54/-55 main battle tank, equipped with 100mm gun | 15 | Soviet Union |
| AMX-13 light tank | 40 | France |
| EBR-75 armored reconnaissance vehicle, equipped with 75mm gun | 50 | -do- |
| AMX-10RC armored reconnaissance vehicle, equipped with 105mm gun | 90 | -do- |
| AML-90 light armored car, equipped with 90mm gun | 162 | -do- |
| Eland armored car | 250 | -do- |
| AML-245 light armored car | 150 | -do- |
| M-8 light armored car | 40 | United States |
| M-113 armored personnel carrier (APC) | 364 | -do- |
| VAB APC | 200 | France |
| UR-416 APC | 70 | West Germany |
| Ratel APC | 80 | South Africa |
| M-3 half-track APC | 56 | United States |
| Steyr 4K-7FA APC | n.a. | Austria |
| Artillery | | |
| AMX F-3 self-propelled 155mm gun | 52 | France |
| M-114 155mm gun, towed | 20 | United States |
| M-109 155mm self-propelled howitzer | 56 | -do- |
| 152mm gun | n.a. | Soviet Union |
| M-46 130mm gun | 12 | -do- |
| 105mm light gun | 36 | n.a. |
| M-101 105mm howitzer | 20 | United States |
| M-1950 howitzer | 42 | n.a. |
| 105mm self-propelled howitzer | 22 | United States |
| BM-21 122mm multiple rocket launcher | n.a. | Soviet Union |
| 120mm mortar | 320 | n.a. |
| 82mm mortar | 70 | n.a. |
| 81mm mortar | 600 | n.a. |
| 60mm mortar | 300 | n.a. |
| Antitank weapons | | |
| M-56 90mm gun | 20 | United States |
| Kuerassier 105mm self-propelled gun | 121 | Austria |
| 106mm recoilless launcher | n.a. | n.a. |
| 75mm recoilless launcher | n.a. | n.a. |
| Dragon antitank guided weapon (ATGW) | n.a. | United States |

Appendix A

Table 14. (Continued).

| Category | Estimated Number in Inventory | Country of Manufacture |
|--|----------------------------------|----------------------------|
| Milan ATCW | n.a. | France and West Germany |
| TOW ATCW | n.a. | United States |
| Air defense weapons | | |
| 100mm gun, towed | | Soviet Union |
| 57mm gun, towed | 100 | -do- |
| 37mm gun, towed | | -do- |
| 20mm gun, towed | | n.a. |
| M-163 Vulcan self-propelled 20mm gun | 40 | United States |
| SA-7 surface-to-air missile (SAM), man-portable | n.a. | n.a. (Soviet design) |
| Chaparral SAM | 30 | United States |

n.a. —not available.

Source: Based on information from *The Military Balance, 1984-1985*, London, 1984, 67.

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Table 15. Major Air Force Weapons

| Category | Estimated Number in Inventory | Country of Manufacture |
|---|----------------------------------|---------------------------|
| Fighter-bombers | | |
| Mirage F1-C | 18 | France |
| Mirage F1-E | 22 | -do- |
| F-5E/F-5F Tiger II | 18 | United States |
| F-5A/F-5B Freedom Fighter | 8 | -do- |
| RF-5A Freedom Fighter (reconnaissance capable) | 12 | -do- |
| Light attack aircraft | | |
| Magister | 22 | France |
| OV-10 Bronco | 6 | United States |
| Transports | | |
| C-130H Hercules | 12 | -do- |
| KC-130H Hercules (tanker) | 3 | -do- |
| Gulfstream | 1 | -do- |
| Falcon 50 | 1 | -do- |
| King Air | 8 | -do- |
| Do-28D | 3 | West Germany |
| Helicopters | | |
| AB-205A | 33 | Italy |
| AB-206 | 3 | -do- |
| AB-212 | 13 | -do- |
| Puma | 27 | France |
| Gazelle | 24 | -do- |
| CH-47C | 8 | United States |
| Trainers | | |
| T-34C | 11 | -do- |
| SF-260M | 28 | Italy |
| Alpha Jet | 24 | France |

Source: Based on information from *The Military Balance, 1984-1985*, London, 1984, 67.

Table 16. Major Navy Weapons, 1984

| Category | Number in Inventory | Country of Manufacture | Date Built |
|---|---------------------|------------------------|------------|
| Frigate | | | |
| Descubierta-class, armed with Exocet surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs), Aspide surface-to-air missiles (SAMS), 76mm gun, and two 40mm guns | 1 | Spain | 1985 |
| Light forces | | | |
| PR 72 type fast attack craft (FAC), armed with 76mm gun and 40mm gun | 2 | France | 1976-77 |
| Lazaga-class FAC armed with Exocet SSM, 76mm gun, 40mm gun, and two 20mm guns | 4 | Spain | 1981-82 |
| Sirius-class large patrol craft (LPC), armed with 40mm gun, and 20mm gun | 1 | France | 1956 |
| LPC armed with 76mm gun and two 40mm guns | 1 | -do- | 1964 |
| LPC armed with two 40mm guns | 1 | -do- | 1967 |
| VC type LPC armed with two 20mm guns | 1 | -do- | 1957 |
| P-32 type coastal patrol craft (CPC) armed with two 20mm guns | 6 | -do- | 1975-76 |
| Arcor 31 type | 3 | -do- | n.a. |
| Amphibious forces | | | |
| Batral type landing ship | 3 | -do- | 1977-78 |

n.a.—not available.

Source: Based on information from *Jane's Fighting Ships, 1984-85*, New York, 1984, 67.

GOVERNMENT JURISDICTION IN THE WESTERN SAHARA

Administrative authority over the Western Sahara is asserted by both Morocco and the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), which was proclaimed a government-in-exile in 1976 by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Río de Oro (Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el Hamra y Río de Oro—Polisario). Morocco has established four provinces in the territory as well as other bodies conforming to the local governmental structures in Morocco proper, including elected communal councils and provincial assemblies. The administrative machinery of the SADR is largely on paper; existing organization is confined to the refugee camps outside the borders of the Western Sahara.

Moroccan Administrative Units

After the occupation of the Western Sahara in 1975, Morocco assumed administration of an area that was divided into the three provinces of Laâyoune, Semara, and Boujdour. When Mauritania renounced its claims in the south in 1979, the fourth province of Oued ed Dahab (formerly Tiris al Gharbia) was organized. Native Saharawi governors of the provinces were appointed by King Hassan II. Ten seats in the Moroccan parliament were allotted to representatives from the Western Sahara territory.

Communal, provincial, and parliamentary elections were held in the Moroccan-controlled portion of the Western Sahara in 1977 and again in 1983–84. A Consultative Council on the Sahara of 80 members was elected in 1981. Personnel from several ministries in Rabat were assigned to work in Moroccan-occupied areas, as well as pashas and *qaid*s to administer cities and towns; other civil servants and most village officials were native Saharawis. Large-scale development was initiated, concentrating on schools, hospitals, housing, and water supplies in built-up areas. The objective was to gain the allegiance of the Saharawi population by demonstrating the benefits of Moroccan rule and to underscore Morocco's ability to administer and control the disputed territory.

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The Polisario

Founded in 1973 as an embryonic movement for the liberation of the Spanish Sahara, the Polisario has as its highest decisionmaking body a Congress of 500 members, which in principle meets every two years. The Congress elects a seven-member Executive Committee and a subordinate 25-member Political Bureau. The Executive Committee is headed by the secretary general of the Polisario, who is also head of state. Mohammed Abdelaziz has held this position since 1976.

The Polisario is regarded as a mass movement to which all adult Saharawis belong. The party organization is confined to the refugee camps run by the Polisario and is organized into 11-member cells. Although the refugee camps are inhabited mainly by women, children, and men over military age, political indoctrination aimed at imparting a national consciousness for the Western Sahara is said to be pervasive.

The Saharan Arab Democratic Republic

In a practical sense, the SADR is synonymous with the Polisario, which timed its announcement of the creation of a formal government on February 27, 1976, to correspond with Spain's official withdrawal from the Western Sahara the previous day. An abbreviated constitution of 31 articles was adopted, declaring that the new SADR was part of the Arab nation, the African family, and the people of the Third World. Islam was designated the state religion. Among the SADR's objectives were the achievement of socialism and the application of social justice. Freedom of expression was guaranteed "within the limits of the law and the interests of the people." Natural resources were declared to belong to the people, but private property was protected as long as it did not lead to exploitation.

The constitution prescribes that the supreme executive body of the SADR is the Council for the Command of the Revolution. The Executive Committee of the Polisario, however, will fulfill the functions of the council for the duration of the war. A nine-member Council of Ministers consists of a prime minister, various other ministers, and secretaries general of ministries. Since 1982 the prime minister has been Mahfoud Ali Beiba, a member of the Executive Committee. The Saharawi National Council, a parliamentary-style body, includes, ex officio, the 21 members of the Polisario Political Bureau, the remaining 20 members being elected by people's base committees in the refugee camps.

Eventually the SADR will be divided into three *wilayaat* (sing., *wilaya*), or provinces, each to be administered by a *wilaya* People's Council headed by a *wali* (governor). The councils will be composed of officials heading lower administrative units called *daïraat* (sing., *daïra*), or communes, whose members are to be elected by the people's base committees. Pending establishment of the SADR in the territory of the Western Sahara, this structure is found only in the refugee camps.

The Polisario movement shares with existing African Marxist states a number of principles, as set out in its constitution and in statements by its leaders. The absence of any real distinction between the governing arm (the SADR) and the single party (Polisario) is a further similarity. Some observers give little weight to the leftist ideological slant, which they note has scarcely any relevance to the actual state of development in the Western Sahara and is alien to the traditions of the Saharawi people. To a large extent the Polisario's leaders may have been motivated by the desire to please their Algerian and Libyan benefactors. The senior figures of the SADR have been depicted by these observers as inexperienced yet pragmatic individuals for whom any ideological labels may be premature at a time when they are engaged in a precarious military struggle.

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Glossary

- amir al muminin*—Commander of the faithful. Traditional and constitutional title of the king of Morocco in his role as religious head of Moroccan society.
- bakshish*—Gratuity or tip offered in exchange for a favor or service in many countries of the Middle East and North Africa. Derived from the old Persian word *bakhshidan* (to give), the term is often translated by foreigners as bribe; indigenous people of areas where the practice is common, however, do not regard it in this connotation.
- baraka*—The quality of special blessedness or grace characterizing a marabout (*q.v.*) or other divinely favored individuals in North African Islam; also, the charisma bestowed on some of the *shurfa* (*q.v.*), endowing them with a special capacity to rule.
- bidonville*—Literally, tin can town. A suburban slum consisting of shanties built of scrap materials, occupied largely by urban migrants.
- bilad al makhzan*—Arabic expression meaning "land of the central government," referring to those areas of preindependence Morocco where central government control was firmly established; may be seen in transliteration as *bled el makhzen* and similar variations.
- bilad al siba*—Arabic expression translated as "land of dissidence" or "land of insolence," referring to those areas of preindependence Morocco where central government control was not fully or consistently in effect; also seen in transliteration as *bled as siba* and similar variations.
- caliph*—Spiritual and temporal head of Islam in succession to the Prophet Muhammad.
- cercle*—An administrative unit comprising several *qaidats* (*q.v.*); several *cercles* are grouped together to form a province.
- dirham* (DH)—Moroccan unit of currency; divided into 100 centimes. A floating currency, the average exchange rate was DH6.26 to US\$1, in late 1982, DH8.06 to US\$1, in late 1983, DH9 to US\$1, in late 1984, and DH9.5 to US\$1 in early 1985.
- fellah* (pl., *fellahin*)—A small landowner in Arabic-speaking areas.
- fiscal year* (FY)—Same as calendar year.
- gross domestic product* (GDP)—The total value of goods and services produced within a country's borders during a fixed

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period, usually one year. Obtained by adding the value contributed by each sector of the economy in the form of compensation of employees, profits, and depreciation (consumption of capital). Subsistence production is included and consists of the imputed value of production by the farm family for its own use and the imputed rental value of owner-occupied dwellings.

gross national product (GNP)—GDP (*q.v.*) plus the income received from abroad by residents, less payments remitted abroad to nonresidents.

habus—Islamic religious endowments. Occurs also in Islamic countries as *waqf*. Sometimes seen as *habous*.

hadith—Literally, the right path; tradition based on the precedent of the words and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad that serve as one of the sources of Islamic law.

imam—In general, an Islamic leader who is a recognized authority on Islamic theology and law; also the prayer leader of a mosque. Specifically in Morocco the term refers to the king as religious head of the society under his title commander of the faithful. See *amir al muminin*.

International Monetary Fund (IMF)—Established along with the World Bank (*q.v.*) in 1945, the IMF is a specialized agency affiliated with the United Nations and is responsible for stabilizing international exchange rates and payments. The main business of the IMF is the provision of loans to its members (including industrialized and developing countries) when they experience balance of payments difficulties. These loans frequently carry conditions that require substantial internal economic adjustments by the recipients, most of which are developing countries.

jamaa—An annually selected council of local tribal leaders. Also seen as *jema'*, *jemaa*, and similar transliterations.

jaysh—Term applied originally to several Hilalian Arab tribes that were granted tax-exempt land tenure in return for military service. Also seen as *guich*.

jihad—According to Islamic doctrine, the permanent struggle for the triumph of the word of God on earth. This additional general duty of all Muslims has often been translated simply as holy war, but modern Muslims see it in a broader context of civic and personal action.

khalifa—A deputy to the pasha (*q.v.*) who oversees municipal districts or wards; in the Spanish zone of the protectorate the governor-representative or vice regent of the Moroccan sultan.

- lois cadres*—Framework laws or general guidelines passed by a legislature, which leave the details to the executive branch of government.
- Maghrib*—The western Islamic world (northwest Africa); distinguished from the *Mashriq* (*q.v.*), or eastern Islamic world (the Middle East). Literally, "the time or place of the sunset—the west." For its Arab conquerors, the region was the "island of the west" (*jazirat al maghrib*, the land between the "sea of sand" (The Sahara) and the Mediterranean Sea. Traditionally includes Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Tripolitania (*q.v.*); more recently some sources have treated Mauritania as part of the region. Also transliterated as *Maghreb*.
- makhzan*—Central government (literally, treasury).
- mandub*—Representative of the sultan. Specifically, the sultan's representative in the international zone (Tangier) during the protectorate.
- marabout*—In North Africa an Islamic holy man, often a Sufi mystic, teaching at local rural levels and thought to be touched by a special divine blessing; usually not a member of the *ulama* (*q.v.*). Transliteration of Arabic *murabit*; literally, a person of the *ribat*, a fortified camp occupied in some instance by a religious community. Understood figuratively as one who had made a religious retreat or experienced a religious conversion at a *ribat*. The plural form (*al murabitun*) is also the source of the transliteration *Almoravids* ("people of the *ribat*") a dynasty that ruled Morocco in the eleventh and twelfth centuries.
- Mashriq*—Eastern Islamic world, as distinct from the *Maghrib* (*q.v.*). Also transliterated as *Machrek*.
- Mauretania*—Classical name for ancient Berber kingdom in northwest Africa and Roman provinces that succeeded it. Cited in some sources as Mauritania but not to be confused with modern Islamic Republic of Mauritania.
- medina*—Literally, the city; traditional Muslim quarter of an urban center, contrasted with the *villes nouvelles* (*q.v.*) constructed during the French protectorate.
- mellah*—The traditional Jewish residential quarter in towns or cities. Also transliterated as *mallah*.
- mulay*—Literally, lord. In Morocco a prenominal title for a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad in the male line, that is, an agnatic sharif (*q.v.*). Also seen as *moulay*, *mawlay*, and similar variant transliterations.
- muqaddam*—The headman of a small village.

oued—French transliteration of Arabic word for stream or river.

Standard English transliteration is *wadi*.

pasha—In modern Morocco a civil servant in a town or city who holds a position much like that of a mayor. The position is equivalent to that of *qaid* (*q.v.*) in rural communes. Traditionally the position was that of an urban governor, with powers exceeding those of a contemporary mayor.

Polisario (Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el Hamra y Río de Oro)—Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Río de Oro. The leading independence group of the Western Sahara (*q.v.*).

qadi—Religious judge who interprets and administers sharia (*q.v.*). Also seen as *cadi*.

qaid—In modern Morocco the official who heads the local government structure in a rural commune; formerly a tribal chief and representative of the sultan having broader judicial powers than the postindependence *qaid*. Primary historical function was that of collecting taxes. Also seen as *caid*.

quaidat—An administrative unit. Several are grouped together to form a *cercle* (*q.v.*). Also seen as *caidat*.

Quran—Islamic scriptures believed by Muslims to be God's (Allah's) revelation to Muhammad. Derived from the Arabic verb *qaraa*, "to read." Commonly written as Koran.

shahadah—Islamic statement of belief: "There is no god but God (Allah), and Muhammad is his Prophet."

sharia—The traditional code of Islamic law, both civil and criminal, based in part on the Quran (*q.v.*). Also drawn from the *hadith* (*q.v.*), consensus of Islamic belief (*ijma*, i.e., the faith as it is believed by the faithful at any given time), and *qiyas* (analogy, an elaboration on the intent of law).

sharif (pl., *shurfa* or *ashraf*)—In strict usage a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad through his daughter, Fatima; broadly, any noble. Used as a title. Adjective is *sharifian*.

shaykh—A minor civil servant ranking below the *khalifa* (*q.v.*); a deputy to the *qaid* (*q.v.*) in rural communes. Traditionally a tribal leader. Also seen as *sheikh*.

Shia—The smaller of the two great divisions of Islam (literally, "party"). Adherents are referred to as Shias (also seen as Shiites). According to Shias, the Quran (*q.v.*) is not a closed body of revelation but is open to further elaboration by inspired imams (*q.v.*).

shurfa—See *sharif*.

souk—A Moroccan market; also seen as *suq*.

sultan—Title of the Moroccan rulers until 1957, when the title

- became king.
- sunna*—Body of Islamic customs and practice based on the Prophet's words and deeds.
- Sunni—The larger of the two great divisions of Islam. Sunnis consider themselves the orthodox adherents of the *sunna* (*q.v.*).
- Tripolitania—Most populous of Libya's three historic regions, situated in the northwestern part of the country. Name derived from Tripolis (Three Cities).
- ulama (sing., *alim*)—The highest body of religious scholars learned in Muslim theology, philosophy, law, and Quranic studies; it elaborated and interpreted sharia (*q.v.*) and traditionally approved the nomination of a new sultan. Derived from Arabic verb *alama*, "to know."
- ville nouvelle*—Literally, new town; the modern quarter of a city constructed during the French protectorate, contrasted with the *medina* (*q.v.*).
- vizier—Minister in the sultan's cabinet. The grand vizier was equivalent to prime minister. Also seen as *wazir*.
- Western Sahara—Formerly Spanish Sahara. In 1976 Spain relinquished control of the territory to Morocco and Mauritania. In 1979 Mauritania abandoned its claim to the southern section, and Morocco has subsequently claimed the entire territory.
- World Bank—Informal name used to designate a group of three affiliated international institutions: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Development Association (IDA), and the International Finance Corporation (IFC). The IBRD, established in 1945, has the primary purpose of providing loans to developing countries for productive projects. The IDA, a legally separate loan fund but administered by the staff of the IBRD, was set up in 1960 to furnish credits to the poorest developing countries on much easier terms than those of conventional IBRD loans. The IFC, founded in 1956, supplements the activities of the IBRD through loans and assistance designed specifically to encourage the growth of productive private enterprises in the less developed countries. The president and certain senior officers of the IBRD hold the same positions in the IFC. The three institutions are owned by the governments of the countries that subscribe their capital. To participate in the World Bank group, member states must first belong to the International Monetary Fund (IMF—*q.v.*).
- zahir*—A decree issued by the monarch.

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